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IMPLEMENTING PEACE SETTLEMENTS 
MULTIPLE MOTIVATIONS, FACTIONALISM AND IMPLEMENTATION DESIGN
Abstract
This research seeks to explain the obstacles to the implementation of peace settlements 
and to the consolidation of more co-operative and stable political systems m the 
aftermath of civil conflicts Peace processes are explored through comparative 
observation and the theoretical modelling of strategic interactions in the immediate 
post-settlement implementation process The study develops the argument that m the 
factionalism that characterises parties to a civil conflict, and m the multiple motivations 
that drive individual and group members to support these factions, he the explanations 
for successful, stalled or unravelled implementation processes It further considers the 
proposal that the design of the implementation process, and the political economy at the 
regional and international level, will have a determining effect on the outcome o f  
implementation to the extent that they impact on the intra-party struggle between 
factions In developing this argument a new model o f implementation - the ‘mtra- 
formation factionalism' or IFF model - is proposed The plausibility o f the ‘mtra- 
formation factionalism5 model and its predictions on the design of the implementation 
process are empirically explored by the application of a number o f hypotheses to a data­
set o f 25 post-settlement civil conflicts This is supported by a further analysis o f three 
in-depth case studies m which the institutional procedures that appear to facilitate the 
successful implementation of negotiated peace settlements are highlighted
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INTRODUCTION
Civil conflict is currently the most pervasive and protracted form of violent conflict in 
the international system But empirical data shows that despite their apparent 
‘intractability’ civil conflicts do come to an end And while the majority of civil 
conflicts have ended with the military victory of one party over the other (Lickhder, 
1998 121), negotiated settlements have brought some conflicts to an end
The process through which violent civil conflict may be de-escalated, or brought to a 
durable end through negotiations, is the subject of this study More specifically, it seeks 
to increase understanding of the process through which negotiated settlements are 
implemented, and to uncover the factors that facilitate and present barriers to full 
implementation It thereby seeks to explain why some negotiation processes are 
ultimately successful and why others fail or become stalled
The study explores the argument that m the factionalism that characterises parties to a 
civil conflict, and m the multiple motivations that dnve individual and group members 
to support these factions, may lie the explanations for successful, stalled or unravelled 
implementation processes It further considers the proposal that the design of the 
implementation process and the political economy at the regional and international level 
will have a determining effect on the outcome of implementation to the extent that they 
impact on the ultra-party struggle between factions
In addressing the implementation of negotiated settlements, the study will contribute to 
the development of the conflict resolution literature on de-escalation More specifically, 
it will contnbute to the de-escalation literature that seeks to explain the process of 
bringing civil conflict to an end through a negotiation process Efforts to reach 
negotiated settlements have increasingly characterised de-escalation processes m civil 
wars across the international political system (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1997) 
However, while the number of successfully negotiated settlements has increased since 
the end of the 1980s, this success does not appear to automatically imply that successful 
outcomes to implementation follow In fact, m case after case, where former enemies to 
civil wars agree to compromise, to share power, to establish new political systems, to 
demobilise armies, and most importantly to stop fighting, the celebrated peace 
settlement is not fully implemented or it unravels, and there is a return to violence at a
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future date Even those agreements that are eventually implemented tend to face long, 
conflict-ridden implementation processes For example, m May 1991 following sixteen 
years of civil war, the UNIT A insurgency1 and the MPLA2 government o f Angola 
piomised to demobilise their armies, to establish a joint army and to replace military 
with political competition m a democratic system Eighteen months later, after an 
implementation process characterised by persistent stalling by both parties, they were 
engulfed m renewed civil war with unprecedented intensity The current violence 
between Israel and the Palestinians was not imagined m 1993, when Yitzik Rabin and 
Yassar Arafat shook hands, established an accord on the principles governing the 
relationship between Palestinians and Israelis, and vowed to bnng peace to the Middle 
East The parties to the Lebanese civil war have since 1990 existed m a society free 
from violence, but m which many of the commitments o f the 1989 Taif Accords have 
been permanently stalled or frozen In El Salvador, Nicaragua and Mali, it took at least 
five years, with violent interruptions, before parties to the settlements made sufficient 
moves to ensure their successful implementation In Northern Ireland, the 
implementation of the Good Fnday Agreement has been slow and tortuous, with stalling 
charactensing the actions of almost all actors
This prompts the question as to why the elite members o f parties to the conflict 
sometimes refuse to implement the commitments to which they agreed, after what were 
generally long negotiation processes, which apparently facilitated consensus on how to 
deal with the core issues of a conflict Conflict resolution literature to date is only 
beginning to address senously this important question Classic conflict resolution theory 
would suggest that civil wars are simply not suitable for peaceful settlement, given 
mutually exclusive goals and the indivisibility of spoils (like, 1971 95), but this raises 
the question as to why groups enter the process m the first place, and why some 
processes are eventually successful Some analysts address this question by exploring 
the conditions under which conflict actors might enter negotiations, negotiate and 
formally endorse a settlement (Zartman, 1993,1995 Kreisburg 1989, Stedman, 1991) 
However, this literature does not truly address the post-agreement implementation 
process
1 National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
2 Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
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Conflict management analysts offer well-developed theories on the types of institutions 
that create incentives for cooperation (Lijphart, 1969, Horowitz, 1985), but they do not 
address the process through which a ‘blueprint’ for settlement is transformed into a 
situation where the parties actually implement the agreed institutions Where 
implementation processes fail, some analysts have gone full circle to present 
‘intransigence, narrow-mindedness and obstinacy’ on the part of the actors, as the key 
barrier to implementation (Knudsen, Mundt and Zartman, 2000) In doing so they are 
explaining the obstacles to implementation with intransigence and zero-sum goals that 
lead to the absence o f political will without political will no settlement will be 
successfully implemented Yet it is arguable that political will is better interpreted as a 
fluctuating concept It is not a constant, rather the result of a ‘complex process that can 
be inhibited by a number of factors’ (Smith, 1995 251) Uncovering the factors that 
determine political will should help us to understand some of the factors that cause 
political elites to alter their attitudes to implementing settlements that they previously 
endorsed This in turn should go some way towards explaining the barriers to the 
implementation of settlements m general
This thesis seeks to address the gap m the literature by building a theory o f  
implementation and the factors that facilitate and impede it It analyses aspects o f the 
design of the implementation process and aspects o f the external environment m which 
implementation takes place to explain why actors might endorse a compromise 
settlement, yet apparently lose the political will to consolidate it during the 
implementation process Analysts who address the implementation of settlements 
(Walter, 1997, 2002, Hartzell, 1999, 2001, Stedman et al, 2001) tend to emphasise a 
number of factors as fundamental determinants o f outcome, but these factors are 
generally external to the immediate rules and procedures of the implementation process 
This study adds a new dimension to the literature by placing more emphasis on the 
design of the implementation process as a determining factor This balance between 
institutional and external factors is not unique to the study of civil conflict and reflects a 
fundamental debate across the disciplines of political science, as to the relative role of 
institutions versus power relations in determining the behaviour of actors (Young, 1995 
37-8)
3
The thesis makes a second original contribution to the literature m its focus on the 
critical importance of the factions that make up political organisations in determining 
their attitude to the implementation process Although the existing literature does 
acknowledge that political organisations are not unitary actors, the study of their 
decision-making processes tends to treat them as if they are, or at most simply focuses 
on elite-societal linkages This study seeks to analyse the struggle between the rival 
factions that exist within the elite and sub-elite of conflict actors and the importance of 
this struggle to understanding their political behaviour m the post implementation 
period It seeks to generate this analysis through the use o f both formal modelling and 
case-study analysis
Critical to this research is the idea that it is possible and useful to make general 
statements about the politics of implementing post civil conflict negotiated peace 
settlements, whether the conflict in question is referred to as an ethnic, a revolutionary 
or a factional civil conflict Further, it is argued that such general statements provide 
valuable insights into the political process m question, and into the power-games which 
take place both between and within conflict actors It can also contnbute to a debate 
about the effect of implementation rules, procedures and mechanisms, and the impact of 
the external environment, on the ultimate outcome of the implementation process
Chapter one develops a theoretical framework on which to build the analysis o f the 
dissertation The theoretical framework is based on the assumption that conflict actors 
are made up of factions These factions are composed of elite, sub elite and mass 
elements, who are driven by multiple motivations to support, be sceptical about or to 
oppose implementation Chapter two discusses the methodological concerns of the 
thesis, explaining the decision to employ formal model building, the criteria on which 
data were selected, the process of defining the concepts o f successful, partially 
successful or failed implementation processes and the method of selecting m-depth case 
studies for empirical analysis In chapter three a formal model o f the implementation 
process is developed using the factions that belong to conflict formations3 as the key
J The terms conflict ‘formation5 and conflict ‘party’ and conflict ‘actor’ are used interchangeably
throughout the thesis to îefer to the same thing The groupings or actors that take part/fight m conflict 
and that negotiate to reach a settlement The term formation captures the idea that conflict actors, while 
unified to fight against one or more enemies, are composed of groupings with different focuses -  military
or political - and of different îanks elite, sub-elite, rank-and-file and supporter/grass roots
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unit o f analysis From the formal model a number of hypotheses are developed on the 
impact of the design of the institutional framework of implementation, and on the 
impact o f external variables, on the outcome of the implementation process Chapter 
four empirically explores the explanatory power of the hypotheses vis-a-vis explanatory 
variables derived from other theories It employs simple statistical techniques and a 
data-set o f twenty-five post cold-war implementation processes, to assess the abilities of 
the hypotheses developed m chapter three, to explain the outcome of implementation 
Chapters five to seven present m-depth case studies selected from the twenty-five- 
country data-set Chapter five explores the capacity o f the hypotheses to explain the 
failure to implement the Bicesse Accords (1991) and the Lusaka Protocol (1994) in 
Angola Chapter six analyses the relatively successful, but yet incomplete, process of 
implementing the Good Friday Agreement (1998) in Northern Ireland, and chapter 
seven, the ultimately successful implementation of the Chapultepec Accords (1994) in 
El Salvador The work is concluded m chapter eight and its contribution to the de- 
escalation literature assessed
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CHAPTER ONE
IMPLEMENTATION 
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter develops a theoretical framework within which to examine the 
implementation of negotiated peace settlements It argues that theoretical models of  
conflict resolution need to acknowledge that the strategies and actions o f the parties to 
the conflict are in part a function of the mtra-party struggle that takes place within them 
In the dominant theories o f the existing literature, authors who focus on the zero-sum 
nature of civil conflict (like, 1971, Pillar, 1983, Holl, 1993) have tended to ignore mtra-
i
party factionalism, as their focus is the intractability o f civil conflict Non-zero sum 
approaches are more focused on conflict resolution, but still tend to treat the political 
organisations involved m conflict as unitary actors (Walter 1997, 2000, 2002, Zartman, 
1993,1995) While much of the literature implicitly recognises that conflict actors are 
internally divided, this is not included m the analysis o f the success or failure o f peace 
settlements In other words, the competing motivations that dnve elite and sub-elite 
actors who collectively make-up each party to the conflict, and the potential of this 
disumty to explain the intricacies of the post settlement implementation process, are not 
comprehensively analysed
This thesis will address this gap m the literature by examining implementation using a 
framework that considers the key players to be the nval factions that make up conflict 
actors The inclusion of factions as a key element m a theoretical framework requires an 
understanding of faction motivation A mixed motivations approach is developed and is 
used to analyse the impact of organisational structure and elite-societal links on the 
actions of factions, and ultimately on the attitudes of the entire political organisation 
towards the implementation of the peace agreement
The assessment of current literature begins with an analysis of zero-sum and non-zero 
sum approaches, and their potential to contribute to an understanding of the different 
outcomes to implementation
ZERO AND NON-ZERO APPROACHES
The inability o f the zero-sum approach to adequately explain the intricacies of the 
management of civil conflict through a successful negotiation and implementation
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process is perhaps a function of its success m explaining the intractability o f civil 
conflict Zero-sum approaches usefully portray conflict as fought over high stakes and 
indivisible spoils (Heraclides, 1997 695) Civil conflict is interpreted as a game of  
deadlock cooperation is impossible because competing groups will always have 
competing interests (Walter, 1997 342) and compromise solutions that are preferable to 
a continued fight for victory are rarely available (Pillar, 1983 24) Where the goal is, m 
fact, to wipe out the enemy, compromise solutions are impossible (Holl, 1993 275) 
Classic conflict resolution theory explains the indivisible spoils as arising from the 
desire o f both conflict actors to control the government of the entity m question1 as 
there cannot be two governments and the passions aroused and political cleavages 
opened render a sharing of power unworkable, civil conflicts resist compromise (like, 
1971 95)
Thus central to the zero-sum model is the contention that settlements are only likely 
where compromise solutions are available However, issue rigidity, indivisible spoils 
and high stakes mean that compromise solutions are rarely available to civil wars hence 
their intractability (Pillar, 1983 24) The model is less useful when applied to de- 
escalation and more specifically to de-escalation through the implementation of a 
settlement It does not explain when, and more importantly why, compromise solutions 
are sometimes available and agreed The increasing number of cases where conflict 
formations enter prolonged negotiation processes (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1997), 
negotiate and endorse settlements, and make some attempt to begin an implementation 
process, implicitly questions the argument that stakes are indivisible, differences are 
zero sum and compromise is impossible, regardless of whether or not they culminate in 
peace agreements Amongst Walter’s data set of 1940 -  1990 civil wars, in only six per 
cent was no cease-fire ever drafted and in seventeen out of the forty-one civil wars 
formal negotiations did take place (1997 337) While the drafting of a cease-fire 
agreement provides no proof that compromise over issues was possible, that there were 
some moves to consider a compromise agreement surely indicates that, for at least a 
period of time, a perception that common ground existed may have prevailed Where 
more formal negotiation processes took place over a period of time, only to break down 
before a settlement could be reached, it is unconvincing to argue that intractable root-
1 In separatist conflicts, one side generally seeks to partition or secede from a given state, but both parties 
to the conflict seek to control fully the part of the state in question
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cause issues were the key obstacles to settlement, given the movement to negotiate in 
the first place, and the considerable progress frequently made m the settlement o f issues
Many zero-sum interpretations highlight the issues, or what are referred to as the root 
causes, that polarise relations between conflict formations, as the key obstacles to 
compromise In accordance with this interpretation, analysts of ethnic conflict have 
presented it as more intractable and therefore less susceptible to compromise solutions 
than any other form of civil conflict (Rothschild and Hartzell, 1997 152) Issues o f  
identity are presented as threatening to one’s very personal security or survival 
(Herachdes, 1997 695), and as less malleable to compromise than, for example, socio­
economic issues The zero-sum model helpfully explains that once escalated to violent 
civil conflict, zero-sum perceptions of root-cause issues make the conflict more 
intractable, raise the stakes, and make spoils further indivisible This increases the 
utility o f fighting over compromise (Kaufinann, 1997 153, Herachdes, 1997 695) 
Kaufmann argues that hyper-nationalist rhetoric and the atrocities that accompany the 
escalation of ethnic conflicts make cross-ethnic appeals unlikely This is because the 
rhetoric and the atrocities help to create a security dilemma that is likely to prevent de- 
escalation without the physical separation of the conflict formations (1996 137)
However, the contention that the rigidity o f issues central to ethnic civil conflict best 
explains its intractability has been questioned It has been difficult to conclusively bear 
out the hypotheses that civil wars, concerning what are generally perceived to be more 
zero-sum identity issues, are more difficult to resolve than other civil wars Lickhder 
(1995) reveals less negotiated settlements to ethnic than other civil conflicts from 1945- 
1995, but neither Mason and Fett (1996) nor Herachdes (1997), nor Lickhder himself in 
a review of the literature’s findings (1998) find conclusive evidence to support this 
contention Maill finds that conflicts (civil and international) defined as primarily 
ethnic, minority, ideological or a power struggle for government were equally difficult 
to resolve Only territorial or resource conflicts are found to have a better resolution 
record (Maill, 1992 114-5) He thus concludes that all civil wars, and not just ethnic 
civil wars, are difficult to resolve
In sum, the zero-sum literature does not convincingly explain why actors might involve 
themselves m negotiated settlements, and the nature of root-cause issues does not
appear to be critical to explaining the obstacles to successful de-escalation An 
alternative model o f civil conflict explains intractability as stemming, not from 
indivisible spoils and issue rigidity, but from the fear, insecurity and distrust associated 
with the uncertainty of entering a bargaining process with the enemy conflict party 
(Galtung, 1996, Walter, 1997, Walter and Snyder, 2000, Zartman, 1995) Most 
proponents of this model take what can be referred to as a ‘rational actor’ approach 
their interest in power is considered to be as important to, or perhaps more important 
than, their policy objectives on the root-cause issues of the conflict The rational 
approach can be distinguished from an ideational school that perceives civil conflicts as 
uniquely emotional and value-laden and naturally shunning of compromise 2 
Underlying the rational approach is the utility-focused concept that actors will agree to 
enter negotiations and, perhaps, to a compromise settlement if  they no longer perceive 
the military option to be rewarding This is the case regardless o f root-cause issues A 
perception by all sides that the rising costs o f conflict pose a threat to substantial 
interests and power bases is considered to be necessary if a stable settlement is to 
emerge (Rothschild and Hartzell, 1997 153) Zartman (1995) refers to this condition as 
a ‘mutually-hurtmg stalemate ’
But obstacles to the emergence of mutually-hurtmg stalemate he m the fear and distrust 
emanating from the asymmetric power relations that characterise civil conflict 
(Zartman, 1995), the reciprocal problem of settlement enforcement and vulnerability 
(Wagner, 1993, Walter, 1997, 2000), and a security dilemma (Snyder, 2000) According 
to Zartman (1995 336), the dominant party (government) initially perceives the use of 
coercion to crush insurgent actions, as less risky than negotiations Equipped with this 
knowledge, the weaker party, in fear and distrust of its more powerful rival, is unlikely 
to make any moves that might endanger its ability to use violence to attain its goals 
Without recourse to violence the power asymmetry is unbearable for insurgents 
Zartman argues that, where successful negotiations have taken place, the insecurity of 
the insurgency was lessoned by its retention of the potential to seriously disrupt the new 
political system, m the event o f a reneging government (1995 339)
2 See King 25-6 for an overview of this school The extent to which it is a zero or non-zero sum 
interpretation depends on how immovable the value laden, deep issues of lecognition and denied 
participation that underlay conflict are presented to be
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Echoing Zartman’s theory on the vulnerability of parties once recourse to violence is no 
longer an option, Walter argues that comprehensive settlements present overwhelming 
threats to the security of conflict actors as they require de-mobilisation As soon as 
parties begin to implement the provisions of a settlement, they become vulnerable to the 
possibility that the other party has not and will not fulfil its part o f the bargain, and will 
instead increase its power and gam the upper hand Thus, while conflict actors may 
wish to comply with the terms of peace agreements, they are powerless to enforce the 
terms over which they bargained so hard (Walter, 1997 338) They will avoid 
settlements rather than risk the uncertainty and insecurity that is created by their distrust 
of the intentions of other formations Wagner (1993 263) also emphasises the 
difficulties associated with enforcing a compromise, rather than the obstacles to its 
negotiation presented by rigid issues and indivisible spoils He presents intractability as 
ultimately stemming from structural constraints and the absence of convergmg 
expectations about possible outcome on the battle field
For Snyder, rational calculations about the high cost of misplaced trust decrease 
incentives to negotiate a settlement He presents this as a security dilemma that mirrors 
not a game of deadlock but a prisoner’s dilemma game both parties prefer to defect 
from a settlement if sure that the other actor will co-operate, but prefer mutual co­
operation to mutual defection (2000 27-8) In other words, if  party A is sure that party 
B will co-operate, party A will defect and receive benefits without having to concede 
any power On the other hand, if  party A knew that party B would co-operate in the 
event o f party A committing to co-operate, it would agree to co-operate, thereby 
securing its second-best option and avoiding the scenario where they both refuse to 
implement, and thus gam nothing But party A ’s fear that party B will renege on its 
commitment to co-operate, while it co-operates itself and is thereby forced to concede 
too much power, prevents it from co-operating3
Empirical studies do support the thesis that negotiated settlements face enormous 
obstacles that stem from the fear and distrust between conflict actors Richardson and 
Wang (1993, 185) find that failure to establish trust and to identify areas o f interest
J Snyder describes the dilemma as one resembling the prisoner’s dilemma without developing the game m 
game theoretic format He does not explicitly say so but he appears to interpret the interaction between 
conflict actors as an iterated, lather than a once-off, version of the game ( 2 0 0 0  2 2 )
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accounted for the collapse o f initiatives m many cases Rothschild and Lake (1998 203- 
4) highlight the centrality of fear and insecurity to ethnic conflict They point out that, 
where ethnic groups possess effective safeguards, share specific expectations and feel 
secure m their relationship with the state and with each other, inter-group competition 
tends to be constructive Fears and insecurities are at stake for ethnic groups m conflict, 
alongside core issues for negotiation such as self-determination and sovereignty, 
according to O’Leary 4 The obstacles posed by fear, insecurity and distrust of the other 
conflict actor do appear to loom large in all civil conflicts But the question of why tins 
fear, insecurity and distrust might prevail to prevent the implementation of a settlement 
after complex negotiations see actors building the trust required to reach a compromise 
settlement is left un-addressed by this model If fears and insecurity loom so large, why 
are negotiation processes entered and implementation frequently, at least temporarily, 
pursued5?
The impact of divisions withm conflict formations on the ultimate strategy of the 
formation may provide an answer to this question It may help to explain what 
frequently appears to be a reduction m elite political will to implement a settlement after 
its endorsement Yet inherent m almost all endeavours to explain the obstacles to 
compromise amongst civil conflict parties, including those discussed above, is the tacit 
assumption that conflict formations are ‘unitary,’ rational actors This is true even where 
an ehte-masses dichotomy is recognised It persists despite a sophisticated literature on 
the negative role played by extremist, ethnic outbidding m the escalation of conflict and 
an apparently clear recognition m the literature concerned with de-escalation that 
conflict formations are not, in fact, unitary This is next explored
UNITARY VERSUS NON-UNITARY ACTORS
The assumption that conflict formations are unitary actors simplifies a complex set of  
interactions This is useful especially where the quest is to explain the intractability or 
sustainability o f civil conflict But there is need to consider mtra-formation divisions 
There is need to consider the role that factions play m determining conflict formation 
strategy where de-escalation and, m particular, the barriers to implementation are 
concerned
4 Radio 4, 13 04 00 ‘Peace in Our Time ’
5 Tins assumes that settlements are not completely imposed (see chapter two)
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Many analysts include mtra-party and mtra-elite relations as a variable affecting the 
intractability of civil conflict, but there is little systematic investigation of the possible 
effect that this may have on impeding compromise, especially from the point of view of 
impeding the process of implementing agreements For example, Walter (2000 64) 
acknowledges that conflict formations are not unitary actors, but she does not proceed 
to discuss the possible implications of this fact Richardson and Wang (1993 185) 
conclude that m many failed peace agreements key influential actors, perhaps factions 
of larger actors, were left out of the negotiation or implementation stage They 
recommend that would-be third parties attempting to conclude accords ensure the 
agreed terms have adequate support among adversaries Implicit in this task is the 
acceptance that negotiating parties are not unitary actors and that an agreement to settle 
may not be an indication of complete support for this position in each party But there 
is little further analysis o f this fact Inherent m Horowitz’s central recommendation, that 
institutions must create incentives for moderate political actors, is the assumption that 
‘broad conflict formations’6 are not made up of unitary actors Implicit in both 
Duffield’s (1999, 2000) and Keen’s (1996, 2000) analyses discussed below is a 
recognition of the existence of different factions withm conflict parties, and of 
controlling, structural hierarchies that frequently dictate the relationships between elites 
and masses
Stedman (1996 349) assesses the implications o f mtra-party power struggles positively 
as long as there are intra-group differences, and as long as those who are willing to 
accept compromise solutions can influence the group decision-makmg, the preferences 
of a party or group are changeable The corollary of this argument is, o f course, that, as 
long as those unwilling to compromise can affect group decision-makmg, there exist 
strong barriers to the successful management o f conflict For Stedman (1991 12-15), 
insurgent movements include individuals, frequently labelled as extremists, who put 
principles before interests, while at the same time they contain individuals who would 
accept far less than the settlement that may be negotiated In other words, insurgent 
groups, like many political groups, are made up of diverse factional elements who,
6 Defined in chapter three
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‘although united, may have competing objectives’ and there may be ‘little consensus 
within a revolutionary organisation on overall goals’ (Stedman, 1991 12)
Zartman (1993 25, 1995 9-10) argues that rebel insurgent groups substitute two factors 
for their lack of military clout commitment and grievances In a powerful theory on the 
incentives for conflict actors to enter negotiations, he argues that a conflict is npe for 
resolution through negotiations if  the grievances that compelled the conflict actor to 
take up arms initially are stronger than the commitment to a power struggle against the 
government Once commitment exceeds grievances, or m other words once the war 
becomes an end in itself, the obstacles to conflict management increase to make success 
extremely unlikely Zartman separately discusses mtra-party relations and the role of 
extremists (1993 27,1995 340-1) He argues that polarisation of the conflict facilitates 
the agendas o f extremists He does not appear to consider that the causation may be the 
other way around that the agendas of extremists polanse the conflict Nor are the 
implications should ‘commitment’ be high amongst one faction of a conflict formation 
and ‘grievances’ high amongst another analysed Yet important explanations for the 
dynamics of the post-settlement implementation process may he in the constant struggle 
between those emphasising ‘grievances’ and those driven by ‘commitment’
Lickhder et al (1993 14), m an endeavour to establish a more systematic relationship 
between settlement and features o f conflict formation leadership, conclude that a 
settlement is facilitated by power concentration on the winning side and leadership 
changes on the losing side in civil wars (Licklider, 1993 308) In other words, the 
outcomes of the internal power struggles over the nature of leadership determine, at 
least to some extent, how and whether or not civil wars are settled Waterman (1993 
295-6) argues that the way m which collectivities are structured and leaders empowered 
largely determines the possibility [or probability] of solutions He argues that, if leaders 
lack autonomy, accommodation will not take place as competitive outbidding makes 
leaders incapable o f giving consent to compromises With this he implies that only 
conflict formations that have centralised leadership structures and power to make 
authoritative decisions will bring about a sustained settlement to civil conflict
However, according to this logic, no leader will sign and endorse a peace settlement 
unless he or she believes himself to have sufficient control over a conflict formation to
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implement it, and thus to remain m power Either this, or leaders with enough autonomy 
but without total centralised control will negotiate and sign an agreement m the hope 
that the implementation process will deepen their hold on power and perhaps increase 
their autonomy That settlements are signed yet implementation processes are replete 
with barriers suggests that the latter interpretation is more accurate, or at least that 
leaders’ confidence m their ability to control the formation is over-estimated This 
brings the argument back to a question raised m the introduction of why elites might 
sign an agreement that they never intended to implement, and suggests that it is quite 
unlikely that he or she will do this knowingly Instead, it is argued that the intra-conflict 
formation power struggle that follows the signing of the agreement explains his or her 
ability to pursue the implementation of the settlement If the implementation process is 
to be understood, the actors to this power struggle must be the central unit o f analysis 
But the question remains as to how mtra-formation divisions are best defined and 
understood and what form this mtra-formation power struggle will take Divisions 
between the elite and masses parts o f conflict actors are first considered
ELITES AND MASSES
Conflict management literature presents the fact that conflict actors are composed of 
blocks of elites and masses as significant Two conditions have been identified as 
essential for the successful application of conflict management solutions elite 
willingness to implement and sufficient elite control over its constituency to pursue 
implementation (Nordhnger, 1972 468-470, Sisk, 1996 77-80, Galtung, 1996 88) But 
short o f total imposition of the terms of a negotiated settlement by a third party, 
settlements are products of negotiations between conflict actors They therefore 
command the support and reflect the positions of those elites who negotiated them Are 
obstacles to implementation thus explained by the unwillingness o f the masses 
(constituency) to support the implementation policy of the elites9 
It is difficult to accept at face value this proposition that elite inability to persuade 
followers to support negotiated settlements provides the key impediment to successful 
implementation This is especially the case given the important role that many analysts 
assign (Kmg, 1996 30-2) to elites in the mobilisation and escalation of civil conflict 
Instead, the question of whether or not the elites or the masses present greater barriers to 
conflict management is complex What is more, there is rarely consensus on the 
question of whether it is fears, insecurities or distrust on the part of elites or the masses
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that pose the greater obstacle to demobilisation This is true even for a specific conflict, 
and few analysts conclude that a conflict is either wholly elite or masses led Amongst 
analysts who interpret conflict as non-zero sum, there appears to be disagreement over 
the relative contnbution of structural7, actor, psycho logical/cultural and socio-economic 
factors to intractability From these disagreements stem the incongruities m the 
literature as to the relative role o f elite decision makers versus mass-level behaviour m 
sustaining the intractable structures of civil conflict
Some analysts emphasise the hardened perceptions of elite members of conflict 
formations as the key obstacle to problem-solving approaches to conflict (Stedman 
1996 347) Others, such as Smith, focus on the motivations o f the masses and their 
attitude to members of the other conflict formation(s)8 Woodward focuses on the role 
that elites play m escalating the insecurities that sustain civil conflict She implies that 
civil conflict is sustained by the rational and strategic decisions made by elites who seek 
to avoid their own insecurity (2000 84) Smith9 questions the rationale behind mass 
willingness to follow unscrupulous elites, plausibly arguing that without genuine 
grievance it seems unlikely that elite endeavours to escalate conflict would succeed 
Posen explains that the near collapse o f the state triggers the secunty fears of the masses 
and leads to the competitive mobilisation of self-help groups (Snyder and Walter 24) 
Self-help groups restnct the choices of the masses and make them likely to support even 
unscrupulous elites This is echoed m MayalPs descnption of the quest for security on 
the part o f the masses that follows state breakdown 10
These approaches to the role of the elite and the masses assume that the elites and the 
masses are coherent groupings But the lack of consensus on the role of elites vis-a-vis 
the masses m sustaining conflict, and by extension impeding implementation, might be 
better explained by the proposition that neither the masses nor the elites are, m fact, 
cohesive groupings An alternative understanding of the intractability caused by mtra- 
party factionalism may help to explain the barriers to the implementation of elite- 
endorsed settlements The multiple-motivations approach to conflict developed below
1 Meaning the development of underlying structure of relations and power distribution, outside of the 
immediate control of conflict actors, that constrains the choices / behaviours of conflict actors
8 Radio 4, 13 04 00 ‘Peace in Our Time
9 Radio 4, 13 04 00 Peace in Our Time ’
10 Radio 4, 13 04 00 ‘Peace in Our Time ’
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does not explain resistance to implementation as a product o f the insecurities of the 
masses and their consequential refusal to support elite pursuit of implementation. Nor 
does it explain resistance to implementation as entirely the product of dishonest elites 
who seek to reduce their own vulnerability by continuing conflict against the wishes of 
the masses. It instead proposes that the different motivations that drive the disparate 
factions that collectively make up conflict actors explain the dynamics of the post­
settlement implementation stage o f conflict.
MULTIPLE MOTIVATIONS: UNDERSTANDING INTERNAL POWER STRUGGLES
The struggle between the factions that characterises the elite (and sub-elite) members of 
a conflict formation is crucial to understanding the behaviour of conflict formations 
during implementation. The motivations that drive these factions therefore require 
consideration. Conflict typologies are frequently used to categorise the motivations of 
civil conflict actors, and many make the popular distinction between conflicts on the 
basis o f under-lying issues. Maill et al (1999: 30-1) suggest three categories: 
Revolutionary/ ideology; identity/ secession and factional civil wars, the latter including 
coup d ’états, brigandage, warlordism and criminality, where the aim is to seize or to 
retain state power to further particular interests. But the typologies do not reflect the 
different cycles that characterise long civil conflicts. The level o f violence may 
intensify, the degree of domestic and international support for any civil war party may 
alter, and the leadership of the political elite may change. In accordance with these 
cycles, the relative importance of issues generally seen as causal may decrease as other 
issues, perhaps associated with the structures resulting from escalation, assume more 
prominence and present more obstacles to resolution.
For example, White (1990: 88) documents extensive research that reveals the policing 
and security forces issues to be the most divisive inter-community issues in the 
Northern Ireland conflict. This is despite widespread perceptions that the zero-sum 
nature of ethnic issues and the constitutional question present the biggest obstacle to 
compromise. In El Salvador, despite the Marxist ‘revolutionary’ aims of sections of the 
FMLN11 insurgency, reliable survey data suggests that political exclusion and the 
actions o f the armed forces were most important in persuading the population to support 
the insurgency (McClintock: 267-71; 284-87). What is more, it is possible to find
16
elements of all three typologies m most civil conflicts Take, as examples, the cases of 
Angola and Mozambique while ethnicity provides/ed a powerful domestic 
mobilising force for each party to the conflict in both conflicts, the expression of 
ideological differences was essential for the mobilisation of international support, while 
there is at the same time clear evidence of warlordism m both conflicts Savimbi’s 
UNIT A once claimed to be ‘freedom fighters’ against Angola’s communist regime In 
2001, while remaining a relatively homogenous organisation m terms of ethnic make­
up, UNIT A appeared to seek to control diamond mines, over and above seeking to 
control the governing of the country or to overthrow a regime on ideological grounds 
(Conesa, 2001 10, Keen, 98 42) Similarly questioning the use of rigid typologies, 
conflict management practitioner, Rupesinghe, questions whether the Palestme-Israeh 
conflict is about religion, territory, power or identity, and whether the escalation of 
violence m Bosnia was really the resurgence of a long-standing ethnic feud In support 
of the argument outlined above, Rupesinghe argues that, while it is possible to 
categorise according to rigid typologies based on root-cause issues, new lines o f  
demarcation are drawn as conflict escalates Original issues are frequently juxtaposed 
with other issues and external factors serve to make the conflict more complex 
(Rupesinghe 57)
In fact, protracted civil conflicts display institutional, structural, actor and issue 
charactenstics m common that question the usefulness of ngid typologies For example, 
following a comparative study of post-1945 ‘internal’ wars, Azar contends that regional 
instability, political fragmentation and fragile state structures are the pre-dominant 
features o f all such conflicts (Maill et al 71) This is regardless of the underlying issues 
Maill et al (1999 74) point out that, regardless o f typology, there is a near consensus 
amongst analysts that a perceived ‘deprivation of human needs’ and recognition of this 
deprivation by a significant proportion of the population is a pre-condition for 
mobilisation m all conflicts The ‘deprivation of human needs’ may emerge from a 
number o f sources It may emerge as a result of frustrated and rising social and 
economic expectations, as a result of an increasingly widespread awareness of political 
discrimination on ethnic, racial or religious grounds, or awareness by a particular group
11 Fiente Farabundo Marti Liberacion Nacionale
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of their complete exclusion from power and patronage But common to all conflicts is 
that for escalation to occur the grievances require mobilisation
It is here proposed that two factors determine whether or not mobilisation is undertaken 
on ethnic, tribal, revolutionary, religious or other grounds the strategic actions o f  the 
elite who mobilise support on the back of discontent and the pre-existmg divisions in 
society The primary source of mass discontent may not necessarily be the prime 
mobilising factor For example, mobilisation may occur along ethnic lines where key 
reasons for discontent have been socio-economic The degree to which the elite actually 
represent the grievances of their constituency and use the promise to redress them as a 
mobilising and sustaining force, relative to the degree o f patronage, racketeering and 
intimidation used to create structures sustaining support, will vary from conflict to 
conflict and from actor to actor Important, however, is that m no conflict is 
mobilisation solely based on a single one o f these factors Even m situations where most 
neutral international opimon has recognised the legitimacy of a movement and its 
grievances, for example the FMLN m El Salvador, there were some reports of FMLN 
coercion to mobilise membership (Stanley, 1996 226)
hi sum, conflict constitutes a struggle for power and this remains the case regardless of 
the mobilising issues and methods This remains the case regardless o f whether power is 
sought by elites for personal enrichment, fulfilment of personal ideological beliefs or to 
genuinely address their grievances and/or the grievances o f the masses More often than 
not the three would combine to form the goals o f individual elites Even where an 
individual leader may have only ‘genuine5 or benevolent goals, it is unlikely that the 
entire leadership12 will have, and the goals of the elite are a sum of all elite goals Given 
the multiple motivations that drive individual elite members o f conflict formations, the 
goals of the elite (including sub-elite) are not always cohesive
Recent analyses o f ethnic conflict structures in Bosnia lend some support to the multiple 
motivations interpretation of conflict outlined above According to one analyst, 
following initial mobilisation, a hierarchical political economy has emerged, less by 
identity than by fear and racketeering along ethnic lines, reinforced by physical
12 Including elite and sub-elite levels ot leadership
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violence The upper echelons o f that hierarchy fear that peace would mean a loss in 
political and economic power (Griffiths, 1999 58-9) Griffiths’s findings suggest that, 
while identity served as and remains as a powerful mobilising force, the structures of 
the political economy and the power hierarchies that characterise elite and sub-elite 
organisation present the key obstacle to conflict management, regardless o f under-lymg 
identity issues Rather than interpreting mtra-party conflict as a function of masses-elite 
disunity, obstacles to the resolution of ethnic conflict are portrayed as a complex inter­
play o f ‘structures’ involving actors, agents, processes and dynamics13
Bellamy’s impression of the Bosnian conflict was that very few people supported it it 
was the legacy of the pre-1990, well-organised society and military structure that 
enabled the conflict party elite to exercise the control to instigate and prolong the 
conflict (1998 6) While generally supporting Bellamy’s interpretations of the spiral of 
violence m Bosnia, Woodward is careful to point out that, while the actions o f elites 
played a very significant role m sustaining the civil war, the US conviction that only the 
very top elite, m particular Milosovic, was responsible for the aggression that led to 
civil war was very misguided (2000 84-7) and ignored the role o f sub-elites who 
belonged to power-hierarchies Indeed that Bellamy was able to form the
impression that the conflict lacked mass societal support, despite the high level o f ethnic 
cleansing which was earned out at both elite and societal level, is perhaps testimony to 
the mixed motivations of those involved m conflict The lack of ‘opposition to ethnic 
cleansing’ at a societal level stemmed for many from the need to remain part o f local 
power hierarchies While this silence certainly did not imply support for ethnic 
cleansing (hence Bellamy’s findings), a degree o f complicity from some actors at 
societal level existed, even if  it was for some a reaction to coercive power hierarchies
Like Woodward, Keen (2000 20) stops short o f placing all blame on power-seeking 
elites at the top of power hierarchies Central to his analysis is a discussion of the 
economic incentives, which exist for certain groups, at both elite and societal level to
13 This perhaps explains why despite the apparent strength of ethnic identity as a mobilising force and the 
cohesion that this mobilising force should give to the masses-elite goals, the negotiation and 
implementation of negotiated settlements to identity civil conflicts encounter enormous obstacles
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pursue a strategy that prolongs conflict The barriers to implementation surely increase 
when, despite the settlement, continuation of conflict is perceived to be in the self- 
seekmg, economic interests o f some powerful factions Griffiths (1999), Keen (1996) 
and Duffield (1998) present civil conflict as sustained by multiple, over-lapping 
structural and institutional factors that increase the incentives for some factions to 
pursue strategies that perpetuate it, and to present it as intractable Using this model, 
which is broadly termed as a ‘political economy’ model of civil conflict, Duffield 
presents two central obstacles to its management The first, the breakdown m the pre- 
civil war political and economic system, heralds an alternative system of profit and 
power, which depends on continued civil war for its survival Secondly, with the 
development o f this power and patronage system, the distinction between war, peace 
and crime are blurred (1998 71-2) According to this interpretation, the development of 
politico-economic hierarchies leaves many people totally dependent on their workplace, 
locality or bosses for needs as basic as food and housing (Duffield, 1998 77-9) This 
system of personalism  and patronage serves to engender loyalty for the civil conflict 
actor that promises to protect these basic interests If the survival of the power hierarchy 
depends on supporting a continued policy of civil war, elites, sub-elites and the masses 
m question will do so to protect their own rational interests An interpretation of conflict 
formations as constituting an elite and a masses block ignores the important role that 
such power hierarchies play m sustaining civil conflict Power hierarchies incorporate 
elite, sub-ehte and sections of the masses
Mark Duffield specifically uses this interpretation of conflict to understand post-cold 
war civil conflicts, which he defines as ‘post modem ’ This political-economy model of 
civil conflict is increasingly applied to conflicts throughout the Afncan continent, where 
almost complete state breakdown and the absence of the provision of basic services and 
needs, such as food and physical protection, tends to accompany conflict But Horowitz 
(1994 49) has pointed to hierarchies as a sustaining factor m previous civil wars when 
he discusses the sense of secunty and source of trust, certainty, reciprocal help and 
protection that ethnic affiliations provide in the face of the neglect of one’s interest by 
strangers 14 The level of state-breakdown and governance vanes radically from civil 
conflict to conflict, Northern Ireland and Sn Lanka perhaps placed at one end, and
14 For example, features of this self-help system are found in Northern Iieland (Cochrane, 2000 12) this 
questioning the need to create a different, ‘post-modern’ category
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Sierra Leone, Mozambique and Angola at the opposite end of a continuum 15 But in all 
civil conflict elements of the pohtical-economy structures of power described above 
exist to preserve sections of conflict formations, both elites and masses, in favour of  
violence 16 On the prevalence or depth of these power hierarchies, the structures that 
keep elements of them in favour of continued civil war, and the ability to create 
incentives to weaken them, may ultimately depend the strength of barriers to 
implementation
Thus the decision to implement a negotiated settlement is arguably dependent on the 
outcome of a power struggle between the factions within each conflict formation Each 
faction is not necessarily made up of individuals who are driven by the same 
motivations But m each faction individual members perceive the same outcome of 
implementation as crucial to their fundamental goal, be it increased security, redress of 
grievances, increased access to power or resources, or all three Each faction 
incorporates actors at elite, sub-elite and societal level And it might be argued that with 
the reaching of a certain threshold m the process of intra-formation out-bidding, 
whereby militant elements, who perceive continued conflict to be in their interest,
gam control of party strategy, the implementation of a settlement is no longer an option 
This theoretical framework, developed through a multiple motivation typology o f  
conflict, presents the factions that make up conflict formations as the key actors m the 
implementation process It presents the outcome of implementation as dependent on the 
ability of those factions, who perceive compliance with implementation to be in their 
interest, to control party strategy
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWER STRUGGLE
If mtra-conflict formation relations is a key determining variable for the outcome of 
implementation, the organisational or institutional structure of the conflict formation 
and its effect on power distribution within it may be significant McKinley (1998) 
argues that the motivations and organisational structure behind warlord-led
15 For example Bellamy (7) considers that disintegration and the collapse of society m Bosnia has not 
gone as far as some states in Western Africa as described by Michael Ignatieff
16 For Northern Ireland, see David McKittrick, The Independent 9 03 01 McDonald Henry, The 
Obsa~ver 27 08 00
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organisations are significantly different to those of insurgent movements However, 
given the argument that civil conflict actors are not unitary actors, they should not be 
defined as ‘war lord’ formations or ‘insurgent’ formations, as this draws too strong a 
defining line where in reality the line is blurred All conflict formations constitute 
power-seeking factions with multiple goals, motivations and strategies, ranging from 
the personal, to the principled, to the ideological, to the self-interested To the extent 
that the elite genuinely represents the grievances of the entire conflict formation and 
depends on its support for power, and the extent to which support of the masses is 
mobilised rather than forced, the group can be classified as closer to the conventional 
conception of an insurgency than to that of a conflict formation dominated by 
warlords 17 It is possible to interpret individual civil conflicts as falling somewhere 
along a continuum where motivations and structure o f conflict formations are 
concerned At one end, one hundred per cent of the motivation behind elite pursuit of 
the conflict is the use o f grievances to sustain personal power, wealth and politico- 
economic structures, at the other, one hundred per cent of the motivation is inspired by 
a genuine commitment to political change and to the advancement of certain economic, 
social or anti-discrimination goals to reduce grievances Conflict nearing the former end
will tend to include actors that operate according to warlord-style organisational
18structures Those at the latter end will tend to be dominated by the more traditional, 
msurgent-style organisation that depends on community support for some legitimacy 
Most conflicts will he somewhere m the middle, as neither the motivations o f the 
masses nor of elite members o f conflict formations are unified, and the strategy of the 
collective conflict formation depends on the outcome of the struggle between factions 
Most actors will attempt to present themselves as lying nearer to the former end
MASSES AND FACTIONS
Most pohtical-economy models seek to explain the decisions made by individuals to 
comply with institutional procedures or rules In doing so they tend to take into account 
the multiple motivations, preferences and behaviour at the individual level (Ostrom, 
1982 23-4) In a similar way, the typology here helps to put some structure on an 
exploration of the motivations of an entire society of individuals, using mtra-party
17 Rich (1999) introduces this concept and he calls for the development of a typology of warlords ranging 
from those that are effectively large-scale gangs to those that resemble insurgent and national liberation 
movements with claims towards being treated as legitimate actors
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factionalism The multiple motivation typology of conflict removes exclusive emphasis 
fiom interactions between the elite and sub elite members of conflict formation elites It 
moves it to focus on the divisions that cut across the elite and sub-elite section o f  
conflict formations and to interactions both within and between conflict formations The 
factions that exist in conflict formations are built on power hierarchies They are led by 
and composed of elites and sub-elites who are motivated to either comply with or defy 
the negotiated settlement But the strategies adopted by faction elites and sub-elites are 
‘clearly affected by the perceived degree to which the proposed action would hurt the 
hierarchy o f support5 enjoyed by a faction (Geddes, 1999 204)
If we are to generalise about the motivations of the individual and the effect that the 
individual’s actions have on the choices made and actions taken by elite members, the 
different backgrounds against which individuals make decisions must be recognised A 
gesture o f support may either involve a genuine degree o f political choice or be the 
result of either physical or socio-economic structural coercion Lending support can be 
by means of election or by other voluntary means such as participation at grass-root 
level m the organisation of a conflict formation, or the contribution of resources to it It 
can also mean compliance with local leaders for dependency reasons, because o f  
threatening or coercive behaviour or forced participation in the campaign of violence It 
is assumed that multiple motivations account for the behaviour, attitude and decisions 
made by individuals to lend support to political elite and sub-elite groupings and/or to 
actively support a paramilitary or insurgency organisation in the conflict-management 
process Motivations may range from allegiance to a family member or traditional 
family support, to a genuine or ideological commitment to the defined political goals of 
the organisation, to a fundamental desire to be involved in violence, to personal 
economic enrichment, to fear or forced recruitment Table 1 1 summarises the multitude 
of plausible motivations that influence individuals and grass-root groups to ‘lend 
support’ (whether because o f choice or force) to a conflict formation or faction
18 Actors described as ‘warlord’ organisations tend to be highly decentralised, with limited command
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Table 1 1 Mixed motivations ot mass support tor conflict tormations and their tactions
DEGREE OF POLITICAL CHOICE 
POLITICAL CHOICE OR PHYSICAL / STRUCTURAL COERCION
MOTIVATIONS
Economic
Economic Opportunism/ Economic Necessity/ Economic resentment
Physical Security
Fear ofloss / Aim to maintain current degree / Aim to increase
Ideological or Identity Motivations
Fear ofloss of self help support groups/ Genuine commitment or loyalty to 
identity/ Genuine ideological commitment or loyalty
Personal / Family / Traditional Loyalty19
Traditional family or personal loyalty to a certain group / person/ cause/ issue
Arguably, the extent to which the political choices o f the masses directly influence the 
strategy of conflict factions (and the outcome of mtra-formation power struggles) will 
be determined by the organisational structure of the conflict formation The overall level 
of democracy in an entity may shape this Yet m Northern Ireland and Sn Lanka, where 
the political choices o f the masses or the constituency have arguably earned weight, 
barriers to implementation have remained high In Angola, where coercion and 
hierarchical political-economy structures account for much of the support for both the 
government and UNIT A and where the leadership of each 
appears to be centralised and coercive, implementation has failed outnght on two 
occasions On the other hand, m Mozambique, where hierarchical structures and 
coercion similar to those in Angola existed, the implementation process succeeded and 
formal civil violence has ended since 1992 There is little expenence of
democracy in Mali yet implementation was ultimately successful In sum, whatever the 
elite-masses relationship (level of democracy), it would appear that implementation 
processes are faced with obstacles In fact, it would appear that the extent to which the 
masses have a formal political choice rather than being pnmanly motivated by physical 
or economic coercion does not provide a convincing explanation for the differing 
outcomes of implementation processes
structures, according to Rich, 1999 90
19 Some may argue that this is a non-rational motivation However, the decision can be interpreted as 
lational at the individual level, in that the individual perceives continued association with a traditional 
(lamily or personal) cause or organisation, as important to his or her overall goals or position in society
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Take, for example, a society where the key motivating factor for supporting a political 
group appears to be the fear of physical or socio-economic retribution for deviating 
from a leadership strategy One might expect that m this situation the leadership would 
find implementation of a settlement to be straightforward Similarly m a situation where 
political choice is a fundamental part of the political system, but where individuals 
appear to offer unquestioning support to parties or factions for reasons of personal, 
family or ideological/identity loyalty, one might expect that leaders could follow an 
implementation strategy without too many obstacles But these clear-cut scenarios do 
not materialise Elites and sub-elites making up conflict formations and their factions 
are driven by many different motivations, and individuals, whether acting pnmanly by 
choice or by coercion, are equally so driven by mixed motivations to support factions in 
the mtra-formation power struggle
The elite and sub-elite o f factions, whatever the extent o f their genuine commitment to 
the espoused cause, are motivated by the desire to either retain or gam power They 
adopt a strategy that they hope will maximise support, in the context o f the pnmanly 
choice or pnmanly coercive conditions for mobilisation in which they operate Where 
the attitudes o f the masses carry weight and can influence the overall balance o f power
withm a conflict formation, their attitudes will tend to be directly reflected in the
20strategies of the conflict factions Here the power struggle is a struggle to gam the
initiative by maximising public support through a combination of representation, 
manipulation, patronage and at times intimidation Where racketeenng and structural 
coercion make political choice less meaningful, the conflict between factions remains 
reflective of the concerns of individuals if  successful, a faction will fulfil the immediate 
motivation of individuals supporting it -  self protection, preservation and economic 
secunty Yet no one faction depends solely on complete representation or coercion
FACTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION
Given this interpretation of civil conflict and of the parties to it as non-umtary actors, 
peace agreements and the formal endorsement of settlements may merely set forth, as 
Hampson (1996 25) suggests, the expectations, goals and compromises that the parties 
(and their factions) and mediators ‘held or accepted at a given point m time ’ They
20 Tsebehs (1990 173-4) uses similar reasoning when considering the elite/masses role in consociational 
polities
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might simply formalise a momentary balance o f power that is changeable with time 
Therefore, agreements are signed by formations for a mixture of reasons, for some 
honest expressions o f support for new polities, for others dishonest attempts to buy time 
to re-arm and to re-build support bases Yet underlying all actions by elites is the desire 
to retain their power base withm their respective conflict formations Within each party 
to any agreement there are individuals and factions who hold differing aspirations and 
expectations from the negotiation and endorsement of an agreement Expectations and 
goals tend to change as they interact with other independent variables, be they the 
external or structural forces referred to by Galtung (1996 93), or the institutional 
variables associated with the implementation process The expectations, goals and 
strategies o f individual factions will thus change during the implementation process 
The outcome of the implementation process depends on the sum of the factions’ 
expectations The sum of the expectations of factions is, m fact, the result of the mtra- 
formation struggle between factions
If this multiple motivations, pohtical-economy model of civil conflict is accurate, 
conventional confhct-management solutions frequently agreed on during peace 
negotiations, such as the setting up of democratic procedures, the holding of elections, 
the introduction of constitutionally protected minority rights for ethnic groups, mtncate 
power-sharing institutions, liberal economic agendas that aim to introduce more 
equality and demobilisation programmes are alone simply inappropriate as they fail to 
take into account the structural power-hierarchies that characterise conflict actors and 
shape the incentives for actors to implement At the same time peace settlements are not 
just prescriptive bluepnnts that have no chance of being implemented At the time of  
endorsement it is possible to argue that an equilibrium exists in favour of agreeing to 
and implementing a settlement The implementation process should serve to maintain 
the equilibrium m favour of implementation It should therefore make the reneging 
option as difficult or as unattractive as possible for the factions that make up conflict 
formations
CONCLUSION
Many conflict analysts consider intra-party relations and the organisational structure of 
conflict formations as two of many variables that contribute to the intractability o f civil 
conflict and the difficulty of successfully applying negotiated settlements Yet most
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proceed to analyse the intentions of conflict formations as the intentions o f unitary 
actors Within the conflict-de-escalation literature that is concerned with exposing 
factors that impede the application of negotiated settlements to civil conflict, a number 
of theories are directly applicable to the question of implementing settlements (Walter, 
1997, Zartman, 1995, Hartzell, 1999) All however are based on unitary, rational-actor 
assumptions about the actors to civil conflict By focusing its analysis on factionalism, 
this thesis seeks to advance an understanding of the implementation process, and to 
make more accurate predictions as to the likely determinants o f success or failure 
Settlements are negotiated and endorsed by elite actors and, given that the masses are 
driven by multiple motivations to lend support to particular power hierarchies, the 
shifting alliances withm the elite and sub-elite section of conflict formations are most 
critical to the analysis The formal model of factionalism m chapter three presents 
implementation as depending on the strategic behaviour of the leaders o f conflict 
formations (i e elites and sub-elites) This itself depends on the outcome of mtra- 
formation factionalism It is argued that the non-umtary actor approach on which it is 
based gives the best insight into why the leadership of conflict formations might 
negotiate and endorse settlements, while subsequently failing to implement them While 
all individuals and factions in a conflict formation act as rational, self-interested actors, 
the collective outcome may be quasi-rational, and ultimately no factions may fulfil their 
goal and the implementation process may be permanently stalled
The purpose of the model developed in chapter three is to advance understanding of  
intra-formation factionalism and its effect on efforts to implement negotiated 
settlements Affecting mtra-party power struggles are a wide range of other variables 
Many of these are hypothesised to be essential for the comprehensive de-escalation of 
conflict in the literature discussed above The variables can be categorised into external 
and internal (institutional) variables, the former refemng to variables that exist outside 
of the formal institutions o f the implementation process The degree to which these 
variables determine the success or failure of implementing a settlement depends on their 
impact on the outcome of the mtra-formation power struggle Intra-party power 
struggles determine the attitude and strategies of conflict formations towards the 
implementation process In other words, in order to understand how external and 
internal variables can explain different outcomes to the implementation process, an 
understanding of the effect that these variables have on the attitudes and choices made
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by the factions involved m the intra-formation power struggles is required (chapter 
three)
28
CHAPTER TWO 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
This chapter outlines the method employed to fulfil the fundamental goal o f this 
research to increase understanding of the actors and structures that make up the 
post- negotiated settlement phase o f civil conflict, and to develop a comprehensive 
theory with which to explain the varied outcomes to implementation processes It 
focuses on a number of methodological concerns which include the usefulness o f  
theory-building through formal modelling, the selection of a data set for empirical 
analysis on a macro- level, the appropriateness of measures used to define the 
dependent van able (the outcome of implementation processes), and the sources o f  data 
used in the selection and operation of m-depth case studies While chapters three and 
four deal with further methodological concerns, which are particular to their content, 
this chapter outlines the rationale for the overall methodological approach to this thesis, 
beginning with a discussion of theory-buildmg
THEORY BUILDING
In the theory-buildmg section, rational-choice and game-theoretic analysis are used to 
build a formal model o f the implementation process New institutionalism theory is 
subsequently used to analyse the institutional environment m which the actors who are 
party to the implementation process make their choices This approach to theory- 
buildmg has been taken for a number of reasons outlined below and further clanfied m 
chapter three
This thesis defines the process of implementing negotiated peace settlements as a 
clearly political process The process of ending civil war has also been implicitly and 
explicitly recognised as a collective action problem Many analysts, including Zartman 
(1995), Walter and Snyder (2000), have recognised the problem as one of collective 
action between rational, goal-seeking actors Others, such as Collier (1998, 2000) and 
de Soysa (2000, 2001), recognise it as a fight between rational actors who aim to 
increase the economic benefits of violent conflict at the expense of other actors Both 
Snyder (2000) and Dixon (2000) model civil conflict as an ongoing, iterated pnsoner’s 
dilemma game, a game-theoretic model, which ‘captures the core logic underlying the 
problem of collective action ’ (Goodin 14)
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It follows that to understand the factors that sustain civil conflict and make it resistant to 
conflict-management solutions, including the implementation of a negotiated 
settlement, the incentives that shape actors’ choices and the structures against which 
they make these choices must be explained Game-theoretic and pohtical-economy 
tools of analysis are accordingly employed 111 an attempt to explain outcome In chapter 
one’s mixed-motivations approach to civil conflict, internal power struggles between 
factions characterise the immediate aftermath of the signing of an agreement, and 
determine each formation’s relative ability to cooperate with the other conflict 
formation/s The analysis is thus shifted to the faction level m order to explain the 
factors shaping actors’ choices, but the de-escalation process remains interpreted as a 
collective-action problem involving rational actors This approach assumes that the 
individual members of the factions that together constitute each conflict formation are, 
m fact, rational actors who work consistently to achieve a given set o f preferences and 
an outcome that will enable them to reach their rationally defined goal The question 
remains as to whether or not this is a valid and useful assumption and whether or not it 
has implications for the result of the study?
Rational choice cannot explain every phenomenon and there is room for other 
explanations Some analysts focus on the system as a whole and explain political or 
social phenomena with reference to the processes and structures that make up the 
system Some argue that forerunning or previous processes and structures best explain 
the current ones, and that processes and structures are perceived to be far more 
important explanations for political phenomena than decisions that are made by actors 
(Tsebelis, 1990 19) These approaches are not entirely incompatible with a rational- 
choice approach, provided that the structures m which actors are making decisions are 
adequately considered by the observer
Another criticism of the rational-choice approach is that actors may indeed be the most 
important unit o f analysis, but that even if real people would like to conform to these 
prescriptions o f expected utility, they do not and they are simply incapable o f making 
all the required calculations So actors may aspire to be but are not, m fact, rational A 
more fundamental criticism is that actors do not act rationally, or even approach acting 
rationally, but instead they act irrationally In both critiques the assumption of 
rationality is considered to be normative and unreflective o f real life In real life actors
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miscalculate and make mistakes, they may have little information about the structures 
of the interaction in which they find themselves Such an approach might argue that 
implementation processes tend to fail because actors miscalculate and make mistakes, 
and, for example, might presume that they either have more or less power than they 
actually do have Or in real life actors may not, m fact, always try to optimise goals, and 
may instead choose to pay a pnce for their beliefs Goals may be egoistic or altruistic, 
idealistic or materialistic (Tsebelis, 1990 20) and actors who make decisions on 
idealistic or altruistic motivations cannot be described as rational
But m defence of the rational-choice approach, it simply assumes that actors try to do 
their best under given circumstances to achieve their overall objective Provided that the 
rules and structures of the interaction and the actors themselves and their objectives can 
be clearly discerned, a rational-choice approach is a good approximation of reality 
(Tsebelis, 1990 37-9) Given that the implementation process is a political 
phenomenon in which the actors’ identity and their goals are established, and the rules 
of the interaction are relatively precise and known to the interacting agents, the adoption 
of a rational-choice approach is appropriate and has advantages The implementation 
process consists o f a series of rounds Miscalculation provides actors with information 
about the intentions of other actors m subsequent rounds Actors who are willing to pay 
a price for beliefs, such as ideologically motivated actors, will, m fact, act rationally, 
given this objective Provided the observer is aware of this objective, the behaviour of 
the actor can be interpreted as rational behaviour given pursuit of this consistent 
objective In sum, given the political phenomena under investigation, the advantages of  
the rational-choice approach are considered to outweigh the possible drawbacks 
associated with it, provided the possibility that miscalculation due to the lack of perfect 
information is recognised and built into the empirical analysis
The rational-choice approach is helpful when one seeks to understand the fundamental 
puzzle presented m chapter one why do elites and sub-elites in a conflict formation 
negotiate and endorse an agreed settlement and then take actions and make statements 
during the implementation process that appear to reduce the prospects o f its full 
implementation? In the rational-choice model o f the implementation process the critical 
actors are considered to be the factions that make up conflict actors, with the result that 
the collective decisions made by conflict formations may frequently appear to be sub-
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optimal But the apparently ‘sub-optimal’ actions are the outcome of rational choices 
made by factions in the mtra-formation struggle between factions Tsebelis (1990 11- 
12) explains this phenomenon with the concept of nested games actors (in this case 
conflict formations) do not choose what is for the observer, the apparently optimal 
alternative because they are involved in nested games Nested games are interactions in 
which contextual or institutional factors have an over-ndmg importance and explain 
seemingly sub-optimal choices (Tsebelis, 1990 11) In the case of the implementation 
process the intra-formation power struggle provides the contextual factor that 
sometimes make actors’ choices appear to be sub-optimal But there are other 
contextual factors and institutional factors that shape the implementation process
Factions are endowed with preferences and ‘the possibility for conflict and cooperation, 
for collective or isolated actions are all part of a strategic agenda ’ How the interaction 
is worked out ‘depends on the structure of politics’ (Shepsle, 1999 269) Structures 
originate m both external and institutional factors external/structural factors and the 
institutions (rules, procedures and mechanisms) of the implementation process While 
the literature has devoted considerable attention to highlighting the external factors that 
might shape the structures m which conflict formations make choices (chapter four), the 
political science literature has devoted little attention to explaining the institutions at the 
heart o f this explicitly political process and the possible impact that institutional 
innovation may have on the outcome of the implementation process In seeking to 
address this gap, this research adopts an approach increasingly used m political science 
to understand the impact of institutions on the behaviour of individuals and actors new 
institutionalism
Central to the study o f institutions m political science is a quest to explain the origins of 
political order (Levi et al, 1999 4-5) To explain the outcome of implementation is 
essentially to explain the extent to which political order prevails and results in full, 
partial or non-implementation of an agreement The application of new institutionalism 
theory is thus highly appropriate Uncertainty about other factions’ intentions and the 
insecurity that this creates arguably prevail during the implementation process and 
threaten the continuity of political order introduced at the endorsing of the settlement 
Institutions can reduce costs associated with uncertainty across time through a system of 
nested rules In fact, political bargaining and exchange, of which negotiated settlements
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are a product, are possible only against the backdrop of stability provided by more 
deeply nested, institutionalised rules (Goodm 1996 23) External actors and structures 
may provide the background stability necessary for implementation but external actors 
who intend to provide stability do not operate in a vacuum and will encourage actors to 
adhere to a set of rules, mechanisms and procedures to further implementation Thus it 
appears that the failure to focus considerable attention on the set of institutions that 
govern implementation, alongside the external variables that also contribute to the 
structures withm which actors make decisions, is a significant omission m the effort to 
gam a greater understanding of the obstacles that exist to full implementation
A formal, rational-choice model of the implementation process and its actors is 
preferred for a number of further reasons Firstly, given the complexity o f examining 
interactions between more than two actors, there are advantages to the use o f a formal 
model, which requires rigour and clarity Secondly, a formal model demands an explicit 
account o f the assumptions about actors and the structures m which they act (Gates and 
Humes, 1997 6) Thirdly, formal models need clear, precise explanations o f the payoffs 
or rewards for actors associated with making certain moves Fourthly, as chapter three 
illustrates, the concept o f equilibrium at the heart o f game theoretic analysis is highly 
applicable to the concept of a negotiated settlement, and to an exploration of the factors 
that cause actors to sign and endorse one yet fail to implement it The benefits o f this 
methodological approach are more thoroughly illustrated m chapter three
From the model of the implementation process a number of hypotheses are proposed on 
key independent variables concerned with the internal rules and procedures o f the 
implementation process, and with the external environment Their explanatory value is 
subsequently explored m the empirical section
EMPRICAL SECTION
There are two parts to the empirical section of the study a macro-study and three micro- 
studies The macro study uses a data set o f 25 cases to explore the relative capacities of 
the Intra Formation Factionalism (IFF) model hypotheses and hypotheses derived from 
other popular theories to explain the outcome of implementation The second explores 
the IFF hypotheses more specifically using three m-depth case studies selected from the 
data set
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Reflecting a methodological discussion m progress across the social science disciplines, 
a debate has ensued within disciplines concerned with civil-war termination over the 
relative advantages associated with the comparative and individual case-study 
approaches to the analysis of civil conflict Those who argue that all conflicts are 
unique1 and thus should be examined individually and not comparatively ignore the fact 
that all phenomena and events that involve the actions o f individuals are m some sense 
unique (King et al 41) While individual case studies provide crucial data for the 
conduction of a comparative analysis, a comparative approach to the empirical section 
is implicitly favoured in the typology of conflict presented in chapter one While unique 
root causes may feature m all civil conflicts, each civil conflict involves individual 
actors who themselves are motivated by multiple factors frequently distinct from the 
‘unique’ root causes Further it is worth recalling the assertion made in Chapter One that 
long civil conflicts enter cycles In accordance with these cycles the relative importance 
of the issues generally seen as causal and contributing to the uniqueness o f the conflict 
may decrease as other issues, perhaps associated with the structures resulting from 
escalation, assume more prominence and present more obstacles to management
Amongst those advocating a comparative method, a further debate can be identified 
between those favounng empirical studies which tend to treat each case study as a 
single empirical observation, and a case-study approach (Walter, 1997, Lickhder, 1995) 
The latter seeks to highlight a number of observations within a single case study In a 
pioneering study on methodology m social sciences, King et al (1994 47-8) emphasise 
the importance of maximising the number of observable implications of the theory m 
question, which they refer to as the critical maxim By combining a comparative 
analysis o f a data set o f twenty-five cases, followed by a more m-depth analysis of the 
IFF model hypotheses using three case studies, this work bridges the gap between 
advocates o f the former and latter methodological approaches, and simultaneously 
increases the number of observations of the IFF theory As well as increasing the 
number o f observations, the cases examine the plausibility o f both the assumptions and 
the predictions of the model developed in chapter three, and the implications of the 
results for the design of implementation processes
1 See Bloomfield, 1997 for overview of analysts who defend a single case study approach
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Critical for the empirical application is the accurate and non-biased selection of cases 
for the data set and m-depth case-study selection Equally crucial is an accurate 
definition of the dependent variable The cntena used to develop the most appropriate 
data set of cases (observations) on which to explore the plausibility of the hypotheses 
are first outlined Following this, the process of defining the dependent vanable and of 
employing appropriate proxies with which to classify or code cases according to the 
dependent variable is descnbed The chapter concludes with a section on in-depth case 
study selection
DATA SET SELECTION CRITERION
In an effort to avoid selection bias and to reduce the possibility that the cntena for case 
selection might effect the findings of this research, a highly inclusive data set of post- 
civil conflict implementation processes was developed Furthermore, an effort was 
made to control for the impact of the international political system and great-power 
rivalry on the implementation of negotiated settlements, m particular given the 
involvement of cold-war patrons m such a large proportion of civil wars
Civil conflicts are defined using cntena based on those used by Wallensteen and 
Sollenberg (1996, 1997) The more frequently employed Singer and Small correlates of 
war (COW) cntena are considered to be unnecessanly restnctive and too arbitrary, in 
their requirement that over 1,000 battle deaths per year must have been generated by the 
conflict for its inclusion m the data set of civil conflict This results m the exclusion 
from the COW data set o f relatively intense, apparently protracted civil conflicts that 
have been ongoing for decades Allowing for lower intensity, Wallensteen and 
Sollenberg include a conflict if at least 25 battle-related deaths are recorded dunng a 
year, and define a conflict as minor armed conflict if  the total number o f battle related 
deaths is below 1,000, as intermediate armed conflict if the total number of battle 
related deaths exceeds 1,000 for the duration of the conflict (1998 621-2), and as major 
armed conflict if the battle related deaths every year exceed 1,000 By taking into 
account both duration and intensity, a more inclusive empincal examination than COW 
would allow is conducted, and the potential selection bias associated with the threshold 
problem is by and large eliminated
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Wallensteen and Sollenberg’s data set was used to initially identify intermediate and 
major civil conflicts ongoing (but not necessarily beginning) m 19892 A conflict is 
accordingly defined as a civil conflict if it constitutes a contested incompatibility 
between government3and an opposition movement(s) The conflict concerns the type of 
political system, the replacement o f central government or the change of its 
composition, or the status of a territory, secession or autonomy (1998 633) In order to 
ensure inclusion and thus avoid selection bias, cases were updated and cross-checked 
against the Heidelberg University’s Kosimo database and Kosimo conflict barometer 
(1997, 1999 2001), Heraclide’s database of separatist conflicts (1997), the State 
Breakdown data set (1999), Monty G Marshall’s Major Episodes of Political Violence 
(1999), and a data set compiled by Caroline Hartzell (1999), which correlates heavily 
with data bases used by Walter (1997, 2002) and Lickhder (1995) Where Wallensteen 
and Sollenberg code intensity as minor, but battle deaths are subsequently recorded by 
other sources as over 1,000 for the duration of the conflict, the cases are included for 
analysis The civil conflicts m Niger, Mali and Dijbouti (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 
351-352, Marshall, 1999) fit into this category Using the above sources, civil conflicts 
were next coded according to whether or not negotiations took place leading to the 
signing or formal endorsement o f any kind of negotiated peace settlement, including 
those defined as comprehensive, peace process, partial or cease-fire agreements
The data set is restricted to including post-cold war settlements, or more specifically to 
including settlements concluded since the later years o f the 1980s, when warming 
relations between the US and the USSR created a structural international environment 
similar to that which emerged in the 1989 and post 1989 international system Firstly, 
third-party mediated settlements to civil conflicts were a rare political development 
dunng the cold war (Lickhder, 1995) In fact, many civil conflicts intensified and were 
significantly complicated by the strategic intervention of superpowers and their allies 
While it is questionable, if not inaccurate, to interpret any of these civil wars as ‘proxy 
wars,’ this interpretation ignoring ferocious domestic power struggles, the nature of the 
international political system ensured that negotiated settlements were either an 
unlikely, or a potentially very temporary outcome In other words, there exists an
2 Wallensteen and Sollenberg’s data set begins with conflicts ongoing or beginning in 1989
3 The party controlling the capital of the state, either internationally recognised or in control of territory 
and its control not disputed by an internationally recognised government that previously controlled it
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overwhelming probability that negotiated settlements to cold-war civil conflicts from at 
least the 1950s until the mid 1980s were negotiated not m earnest, but to allow for a 
temporary pause m violent conflict, and that the fate of its implementation lay m the 
hands of rival super powers, interested in re-launching the conflict when the right 
opportunity arose The current analysis restncts empirical data to negotiated settlements 
concluded after this period This restriction helps to limit the probability that the failure 
of implementation is far better explained by the nature o f the international system, than 
by the other external variables and the internal variables of concern to this study
Secondly, restricting the analysis to settlements that were concluded m a non-bi-polar 
international system, in the first instance takes into account the effect that the thawing 
of super power relations, and the reduction in financial and military support for conflict 
actors that frequently followed, may have had on the collective goals and strategies of 
conflict formations With the removal of the pretext of the communist or capitalist 
threat resulting m a decline m strategic intervention m civil wars, domestic actors lost 
long time sponsors, a factor that may have motivated some factions o f conflict 
formations towards negotiations, and others towards finding alternative sources o f  
matenal and political support However, the changes that the thawing of superpower 
relations may have had on the motivations o f conflict formations should be similar 
across most conflicts, and thus controlled for in so far as possible In the second 
instance, the thawing of super power relations altered the strategic interests o f powerful 
international actors, and a large proportion of post-1987 interventions by former 
superpowers or other powers has been to bnng economic and political stability to the 
region in question Therefore the ‘peace process,’ as currently known, is a relatively 
new phenomenon (Cox, 1997 671), increasing m number since the end of the cold war, 
and more often than not including powerful actors who publicly prioritise the 
implementation of the terms of the settlement In sum, while the capability and best 
third-party strategy to oversee successful implementation remains unclear, and is a 
concern of this thesis, the intentions o f the most powerful actors m the global political 
system are, for strategic interests, more disposed towards securing an implementation of 
peace agreements than was likely during the cold war 4
4 It could be argued that as no peace agreement could have been signed in the cold war period without the 
consent ot the superpower, those that were must be included in the analysis However many analysts 
make distinctions along pre and post cold war lines and other civil war data sets begin in 1945, a date also
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Operational concerns relating to the availability of comparable data coincide with the 
decision to concentrate on post 1987 implementation processes Table 2 1 lists all such 
civil conflict settlements between 1987 and 1999
Table 2 1, Negotiated Settlements, 1987-1999
Process Year Process Year
Angola 1 1991 Liberia 1996
Angola2 1994 Mali 1992
Bosma-Herzegovma 1995 Mozambique 1992
Cambodia 1991 Nagomo-Kara 1994
Chad 1994 Moldova 1992
Chad 1996 Namibia 1988
Chechnya 1996 Nicaragua 1991
CHT(Banglds)5 1997 Niger 1995
Congo 2000 N Ireland 1998
Djbouti 1994 Philip (MNLF) 1996
East Timor 1999 S Leone 1 1996
El Salvador 1992 S Leone2 1999
Georgia 1994 Sri Lanka 1987
Guatemala 1996 South Africa 1994
Israel/ Palest 1993 Tajikistan 1997
Kosovo 1999 Western Sahara (Morocco) 1991
Lebanon 1989
Conflicts were next coded according to whether or not the settlement was reached via 
inclusive negotiations, and whether it constitutes a ‘formally endorsed, negotiated 
settlement ’ This is to ensure that the selection of cases reflects the concern of the thesis 
with explaining the obstacles to implementing comprehensive, negotiated settlements 
that document compromises, and a guide to a political process through which the 
conflict will be transformed The coding criteria, and the proxies appropriate for the 
identification of formally endorsed negotiated settlements, are next discussed with an 
eye to avoiding selection bias
Where possible, cases are excluded if there appears to be a high probability that parties 
negotiated and endorsed the agreement m order to dupe the other party(s), while fully 
intending to return to battle as soon as their military capacity had been strengthened It 
is judged that m these cases actors did not truly endorse the settlement, and that this
demarcated by a shift in the international system To conclusively deal with such criticisms, seven 
negotiated settlements from 1945 -  1987 could be added to the current set in another study
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non-endorsement is most likely to provide the best explanation for a failure to 
implement
But, given the mixed motivations and non-unitary actor interpretation of conflict 
outlined m chapter one, the elimination of cases on these criteria is a complex and 
potentially highly subjective process In fact, it is virtually impossible to conclusively 
judge m which cases ‘to dupe ’ is the primary motivation of all (or a critical mass of) 
factions in the conflict formation While the presence of Zartman’s concept of a 
mutually hurting stalemate (discussed m chapter one) could be useful in identifying 
cases unlikely to be a dupe, he in fact argues that mutually hurting stalemates are 
required to convince parties to enter a comprehensive negotiation process By this 
argument, a mutually hurting stalemate characterised all conflicts for which negotiated 
settlements were negotiated (table 2 1)
Walter endeavours to control for duping by omitting from her group of successfully 
negotiated settlements those settlements where the terms were either never implemented 
or only partially implemented, with violent conflict following within the year (1997 
344-345) In a similar endeavour, Hartzell (1999 14) only includes cases where ‘some 
effort’ was actually made by antagonists to implement the settlement But the question 
must be asked as to whether or not the failure to move to implement a certain number of 
settlement terms is due to a prevailing motivation within all formations to dupe, or due 
to a more fundamental failure in the design of the implementation process, or to a 
structural vanable such as the underlying political economy Could it be that the failure 
to implement is due to the absence from implementation design of agreed rules and 
procedures that facilitate movement on implementation? Or might it be that the absence 
of a third party, secunty or economic credible commitment to the parties implementing 
the agreement contributes to its early failure? Or perhaps the reluctance of regional 
powers to endorse the agreement prevented parties from initiating a genuine 
implementation process Further, if we assume that in all conflicts divisions exist within 
conflict formations, it is quite likely that it is these factors, and not the fact that conflict 
formations were only motivated towards ‘duping,’ that are key
5 Chittagong Hill Tracts Bangladesh
39
A selection criterion used by Walter helps to further illustrate this point Walter (1997 
344) excludes from her data set of negotiated settlements negotiation processes that 
appear to have been undertaken m bad faith, where either ‘duping’ or spoiling the 
negotiations would appear to have been the real goal, or where delegates refused to talk 
to each other or set ridiculous pre-conditions She argues that by excluding these cases 
that were ‘unlikely’ to succeed (despite their having endorsed an agreement) she is 
making the test for her credible commitment hypothesis, to explain the successful 
outcome of settlements, tougher This argument is based on the premise that amongst 
the cases she does examine belligerents were favourably disposed to negotiations, and 
therefore it was more likely that they would succeed without outside factors The strong 
correlation between settlements that are eventually successfully concluded and the 
presence o f a credible commitment is interpreted to imply that even where belligerents 
are favourably disposed towards negotiations they will not succeed without the credible 
commitment While this point is well illustrated, what is omitted from the analysis is the 
possibility that a credible commitment, or any of the other variables which are included 
for empirical testing, characterised the afore-mentioned, eliminated cases With the 
inclusion o f these cases, other variables may have explained equally well or even better 
the success or failure to negotiate and to consolidate settlements In other words, an 
explanatory vanable other than credible commitment, and other than an apparent 
‘dupe,’ may have explained why the implementation process managed to overcome 
some obstacles or failed at the first hurdle
A further danger with approximating duping with the re-emergence of civil war withm 
the year is that o f selecting cases more likely to be successful, while eliminating cases 
that look likely to fail during implementation This not only introduces selection bias, 
but it reduces the variety on the dependent vanable to a point where it may be difficult 
to discern anything from the results of an analysis that attempts to explain varied 
outcomes
Yet, despite these methodological difficulties, where the task is, as outlined, to identify 
‘inclusive’ and ‘formally endorsed, comprehensive negotiated settlements,’ it remains 
desirable to exclude cases m which no actors are interested m implementation But, 
given the concerns outlined, this study does not attempt to read the intentions of conflict 
formations as unitary actors, nor does it use stalemate or outbreak of civil war within
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the year as indicative of a dupe Instead, it is argued that if  a number of criteria that 
define a settlement as inclusive and comprehensive are satisfied by a settlement, it 
cannot be categorised as a dupe and must therefore be included
Fnstly, the settlement must be negotiated or at least be endorsed by the key conflict 
formations6, with evidence of some support for the agreement on signing, and of  
documented compromise on issues deemed to be central to the conflict and its 
management Where members of conflict formations played no part m negotiations, and 
where a settlement appears to have been completely imposed by outside parties, cases 
are excluded, as they do not fulfil either the first (inclusion) or second condition 
(endorsement o f compromises) to make it an inclusive, comprehensive negotiated 
settlement Excluding cases on this basis, a basis adapted from Hartzell, who excludes 
cases where an uneasy peace appears to be the result o f an imposed settlement that 
depends on foreign troops (1999 12-13), is an apparently sensible way to deal with 
cases where it is unclear whether or not existing documented compromise is really 
endorsed by the conflict formations (or any part of) On this basis the cease-fire 
agreements producing a type of imposed stalemate m Nagomo-Karabak, Georgia and 
Moldova are excluded from the examination The cases o f Haiti and Kosovo are 
excluded on the grounds that they are arguably inaccurately defined as post-civil 
conflict implementation processes, and more accurately defined as state-buildmg 
processes in which the international community negotiated with one party to the 
conflict In fact, Cousens and Kumar (1996 1) refer to the UN operation m Haiti as the 
‘first time that UN peacekeepers were deployed in a situation characterized by neither 
interstate nor internal warfare’ The Portuguese-Indonesian settlement for East Timor is 
excluded on the double bases that East Timorean formations were not directly involved 
m negotiations, and the process of implementation is possibly more accurately defined 
as state building
The settlements m Namibia and Sn Lanka are included While m Namibia neither 
SWAPO (South West Africa People’s Organisation) nor the South African installed 
government of Namibia were directly involved m the negotiations which involved UN  
mediators and the South African, Angolan and Cuban governments, negotiations were
0 ‘Conflict formation’ or ‘conflict actor’ lefers to a single political orgamsation/party or to a broad 
alliance of organisations which together represent a community ’
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based on agreement reached in 1978 and 1982 and were believed to have the full 
endorsement of SWAPO, who were represented by mediators and had been 
internationally recognised as the sole and authentic representative of the people o f  
Namibia (Hampson, 1996: 78; 59). While the Accord between the Sri Lankan and 
Indian government primarily excluded Tamil groups from negotiations, several were 
supportive o f the agreement and of India’s role as their representative, with the most 
strident opponent LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) agreeing to support it after 
its signing (Hancock, 1999: 91-2).
Concerning the second criteria, that a settlement be comprehensive, the level and depth 
of documented compromise differs from agreement to agreement. Provided that 
documented compromise exists on more than a retreat, or that settlements signify more 
than a cease-fire accompanied by a promise to have talks in the future, the agreement is 
included. In sum, agreements are excluded if the settlement appears to have been 
imposed, and/or if  substantial agreement pertains only to a cease-fire and is followed by 
no further documented compromise, or by stalemated negotiations over the management 
of conflict issues.7
Partial agreements, to which not all conflict formations involved in the conflict in the 
entity in question were party, are included provided that documented compromise exists 
and the door was open to the non-endorsing formation to take part in the negotiations
o
for the settlement. For example, the peace accord signed by the Philippine government 
and the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front) is partial in that the rival MILF (Moro 
Islamic National Liberation Front) insurgent organisation, which split from MNLF in 
the late 1970s, did not endorse it. But the door has been left open to the MILF to 
negotiate with the government, this recently leading to a cease-fire agreement in June 
2001 (Manilla Herald: 8:8:01). The existence of a section of a conflict formation that 
continues to fight might in fact enable a clearer identification of factions, while this 
non-endorsing faction would itself incorporate factions with differing motivations
The theory could well be applied to such ‘purely cease-fire agreements,’ but for the purposes of 
comparing implementation processes further agreements must be signed for inclusion. Anyway, purely 
cease-fire agreements, m particular those that are frequently broken or that have moved to no farther 
compromise, suggest that endorsement may have been motivated by the desire to ‘dupe.’
8 If certain formations or factions are invited, but refuse to participate or leave half way through 
negotiations, without being suddenly subjected to stringent pre-conditions for participation, the 
negotiation process conforms to the inclusion requirement.
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towards negotiations Similarly, m Djibouti, a faction of FRUD (Front for the 
Restoration of Unity and Democracy) did not endorse the settlement signed by the 
government and a moderate FRUD wing in December 1994 (European Platform,
10 2000 Djibouti) But the door was not closed to the other FRUD faction, which 
continued to wage low-level violence against the government, and further negotiations 
between it and the government resulted in negotiated settlements in 2000 (Jane’s 
Sentinel North Africa, 7 01 118) and 2001 9 The significantly different dynamics 
behind the partial agreements m Chad m both 1994 and 1996, which saw a number of 
conflict formations outside of the process and government insistence on negotiating 
with some and not with others, along with the cease-fire nature of the agreements 
(European Platform, 2000), results in their exclusion from the data set
For the practical purposes of examining an implementation process, the settlement must 
have been endorsed four years before the time of final analysis (July 2002), except 
where a settlement was so clearly a failure10 that it can be identified as such m a shorter 
time frame of three years The 1999 settlement endorsed by parties to the conflict in 
Sierra Leone is the only such exception included m the data set The full list of twenty- 
five cases appears m Table 2 2
9 www AllAfnca com Peace Agreement Addresses Atar Discontent’ 14 05 01 [27 8  01]
10 At least initially
Table 2 2, Final Data Set and the Dependent Variable (Outcome of Process)
Process Year Outc
Angola 1 1991 F
Angola2 1994 F
Bosma-Herz 1995 P
Cambodia 1991 P
Chechnya 1996 F
CHT(Banglds) 1997 P
Djbouti 1994 P
El Salvador 1992 S
Guatemala 1996 S
Israel/ Palest 1993 F
Lebanon 1989 P
Liberia 1996 P
Mali 1992(5) S
Mozambique 1992 S
Namibia 1988 s
Nicaragua 1991(4) s
Niger 1995 p
N Ireland 1998 s
Phihpp(Mind) 1996 p
S Leone 1 1996 F
S Leone2 1999 F
Sn Lanka 1987 F
South Africa 1994 S
Tajikstan 1997 P
W Sah (Mor) 1991 F
S = Successful, P = Partially successful and / or stalled, F = Failed
The process o f coding the dependent variable (outcome), which also appears m Table 
2 2 above, is now addressed
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Dependent vanables must be explicitly defined, and the proxies selected to approximate 
the dependent variable must be clearly distinguishable from those that approximate 
explanatory vanables for each observation In their endeavours to explain the causes of 
‘complex humamtanan emergencies,’ Melkas (1996) and Auvmin and Nafziger (1997) 
devote much thought to the definition of the concept and the proxies most suitable for 
its measurement While it may have immediately seemed appropriate to seek to define a 
complex humamtanan emergency using macro-economic aspects o f the state in 
question, when the goal of the study is to use economic trends and phenomena to 
explain the occurrence of CHEs, this is clearly an inappropriate method Thus Auvmin 
and Nafziger (15-17) employ proxies of the intensity o f fighting, the volume of
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displaced people, malnutrition and infant mortality to confirm whether or not a CHE 
prevails in an entity
The dependent variable in this thesis is the outcome of the implementation process and 
three possible outcomes exist Successful, Partially Successful/Stalled and Failed The 
measurement of outcome is problematic, given the complexities associated with both 
the short penod of time since the endorsement o f settlements, and differing 
interpretations m the literature of what truly constitutes the successful ending of a civil 
war or conflict and thus the outcome of an implementation process Different theories of 
conflict resolution apply different criteria to judge the extent to which the management 
or resolution of conflict is successful But these differing approaches are not entirely 
incompatible and can be taken together, within the constraints imposed by the short 
duration of the implementation processes, to assess degrees o f successful 
implementation
A pnncipled-negotiation approach would perceive the ability of parties to reach a 
formal agreement through negotiations as successful conflict resolution Human-needs 
theorists, on the other hand, require that a significant duration of time will have passed 
since the agreement was signed to assess the degree of success and require that the 
needs of the parties, such as identity or security, are met (Ross and Rothmann, 1999 6) 
Some analysts require that comprehensive reconciliation processes that frequently 
establish new institutions to deal with reconciliation are part o f implementation if  the 
roots o f the conflict are to be truly addressed (Mail et al, 1999 187) Those who focus 
on conflict transformation see a recasting of the relationship amongst parties as the key 
to judging success (Ross and Rothmann 6) Others blur the line between conflict and 
peace (Duffield, 2000 80), pointing to the very fine, defining line separating societies 
‘at war5 and societies ‘at peace’, and highlighting a number of structural factors that 
serve to maintain coercive war-time power hierarchies m societies that are ostensibly ‘at 
peace ’
But can an implementation process be rendered successful given, for example, the 
persistence of war-time coercive power hierarchies or deeply entrenched animosities yet 
to be addressed by truth or reconciliation processes? If the answer is no, as peace studies 
and some conflict resolution analysts might suggest (Groom, 1986 90), highly
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subjective criteria must be applied to assess, for example, the extent to which socio­
economic power hierarchies have been broken down, or reconciliation has taken place, 
m order to derive the dependent variable for each conflict If the answer is yes, and thus 
allows for the possibility that implementation may be successful without a formal 
reconciliation process, or without a full transition to democratic governance, or without 
the full breakdown of power hierarchies that originated m war time, the definition of  
success should be indicated by other, arguably less subjective criterion The latter 
interpretation is tentatively adopted by this research for a number of reasons that are 
explained below
The proxies that are selected to reflect this will have an important impact on the result 
of empirical analysis The less subjective, the more accurate the analysis will be The 
dependent variable is defined as simply an estimate of the extent to which 
implementation has proceeded along the lines envisioned in the agreement and 
according to the stated overall objectives of the agreement Principled negotiation 
theorists’ proxies would be insufficient to establish successful implementation, Human 
needs theorists’ proxies too restrictive, given the length of time that an implementation 
process lasts
A recent paper concerning lessons for policymakers involved m implementing peace 
agreements reports the findings of one of the few empirical works to address 
implementation from a broad, comparative perspective In an apparent effort to avoid 
both overly restrictive and subjective cntena for the identification of successful 
implementation, an emphatic definitional distinction is made between the requirements 
of peace building and of implementation According to the project co-director ‘good 
things like reconciliation, justice, democracy and the rule of law cannot be attained in 
the short run,’ they argue (Stedman, 2001 7) ‘Good things like economic growth, 
equitable development and good governance’ are also considered to form a ‘useless 
standard for evaluating implementation actions that take place in a short period o f time’ 
(Stedman 2001 8) Thus only two proxies are used to indicate the outcome to 
implementation (l) Whether the specific war that the peace agreement is designed to 
address is brought to an end while the implementers are present and (11) whether the war
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is terminated on a self-enforcing basis, so that the implemented can withdraw without 
fear o f the war resuming 11
While agreeing with the principle behind this approach -  namely the limited progress 
that can be made mside a short time frame -  this thesis takes a slightly broader one and 
attempts to take into account improvements or developments in the institutionalisation 
of mechanisms for managing conflict that appear to follow or accompany the 
implementation process This refers to the somewhat intangible concept of the degree 
to which the documented compromises were indisputably implemented to the point 
whereby space for the operation of the new instruments o f conflict management, and the 
breakdown of former power-hierarchies, has been created It is argued that, rather than 
hailing settlements as ‘political solutions/ where the outcome of implementation is 
concerned it is more helpful to interpret peace agreements as serving to facilitate the 
political management o f the conflict by creating an institutional set up through which 
structures to manage the conflict might be established This concept is worth defining m 
the quest to seek the most accurate proxy for the dependent variable
The approach taken by the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CUR, 1996 
28-9) illustrates how it might be possible to operationalise the concept of ‘political 
space’ Analysing the ‘important, if  limited or modest’, effect that the peace accords 
have had on changing Guatemalan politics and society, it notes that the accords have 
facilitated the subordination of military power to civilian authority, a new exercise m 
leadership and citizenship and a move from confrontation to negotiation But first and 
foremost, it reports, the peace process allowed for a political solution to the armed 
conflict It created the space for a political solution Mirroring this approach, the success 
of implementation here is measured by the extent to which compromise solutions, 
documented m agreements, were implemented, opening up the way for the political and 
peaceful management of power struggles over conflicting issues
How can the quality of this ‘space for a political solution’ be measured m a way that 
approaches objectivity, and, what is more, how can this measurement process avoid 
reference to important proxies subsequently employed as ‘explanatory variables'? To
11 They focus clearly on policy lessons for the external implementer and their analysis restricted to cases 
in which external actors are the implementers, this giving them a data set of 16 agreements
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this end, a number of proxies have been selected that are together considered to give an 
overall assessment of progress in implementation and the relative development o f the 
entity, from one where violent civil conflict defines relations between actors, to one 
where political institutions replace it.
Sources for all proxies are listed in appendix A and the bibliography. A measurement of 
the extent to which armed conflict persists, has decreased or has ended altogether is 
included as a key indicator of the extent to which the most fundamental objective o f a 
‘peace agreement’ is achieved: Violence is brought to an end. This proxy measures 
trends in violent conflict levels over the four years following the endorsement o f  the 
settlement, using a number of sources (appendix A). Clearly the withdrawal, in the 
context of completing its mandate, of third party actors involved in the implementation 
process will be important in defining the extent to which the terms of a settlement have 
been implemented, but it is not in itself the only aspect of this proxy to be evaluated, 
and, in conflicts where no external actor has played a key implementing role, it would 
be problematic. The apparent progress achieved by conflict formations in the 
implementation of the commitments they endorsed in the settlement serves as an 
equally direct measurement o f the extent to which implementation is achieved. Using a 
range o f sources (bibliography), conflicts are evaluated for evidence of movement on 
key commitments in the peace agreement, such as the setting up or dismantling of  
institutions, adherence to agreed procedures and contributions towards the setting up of 
implementation bodies.
The volume of displaced people tends to correlate highly with the incidence of violent 
civil conflict (Auvinen and Nafziger, 1997: 15) and estimates of the number of refugees 
and internally displaced people (IDPs) seeking refuge both inside and outside of the 
entity are frequently employed to measure the extent of civil conflict. Where the 
measurement of implementation is concerned, the return of refugees and IDPs serves as 
an important proxy of the extent to which the general population believe that some 
movement towards the replacement of coercive and violence-centred institutions of 
governance with more peaceful, co-operative institutions has been made. In many cases, 
such as El Salvador, some people who fled as refugees during the civil war prefer, for 
socio-economic reasons, to remain abroad (Auvinen and Nafziger, 1997). Figures 
compiled by agencies such as the UNHCR and US Committee for Refugees make a
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laborious effort to exclude former refugees, now nationals (or aspiring nationals) 
abroad, who fit this description and who therefore do not fall into the category of 
refugees Given this effort, the figures do give a picture o f the extent to which people 
who want to return, fear returning home, either from abroad or from internal 
displacement Estimates of the extent to which the problem of unretumed refugees and 
internally displaced people persists are used alongside a measure of violence levels to 
assess the extent to which implementation is real
Independent, comparative assessments o f relative improvement or deterioration in the 
level of democratic institutionalisation, and the civil and human rights situation in the 
entity in question, complete the proxies that are used to measure the dependent variable 
Regardless o f the initial level o f democracy, all peace agreements enshrine as a central 
goal the further institutionalisation or establishment of democratic institutions and 
sometimes the decentralisation of power as steps m the implementation process An 
independent measure of the level o f democracy and autocracy thus helps to assess not 
only whether or not the institutions were established, but whether or not they conform to 
the type of institutions outlined m the agreement The Polity 98 and 2000 databases are 
used to assess changes m democracy and autocracy levels, both before and after the 
endorsement o f agreements Freedom House Scores o f the extent of political and civil 
freedom both before and after the negotiated settlement are included alongside regular 
reports from Human Rights Watch to broaden the institution-centred definition used in 
polity 98 and 200012
Taken together, these indicators give a fairly clear assessment of the relative success or 
progress m the implementation process, even for conflicts that have only formally ended 
for four years The time frame of implementation clearly restricts evaluating success 
using the more demanding criteria proposed by peace-building or ‘human needs’ 
theorists However, simple trends in the level of institutionalisation and civil freedoms, 
frequently at their most restncted dunng civil war, can only enrich the evaluation of
12 Where the civil conflict has taken place in an entity or part of a state, Freedom House Index and Polity 
scores were read in conjunction with country reports from Human Rights Watch and European Platform 
for Conflict Transformation and Management to ensure that the trend indicated for the state by the indices 
leflected human and civil rights and démocratisation trends in the entity
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implementation and the accurate coding of outcome A summary of the conditions and 
corresponding proxies appears in table 2 3
T^ble 2 3 Summary of Dependent Variable Proxies (See A ppendix A for Elaboration and Case Data)
Proxies No Change/Deterioration Some Improvement Significant Improvement
Relative Level of 
Civil Violence
Remains the same or worse Decreases but remains 
persistent at a lower level 
(& is connected)
Almost disappears except 
some isolated incidents
Relative Position 
of Refugees and 
IDPs
The number of refugees 
either increases overall or 
remains the same
Numbers decrease as a 
result of the agreement but 
remain at a significant 
level
The majority are returned 
home and some moves are 
put m place to deal with 
IDPs with some movement
Evidence of 
Implementing Key 
Provisions
Little or no movement on the 
implementation key 
provisions m the agreement 
oi formally set up but not 
used
Some movement on 
implementation but the 
overall characteristic on 
most provisions = Stalling
Institutions and 
compromises o f the 
agreement have by & large 
been implementented
Relative level of 
institutionalised 
democracy & civil 
rights/freedoms
Both remain the same or 
deteriorate overall
Some improvement but 
not consistently moving in 
an improving direction
Significant and incremental 
improvement
By including all proxies, the situation where a case notable for a profound reduction in 
the level o f civil violence, but also for permanent stalling on the implementation o f  
agreed institutions and a consequential persistent real threat o f renewed fighting, might 
be labelled as successful is avoided Similarly, where agreed compromises and 
institutions are set up, but where conflict and fear remain relatively persistent and the 
level to which institutions have resulted m any perceived consolidation of democratic 
governance is highly questionable, both casting doubt on the verbal endorsement given 
by conflict formations to the principles o f the agreement, the implementation process is 
unlikely to be classified as successful Equally unlikely to be defined as successful is a 
process, for example Cambodia,13 in which further sustained outbreaks o f violent civil 
conflict or war precedes the final consolidation of more peaceful governance, raising the 
possibility that the outcome of violence was the most likely catalyst for final 
consolidation Details o f the proxies used to determine the dependent vanable are 
displayed m appendix A The independent variables and the proxies and sources used to 
code them for each hypothesis are described, along with the statistical techniques for the 
macro-empincal analysis, m chapter four
13 Hartzell 1999 codes Cambodia as an agreement that secured stability, despite the increase in violence 
and re-outbreak of civil war before stability emerged
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IN-DEPTH CASE STUDIES
After chapter four the dissertation further explores the plausibility of the IFF model 
predictions using case studies selected from the data set (Chapters Five to Seven) Case 
studies were selected to represent different values on the dependent variable, a selection 
criteria critical if selection bias is to be avoided They include two relatively successful 
outcomes El Salvador and Northern Ireland and two failed outcomes Angola (1991) 
and Angola (1994) What is more, within each case study there are observations of 
many outcomes, both successful and stalled In both Angolan implementation processes, 
m particular the second, while there was ultimately more stalling, there was some 
implementation In Northern Ireland, stalling has prevailed on many occasions and in El 
Salvador it frequently characterised the process A successful outcome was by no means 
a given in either case In fact, the process in Northern Ireland is not yet fully 
institutionalised and m El Salvador, while more or less institutionalised, the socio­
economic provisions o f the agreement require further incremental implementation if 
root causes of the civil war are to be fully addressed
Given that the case studies serve as an effort to explore the accuracy of the IFF model 
predictions on the institutions o f the implementation process, an effort was made to 
control, in so far as possible, for other potential explanatory variables which are 
considered in detail m chapter four For example, two popular independent variables are 
the presence o f a mutually hurting stalemate, and the presence of certain conditions in 
the international regional political and security environment Despite the different 
outcomes on the dependent van able, m all three conflicts regional factors supported a 
settlement, and the mutually hurting stalemate predicted to encourage settlement 
appeared to characterise the conflicts and its actors As chapter four will outline, a 
number of other independent variables concerning the presence of a credible 
commitment and power sharing were similar across all cases despite the different 
outcomes The end of the cold war and of greater power interest m perpetuating civil 
conflicts contributed to the development o f mutually hurting stalemates m favour of 
settlement, as did the end of regional conflict complexes in each of the case studies, m 
particular m El Salvador and Angola (Juhn, 1998 2, SWO, 1996 5) The regional 
circumstances that helped to sustain the conflict in Northern Ireland gradually eroded 
during the late 1980s and 1990s, with the development of a greater degree of common 
understanding between the British and Irish governments on what needed to be done if
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the conflict was to be managed (McGarry and O’Leary, 1995 386, Darby and McGinty, 
2000 85)
The methodology employed is consistent across all three cases The closed and 
centralised nature of conflict formations and the coercive political structures that 
characterise many of them, regardless o f the level of democracy in the entity, makes it 
difficult to clearly establish membership of factions, and therefore to highlight the 
impact of predicted mechanisms on the intra-formation struggle at each juncture m the 
implementation process In an effort to overcome this empirical difficulty, conflict 
formations are examined at the outset for evidence of, and incentives for, the existence 
of factions with different attitudes towards implementation Following the identification 
of factions, for each case study the rules, procedures and mechanisms of the process 
(central to an examination of the hypotheses developed in chapter three) are detected 
and an analytical narrative presented that focuses on using these rules and procedures 
and any changes to them to explain the behaviour of factions and formations in the 
implementation process and to ultimately explain the outcome of the process
The texts of the Accords and any subsequent agreements on implementation were used 
to highlight the features o f implementation design central to the hypotheses developed 
m chapter three A range of reliable international news and news wire services, such as 
Agence France Presse International, Associated Press, Financial Times, the Guardian, 
the International Herald Tribune and the BBC news were used to create a highly 
detailed, day-to-day account of the actions, events and general progress m 
implementation for all cases BBC World Wide Momtonng, which closely monitors and 
reproduces local broadcast and print media, was used extensively to access statements 
and actions of conflict formations and factions Financial Times Profile, which permits 
access to a wide range of worldwide media sources, was also extensively used to assess 
progress on implementation Further extensively used sources include Estudios Centro 
Americano (ECA), El Diano/La Prensa, Latin American Newsline, Angolan Peace 
Monitor (APM), Jane’s Intelligence Review and Jane’s Sentinel
Special Representative to the UN SG, Margaret Antsee, provides an eyewitness, 
detailed account of the first Angolan implementation process froml992 -  1993 An 
invaluable source that concentrates on detailing the day-to-day events and frustrations
52
of the process, while arguably seeking to defend the UN role m the process, serves as an 
unbiased account o f the conflict actors as it does not seek to place blame for the collapse 
entirely at the door of one conflict formation or the other Tncia Juhn (1998), m her 
account o f the negotiation process preceding the signing of a final agreement m El 
Salvador, draws on a range of primary sources and documents, including internal 
memos from the parties to the negotiations As access to this documentation was not 
available in this case, the sources and her well-argued and highly-illustrative account of 
the process are drawn upon where relevant While access to some documents and 
statements o f conflict actors m El Salvador and Angola was possible, the contents of 
statements were more comprehensively available using the media sources above, which 
m fact covered day-to-day broadcasts from official broadcast media and broadcast 
media run by the FMLN and UNIT A Given the more recent agreement m Northern 
Ireland and the proximity to the case, it was possible to access first hand the statements 
of actors and daily coverage of events m the process from Northern Ireland, the 
Republic o f Ireland and British media sources The Independent (London) and the Irish 
Times, alongside chronologies provided by the Northern Irish Office (NIO) and CAIN 
for the earlier 1998 and 1999 periods, and the statements of actors, were primarily used 
to create the four-year chronology
Media sources and personal accounts that do more than reproduce or report the 
statements made by formations invariably include some bias By using a wide range of 
media sources, backed up by official UN accounts m the cases of Angola and El 
Salvador, and by focusing sharply on documenting concrete events, actions and 
statements, including those of third parties, an effort is made to avoid the problem 
presented by bias m the interpretation of events in certain media sources Where media 
sources assign blame or quote those assigning blame to one or another formation for 
stalling, this may be noted, but the focus remains on documenting events and actions 
and discussing them in the context o f the rules, procedures and mechanisms of 
implementation and their impact on shaping formation choices
Using the combination of conflict actor statements, UN or mediator reports, media 
source recounts or direct re-production of statements and events, it is estimated that 
every week m the implementation process was analysed, from May 1991 until October 
1992 and November 1994 until at least mid 1997 for the Angolan process, from April
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1998 until October 2001 in the Northern Ireland process and from December 1991 until 
the end of 1993 for the Salvadorian process This was m addition to UN or other 
summary reports of the implementation process Once compiled, the data was analysed 
to examine the extent to which multiple motivations and factionalism within the conflict 
formations were evident throughout the implementation process It was next subjected 
to an analytical process, which sought to expose progress or setbacks m 
implementation, and the rules, procedures and mechanisms of the implementation 
process at the time in question Events and statements m the day-to-day category were 
thus deemed important in so far as they represented a change in the rules, procedures 
and mechanisms of implementation, a significant step away from or towards 
implementation or exposed a serious internal dispute An effort was made to explain the 
inter-formation disputes, which will inevitably characterise implementation processes, 
as a function of mtra-formation factionalism and, where possible, to highlight the 
mechanisms that facilitated a simmering m intra-formation factionalism and progress in 
implementation
Finally, while far more extensive empirical and analytical work was undertaken on the 
m-depth case studies, international news and news-wire sources outlined above were 
used, as well as the sources that establish the value of other independent variables 
outlined in chapter four, and a similar process of analysis was employed to research 
each case in the data set Before the empirical work is set out in detail, the next chapter 
(three) presents the mtra-formation faction (IFF) model o f the implementation process
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CHAPTER THREE 
A STRATEGIC MODEL OF INTRA-PARTY FACTIONALISM 
AND THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS
A theoiy ot implementation should explain the diffeience between ‘giving oideis’ 01 
agieeing on a common action and 'getting results’ (Mungei, 2000 28) But without 
identifying the actois central to the piocess and without a good theory of incentives and 
compliance, one cannot determine the factors that may facilitate 01 impede the 
implementation process Using the power struggles that take place within conflict 
actors and the stiategic interaction of the competing factions as the cential unit ot 
analysis this chapter builds such a theory
Few analysts apply formal, stiategic interaction to the piocess of negotiating 
settlements, and fewer again to their implementation Walter’s depiction of the secunty 
dilemma inherent m all attempts to consolidate negotiated endings to civil conflict is a 
descnptive application of strategic interaction A later study by Wagnei (2000) applies 
stiategic interaction to the process of pre-settlement bargaining Dixon (2000 1-6) uses 
tational choice to develop a ‘civil war termination game’ with which he investigates the 
effect of third-party military intervention on the decisions made by conflict actors to 
either accept or reject compromise agreements Interpreting civil conflicts as revolving 
around a struggle over the stream of resouices available between government and 
insurgents, Dixon’s theory includes a post-negotiation sub-game that mirrors the 
security dilemma presented by Walter (1997) and Snyder (2000) Each actor has an 
opportunity to defect fiom implementing the agreement and at least some incentive to 
do so To favour co-operation, the actor must believe itself to be unlikely to have 
enough power to use force to bettei control the stream of lesources The incentive to co- 
opeiate therefore depends on the extent to which the actor believes that co-operation 
will fuither or at least maintain their control over the stieam of resources
The interaction between the two conflict formations, which is presented as a security 
dilemma, is depicted in game-theoretic format below ‘4’ is the highest possible payoff 
Ioi each formation It is argued that where a third-party security piesence can physically 
mciease the costs of continued conflict suJ fluently to increase incentives toi mutual co- 
opeiation a settlement will be negotiated and implemented
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T ihle 3 1 Prisoner’s Dilemma/Security Dilemma
Umlateial Detection> Mutual Co-opeiation > Mutual Defection > Umlateial Co-opeiation
Conflict Formation B
Co-opeiate/Negot, Don t Co-op/Detect
Co-operate/Negotiate (3,3) (4,1)
Conflict Form A
Don t Co-opeiate (4,1) (2 ,2 )
Inherent in the application of strategic theoiy to the settlement and post-settlement 
piocess is the assumption that actors aie unitary, lational actors Theie is no lecogmtion 
of conflict tormation actions as the product of an internal bargaining process oi powei 
stiuggle, and thus no consideration is given to the nested games in which actois aie 
involved Adopting the unitary actor approach discussed m chapter one, the model 
ofleis little explanation outside oi a third-party security presence foi why conflict 
foimations might negotiate, endorse and begin to implement an agreement, only to latei 
lenege on its clauses
The IFF model seeks to explain faltering implementation processes by modelling the 
dynamics of intra-party factionalism and its effect on the overall strategies oi collective 
actions undertaken by conflict formations The focus shifts to the unexplored, strategic 
actions between factions that shape the interactions between conflict parties An 
'intended5 lational actor approach1 is assumed all tactions belonging to all foimations 
act lationally m pursuit of their own interests, but the collective action of the conflict 
(oimation may not appear to be in the best interests oi the entire tormation The multiple 
motivations that together determine the strategy ot each conflict actor, the unceitainty ot 
lack of information about the payoffs and the motivations of the other conflict foimation 
and its factions aie central to the model
The model draws on a number of concepts developed within the political science 
discipline that help to measure incentives tor compliance including tiansaction costs, 
agency costs and the logic of collective action In the first section, the strategic model
1 Heibert Simon defined this intended iational actor approach See Ostrom 1982 184-6
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ot incentives and compliance tor conflict factions is developed Given these incentives 
and stiategies the next section piesents an incentive-altering political context that may 
mciease the likelihood of implementation A numbei of hypotheses aie denved tiom 
this model and the third section discusses these hypotheses in the context of the two 
categones that define the political context of implementation The institutional design ot 
the implementation process and the external environment
IFF MODEL THEORY OF INCENTIVES AND COMPLIANCE
In his model of negotiations, Diuckman (1978) highlights the dual lole of the negotiatoi 
as bargainer and representative, as an inter-mediatoi between his constituency and the 
opposition party An adequate reflection of pre-agreement negotiations this model sees 
negotiating teams which are geneially leflective of the leadership ot the party, 
bargaining with the opposition while involved m an ongoing process of persuading the 
majority of their own party to support their position (Figure 3 l)2
As negotiations inch nearer to agreement and reach a formula or a final settlement, the 
model of the interaction changes significantly A signed agreement introduces a new 
element 01 lefeience point into the interaction, with which the leadership or pro’ 
faction5 of both or all parties identify An agreement establishes a norm (Gelpi, 1997 
355) A new focal point in the relationship between parties This effectively establishes 
a new or public declaration on the positions of each party to the conflict
Figure 3 1 The Pre-Agreement Negotiation Process
While mtra-paity differences clearly provide difficulties during the pre-agieement 
negotiation process, and this will be leflected in the Ieadeiship’s consistent consultation 
with ail elements ot its party and/oi constituency, this consultation manages in a number
Party A Party B
N egotntm g
Team Paity B
: This lesembies the process famously coined by Putman as the ‘two level game ’ Putman 1988
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ot wavs to alleviate the obstacles piesented by mtia-paity povvei struggles By 
consulting elements within the paity it gives them a sense of powei and a sense of 
choice As long as no final agieement has been leached, the leadership can continue to 
piesent itself as being answeiable to only one base the paity 3 Duimg this time those 
with anti-settlement tendencies within the paity may piefer to wait in the hope of yet 
seeing their peispective becoming dominant As Tsebehs aigues in his analysis of 
strategic behaviour (1990 103), as soon as political actors recognise an outcome as 
disadvantageous foi them, 'they do not necessanly attempt to modify existing 
anangements immediately’, but hope that outside conditions will work m then favoui 
and/oi calculate that moie time is needed to build political coalitions around then 
perspective Therefore, even minonties withm the party who are fundamentally opposed 
to the negotiation strategy can hope that if moves towards the finalising oi a peace 
settlement collapse then the initiative withm the party may shift to them
Recalling Hampson (1996 25), the negotiated settlement leflects 'the expectations, 
goals and compromises that the parties accepted at a given point m time ’ At the time ot 
endorsement the decision by factions to accept the agreement or to mute objections - 
thereby ensuring that the endorsement of the settlement on behalf of the formation is not 
prevented - is the best strategy for the factions within each conflict formation The 
factions’ decisions to endorse the agreement is an ‘equilibrium’ point in the negotiation 
process4 An equilibrium outcome is defined as one that is stable against the umlateial 
deviation of one party (or m this case faction) no faction has the incentive to deviate as 
a unilateral move cannot improve its payoff (Tsebehs, 1990 67) In other woids, an 
agreement is the outcome of equilibrium strategies of conflict formations and, peihaps 
moie critically, equilibrium strategies of the factions that make up foimations While 
the rationale or motivation behind the strategy of endoisement put sued by individual 
[actions is likely to differ at this equilibrium point no faction with the ability to act in 
such a way as to bring the agreement down has the incentive to do so, or no taction with 
the incentive to do so has the ability Thus, one would expect the agieement to stay m 
place unless a change in the external environment or the rules of the game tiansfoims
This begs the question Why did tactions against the agreement agree to sign it, oi at least not to voice 
objection to signing'? In some cases they may have voiced its objections horn the start and lefused to 
endoise the sign-up m other cases they may have been backed into a corner with no legitimate teims in 
which to couch then objections and will have endoised it but await the first opportunity to ieject it 
[ The equilibria discussed heie and throughout the chapter are formally lefeired to as Nash equihbna
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the incentives of some pivotal actoi 01 the pivotahty ot some actoi who aheady holds 
incentives 3
The signing of the agreement itself fundamentally alteis the political context The 
piesentation of the conflict m 'zero-sum5 terms by leading actors 111 the conflict 
f01 mations is no longei an immediately feasible strategy as the process has lesulted m 
documented common interest between parties The above model changes to one where 
the leadeiship must bargain with factions within its own party and repiesent the 
negotiating parties that signed the agreement Intra-party divisions may not be 
immediately obvious on the signing of the agreement, with suspicious and anti-peace 
elements sometimes unwilling to appear completely disinterested in ‘peace and 
development5 However, once the implementation process dawns, Figure 3 2 is a moie 
adequate reflection of the interactions taking place,6 with factions motivated by different 
goals emerging The formations are broken into pro, sceptic and spoiler factions7
Figure 3 2 Actors in the Immediate Post-Agreement Implementation Process
AGREEMENT
SPOILERS
A
SCEPTICA
L
FACTION 
S A
‘PRO’ ‘PRO’
FACTION A FACTION B
SPOILERS
B
SCEPTICA
L
TACTIONS
B
The degree to which the pro faction represents, controls or has the capacity to lead the 
lest of the party can be presented as the key variable effecting implementation (Figute 
3 2) The sceptical faction has genuine fears and insecurities as to the teal benefits, 
politico-economic, personal or ideological of newly-agreed structures and the
'  Definition is adapted from Laver and Shepsle, 1996 61-2
This is perhaps an accurate depiction of relations just before a settlement but it is more foimaiised oi
pionounced following formal endorsement
7 The term ‘spoilei5 is not an original term It is borrowed hom Stedman 1997 Onlv the term is 
bon owed and the context in which is it used here and the attributes of the faction are ongmal woik
59
feasibility of tiusting the othei conflict foimation to implement them While sceptical 
tactions may be motivated by multiple and diffenng factors the key defining 
chaiactenstic of these factions is that they aie not fundamentally in favoui of the pie- 
settlement status quo, but feaiful that implementation will not bung the secunty, and 
pet haps the powei, promised Spoiler factions on the other hand, are fundamentally 
opposed to co-operation, and are m favoui of the pi e-settlement status quo They oppose 
co-opeiation for personal or ideological leasons, perceive it as threatening then political 
and, peihaps, economic security, and feai any threat to then position in the political and 
socio-economic hierarchy Some of those leading and supporting the spoiler faction 
tend to believe that the personal benefits, material and power they will acciue from a 
continuing state of war out-weigh what they expect to gam fiom the peace Others 
believe the agreement to be a strategic mistake, which will weaken the movement’s 
capacity to achieve its political goals Personal motivation is not exclusively leserved 
foi spoiler factions The factions in favour of and sceptical of implementation are also 
primarily motivated by expected economic and political benefits The point is that, 
while ‘pro’ factions see implementation as a way towards fulfilling this motivation, 
spoiler factions see blocking implementation as fulfilling this motivation
Before describing the incentives and transaction costs of compliance tor each faction, 
the assumptions of the model are addressed Firstly, it is assumed that at the point of 
endorsement and at the outset of implementation, a significantly powerful faction in 
each foimation has made a calculated decision that it is m its interest to co-operate and 
to make moves to implement the agreement Secondly, consistent with chapter one the 
illustration of divisions in parties as three broad factions does not indicate that these 
factions include fixed membership In fact, a power struggle is underway and elite and 
sub-elites shift allegiances amongst factions In other words, faction membership is 
fluid as the spoiler faction becomes more numerous and hence more powerful8 and if 
the sceptical faction adopts a strategy that aligns with spoilers the prospects foi 
implementation are significantly reduced The point is that it is difficult foi outsideis to 
differentiate formations that are genuine in their search for peace from those who adopt 
tactical peace-seeking strategies, because conflict formation strategy is a function of the
H Power here iefeis to the lelative ability of each faction to dictate the actions of the conflict foimation
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fluid internal stiuggle It is similailv difficult to identify beyond doubt membeis ol 
spoilei sceptic and pio tactions a factoi which pi esents bat nets to implementation
Thndly in keeping with an assumption frequently made by political scientists9 the 
inteiests ol politicians 01 political actois aie assumed to centie on access to olfice 01 
where not feasible, on access to power thiough the domination of stiuctuial hieiaichies 
In othei woids, all individuals who make up factions aie assumed to be powei-seeking 
actois Some individuals seek powei for ideological 01 pohcy-dnven motivations, otheis 
lot personal enrichment However their reason for seeking power does not change the 
fact that they seek it and access to power is required for the puisuit of goals, whatevei 
then duving foice and regardless of the extent to which they are driven by ideological 
loices, policy beliefs, economic goals or all three
Fourthly ‘conflict formation5 refers to a single political organisation 01 to a broad 
alliance of organisations perhaps repiesentmg a community or a cause Foi example, the 
Unionist and Nationalist communities in Northern Ireland, the Singhalese and Tamil 
communities in Sn Lanka or the Muslim, Serb and Croatian communities in Bosnia, and 
the political and military actors that represent them are defined as conflict formations 
Furthermore, the model is limited to two formations, where as in many conflict 
situations, for example in Cambodia, there are more formations It is aigued that, where 
thiee and fout formations exist, the intra-formation struggles that ensue will have 
identical implications for the design of implementation processes
ACTORS AND INCENTIVES FOR COMPLIANCE
The fate of the agreement lies on the outcome of the mtra-formation power struggle and 
on the degiee to which opposing ‘pro’ factions can remain united in then consensus on 
the agreement and its implementation The incentives for pro, sceptic and spoiler 
factions to comply are thus highly significant and aie next considered
PRO’ FACTIONS
pro’ factions have staked their immediate political future on the implementation of the 
agieement Therefore mutual co-operation or mutual implementation is then pieiened
] Poi one iccount see Geddes, 1999 201-2
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I
Ioutcome A pro faction’s aims are not limited to this howevei, and then interest in 
lemaimng as the most powerful faction 111 the formation (01 community) is geneially of 
equal mteiest to them Whethei power 01 lull implementation is ot moie 01 less 
mteiest to a pio faction depends on the individual in question, but it is assumed that 
both aie of equal importance to the overall stiategy of the taction But pio tactions aie 
geneialiy made up ot elites who are publicly committed to the implementation piocess 
above all else, and, if they wish to legitimately present then inteiest m lemainmg in 
powei, they tend to do so by proclaiming successful implementation to be contingent on 
then letaimng power In order to fulfil its desire to retain power and contiol over the 
foimation, the pro’ faction is reluctant to move forward without the support ot its 
sceptical faction implementation without the sceptical faction’s support incieases 
tiansaction costs for the ‘pro’ faction by placing at risk its powei and contiol over the 
foimation
Using supply and demand and cost transaction concepts o f the political economy 
literature, ‘pro’ factions’ demand function foi implementation depends on the extent to 
which their power is, and becomes dependent on, full implementation Then supply 
lunction foi implementation depends on the political and economic costs to them ot 
achieving compliance (and this depends on their ability to convince sceptical and spoilei 
factions to comply) Given the information available to them, if the incentives tor 
lewaid (dictated by the demand function) exceed the costs required m achieving 
agreement (the supply function), ‘pro’ factions will pursue with implementation if not, 
they aie likely to choose to create legitimate reasons to stall and to eventually abandon 
implementation, in order to remain securely in control of the conflict formation10
It is clear that the ‘pro’ faction would initially prefer to implement, but its ability to do 
so depends entirely on there being a strong probability that the othei pro faction will 
do likewise As such the strategic interaction between ‘pio5 factions constitutes a loan 
of what is called co-operative game theory Given imperfect information on the 
dynamics of intra-party factionalism and the size and lelative strength of the sceptic and 
spoiler factions in the opposite conflict foimation (see below), neithei can be suie of the 
others tactions payoffs and incentives and therefore of the probability that they will
!<l See Levi 1997 3 1-3 foi a similai approach to the implementation of consci iption
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/choose to implement Aiguably this is the case despite the tiust engendeied and the 
mci eased communication and compionnses made dm mg the negotiation piocess, and 
even despite the effect of ciedible commitment and/oi confidence-building measiues In 
othei woids, while pio1 taction A might entirely tiust the intentions of pio’ taction B 
towaids the agieement it is unsure about pio faction B ’s ability to peisuade other 
factions and is keen to avoid its woist payoff, which lesults if it coopeiates and pio 
faction B leneges This weakens its position vis-a-vis the spoilei taction within its own 
toi mation
The piefeiences of ‘pio faction A m an mter-party mteiaction with 4pio’ faction B can 
be summansed with the assistance of game-theoretic concepts (table 3 2) Labels used 
by Tsebelis (1990 61) aie employed alongside payoff numbers R stands foi reward 
and refers to the individual payoff for mutual co-operation, P stands foi penalty and 
lefers to the individual payoff for mutual intransigence/ refusal to implement, T stands 
foi temptation and refeis to the payoff for reneging while the other actoi implements 
and S stands for the sucker punishment for unilateral co-operation, 1 e co-operating 
while the other actor reneges So the possible outcomes are (R,R), (P,P), (T,S) and 
(S,T)
Table 3 2 ‘pro’ faction Preferences in Interaction with other ‘pro’ faction
‘pro’ faction B 
Implement 
Implement (4,4)
‘pro’ faction A
Don’t Implement (2,1) (3,3)
Mutual co-operation > Mutual intransigence > Unilateral intransigence > Unilateral co-operation
pio faction A (Ra, Rb) > (Pa, Pb) > (Ta, Sb) > (Sa, Tb)
(4,4) > (3,3) > (2,1) > (1,2)
As outlined above, an equilibrium strategy lefers to an outcome in which neithei actoi 
could mciease its payoff by changing its move unilaterally Actois theiefoie have no 
incen tive  to deviate fiom these outcomes In the one-off interaction depicted above 
theie are two equihbiium strategies at mutual co-operation (R R) and mutual defection
Don’t implement 
0 , 2)
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(P P) It is thus equally likely that the inteiaction will lesult in mutual co-opeiation 01 
mutual defection, the lattei precipitates the bieakdown of the process
Given that the implementation of peace settlements by foimations cleaily involves a 
senes of interactions, Figuie 3 3 piesents the interaction between 'pro1 factions duung 
implementation as one lound in a repeat play, finite set of intei actions 01 in othei woids 
as a seues of the intei actions depicted in table 3 2
Figuie 3 3 One tound ot an Extensive Form vpro’ faction Interactions
Many game-theoretic analysts would use the logic o f ‘backward induction’ to argue that 
the likelihood of mutual co-operation (Ra,Rb) ultimately emerging from the finite 
i nteiaction depicted figure 3 3 is no better than in the one-off interaction displayed m 
table 3 2 Backward induction lefers to the process whereby actors paitaking in a finite 
set of intei actions look ahead to the clearly identifiable (because it is finite) last 'tound5 
and base their strategy on their best move m that lound, given their knowledge about the 
other player’s payoffs The last lound will lesemble Table 3 2 Therefore each actoi s 
calculation of the probability of the other party co-operating with or lenegmg on
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implementation in Table 3 2 lemams the key vanable aitectmg then decision 1! Taking 
this to be the case, the extensive game is a series ot one-shot interactions It does not 
altei the ongmal equihbnum outcomes and lends nothing to the endeavoui to predict 
which of the two equilibrium stiategies that will result Then what factoi does help to 
piedict which equilibuum stiategy iesults?
PROBABILITY, RISK PERCEPTION AND TRANSACTION COSTS
In the context of eifhei the extensive set of interactions or the single-shot inteiaction 
theie aie two possible outcomes to PFa (‘pro7 faction A) or PFb’s decision to coopeiate 
they lisle receiving their worst pay-off (‘ I5 oi S) while opening up the opportunity to 
leceive their best (4 or R) Theiefore ‘implementation’ gives them a R+S (4+1) payoff = 
5 On the other hand, by choosing to defect or not to implement, ‘pro’ factions risk a 
mutual defection outcome (3 oi P) or a penalty (2 or T) Their combined payoff from 
this move also amounts to 5 (P(3) +T(2))
Given a 50/50 perceived probability that the other ‘pro’ faction will choose to 
implement, is it as likely that ‘pro’ factions will stall on implementation as it is that they 
will move towards their mutually desired outcome of implementation This scenario 
leads to two equilibria m a once-off or a repeat-play, finite game (4,4) and (3 3) The 
second equilibrium, if repeated m an extended series of interactions, would lead to 
deadlock, whereby little or none of the agreement is implemented and the piospect of its 
umavelling is leal
Wheie K signifies PFb’s perception of the probability that PFa will implement and 
( l-K) signifies its perceived probability that PFa will not implement, PFb’s dominant 
strategy will be to implement if
K (R+S) > (I-K) (P+T)------- Equation 3 1
PFb’s dominant stiategy will shift to defection if
K(R+S) < (I-K)(P+T)---------Equation 3 2
11 The concept which was developed by Stelton, has been challenged Tsebelis aigues using the told 
theorem that given incomplete information and a significant numbei of lepeat interactions the logic of 
backwaid induction is less likely to pieclude mutual co-operation Tebehs, 1990 73-6 This idea is taken 
up Utei
65
Thus if eithet pro iaction weie to perceive the piobabihty that its countei-pait will 
implement as below 50/50 the dominant stiategy shifts fiom a toss up between 
implementation and defection to defection Foi example given a peiceived 40/60 
piobabihty that PFa is in the position to implement, PFb will calculate that it will obtain 
a payoff of (0 4)(4+l) foi co-opeiatmg and (0 6)(3+2) for defecting, making defection 
maigmally pieferable
Linking the above mteiaction to the stiuggle between factions that affects pio5 faction 
stiategy, the woist outcome foi a ‘pro’ taction is if it implements without the suppoit of 
its own sceptical factions, while the other pro’ faction does not implement This puts at 
dual risk its oveiail objectives Leadership of the conflict formation and implementation 
of the agreement If payoffs were re-structured to reflect the devastating and potential 
dual blow that the sucker punishment presents to ‘pro’ factions (this threatens its 
position m the formation and the future of the agreement), defection becomes the 
dominant stiategy for both parties, even given a 50/50 calculation that the other paity 
will implement For example, if the payoff in table 3 2 or figure 3 3 for R remains 4, foi 
T lemams 3, foi P remains 2 but for S is altered to 'minus 1’, K, or the perceived 
probability foi each ‘pro’ faction of its counterpart implementing, would have to 
increase to at least 62 5% m order to secure implementation as a dominant stiategy
In sum, the ciucial determinants of the ‘pio’ faction’s ability to pioceed to implement, 
while pursuing its overall objectives, is determined by its perception of the probability 
that other ‘pro’ factions can implement and that it has the support of its own sceptical 
faction The actual payoffs associated with the ranking or labelling of piefeiences is key 
to deteimming the dominant strategies in this ‘pro’ faction interaction which itself will
r
determine probability But what factors determine the probability that PFa and PFb will 
choose to implement? Or, equally significant, what determines PFa’s perceptions of the 
probability that PFb will implement7
The short answer to these questions is that ‘pro’ faction A’s strategy depends on the 
outcome of its own mtra-foimation struggle and of the mtra-formation stiuggle ongoing 
in toimation B These interactions cannot be illustrated in the table oi figuie above The 
stiategies and preferences of sceptical and spoiler factions are ciucial to detei mining 
piobabihty, and illustrate the complexity of interactions and inter-dependent stiategies
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that makes up the implementation piocess and its outcome Moie specifically two 
iactois deteimme fnstly the probability that PFa will implement and secondly PFb s 
peiception of the piobability that the PFa will implement (K)
(i) PFa s capacity to peisuade then own sceptical faction A to suppoit them m
implementation,
(li) PFa s belief that PFb has the capacity to persuade sceptical iaction B to support
implementation and thus its peiception of the piobability that PFb can 
implement
This depends on other factions 
SCEPTICAL FACTIONS
The concept of a sceptical faction captures well the fluidity of mtia-foimation 
factionalism At the immediate point of signing, sceptical factions aie lepiesentative of 
those who actually do perceive the implementation of peace and stability to be desnable 
and to be ultimately in then mteiest However, they do not perceive their political futuie 
and security to depend on its successful implementation, and, if  in time they are 
convinced that a return to civil war is more likely to facilitate then goals, they will 
support this Sceptical factions, above all, fear the implementation piocess They feai 
that the change m the status quo brought by the process could, on balance, result m 
more physical insecurity, political insecurity, a loss of patronage and/or of economic 
security which is frequently associated with their position in the powei hieraichy that 
makes up the conflict formation, and society in geneial Ideologically-driven members 
of the sceptical faction perceive the survival of their ideology to depend on their 
1 etention of influence within the power hierarchy or conflict formation Thus the 
fundamental motivations amongst elite and sub-elite sceptical elements aie similai to 
those driving ‘pro’ factions, m that they seek to retain security and power
Cntically, however, sceptic fears are focused on the need to be associated with eithei 
outcome Sceptical factions
(1) Feai full implementation of an agreement to which they did not clearly lend 
support, lest they lose important security denved from their position in the 
power hierarchy,
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(n) Feai thiowmg then support cleaily behind implementation, lest it
subsequently tail to materialise m a successful outcome and then secunty is 
i educed vis-a-vis tnumphant spoilei tactions who identity them as a nval 
taction12
These incentives cieate what are frequently over-ndmg incentives for the sceptical 
faction to adopt a stiategy that aims to fiee-nde on the back of its own pio 01 spoilei 
faction stiategy But if sceptical factions fiee ride, the collective action of each conflict 
toimation will be to stall (fig 3 5 below) continued stalling by conflict foimations 
results m reneging and in the eventual unravelling of the implementation process
Given its ongmal disposition towaids implementation, the sceptical faction’s piefened 
outcome m an interaction between its choice and the combined move of the othei 
conflict formation is implementation (R,R) The second best outcome is one in which it 
holds-off giving its support to the ‘pro5 faction, which m turn holds off on 
implementation, while the other conflict formation simultaneously implements (T,S) in 
this scenario, the other formation’s move keeps the hope of implementation alive, yet 
the sceptical faction did not have to take a lisle of openly supporting its 'pro faction and 
can do so 111 the next lound of interactions Its third best or second woist outcome is if 
both foimations stall (renege) the prospects for full implementation fade but it has, at 
least, not lisked security in the process (P,P) Its worst outcome emerges if it clearly 
supports its own 'pro5 faction by implementing while the other conflict foimation does 
not implement (S,T) This reduces the ultimate prospect of implementation and places 
at risk its security vis-a-vis the spoiler faction The spoiler faction is in turn encouiaged 
by the damage done to its pro and sceptical factions by the other foimation’s defection, 
and the 1 eduction m the security of the entire conflict formation vis-a-vis the othei 
foimation
In terms of tiansaction costs for the sceptical faction, demand depends on the extent to 
which it believes that the new arrangements, if fully implemented, would be 
significantly more likely to provide it with security than the status quo The supply 
function depends on the extent to which the sceptical faction sees compliance as a nsk
12 This does howevei depend on how fai the agieement proceeds Spoiler tacttons may have some mteiest 
m keeping sceptical factions onside so as to maintain the size of the foimation that they would then lead
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to its own secunty and the extent to which it believes it can get away with inclining 
tew tiansaction costs, while still enjoying the benefits o f peace if implementation 
succeeds 1 e the extent to which it perceives fiee nding to be an option This in turn 
depends on two factois the effectiveness of the spoilei faction in its effoit to challenge 
the pi o' faction and the sceptical faction s beliefs about the pieferences of the opposite 
sceptical and spoiler factions Demand exceeds supply, 1 educing transaction costs when 
the perceived benefits fiom supporting implementation aie higher than the nsk factoi 
associated with supporting implementation Its prefeired outcome is secunty and it 
consequently depends on the actions of the other factions m both foimations
Table 3 3 illustrates sceptical faction A ’s strategy in a once-off 01 finite lepeat-play 
intei action with the collective strategy of Conflict Formation B
Table 3 3 Sceptic A’s Preferences as dependent on Party B’s Moves
Mutual Co-operation> Unilateral Intransigence (by Sceptical tactions) > Mutual intransigence ->
Unilateral Co-opeiation (R,R)> (T,S)>(P,P)>(S,T)
Formation B13
Implement Don’t Implement 
Support Implementation 4 I
Sceptical factions A
Don’t Support Implementation 3 2
Given that a similar process is underway in conflict formation B, wheieby the 
piobabihty that the ‘pro’ faction will make a move on implementation is dependent, m 
pait, on the actions of sceptical factions, the preferences of both sceptical factions can 
be presented as dependent on one another Figure 3 4 displays one lound of an extensive 
foim interaction between sceptical faction A and sceptical faction B
1 This gives payotfs tor the sceptical faction depending on the move finally taken (attei the mtra-paity 
str uggle) by the other party
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Figuie3 4 One Round of Extensive Form Sceptical faction A’s strategy as contingent on Sceptical 
faction B’s
Mutual Co-opeiation > Unilateial intransigence > Mutual intransigence > Umlateial co-opeiation
While pro and sceptical factions are differently motivated/4 there are two equilibria in 
every round of the sceptical faction interaction in figure 3 4 (R,R) and (P,P) But given 
uncertainty about the relative strength and perceptions of the other sceptical faction, and 
its willingness to support implementation, it is likely that sceptical factions will not 
move forward to support implementation In tact, if all else is equal, unless a sceptical 
taction calculates with an over 50/50 probability that the opposite pro’ faction will 
implement and thus has the support of its sceptical faction, it is likely to defect 
Sceptical faction A’s preferences, and the relative degree to which the potential lewaid
14 The key difference between sceptical and pro3 tactions is that sceptical faction mteiest in 
implementation is purely a security one This is leflected in the payoffs Sceptical tactions piefer to 
cooperate while the other formation detects, to the mutual defection outcome The greatei tiust in the 
pio taction interaction is illustrated by their prefeience for mutual defection over their own umlateial 
detection
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fiom co-operating (demand) exceeds the peiceived costs of getting theie (supply) 
depends on a number of diifeient inter-formation and intra-foimation mteiactions 
Uiibrne of the tiue intentions and motivations of individuals, sceptical faction B may not 
be explicitly awaie of who lepresents each faction Howevei, it can be suie that a 
spoiler and a sceptical faction exist m foimation A It can also be suie that the 
piobability that conflict foimation A will collectively choose to eithei co-opeiate or to 
lenege depends on
(i) Then belief that ‘pro5 faction B can persuade, 01 has the capacity to
peisuade, sceptical faction B to support a move to implement,
(II) Their belief that spoiler faction B has not convinced sceptical faction B 
otheiwise,
(III) Susceptibility of sceptical faction A to its own spoiler faction’s peisuasive 
arguments against supporting 'pro5 factions in implementation
For a full picture of the implementation process, and an assessment of the piobability 
that the stalling equilibrium will emerge, an analysis of the preferences and stiategies of 
spoiler factions is required
SPOILER FACTIONS
Spoiler factions are fundamentally anti-implementation for what are power-calculating 
and sometimes, ideological reasons 15 Believing the personal, political and economic 
benefits that they accrue from a continuing state of conflict to outweigh what they 
expect to gain from peace and implementation, spoiler faction leaders tend to be 
supported unconditionally by those in society who feel similaily, or those who depend 
on them in power hierarchies that make up the formation
The pieferences of a spoiler faction are twofold One, to increase its powei vis-a-vis the 
leadership or the group centied on the leadership and, two, to ensure the non- 
implementation of the peace agreement It achieves its preferred outcome (Figure 3 5) if 
no moves on implementation are made in the extended process of implementation and
15 Some members ol spoiler factions use ideological concerns to justify opposition to implementation 
covei ing what aie primarily power seeking motivations Otheis are genuinely motivated against the 
agieement on primarily ideological grounds
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ii it can simultaneously isolate the ‘pio’ faction in then paity to take ovei its leadeiship 
This is a difficult task, as the ‘pro faction (above) generally peiceives power and 
leadership of the party as equally important to implementation, and is unlikely to make 
a move that will jeopardise its position However, as figuie 3 5 will show theie aie 
fewer obstacles to the spoilei faction goal of bunging about a permanently stalled 
implementation piocess and this is eventually likely to result in an uniavellmg o f the 
piocess, and a leturn to the status quo before settlement It thus serves as an alternative 
loute to the ultimate goals of spoiler factions
The worst outcome for the spoiler faction emerges if its sceptical faction supports the 
‘pro’ faction and facilitates mutual implementation, while the spoiler faction itself 
simultaneously miscalculates and exposes its fundamentally anti-implementation stance 
It is thus isolated from a party and, perhaps, from a dominant hierarchical position and 
fiom any immediate chance of increasing its power Its demand function depends on the 
extent to which it collectively perceives new arrangements to be detrimental to its 
power struggle Its supply function depends on the extent to which open defiance puts at 
lisle its maintenance of power and its chances of mcieasing it, economic w'ell being 01 
dominance, and thus depends in part on the protest avenues available to it The 
tiansaction costs of moving to ‘spoil’ the implementation process mciease wheie open 
defiance is perceived to be more damaging to their prospects for increasing or 
maintaining power to pursue goals than is allowing implementation to proceed
Figure 3 5 illustrates spoiler Faction A’s preferences in an extensive inteiaction with 
PFa and Sceptic Fa, a strategic inteiaction that falls into the category of non co­
operative game theory
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Figure 3 5 Spoiler Faction A Payoffs in an interaction with ‘pro’ faction and Sceptical taction
Spoilei Taction Intransigence (piovided sceptical factions aie intransigent) > Intiansigence ot all tinee
(deadlock) > Co-opeiation (when the sceptical taction defects/fiee i ides) >Mutual co-opeiation (ot all 
thiee tactions)>UmIateial (spoilei) intiansigence 9
\
Both spoilei factions have two first preferences, the ìankmg of winch depends on the 
pio' faction’s move One preferred outcome, the alternative route ìeferred to above 
(deadlock) emerges if the ‘pro’ faction stalls at the first node, believing that the 
sceptical faction will not support it and/or that the opposing faction will also stall This 
inci eases the prospect of permanent stalling The preferences in the upper part of the 
figure lelate only to the instances in which the ‘pro’ faction implements, i e does not 
stall Spoiler faction’s first preference m this interaction - to renege along with sceptical 
factions when the ‘pro’ faction moves to implement - is a difficult outcome to sustain on 
a iepeat-play basis Their second piefeience, co-operation alongside the fiee-iiding oi 
intiansigence of the sceptical faction leflects their desile to initially avoid open 
defiance while simultaneously wishing to reduce the probability that pro factions will
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implement in the next lound Then prefeience in each round foi the co-opeiatjon of all 
thtee factions ovei the co-operation of the pro and sceptical faction along with then own 
detection leflects then feai of isolation and their hope that circumstances will enable 
them to piactice spoilei tactics to undo the settlement in subsequent lounds 01 m the 
futute This lanking is based on the assumption that the spoilei faction wishes to appeal 
leasonable, an assumption that is discussed in more depth below (page 77-8)
In sum it is assumed that pio’ factions lank the letention of powei and the 
implementation of the agreement as equally impoitant Some will be primanly 
motivated by the desire to increase 01 to letain power Otheis are motivated by the 
collective good of political development and peaceful conflict management that they 
hope the implemented agreement will bring, but they peiceive successful 
implementation as only possible if they retain power Spoiler factions are assumed to 
lank equally the letention of position and/or increase in relative power within the 
foimation to non-implementation of the settlement For sceptical factions, security is the 
prionty, and during the implementation process its incentives to implement are likely to 
sway, depending on ‘pro’ faction or spoiler faction actions and on the actions of factions 
in the opposite formation
Two equilibria exist in the mter-faction interactions in Figure 3 5 (R,R,R), which if 
continued in a number of rounds results m full implementation and (S?T T), which if 
lepeated ultimately unravels the process If implementation is to succeed, the conditions 
under which it takes place must create incentive structures that lesult m the fust 
equihbnum outcome (R,R,R) The factors that determine the choices made by the 
spoiler faction help to explain the probability that this implementation-guaianteeiiig 
equilibrium will prevail and they are next explored
The spoiler faction’s best outcome depends on a series of events that they hope might 
precipitate the breakdown of the process and their own ascendancy to a poweiful 
position in their formation To set about achieving their preferred outcome, spoileis tiy 
to influence the actions of a numbei of factions within both formations ovei a numbei of 
lounds to precipitate a series of events in the following order 
(i) Stall the implementation process (deadlock, Fig 3 5),
(11) Wm the support of sceptical factions in their party,
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(in) Breakdown the consensus between the two ‘pio" factions and thereby
ultimately piecipitate the fall of the agieement and of the pro faction too 
i e achieve the (S T,T) outcome on an ongoing basis
The degiee to which oppoitumties are available to spoiler factions to precipitate this 
sequence of events is critical to the outcome of the implementation piocess
WHAT DETERMINES THE SPOILER FACTION’S INCENTIVES TO SPOIL**
The fhst step of the spoiler faction’s tluee-pionged strategy (stall the piocess) is not too 
difficult to achieve, given other faction aims and strategies (figure 3 5) In fact 
deadlock is a highly likely outcome to the early rounds of the interaction, and it 
becomes even more probable the more incomplete the mfoimation and the 11101 e 
uncertainty that pievails
The spoiler faction’s ability to precipitate the second step - to rally the suppoit of the 
sceptical faction - depends on a number of factors, including the extent to which 
sceptical factions consider the issue in question to be important Despite the 
compromises inherent 111 the agreement, different interpretations by each party o f the 
obligations ail sing from it can leave many ‘controversial’ issues for the implementation 
piocess Genuine fears and insecurities do exist and differing interpretations of the 
lequnements of the agreement reflect these The strategy of the spoilei is designed not 
to lessen these fears, but instead to use them to bring down the peace agreement duiing 
implementation For this leason spoiler faction A aims to focus on issues that aie 
conducive to heightening the fears and insecurities of conflict foimation A’s sceptical 
taction It hopes that this strategy will simultaneously have a knock-on effect 011 
sceptical faction B and will reduce its confidence in party A’s ability to move on 
implementation Spoilers aim to transform ‘difficult’ and inconclusive issues (issues 
that are perhaps less conducive to neat, conflict resolution formula) into ‘intractable,1 
zero-sum’ issues, by focusing then efforts primarily on the two sceptical factions If 
sceptical faction A grows increasingly suspicious and distrustful of Party B’s ability to 
deliver, and thus fearful of the outcome of implementation, they aie likely to eithei 
suppoit spoilers efforts to break down the process, or at least to stall on 
implementation which eventually has the same effect Once this happens, that these 
tactions oppose implementation foi quite different reasons no longer matters In fact
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(i) How might the spoiler faction tiansaction costs associated with spoiling 01
open defiance be increased?
(II) How might the ‘pio' faction’s transaction costs associated with compliance 
be i educed?
(III) Would a 1 eduction in the transaction costs of compliance for ‘pio’ factions 
and an increase 111 the transaction costs ol open defiance toi spoileis be 
sufficient to encourage ‘pro’ factions to implement? There is a tendency tor 
a lack of mfoimation or a miscalculation about the preleiences of otheis to 
lesult, in some rounds, in non-implementation by sceptical factions, who 
instead opt for their second best payoff -  (T, S) -  m the mtra-foimation 
game How might the damaging effects of one miscalculation and thus the 
adoption of an intransigent position by one formation (collectively) at the 
expense of the other, be reduced to avoid it preventing further co-operation?
Taking the first two questions together, the ability of the ‘pro’ faction to mciease the 
spoiler faction’s tiansaction costs lies in its ability to exploit the weaknesses of its 
stiategy and the other spoiler taction’s stiategy The weakness of the spoiler faction’s 
strategy lies in two inter-connected aspects Firstly, in the spoiler faction’s stake in 
appearing to be reasonable, (outlined below) and thus on using what are defined as 
tucks ’ Secondly, if it is to achieve its ultimate goal the spoiler faction depends on its 
ability to precipitate a number of events to bring down the process that aie ultimately 
dependent on the attitudes and strategies of other factions The spoilei’s stake 111 
appealing to be reasonable is first considered
Given the assumption that the third parties involved in peace processes aie at least 
publicly committed to overseeing the implementation of the peace agieement, the 
spoiler faction must simultaneously endeavour to influence a number of audiences in 
Older to pursue their preferred strategy These audiences do not only include those 
dnectly involved 111 the implementation piocess, but include the international 
community, legional financial donors upon which the success of their faction may
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depend17 and the spoiler s own constituency 01 the geneial public Depending on the 
level ot accountability in the political system, they will seek to influence then 
community eithei thiough coercive 01 peisuasive methods, but geneially thiough a 
mixtuie ot the two Because ot the multiple audiences which they aie simultaneously 
tiymg to influence, and given the differing motivations and incentives foi individual 
action alongside the spoiler taction’s ultimate feai ot being isolated (tiom powei) the 
success of its stiategy lies in its ability to hide its tiue pieteiences and to instead present 
ideological, legitimate 01 fundamental objections to implementation, based on concerns 
othei than its ambition for power 01 objections to the entne peace piocess 18 Spoilei 
tactions aie unwilling to openly declare themselves to be anti-peace, anti-negotiation 01 
anti-compiomise, or to expose their true preference as directly lelated to the continuing 
insecurity which would boost their own power or immovable, ideological position 
Instead they piefer to pose apparently leasonable opposition to key aspects ol the 
implementation process with a view to ultimately uruavellmg it For this leason they 
employ a stiategy, which has been referred to as ‘tucks ’(Ury, 1991 73)
A tuck’ sees spoiler factions present either publicly oi privately to ‘pio’ factions, a fait 
accompli (fixed intransigent position) on a particular issue, but one couched m co- 
opeiative language and reasonableness for the purposes o f deception Tough to detect 
and moie importantly tough to expose, the apparent reasonableness of tricks makes it 
difficult to challenge them directly The point is, however, that the strategy of the 
spoiler faction is staked upon appearing to be reasonable and it is m this lies its 
weakness
The best lesponse to ‘tricks’ m any set of negotiations has been presented as one that 
lestiams from dnectly accusing the faction ot hiding tiue motivations, lefiames the 
issue in terms ot interest instead of position, and asks for clanflcation on these inteiests 
in the foim ot reasonable requests (Ury, 1991 74-5) Refusing to undeitake a leasonable 
lequest will expose an unreasonable position and, if occurring early in the
17 Many analysts point to the importance attached by all formations to the opinion and stiategy of 
powerful members of the international community See Collier 2000 92
!S Cven where it seems clear that a faction is against a settlement it is extiemely rare toi any oigamsation 
oi taction to justify this opposition to their domestic or international audience m teims ot power- 
max musing motivations As the model explains the signing ot the agreement places spoiler tactions in a 
wcaket position They have little to gain fiom publicly attacking a position on which they have been 
shown to be in a minonty and they seek legitimate pretexts
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implementation piocess may limit the appeal of spoileis to sceptical factions and thus 
undeimme the spoilei faction’s stiategy Sceptical factions in both conflict actois aie 
pnmaiily concerned with security If the obstacles that spoilei factions piesent to 
implementation ate exposed as disingenuous, exaggeiated and dehbeiately designed to 
heighten the msecuiity of the test of the formation, sceptical factions will leahse the 
tuck at the heart of the lhetoric and then insecurities will leduce
The implementation process is made up of a senes of lounds involving several diffeient 
issues, sub-issues and moves It is pioposed that sceptical factions have diffeient 
prefeiences foi each lound m the process The more that the move lequired 111 each 
lound is initially perceived to put their security at nsk, the more susceptible sceptical 
factions are to the tactics of spoiler factions and the less costly it becomes foi the spoilei 
taction to use tucks to increase the sceptical faction’s nsk perception In a lound of 
implementation where a sceptical faction perceives high transaction costs, it is moie 
likely to collectively perceive its best strategy to be a non-committed one that fiee ndes 
on the back of a ‘pro’ faction-led strategy of implementation This leaves open the 
option to free-nde on a spoiler-led leturn to the pre-agreement status quo Thus while 
the sceptical faction’s highest payoff remains (R,R) foi which it receives 4, the usks 
associated with sceptical co-operation in the event of non-implementation by the othei 
foimation (S,T) dramatically mciease, the sucker payoff giving them -  3 Table 3 4 
lanks a sceptical faction’s payoffs in an interaction that requires it to inevocably move 
to implement a step that it perceives as incurring high transaction costs 19
T ible 3 4 Sceptic’s preferences on implementation rounds with ‘high transaction cost’ as 
dependent on the ultimate outcome of the implementation process
Foi the sceptical taction R (4) > P(3) > T(2) > S(-3) (Rsf R)>(Psf,P)>(Tst S)>(Ssf, T)
Outcome
Agieement Piocess
Implemented Breaks Down
Coopeiate with 4 (R,R) -3 (S,P)
Implementation 
Sceptical tactions
Don’t Cooperate 3 (P,S) 2 (T,T)
N In this case it is assumed that if the agreement were fully implemented (i e by party B) the seem ity 
! isk could be iveited
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Two equilibna exist at (R,R) and (P5P) But the tiansaction costs associated with 
seeking then fust prefexence have significantly incieased foi the sceptical faction 
compaied to the payoffs 111 the lound of implementation lllustiated by table 3 3 The 
probability that the (R R) equilibrium would pievail in the above outcome depends on 
the sceptical faction A's perception of the piobability that the lesult of mtia-foimation B 
stiuggles will be a move to implement (R) Recalling equation 3 1 foi the 
implementation equilibrium to lesult from this mteiaction, sceptical tactions believe 
there to be an 84 per cent20 probability that the opposite conflict formation will 
implement
Figure 3 6  Probability that sceptical factions will stall K= probability that conflict foimation B will 
implement
K(R+S) > (K-1) (P+T) Equation 3 1
K (4+(-3) > (K-l) (3+2)
K>5(K-1)
Given the high probability required for sceptical factions to choose to implement, then 
dominant strategy in any lound that lesembles table 3 4 will be to stall in this scenario 
it is highly likely that spoiler factions will see non-implementation becoming dominant
If, on the other hand, the lound is perceived to pose less lisk to the security of the 
sceptical faction, its preference will reflect these reduced transaction costs (table 3 5) 
Heie the costs associated with co-operating in the absence of the co-opeiation of the 
other conflict formation reduce from -3  to 0 (sucker), with payoffs for the temptation of 
lenegmg while the other formation implements and thus drs-improvmg relations with 
pio’ faction (2), marginally preferable to mutual stalling (1) As a lesult of the changed 
payoffs in this scenario, sceptical tactions are more likely to nsk leceivmg the sucker 
payoff (0) The tiansaction costs associated with receiving S are lowei and to encouiage 
them to take the risk they require a lowei perceived probability that the othei conflict 
foimation will implement than they do m the prefeience stiuctunng m table 3 4
2i! K= 0 84 in the equation K > 5(K-1) ( 84 > 5( 84-1)
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f  ible 3 5 Sceptic Pieterences on moving to implement on lounds with Mowei tiansactiou costs’ is 
ik pendent on the ultimate outcome of the implementation process
Outcome
Agreement is Not Implemented/Pi ocess
Implemented Bieaks down
Co-opeiate 4 (R,R) 0 (S,P)
Sceptical tactions
Don’t Co-operate 2 (P,S) 1 (T,T)
Theie lemain two equilibria for sceptical factions at (Rsf,R) and (Tsf, T) in table 3 5 
But using equation 3 1 [K(4) > (1-K)(3)], the sceptical faction’s dominant stiategy will 
be to implement if it believes theie to be a 42% probability that conflict foimation B 
will implement If table 3 5 resembled the preferences of sceptical faction A in a lound 
of the implementation process, they are likely to risk openly supporting implementation 
Therefore, the incentives in Table 3 5 alter the sceptical faction’s attitude to the 
implementation process in two important ways Firstly, co-operation becomes a 
sceptical faction’s dominant strategy Secondly, the piobability that a ‘miscalculated’ 
oi noise-induced (Axelrod, 1984 31) move by one formation will pieclude any futuie 
co-opeiation amongst ‘pro’ factions is reduced Given that the transactions costs 
associated with co-operation by sceptical factions are lower than in Table 3 4 a 
defective move by one conflict formation is unlikely to increase the transaction costs of 
co-operation in the next round sufficiently to make it no longer the dominant strategy
11 it were possible to permanently alter the sceptical taction’s transaction costs to leflect 
the preference and outcomes in table 3 5, its dominant strategy in each lound would be 
to co-opeiate Given knowledge of the sceptical faction’s payoffs and lisk perception, 
the spoiler faction’s opportunity to use tricks without high nsks would be ieduced, this 
leinforcmg a dominant stiategy to co-operate for the sceptical faction The less scope 
theie is for spoiler tricks, the higher the chance that the sceptical factions’ payoff 
stiuctuies would remain unaffected by spoilei faction attempts to increase their 
peiception of costs Given ‘pro’ faction A s knowledge of this incentive stiucture loi 
sceptical faction A and sceptical taction B, it would be more confident to move to 
implement, m the expectation that the sceptical taction would support it and that 
sceptical faction B would support pro faction B The incentive stiuctuie would be
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quite likely to guaiantee implementation (see Figiue 3 5(R,R,R)) The deadlock 
outcome in Figuie 3 5 might thus be avoided if lounds in the implementation piocess 
weie stiuctuied to resemble the above table The peiceived and leal value ot K in 
equation 3 1 would be altered to lesult m a dominant stiategy that would leplace the two 
equihbiia in Figuie 3 4 with one equilibrium (R,R R) It would also leplace the two 
equihbiia in the ‘pio’ faction mteiaction in Table 3 2 with only one equihbnum Mutual 
co-opeiation (R,R) To structuie the sceptical faction s decision-making piocess to 
avoid the dominance of the Table 3 4 scenario while encouiaging that of Table 3 5 two 
tactois are key
(i) The ability of ‘pio’ factions to limit the capacity of both spoilei factions to
successfully use ‘tucks 5 This ieduces then ability to engage sceptics m a 
blocking coalition which creates the incentives illustrated m Table 3 4 
(n) The simultaneous and mter-dependent ability of both ‘pro5 factions to incite
sceptical factions to undertake the costs necessary to implement, lathei than 
simply fiee ndmg on the risks taken by the two 'pio’ tactions
It pio tactions were togethei to seek to expose the unreasonable stance at the hcait of 
the tuck, to leveal the illegitimacy of the ‘trickster’s' difficulties with the negotiation 
issue, spoiler strategy may fail But as Figure 3 3 illustrates, at the heait of the pioblem 
is £pio’ faction uncertainty about each other’s abilities to pursue pio implementation 
stiategies and this spreads to uncertainty about their ability to pursue this countei-trick 
stiategy The next section addresses the possibility of engineering this incentive 
stiuctuie, and the question of what contextual factois associated with the 
implementation process might facilitate the equilibrium that dehveis implementation
DESIGNING AN INCENTIVE STRUCTURE FOR IMPLEMENTATION
A political settlement and its subsequent implementation are not set in a vacuum but m 
a context defined by factors that fall into two broad categories the design ot the 
implementation process and the external, structural environment against which 
implementation takes place The following section develops a numbei ot hypotheses 
concerning the tules, piocedures and mechanisms of the implementation piocess (desLgn 
ot the implementation process) and their ultimate impact on the outcome ot 
implementation It considers how they may be stiuctuied to mciease the likelihood that
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an incentive stiuctuie tacilitating implementation emeiges Following this the obstacles 
cieated 01 imposed by the external envnonment to its emeigence aie briefly consideted
INTERNAL FACTORS RULES, PROCEDURES AND MECHANISMS OF THE PROCESS 
New institutional theoiy used in political science, political economy and international 
lelations, seeks to explain the vanance m outcomes to mtei-dependent decision-making 
01 collective-action processes, like those involved m an implementation piocess It 
ptoposes that the lules and procedures, which aie frequently deteimined by the political 
stiucture in which interactions take place alter the stiategies of actois The theory 
assumes that the effect of social and political institutions that opeiate m the absence of 
centiahsed government, lather than or m addition to, material considelations, can 
explain the variance in the outcomes to collective action problems (Young, Keohane 
and Ostrom, 1995 33)
The implementation process described above is a post-conflict, collective-action 
pioblem The outcome can be seen as in part determined by the effect of the institutions, 
i ules and procedures of the process on the choices made by the actors that ultimately 
shape the outcome Realists and neo-realists m the international relations discipline 
would consider the determining effect of implementation design on the outcome of 
implementation to be secondary to power relations m the regional and international 
context (Young, 1995 37-8) In fact, the neo-realist approach to aspects of international 
politics has aigued that institutions merely reflect the existing power lelations m the 
entity for which they are designed Others are less critical of the appioach, but point out 
the limitations of a purely institutional one Like any set of rules, institutions depend 
upon the players accepting to play the game, and if powerful actors decide that the lules 
aie not valuable they may cancel the emergent game (Moestrup 1999 174)
These concerns are addressed as follows Firstly, in contiast to the evolutionaly ongin 
oi the iules and procedures of the institutions frequently associated with common-pool 
tesource problem in small entities, and sometimes with governing the international 
community, the rules, piactices and institutions of the implementation piocess onginate 
in both the teims of the negotiated settlement and ficquently with the influence of 
thud- party mediators oi aibiteis It is assumed, in line with the empmcal data of civil 
conflict negotiation processes that ‘pro’ factions and an intervening (non-mihtaiv) thud
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paity have significant scope ovei the woiding and design ot the final settlement and 
thus ovei the mechanisms foi implementation As many analysts point out, stalemate 
chaiactenses relations between formations at the end of civil conflicts (Zartman 1993 
1995, Rothschild and Haitzell, 1997, Hampson 1996) The implementation 
mechanisms and the post-conflict governing institutions agieed tend to leflect this 
balance of powei, this opens up the possibility that institutional design and not just the 
i elative balance of militaiy powei, will affect actoi’s incentive stiuctuies in the 
post-settlement stage 21
Secondly, as Ostiom (1992 192) points out, actors fiequently peiceive obeying i ules 
and acting in their own interest to be the same thing Only total enfoicement which is 
geneially too expensive will ensure obedience without this incentive Wheie the 
piocess of implementing peace settlements is concerned, there is almost nevei a third 
paity available willing to take on the expense of implementing a settlement entuely 
thiough foice, and thus an examination of the mechanisms and rules of the 
implementation process is important, if the action of conflict factions is to be 
undei stood
in sum, it is assumed that there is some scope foi an impaitial arbitratoi and indeed foi 
pi o’ factions, who are instrumental in the negotiation ot the agreement, to insist on the 
use of certain mechanisms for implementing the agreement Given this, an investigation 
of the institutional set-up more likely to deliver an optimal outcome to the collective 
action problem is vital to an inclusive theory of implementation This section proceeds 
with this exploration, initially focusing sharply on the possibility that a particulai 
institutional design might serve to alter the equilibrium outcome from short-term 
deadlock and long-term leturn to conflict to one of mutual implementation While all 
other potential explanatory factors are initially held constant, the final section briefly 
builds further independent variables into a more comprehensive framework This 
addresses any remaining concerns with the concentration on institutional above external
21 !t the institutions implemented during the implementation process aie in effect devices cieated bv the 
pi ivileged in tandem with a thud party to perpetuate asymmetrical distribution ot power and wealth 
between foimations and pioviding foi little equity, inclusion or long-teim efficiency the piobabihty of a 
tutuie leturn to violent conflict is high unless lepression is high This is not caused bv mechanisms oi the 
implementation piocess but the teims and compromises set out in the original agreement which 
lesembles moie closelv a militaiy victoiv than a negotiated settlement
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iactois By mtioducmg existing theones that tocus on external factois to the e nip meal 
analysis chapter foui fuither deals with these concerns
DESIGN AND THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS
Political institutions stiuctuie the individual choices of strategic actois so as to pioduce 
equilibrium outcomes Foi Levi, accurately designed political institutions should ensuie 
that noimative and mstiumental motivations work m the same dnection (1997 25) It 
the institutions ot the implementation process are to influence faction behavioui so as to 
make choices that lesult m implementation, they should be designed to maintain the 
equilibuum at signing (with lefeience to the theoiy of incentives and compliance 
outlined above) Recalling the earliei definition, Equilibrium’ descubes a situation 
wheieby no political actor with the ability to act m such a way as to bung down an 
agreement has the incentive to do so, or no actor with the incentive has the ability to do 
so If designed to foster optimum outcomes, implementation mles, procedures and 
mechanisms should work to reduce sceptical faction incentive and spoiler taction ability 
to defect, having the ultimate affect of reducing spoiler incentive to spoil
institutional analyses ot public policy processes are based on the piemise that mles can 
cieate opportunities foi particular individuals or groups impose constiamts on otheis 
and thus affect who wins and who loses the competition to influence policy outcomes 
(Huber, 1996 1) In explaining the outcome of public policy, institutional theory 
considers the effect of various rules and procedures that define how representatives aie 
chosen how policies are formulated and adopted, how policies are enioiced, and how 
the mles tor choosing policy are themselves established It follows that an institutional 
analysis of the implementation process and the opportunities that it cieates foi ceitain 
actors (factions) should consider the rules and procedures determining how and when 
piovisions in the agieement aie to be acted on, the mechanisms for momtonng oi 
oveiseeing this action and how the rules and procedures for implementation aie 
established or interpreted The theory of implementation should explain how these mles, 
proceduies and mechanisms, which outline how to get from A (the paper agieement) to 
B (the post-implementation political system), determine the existence ot diffeung 
incentives foi tactions to co-operate
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fheiefoie implementation design leteis to the mles pioceduies and mechanisms that 
deteimine how the issues on which the compiomises have been leached will be 
implemented Issues on which compiomise agreements have been leached generally tall 
into a numbet ot categones such as military, public secuiity, political, socio-economic 
equality/human lights and leconciliation issues If each issue is to be fully implemented 
conflict actors (formations) are generally lequned to take a senes of moves, which aie 
ot vaned size and importance In othei words, each issue is made up of an end goal and 
a senes ot steps that suggests 01 outlines how actois will achieve that end goal An end 
goal is frequently concerned with the full consolidation of a new institution Fot 
example on policing issues the end goal is fiequently the institutionalisation of a new 
police toice, on military issues it is peihaps the completion of a comprehensive 
demilitarisation process Agieements frequently lequire parties to implement concrete 
steps which together consolidate new procedures and institutions They also fiequently 
1 equire the parties to implement what are termed as confidence-building measures 
(CBMs) ‘inciemental, tiansparent actions that demonstiate compliance with the 
pi onuses made m a treaty’ (Rothschild and Stedman, 1996 29) But beyond this, the 
design of implementation processes can differ enoimously from Accoid to Accoid The 
aspects of a settlement that account for this critical vaiiety m implementation design, 
and the impact of different aspects of design on the ultimate outcome of implementation 
piocesses, are next considered They are separated into two categones
SEQUENCE TIMING AND CONTENT OF EACH INTERACTION 
Tnstly, the sequence, timing and content of each mteiaction or round m the 
implementation process is consideied Analysts of political development foi example 
Noidhnger (1978), have fiequently applied the notion of sequence and timing to 
variables affecting processes and outcomes of political development Furthermoie the 
deliberate sequencing of issues so that they are interlinked has been identified as an 
important mechanism in the successful negotiation of compromise or legulatoty 
agieements between lival organisations (Martin, 1995) The sequence and timing mles 
that govern when and how the moves that together make up the process of 
implementing each issue in the agreement clearly shape each lound or inter-action m the 
implementation process These rules have an impact on the incentive and payoff 
stiuctures foi each faction in each formation The final older and sequence of events and
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moves in the implementation process is referred to as the output of implementation 
design.
Settlements vary in the degree to which they endorse specific and detailed timetables, 
but all settlements include timetables of sorts. Some agreements include detailed 
commitments on the steps that are required for the full implementation of issues. In 
others the documentation of the commitment on each issue is itself vague, and the 
parties’ endorsement to work together to outline a road to full implementation is instead 
included. In other words, some give a clear road map of how to get from A to B; others 
only include guidelines.
Secondly, the mechanisms and procedures that control the output are derived from three 
broad aspects of design. In the first instance the output is controlled by terms in the 
agreement that specifically or deliberately outline sequencing and timing requirements. 
In the second instance, rules that sequence and time implementation moves can be 
influenced or changed through dispute-resolution mechanisms that are empowered by 
the agreement to deal with the implementation of all or specific issues. In the final 
instance, the rules and procedures governing the sequence and timing of implementation 
can be discerned by a body that is empowered to interpret the agreement and to 
determine what it requires of each/ all conflict actor/s.
Settlements also differ in the degree of power that is allocated to outside, established or 
newly-created, independent actors to interpret the rules that govern implementation and 
to oversee the implementation process. They further differ on the extent to which 
dispute-resolution procedures are provided for and on the nature of these dispute 
resolution procedures.
But can implementation design have a determining effect on the likelihood that the 
intra-formation struggle will ultimately result in full implementation of the settlement? 
Recalling the determinants of faction strategy, pro agreement factions have differential 
capacities to move forward with implementation. Payoffs in each implementation round 
are set by their intra-formation arrangements: the costs to spoiler factions of adopting 
spoiler tactics, and the interlinked ability o f 4pro’ factions to present each 
implementation round as low in transaction costs to sceptical factions. If the spoiler
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faction’s costs are high, the constraints on bpro' factions decrease and payoffs for their 
miscalculation on the intentions of sceptical factions towards each move reduce. This 
enables Lpro’ factions to move forward on implementation with bearable costs. If 
transaction costs for sceptical factions can be presented as low (Table 3.5), this itself a 
function of high spoiler faction transaction costs associated with spoiling, "pro’ faction 
constraints are further reduced. But if  the spoiler faction’s costs associated with 
spoiling are low, they will have the effect of increasing the sceptical faction’s 
transaction costs associated with implementation and increasing the constraints on wpro’ 
factions who face potentially crippling punishment for implementing. These obstacles 
will result in a stalled process that is likely to eventually unravel. The below 
hypotheses propose that rules, procedures and mechanisms might sequence and time the 
moves required of actors in the implementation process in such a say that facilitates the 
emergence of the mutually co-operative equilibrium in place of the mutually stalling 
equilibrium (Figure 3.5).
HYPOTHESES ON IMPLEMENTATION DESIGN AND OUTCOME
The presence of rules and procedures that encourage the following sequencing and 
timing of issues is hypothesised to facilitate the equilibrium that makes full 
implementation a likely outcome.
I. STEP-BY-STEP IMPLEMENTATION: ISSUE BREAKDOWN
The implementation of an agreement generally requires moves by actors on a number of 
clearly identifiable issues: constitutional, military, public-security, socio-economic, 
prisoner, human-rights/reconciliation. Issue breakdown is a central part of design if the 
compromises and commitments made on each issue are broken down into a series of 
clear steps which together will incrementally result in the full implementation of each 
issue. Take for example the implementation of demobilisation. The design of its 
implementation is informed by issue breakdown if actors are required to demobilise 
armies in a number of steps, for example, the assembly of 20 per cent at a time followed 
by their disbandment, before the assembly of the next 20 per cent.
This feature of design will simultaneously contribute to a reduction in the transaction 
costs associated with each move to implement for both kpro’ factions and an increase in 
the transaction costs associated with adopting spoiler tactics for spoiler factions. This
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decieases the likelihood that sceptical factions will be susceptible to spoilei taction 
tactics This is because a spoiler taction hopes to exploit issues in oidei to foim a 
blocking coalition with its own sceptical taction and to encouiage a blocking coalition 
in the other toimation Its ability to do this is enhanced when the step in question is a 
laige step which appeals to be highly sensitive to the secunty oi sceptical tactions The 
opportunities foi spoiler factions to exploit issues so as to force the deadlock 
equilibrium and the subsequent umavelhng of the agreement aie 1 educed when pi o ’ 
tactions present them with a leasonable lequest It is aigued that issue bieakdown can 
piesent a senes of leasonable lequests to spoilei factions, theieby limiting then ability 
to toim a blocking coalition without exposing their unreasonable position22
Issue bieakdown should also reduce the damaging effect that backward induction can 
have on the prospects for co-operation in finite, repeat-play mteiactions Recalling the 
two possibilities for combating backward induction, Axelrod (1981 75) argues that an 
unknown or infinite number of rounds reduces the logic of backwaid induction and 
instead increases the chances of co-operation that is based on the adoption of a tit-foi-tat 
stiategy While arguing that all political processes are inherently finite given the shoit 
term aims of political actors, Tsebehs uses Fudenberg and Masking’s folk theoiem  to 
defend his argument that a significantly numerous, though not infinite number of 
lounds in conjunction with incomplete information is sufficient to encouiage co­
operation and to overcome the logic of backward induction m non-cooperative game 
theoiy (1990 74-5) Whether an implementation process is closer to Tsebehs’s finite set 
of inteiactions, a perception preferred by this analysis, or to Axelrod’s infinite set of 
interactions, the principle of issue breakdown, which maximises the numbei of 
interactions that make up the process of implementing each issue, should limit the 
bairiers to co-operation presented by backward induction and facilitate the engineenng 
of interactions that resemble Table 3 5
However issue breakdown does not in itself create enough incentives and theie lemain 
obstacles to full implementation While issue breakdown may reduce the vulneiability
"  Issue bieakdown may appear to be more or less the same as confidence-building measuies Bui 
Lontidence-building measuies are designed to decrease the distrust that exists between conflict actois 
(Speais 2000 23) Distrust is not behind the obstacles presented by spoilei lactions and issue 
bieakdown is designed to i educe the lelevance of spoilei factions by i educing then ability to continual Iv 
use nicks to peimanently stall the progress
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ot pio and sceptical tactions and 1 educe the opportunity foi spoilei factions to use 
spoilet tactics to stall the implementation ot each issue m the piocess, issue breakdown 
is not enough to oveicome the obstacles to implementation that may anse fiom mles 
and pioceduies that govern the oideung ot implementation Fuitheimoie, the 
incomplete mfoimation about the content of each lound that Tsebehs (1990 74-5) 
lequnes it a significant number ot rounds is to oveicome the obstacles piesented by 
backwaid induction is not necessarily present in an implementation piocess which is 
quite cleai on the compromises and commitments requued of each actor In tact, the 
steps that aie lequned of factions during implementation aie still open to exploitation by 
spoilei factions, regaidless of issue breakdown and the oidermg and sequencing ot the v 
steps that make up full issues is crucial
2 PARALLEL SEQUENCING
Without xules and proceduies that provide for a parallel, sequenced implementation of 
issues, the positive effect that issue breakdown has on facilitating full implementation is 
i educed and, perhaps, eliminated The parallel sequencing of implementation lequnes 
conflict actois to incrementally and simultaneously work towards achieving the full 
implementation of all issues, such as military, policing, constitutional, human lights, 
socio-economic or reconciliation issues A number of timing and sequencing pioceduies 
can prevent parallel sequencing fiom governing the implementation piocess Paiallel 
sequencing of implementation can be achieved if all forms of issue hierarchy aie 
avoided, unilateral demands and issue holdover are avoided, and if leciprocity and/oi 
leversibihty charactenses each step m the implementation process
Issue hieicnchy 1
Issue hierarchy is a rule or mechanism that makes the implementation of one agreed 
issue m its entirety contingent on the full implementation of anothei issue This 
oi denng is frequently assumed to encourage implementation on the basis that the tiust 
built up from earlier co-operation will induce parties to continue to co-opeiate Foi 
example proceduies that require the military commitments of both/all formations to be 
implemented m full before they begin to implement the provisions that make up othei 
issues demand issue hierarchy This foim of issue hieraichy increases the opportunity 
foi spoilei tactions to point to process-ielated features associated with this oidermg of 
implementation as unfair and peihaps security threatening This is because it is
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inevitable that one 'issue (toi example demobilisation) will be seen as moie secuuty 
sensitive to one formation than another and the issue hieiarchy thus seives to cieate a 
unilateial demand that one actor implements fully its secunty sensitive issue pnoi to 
the implementation of the lest of the teims of the agieement
Unilateral demands facilitate spoilei factions’ quests to adopt intransigent positions that 
aie couched m co-opeiative language It enables them to declaie then suppoit foi a 
solution to the conflict, but to make the seemingly fan demand that the issue hieiaichy 
be altered before their consent to implementation is given They can do this in the 
knowledge that the other conflict formation will not be in the position to altei the 
01 dering which was agieed in the rules and proceduies of implementation, given the 
tactics ot its own spoiler faction it will use a call for strict adheience to the ordering 
outlined 111 the agreement as a tactic with which to stall the process Moieovei spoiler 
lactions will attempt to create issue hierarchy demands where they do not explicitly 
exist in 01 dei to create difficulties for the opposite ‘pro’ faction in its quest to gam its 
sceptical faction’s support for the implementation piocess
Baibara Waltei has argued that, given the obstacles to implementation that stem tiom 
the enoimous distiust between the parties, conflict actors must implement the 
military/security issues last, after confidence and trust has been built during the 
implementation of other issues (Walter, 1997) But this sequencing does not appeal to 
consider the intra-formation struggle that actually determines the ability and the will of 
actois to implement the agreement Nor does it take into account the obstacles created 
by the power asymmetry23 that generally characterise lelations between conflict actois 
These two fears make the demand that one issue be implemented in its entirety befoie 
implementation commences on another a highly exploitable one foi spoiler factions in 
both foimations In this context, the IFF model predicts that parallel sequencing, which 
ensuies the absence of this form of issue hierarchy, will facilitate full implementation It
- Zaitman ( 1993 1995) presents the pioblem ot an asymmetiy ot power between what is usually the 
government ot an entity and a challenging insurgency oi warloid-led oiganisation as the biggest obstacle 
lo the lesolution ot civil conflict as the weakei foimation is too insecuie to commit to a piocess of 
demobilisation
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can eliminate the opportunities that the design ot the implementation piocess can cieate 
toi spoilei factions in both/all formations
Is sue Hiei cn chy 2 Umlatei a! Demands
Timetables aie chaiactensed by eithei umlateial deadlines, leciprocal airangements 01 a 
combination ot the two 'Unilateral and irreversible’ lequiiements of any conflict 
toimation aie a foim of issue hierarchy and create disincentives foi implementation 
Instead lecipiocity should prevail where steps m the piocess of implementing provisions 
aie not leveisible For example those who initially demanded that the FMLN be fully 
demobilised befoie further negotiations were held on leforms to the Salvadonan 
political system wanted to include a unilateral demand 01 deadline This foim ot issue 
hieiaichy is hypothesised to result m breakdown for the following reasons Inflexible, 
unilateral demands or deadlines written into a settlement are exploitable by spoileis who 
will present them as imposed, arbitrary and threatening On this basis, they will attempt 
to undeimine the equihbnum at the heart of the compromise m question Umlatei al 
deadlines are fiequently interpreted as a threat, especially as the deadline approaches
L
(Uiy, 1991 118) Spoiler factions aim to inciease the threat, to remove focus fiom the 
compromise, and to use the unilateral deadline to ensuie that reasonable lequests cannot 
be made ot them Thus, deadlines per se are not an obstacle to a successful outcome but 
inflexible or unilateral timetables, which give pretexts foi spoiler factions to call into 
question the legitimacy of the substantive issue or compromise in the agieement, 
piesent obstacles to implementation
This ability to exploit unilateral demands is further enhanced by the fact that they make 
no allowances for the concept o f ‘noise’ (Axelrod, 1997 31) In this way they put 
piessure on the umty-of-purpose that exists between ‘pro’ factions An outcome results 
tiom noise when one actor misinterprets the actions, or at least the strategic intentions, 
behind the actions of another actor and defects where the other actor co-operates But 
the detection in this case is the lesult of miscalculation lather than being indicative of 
the detecting actor’s lack of interest in co-operation (1997 31) Noise can lesult m a 
miscalculation by pro’ faction A on the intentions ot its own sceptical faction A Mote 
commonly noise can lesult in a misinterpretation by sceptical faction A of the 
intentions of the sceptical taction that it knows to exist in conflict actoi B and to have 
consideiable influence on the pro taction This miscalculation can lead to a defection
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bv conflict actoi A (pio and sceptical factions) and co-opeiation by conflict actoi B 
With lecourse to the initiation of a leciprocal mechanism that has the effect ot making 
its move leveisible the co-operating pio’ taction B may be more successtul in 
peisuading its sceptical faction to co-opeiate in the following round ot the piocess 
despite the lecent detection by conflict actor A Futther, this mechanism should help to 
ieduce the opportunities for the spoilei faction in actor B to point to the defection of 
conflict toimation A as a legitimate reason to lesist any further co-opeiation with 
tormation A Without leciprocity or leveisibihty it is unlikely that co-opeiation could 
be lepeated by conflict actoi B
Empmcal research on inter-party competition (Axelrod 1997 31) supports the aigument 
that "noise calls for forgiveness, but not too much foigiveness, as this calls foi 
exploitation ’ Gelpi (1997 335), who is concerned with co-operation between unwieldy 
oigamsations, finds that future co-operation is best facilitated by a film but flexible 
tesponse to the breaches of newly-established norms Both findings support 
inteipretation that too much flexibility can lead to appeasement and to fuithei bteaches 
In the mtia-iormation context, too much flexibility in lesponse to breaches ot the teims 
ot implementation will encouiage ‘pro’ factions to take less lisks to implement, given 
that they will expect to be appeased m the event of not taking them This will inciease 
the chances that ‘pro’ factions will stall, and will httle-by-httle deciease the tiansaction 
costs associated with the use of 'tricks’ foi spoiler tactions Theretoie deadlines may 
actually facilitate the ‘pro’ factions m the pursuit of implementation, as complete 
flexibility may provide spoiler factions with opportunities to use process design to 
justify lelentless stalling But unilateral deadlines will not facilitate implementation
In sum, the absence of unilateral demands, or in other woids the piesence ot lecipiocity 
oi leveisibihty is predicted to both reduce the opportunity tor spoilei factions to use 
tucks and to facilitate the persistence of ‘pio’ taction co-operation This is the case 
despite mixed signals that may emerge duimg the process as to the other taction s 
ability to implement the terms of the agreement
issue  ffie i l\) th y  3 Issue H oldover
Negotiation processes tend to follow either a nothing is agreed until everything is 
agieed’ punciple or one that requnes the implementation ot piovisions agieed on certain
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issues beioie negotiations on othei issues begin The second pnnciple endoises issue 
holdovei and it is predicted that where issues are held ovei in then entuety foi tutuie 
negotiations the implementation of agreed conflict-management proceduies will be 
impeded The held-ovei issue simply lesembles Table 3 4 and lesults m stalling 
legaidless oi the possibly successful implementation of paits ot eaihei issues What is 
moie that the held-ovei issue awaits the end of the piocess is cleai, and batkwaid 
induction leduces the incentive for factions to fully implement pnoi issues, despite what 
might otherwise be a well-designed implementation process
While having a similar effect to the first concept of issue lueiaichy, issue holdovei 
differs m that it concerns the promise to hold future negotiations ovei an issue, such as 
the constitutional status of an entity, m the aftermath of the implementation piocess 
Unless held-over issues are eventually agreed and sequenced with the lest of the 
implementation process, it is predicted that implementation will ultimately stall and 
unravel
Issue Hiei archy 4 E a rly  In ter-P arty  E lec tora l C ontests
While not creating a unilateral deadline, the setting of a tight deadline for an eaily, 
wmnei-takes-all election5 creates disincentives foi ‘pro’ factions to implement other 
aspects o f the agreement In fact, regaidless of the sequencing and timing that govern all 
othei aspects of implementation, ‘pro’ factions are aware that winner-takes-all elections 
aie likely to change the equilibrium that lesulted in the agreement and to possibly make 
its terms irrelevant Should one party decisively win early elections, its ‘pi o’ faction 
may be under pressure from its spoiler faction to ignoie the agreement, which was 
negotiated when the power of the conflict formations was less certain On the othei 
hand, the sceptical faction within the losing party, feeling its position thieatened by the 
loss in the elections and by the rhetoric of the opposite spoiler faction may be 
umesponsive to calls to continue to implement other aspects of the agieement This 
unwillingness is likely to be confounded by the spoiler faction’s effoits to undeninne 
the sceptical faction’s trust of the other conflict actor This can eventually unravel the 
process despite the existence in both formations of relatively strong tactions who 
tetiidin interested in implementing the settlement Thus it is predicted that wmnei-
94
takes-all elections, if not sequenced to take place at the end of a process, will create 
issue hierarchy, and will result in the unravelling of the process.24
3. INSULATED MECHANISMS AND DISPUTE-RESOLUTION PROCEDURES CONTROL DESIGN 
The implementation of a settlement is generally steered by a single institution or by a
number of institutions/commissions which each deal with a specific issue(s) in the
process. These institutions drive and interpret the rules and procedures for
implementation and for dispute resolution which together control implementation
design. Oversight institutions can be either insulated or not: insulated implies that the
institution or mechanism charged with implementation has no outside interest other than
that of furthering implementation. It is predicted that if institutions are insulated and
thus shielded from the intricacies of intra-formation factionalism, they have a greater
capacity to bring about a sequence and timing output hypothesised to facilitate
implementation. Furthermore, it is important that institutions are not left open to the
accusation of partisan behaviour even if the accusation is untrue. This charge presents
spoiler factions with pretexts on which to stall. In other words, they use arguments
associated with process to hide their true objections to the implementation of a
settlement.
But insulated institutions will only guarantee successful outcomes where they can 
ensure that design is informed by the sequence and timing optimal for implementation.
In sum, it is predicted that if the implementation of issues in the process is governed by 
issue breakdown and parallel sequencing, the latter which requires the absence of issue 
hierarchy, prospects for successful implementation are high. Where parallel sequencing 
and issue breakdown are not clearly outlined, insulated mechanisms should facilitate the 
agreement on such a sequence and increase the prospect of a successful outcome. On 
the other hand, where issue hierarchy is central to the design of the implementation 
process, insulated institutions are unlikely to be able to bring about the successful 
implementation of the settlement.
24 This does not contradict the parallel sequencing hypothesis. Holding the elections is generally the last 
of a series of steps to reform an existing electoral system or establish a new electoral and political system 
This hypothesis predicts that if the system is a ‘winner takes all* system, this last step must take place at 
the very end of the entire implementation process.
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EXTERNAL MECHANISMS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS
The detei mining effect of vanables that aie external to the institutional design of the
implementation process was held constant to facilitate the development of the 
hypotheses on the internal mechanisms and institutions But an accuiate empnical 
application of the model lequires that consideiation be given to external vanables and 
then effect on the intra-formation power struggles The lole of actois in the international 
system of third-pai ty international and legional formei sponsois of the civil war, and of 
stiuctural factors associated with the working of the political economy aie identified by 
many as ciucial to the successful negotiation of a settlement It follows that external 
tactors that shaped the environment that facilitated the agreement between paities aie 
cntical to maintaining that equilibrium duimg the implementation process
Understood fiom within the context of the IFF model, external vanables aie significant 
m that they can affect and even alter the preferences and strategies of the factions 
cential to the implementation piocess They are crucial if they seive to alter the external 
equilibrium-maintaining factors that facilitated the settlement sufficiently to altei the 
incentives to comply or defy implementation for a number of factions As such, external 
vanables can undermine an implementation process even where the mechanisms, 
procedures and rules of the process create incentives for all factions to abide by the 
agieement It is therefore concluded that the presence of certain external vanables, 
which will be discussed m chapter four, are necessary but insufficient condrtions foi a 
successful outcome to implementation external variables that facilitated the 
endoisement of an agreement must remain constant if they are to marntain the 
equilibrium in favour of implementation
The formal, mtra-formation faction model of implementation has facilitated the 
development of hypotheses on the expected impact that implementation design will 
have on the outcome of implementation Chapter four empirically examines the 
plausibility of the hypotheses on implementation design, and on the equihbnum- 
marntamrng impact of external vanables, using the data set of 25 implementation 
piocesses developed m chapter two It also considers the plausibility of alternative 
hypotheses developed from established theories of the implementation process and
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mostly concealed with external vanables It concludes by empirically assessing the 
stiengths ot the hypotheses geneiated fiom the intia-ioimation tactionahsm model
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE OUTCOME OF IMPLEMENTATION A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
This chapter explores the capacity of the IFF model’s hypotheses to explain successful, 
partially successful and failed outcomes to implementation processes A number of 
alternative conflict management theories are first introduced and their contribution to 
the quest to explain the dynamics o f the implementation process are outlined These 
theories are formulated as hypotheses and their predictions are discussed m the context 
of the IFF model and its predictions The explanatory power of all hypotheses is 
empirically explored using the data set developed m chapter two The criteria used to 
select and code proxies for the independent variables derived from the hypotheses is 
described, and the process of gathering data to establish proxies for the twenty-five 
cases is outlined, before an analysis of the data through the application of statistical 
techniques is undertaken m an endeavour to establish the variables that appear to best 
explain outcome The final results indicate strong support for the IFF model’s 
predictions on the vanables that determine the outcome of implementation processes
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES FROM THE LITERATURE
There is near consensus m the literature that external vanables, both security and 
politico-economic, have a strong determining effect on whether civil wars persist or can 
be managed with negotiated settlements These external vanables are also deemed to 
determine whether or not conflict actors can be persuaded to negotiate and to implement 
peace settlements The explanatory vanables presented below, most of which can be 
defined as ‘external’ vanables,1 are used to explain the bamers to consolidating 
negotiated settlements by a number of conflict analysts discussed m chapter one
Walter (1997 335) empmcally defends her hypothesis that a credible third-party 
secunty commitment to the settlement is the single most important determinant o f a 
stable, negotiated settlement Equally significant is her finding that agreement on 
power-shanng structures has a significant positive relationship with a stable outcome 
This is reinforced by Caroline Hartzell's findings (1999, 2001) Using comparative 
analysis o f a data set o f peace settlements, she finds that stable settlements
1 Hartzell’s power sharing proxy (1999, 2001) is possibly more appropriately defined as internal to the 
implementation process but as it does not specifically address procedures for implementation it is treated 
as external in this analysis
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are determined by the extent to which 'security-providing guarantees’ are included in 
the tenus of the settlement Security guarantees are defined as ‘political, territorial, 
economic and military power-sharing arrangements’ (Hartzell, 2001) which are written 
into the text o f the peace agreement (Hartzell, 1999 4)
Both Walter and Hartzell’s analyses are based on an assumption, discussed in chapter 
one, that distrust between conflict actors is the single greatest obstacle to the 
implementation of a stable settlement According to Walter (1997 338), it is almost 
impossible for conflict actors themselves to give credible commitments to implement 
the terms of the settlement because vulnerability, stemming from distrust of the other 
party’s intentions, reduces the incentives to implement Consequently, efforts to 
implement almost inevitably suffer from the dual and mutually-reinforcing problems of 
enforcement and vulnerability According to Walter’s analysis, distrust and 
vulnerability are most effectively reduced by a credible commitment to the 
implementation of the settlement by a third party Distrust and vulnerability are 
reduced, according to Hartzell, by the inclusion of power-sharing guarantees m an 
agreement In sum, while Hartzell5s analysis is more concerned with the content o f the 
agreement and Walter’s with external mechanisms, both perceive distrust between 
conflict formations, and the insecurity that distrust creates, as the critical barriers to 
implementation In fact, m a recent empirical study, Walter (2002 107) argues that in 
most cases a third-party credible security commitment and a power-sharing pact are 
required for a successful outcome
The determining effect o f the military balance o f power is also used to explain the 
outcome of conflict management initiatives 2 Zartman contends that the factor best 
determining the prospect of successful negotiations is the existence of a mutually- 
hurting stalemate for parties to the conflict only then is a conflict ‘npe for resolution ’ 
(Zartman, 1993, 1995) Applied to implementation, the critical obstacle to 
implementing agreements is the persistence of the perception on the part of conflict 
formations that there is more to be gamed on the battlefield than from a consolidated 
negotiated settlement The concept is somewhat difficult to apply to implementation
2 Where the process concerned is the mechanisms and rules of implementation, the military balance and 
question about the existence of a mutually-hurting stalemate before and during negotiations is cleaily an 
external / structural variable
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given that an agieement has at this point been endorsed This endorsement, according to 
Zartman’s theory, required the presence o f a mutually-hurting stalemate Perhaps its 
most appropriate application to the implementation process is the implicit contention 
that negotiated settlements that fail during implementation were m fact negotiated and 
endorsed by conflict formations who did not truly experience a mutually-hurtmg 
stalemate At the heart of such a contention is the idea that, once negotiated and 
endorsed, peace agreements are either guaranteed to succeed or doomed to failure, as 
parties (unitary actors) are either suffering a mutually-hurtmg stalemate or not 
Settlements that fail, according to this interpretation, were never intended as more than 
a temporary l u l l  in the power struggle between parties They were endorsed when the 
conflict was not truly ‘npe for resolution’ as conflict formations were not committed to 
a non-military strategy
An alternative interpretation of the ‘npe for resolution’ approach might posit that the 
hurting stalemate prevailed and was m fact necessary for the successful completion of 
negotiations m a settlement But a hurting stalemate might be temporary and 
implementation might fail as changing structural factors erode it For example, it might 
be eroded by strategic actions in support of one or another formation m the 
implementation process by an external actor, such as the diversion of significant 
amounts of financial support by diaspora organisations or o f financial and military 
support by regional actors with intransigent agendas not necessarily compatible with the 
implementation This interpretation raises another important external factor
The persistence of civil conflicts has been explicitly linked by a number of analysts to 
the prevailing state of regional inter-state relations (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1998) 
Furthermore, changing politico-secunty dynamics in the immediate regional 
environment have been cited as the catalyst for the successful conclusion o f a number of  
negotiation processes m stable settlements (Hampson, 1996 19, Wallensteen and 
Sollenberg, 1998 625) Applied to implementation, the proposition is that incentives to 
implement vary with the favourable or unfavourable regional context against which 
implementation takes place Where a ‘regional conflict complex’ either exists or 
develops over the course of implementation it presents barriers to implementation
10 0
Highly linked to the regional security environment, regional and internal politico- 
economic dynamics may also be important variables Political-economy analysts of 
conflict, such as Collier (2000), Duffield (1998), Keen (1996) and de Soysa (2001), all 
imply that, where the political economy accommodates the economic agendas o f rebels, 
increasing the likelihood that civil conflict will persist, conflict management, and thus 
the implementation of peace agreements, will face enormous obstacles The greed 
model of conflict makes the assumption that, while actors publicly articulate their 
agendas as ‘grievance agendas,’ conflict actors’ self-fulfilling economic agendas 
dominate (Collier, 2000 93-4) Civil war is interpreted as a battle to control the 
resources of an entity both the rebel and government’s conflict formation rationally 
calculate the size o f the potential resource base m the event o f victory, and the sum of 
the total costs incurred by continuing to fight to control these resources, or by 
continuing to operate m a state of quasi-conflict m which at least some control o f  
resources is guaranteed (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998 564-6) It follows that if  rebel or 
government conflict formations perceive the expected matenal benefits from victory or 
a continued state o f civil war to outweigh the costs incurred by fighting, no genuine 
conflict management initiatives will be fruitful If by remaining at wai they can more 
successfully pursue selfish economic agendas dominated by the desire to control the 
state’s resources civil war will persist
According to this interpretation, civil wars are far more likely to prevail in political 
economies where few politico-economic opportunities outside of the civil war’s conflict 
structures exist for the elite and sub-elite (Collier, 2000 93-4) For Collier (2000) and 
de Soysa (2000, 2001), where the availability of Tootable’ resources is high, so are 
incentives to persist with civil wars Duffield (2000 73-4) and Keen (1998) argue that 
civil conflicts will be sustained where conflict actors are heavily involved in economic 
networks that are engaged m the extra-legal or informal political economy These 
activities tend to be an integral part of the power structures associated with the civil war 
and they satisfy rebel organisations and governments’ quests for financial sustainability 
Civil conflict is thus protracted Applying the logic of the greed hypotheses to the 
implementation process, where political economies display these features, efforts to 
implement negotiated settlements will face greater structural resistance
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Grievance models emphasise the justice-seeking issues that motivate conflict actors, 
such as the desire to eradicate a government that discriminates against certain sections 
of the population, to seek autonomy, or to seek socio-economic changes to reduce 
inequality (de Soysa, 2001 4-5) Inequality has been empirically linked to the incidence 
of political instability and violence by a number of analysts (Alesina and Perotti,
1996 1225-8, Auvinen andNafziger, 1997 68, Melkas, 1996 22, Gissmger and 
Gleditsch, 1999 14) Its significance is explained by its propensity to lead to violent 
civil conflict between the regime and those who seek to challenge the regime that is 
perceived to perpetuate this inequality Others argue that inequality does not have a 
relationship with the incidence of civil war, and point to the many states where 
structural inequality exists without perpetrating violent civil conflict
While the results of many empirical analyses suggest that economic inequality alone 
does not appear to have a causal relationship with the outbreak of violent civil conflict 
(Collier 2000 97, Gissmger and Gleditsch 14),3 it would be wrong to thus conclude that 
inequality has no impact on the persistence of civil conflict, once escalated Once 
escalated, inequality and the lack of access for significant proportions o f the population 
to opportunities to earn a decent living, to access education, let alone to increase income 
(all predicted to be significant by Collier’s greed motivated model) may serve to 
perpetuate conflict by either forcing people to support or to join corrupt, rebel or 
government-dominated networks in order to live, or as has been suggested, by making 
people susceptible to supporting extremist rhetoric and demands (Melkas, 1996)
A number of hypotheses can be derived from these popular theories on the obstacles to 
conflict management A summary of these hypotheses appears m table 4 1 below
3 Gissmger and Gliditsch find that inequality is related to political instability but not to civil war
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TABLE 4 1 Summary ot Hypotheses From Dominant Theories in the Literature
1 The failure to secure a third party’s credible commitment to the settlement and to the parties 
during the implementation process best explains why settlements either fail or are only partially 
successful,
2 Failed and partially successful processes can be explained by the absence of power sharing 
guarantees in the terms of the agreement The more institutional guaiantees m a settlement, the 
more successful an outcome will be
3 The absence of a mutually-hurting stalemate before, during and after the negotiation stage of the 
process, explains stalled and failed outcomes to implementation processes
4 A shift in regional dynamics that either creates, significantly alters, or reinforces an already 
present regional conflict complex, best explains the variety of outcome to implementation 
processes
5 Structural conditions associated with the political economy, namely the dominance of primary 
commodity products and low human capital, combine to create barriers to implementation 
associated with conflict actor’s decision that the status quo better serves its purposes
6  Persistent inequality present obstacles to the implementation of peace settlements as the 
grievances underlymg the conflict persist and create incentives for people to support extremist 
agendas
Before the IFF model’s predictions on the accuracy of these hypotheses is addressed, 
the concept of a credible economic commitment is briefly considered Not unlike the 
credible security commitment recommended by Walter, this is emerging as a 
recommendation, particularly m the peace-buildmg literature, that focuses on the 
policies and actions of donor governments and International Financial Institutions 
(EFIs) Two interpretations o f a credible economic commitment can be found m the 
literature, the first o f which is presented here, the second m the concluding chapter of 
this thesis
The first interpretation is that large sums of money and resources are required if 
implementation of settlements and peace-buildmg initiatives are to succeed Those 
involved m efforts to implement agreements frequently cite the lack of resources and 
funding available to pursue important objectives as creating enormous barriers to 
implementation (Anstee, 1996, Lode, 1997) Loans from international financial 
institutions (IFI) aside, for ‘peace-building activities’ most implementation processes 
rely on resources pledged by international donors, be they governments, inter­
governmental organisations or NGOs The argument appears to be that the credible 
commitment envisaged by Walter must extend to the economic field to ensure that large
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amounts of financial assistance serve, alongside the credible commitment o f a third 
party to implementation, to decrease distrust to a point where implementation is 
possible Thus implementation will succeed if the amount of donor aid and IFI 
assistance to the country is high Linked to this proposition is the idea that the stronger 
an economy m terms of growth, the more capable the entity will be to consolidate 
peaceful relations (de Soysa, 2000 17) or to fully implement a peace settlement
PREDICTIONS OF THE IFF MODEL ON EXTERNAL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Recalling the IFF model’s hypotheses, the determining impact of the external 
environment on implementation is explained in two ways Firstly, while the 
international and regional security environment and the political economy may serve as 
equilibrium-maintaining forces, they cannot alone guarantee implementation Secondly, 
changes m the external variables that prevailed when an agreement was signed may 
effect a shift m the strategies of pro, sceptical and spoiler factions that makes 
implementation highly unlikely
More specifically, the model predicts that, while credible commitments and 
institutionalisation of power sharing may be instrumental m persuading conflict 
formations to end negotiation processes with the endorsement o f a peace settlement, 
neither will guarantee its implementation some settlements will falter during 
implementation despite both credible commitments and guarantees Therefore, while 
institutional guarantees and credible commitments are influential m increasing trust 
between conflict formations, they will not reduce the damaging effect of intra-party 
power struggles on the process The texts o f peace settlements are frequently necessarily 
vague and interpreted, or at least presented, as having drastically diverging implications 
by different parties or factions who are m pursuit of their own immediate objectives 
(Cousins, 2001 114) The very nature of negotiated settlements requires, more often 
than not, that a peace agreement mean different things to different people Thus, wntten 
guarantees are open to interpretation or misinterpretation and, while possibly necessary 
to induce signing, are not sufficient to secure its implementation In sum, 
institutionalisation of power shanng may coincide with a successful or partially 
successful implementation process, but a more immediately significant explanation for 
this relationship will be the mechanisms and procedures for implementing guarantees 
Ciedible commitments and the guarantee that this provides for formations will have a
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significant relationship with all successfully negotiated settlements, but its relationship 
with the outcome o f implementation will be unclear
Fundamental to theones that focus on ‘ripeness’ is the argument that the presence o f a 
'mutually-hurting stalemate’ for parties to the conflict best explains their entry into 
negotiations and the successful negotiation of a settlement Given the stalemate 
necessary for the settlement outcome, one would expect implementation to be a 
relatively straight-forward process once the agreement was negotiated and signed That 
this is not the case and that even successfully implemented settlements undergo 
implementation processes replete with obstacles suggests that the stalemate was not 
sufficient to ensure implementation, and that other barriers threaten the full 
implementation of the agreement In other words, the usefulness of the ripeness concept 
to efforts to explain the implementation process is questionable
But the IFF model introduces an alternative interpretation of the ripeness concept What 
is a ‘hurting stalemate’ for some factions m the post settlement period may be seen by 
another faction m the same formation as an opportunity to re-launch violent conflict 
with a view to satisfying its dual goals to catch the other formation off guard, and 
thereby improve the overall military position of its party vis-a-vis the other formation, 
and to simultaneously promote its own faction power vis-a-vis other factions in its own 
party If this is the case, no strong relationship should exist between the proxies used to 
measure the presence or absence of a ‘mutually-hurtmg stalemate’ and the outcome of 
the implementation process While this may be m part due to the difficulties inherent in 
measuring such a concept, the prediction is also based on the proposed non-umtary 
nature of conflict formations, and the fluidity that characterises post-agreement mtra- 
party relations and strategies
According to the IFF model, dramatic shifts m the strategy and actions of relatively 
powerful regional and international actors during implementation will erect enormous 
obstacles to implementation These shifts can alter the preferences of factions, 
decreasing transaction costs for spoiler factions to follow their preferred strategy, and 
increasing pro factions’ transaction costs for implementation But the emphasis on shifts 
in regional policy is important formations are unlikely to collectively endorse a 
settlement while a ‘regional conflict complex’ continues to exist and thus, unless shifts
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in regional policy occur, it is contended that regional conflict complexes will not 
piesent the key obstacles to implementation of agreements It is contended that regional 
co-operation is necessary to encourage formations to negotiate and to endorse an 
agreement, but it is not, m itself, sufficient to ensure that peace agreements will be 
implemented In other words shifts in regional dynamics threaten to alter equilibrium 
strategies and may encourage stalling and thereby present barriers to implementation 
But implementation processes may still falter despite a favourable regional 
environment
Structural conditions embedded m the international political economy may serve to 
make implementation more difficult by increasing the incentives for spoiler factions to 
spoil, and reducing the confidence of sceptical factions in their post-implementation 
secunty, and m a strategy that advocates implementation However, given their 
structural nature, these factors existed at the time of signing and they should not make 
implementation impossible, given the right implementation process If not addressed m 
the agreement and m the long run, they are likely to result m the outbreak of renewed 
civil conflict However, a strong relationship is not anticipated between the factors that 
proxy the greed and grievance political economy models and the outcome of 
implementation m the short term
What about the proposition that inadequate and insufficient funding creates 
insurmountable obstacles to implementation and ultimately causes its failure7 
Importance has been attached to the positive effect o f financial resources and their 
effective management m Mali (Lode, 1997) Some empirical evidence suggests that a 
donor policy informed by ‘peace conditionality’ contributed to the relative success of 
implementation m Guatemala (Auvmen and Wayne, 1997 26) At the same time, the 
Guatemalan government’s foot-draggmg over the implementation of important socio­
economic commitments (Cousens and Kumar, 1996) highlights the degree to which the 
pressure to spend little on peace-building came from internal, political forces The IFF 
model argues that using insufficient resources or weak economic commitment to a 
process to explain unsuccessful outcomes suffers from the same weaknesses as the 
credible secunty commitment argument This is because sufficient resources will not 
guarantee the successful implementation of peace agreements Resources that do not 
take into account the bamers to implementation created by mtra-formation factionalism
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will not destroy the incentive to stall Resources, both national and international, are 
clearly essential if an implementation process is to result in a successful outcome that 
contributes positively to development and peace-building But the relative volume of 
donor aid will have no significant effect on the prospect of implementation In other 
words, unless accompanied by the implementation process outlined by the IFF model, 
resources cannot m themselves guarantee success
The predictions of the IFF model on the internal mechanisms of the implementation 
process developed m chapter three are now recalled m Table 4 2 below
Table 4 2 IFF Hypotheses on the Implementation Process
The prospects of a successful outcome should increase with the
1 Absence of issue hierarchy (issue hierarchy 1, unilateral demands, issue holdover and ‘early 
election)
2 Presence of issue breakdown (with reciprocity and reversibility which is connected to 1)
3 Presence of parallel sequencing of all issues
4 The presence of insulated institutions should increase the probability that the sequence and 
timing hypothesised to facilitate implementation develops
The IFF model’s hypotheses on the external variables employed by many analysts to 
explain the outcome of conflict management initiatives are summarised m Table 4 3 
below
Table 4 3 IFF Hypotheses on External Variables from other theories
1 The institutionalisation of different forms of power sharing may coincide with a successful or 
partially successful implementation process, but a more immediately significant explanation for 
this relationship will be the mechanisms and procedures for implementing guarantees
2 Credible commitments and the guarantee that this provides for formations will have a significant 
relationship with all successfully negotiated settlements, but its relationship with the outcome of 
implementation will be unclear
3 There will be no strong relationship between the proxies used to measure the presence or 
absence of a ‘mutually-hurting stalemate’ and the outcome of the implementation process
4 Regional co-operation is necessary to encourage actors to negotiate and to endorse an agreement, 
but it is not, m itself, sufficient to ensure that peace agreements will be implemented
5 Given their structural nature, the conditions associated with protracted conflict by the greed 
model of civil conflict should not make implementation impossible, given the right 
implementation process
6  Given their structural nature, the proxies associated with coding the grievance model of civil 
conflict existed at the time of signing The conditions associated with prolonged conflict by the 
grievance model of conflict should not make implementation impossible
7 Unless accompanied by the implementation process predicted by the IFF model to facilitate 
success, resources cannot in themselves guarantee a successful outcome
In the next section the coding of proxies for the independent variables derived from all 
the hypotheses is discussed and, following this, their empirical application to the 
outcome of implementation is described The chapter concludes with a presentation o f  
the results o f statistical analysis, and an assessment of the strength of the IFF model
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CODING PROXIES FOR EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF HYPOTHESES
The tables in appendix B provide supporting data for the generation of the proxies 
discussed below The existence of a credible commitment was measured for all 25 cases 
using the criteria employed by Walter For each case a commitment was considered to 
exist where there is a formal or official ‘implicit or explicit promise by an outside power 
to protect adversaries during the treaty implementation period’ (1997 345-6)4 A 
formal promise offered publicly by the head of state (or his or her direct emissary) to 
intervene should an agreement break down was coded as a weak guarantee, a moderate 
guarantee sees the promise accompanied by the deployment of at least five hundred 
soldiers prior to the implementation period, and a strong guarantee exists when the 
number o f troops exceeded three thousand5 While the strength of the guarantee is less 
important to the testing of the power of the credible commitment theory to explain the 
outcome o f implementation, it was included so as to check for a relationship between 
the strength of the commitment and outcome
After relatively extensive empirical analysis of a data set o f 23 cases, Hartzell proposes 
that extensively institutionalised settlements are the most likely to prove stable, even 
with the inclusion of a number o f control explanatory variables (Hartzell, 99 17) The 
clarity of her findings is somewhat reduced by the evasive concept o f ‘guarantees,’ 
which are arguably written into all peace agreements m some form or another 
Guarantees, or institutionalisation, refer to rules written into agreements regarding the 
distribution of political power, coercive force and economic or distributive policy The 
independent variable was coded on a scale from zero-to-four according to the extent to 
which guarantees are institutionalised (Hartzell 2001) Distinctions were made between 
military, political, economic and territorial guarantees This independent variable - 
institutional guarantees -  was measured for each case using the coding criteria explicitly 
set out m her empirical work (2001) and a breakdown into type of power sharing for 
each case appears m appendix B
A number of proxies were employed to test the capacity o f a mutually-hurting stalemate 
to explain the outcome of implementation The measures are based on those used by
4 Few cases overlap with Walter’s dataset of settlements from 1940-1990
5 Walter, 1997 requires it to exceed 10,000 In 2002 she breaks down the categories further
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Walter to proxy the existence of a mutually-hurting stalemate, and the extent to which 
the costs to conflict formations of continuing to adopt belligerent strategies likely 
outweigh the benefits is estimated (Walter, 1997 347) For each case, the duration, the 
magnitude, and the intensity of the war, measured by battle-related deaths per 1,000 
people, were established as proxies for the extent to which a mutually-hurting stalemate 
might have prevailed 6 Marshall (1999) has created an index of magnitude which uses a 
number of factors to estimate the destructive impact of the conflict on the directly 
affected society, including state capabilities, interactive intensity, area and scope of 
death and destruction, population displacement and the duration of violent conflict 
Marshall’s index includes all cases m the data set It codes magnitude on a scale o f 1 to 
10 and these codes are used to assess the magnitude of the civil war According to 
Waiter's interpretation of the ‘mutually-hurtmg stalemate’ concept, a high magnitude, 
high intensity and long duration increases the probability that a mutualiy-hurtmg 
stalemate will exist The hypothesis is therefore examined, with an assessment o f the 
extent to which these proxies for a mutualiy-hurtmg stalemate coincide with successful 
implementation
Cases are analysed for the presence or absence of a ‘regional conflict complex ’ The 
central question is whether or not either the persistence of or the development o f a 
‘regional conflict complex1 explains prolonged stalling or failed outcomes A ‘regional 
conflict complex’ has been defined as existing where conflict, whether civil or inter­
state, persists or erupts m neighbouring states and has clear links to the civil conflict in 
the state m question The links may be ‘so substantial, that changes m conflict dynamics 
or the resolution of one conflict will have an effect on a neighbounng country ’ 
(Wallensteen and SoIIenberg, 1998 623) These links may be related to the existence of 
an ethnic group straddling a border, such as the large group of Palestinians living in 
Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Jordan They may also relate to the active support o f a 
conflict formation by a regional actor m a neighbouring civil war by direct military, 
political or financial assistance, such as the direct intervention of the Angolan
6 Walter uses number of deaths per month to measure intensity, but battle deaths per 1,000 is favoured by 
this analysis She adds a further indicator to proxy the apparent ability of combatants to make notewoi thy 
advances on the battlefield, and codes each conflict from historical sources (347) Given that she found a 
lelationship to exist between magnitude, duration the incidence of successfully negotiated settlements, as 
well as with this personally coded indicator, it was decided that the first three proxies should be sufficient 
to captuie the concept of a mutually-hurting stalemate
109
government m the conflict in the Congo, or the dnect intervention of Israel and Syria in 
the Lebanese civil war m the 1980s and beyond
The concept o f a ‘regional conflict complex’ is here extended to include situations 
where regional actors, who are not involved m other civil wars, do pursue an official 
policy of obstruction to the peace process, thereby having an effect similar to a conflict 
complex and creating an unfavourable regional environment for implementation 
Proxies for the persistence o f this extended concept o f ‘regional conflict complex’ are 
sought by the application of the following to each implementation process A ‘regional 
conflict complex’ does not exist or has not emerged m the following scenarios if the 
final agreement was formally endorsed by regional actors, m particular those actors who 
were previously sponsors o f the different conflict formations, if  these actors remain 
committed to the agreement dunng implementation, if no neighbouring civil or inter­
state war has erupted that is significantly linked to the conflict to which the negotiated 
settlement is being applied
A major break with the peace process by a regional actor, judged to have the potential to 
influence the direction taken by conflict formations, indicates the existence o f a poor 
regional environment or a regional conflict complex An important distinction is made 
between the official rejection of a peace process by a regional actor, and 
covert/unofficial breaching of official policy m support of a peace process by elements 
of regional actors For example, while neighbouring governments, some former 
sponsors of actors m the Cambodian civil war, remained officially committed to the 
implementation of the Paris Peace Agreements, there is ample evidence of continued 
Thai assistance to Khmer Rouge elements, and m particular of the Thai military’s 
involvement m cross-border trade worth millions of dollars to the Khmer Rouge (Berdal 
and Keen, 1997 802-4) This breach of official policy by elements o f a neighbouring 
state is qualitatively different to a break-down or fundamental shift m regional power 
relations between states, or to the outbreak of violent conflict m a neighbouring state, m 
that it pertains to the inability (or unwillingness) of a regional actor in the 
implementation process (most likely a previous sponsor) to control elements supposedly 
under its control This is defined as mtra-conflict formation factionalism as it constitutes 
factionalism withm a party that is officially m support of the peace process, m this case 
the Thai government More significantly for this thesis, it highlights factionalism withm
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the former Thai-Khmer Rouge coalition between factions m favour of and against 
cooperation with the Cambodian peace process On the other hand, if  this covert support 
is the result o f a nearby civil or mter-state conflict, such as the support for conflict 
formations m Sierra Leone by actual and subsequently former parties to the Liberian 
civil war, it is interpreted as stemming from a regional conflict complex
Chailes Taylor (NPFL)7 was a long-time supporter of the challenging conflict formation 
(RUF)8 in Sierra Leone’s civil war His continued support for a militant RUF despite 
the peace agreement m Sierra Leone (1996) and the peace agreement m Libena (1996), 
were the result o f a continuation of the civil war m Libena at a low level, as resulting 
from a ‘regional conflict complex ’ The official end to the civil war in Liberia coincided 
with the 1996 agreement in Siena Leone With the onset of the implementation process 
m Libena, travelling Libenan militias introduced a dramatic shift m the regional 
environment, which presented obstacles to implementation m Siena Leone Former 
rival Liberian conflict formations are involved m Sierra Leone, m support of both the 
government and the RUF, and factions belonging to Libenan formations presumably 
use Sierra Leone as a base for their officially disbanded (but m reality only reduced m 
size) militias Thus the actions of the Libenan actors, though frequently officially 
denied by the President of Liberia, and in this sense ‘covert,’ must be interpreted as part 
of the ‘regional conflict complex’ still m existence The instability m Sierra Leone 
creates a ‘regional conflict complex’ for Libena, m that the government protects 
Libenan militias who continue to fight the NPFL Libenan government In Cambodia, 
on the other hand, the former mter-state war m which Thailand was allied with Khmer 
Rouge essentially came to an end with the cold war There is no longer violent mter- 
state conflict that could be linked to the peace process m 1992 and 1993
Conflict m Namibia, South Africa and Angola dunng the 1980s would have been part of 
a regional conflict complex But after 1989 the Namibian conflict was no longer 
ongoing and cannot be seen as negatively impacting on the Angolan implementation 
process While elements of the South African Defence Forces appeared to have 
continued to support UNITA (Afnca Confidential, Feb 93), the government was no 
longer officially and mihtanly involved and, more significantly, any breaches of official
7 National Patriotic Front of Liberia
8 Revolutionary United Front
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policy weie not sudden or new m the post-May 1991 implementation process On the 
other hand, if the Democratic Republic of Congo were included m this sample, it would 
be coded as existing within a regional conflict complex, given that outside interference 
and support for conflict formations is so great that it makes it akin to an inter-state 
conflict played out on Congo soil
Moving on to pohtical-economy theories centred on the greed and grievance models, 
analysts tend to focus on the politico-economic factors that contribute to the escalation 
or to the persistence of civil conflict While most offer recommendations on the factors 
necessary if  cycles o f protracted conflict are to be broken, the accuracy o f many o f these 
recommendations is difficult to empirically assess given their untried and untested 
nature For example, Duffield (2000 81) interprets patterns of conflict and trade to be 
inseparable and perceives the commercial complicity that characterises many parts of 
international business culture (Duffield, 2000 85) as perpetuating the trans-border trade 
central to elite politico-economic strategies in civil wars These strategies are 
consequently presented as vulnerable to a concerted application of appropriate 
compliance and regulatory measures for international and trans-border trade (Duffield, 
2000 86) The UN-led effort to regularise the international diamond trade, aimed at 
cutting off access to badly needed capital for rebels with economic agendas, m 
particular UNIT A in Angola and the RUF m Sierra Leone, is the best example o f efforts 
to implement this recommendation Opinions widely diverge on the relative success of 
this measure, m terms of both of its actual success m limiting the trade in illegal 
diamonds and m curbing the economic options open to conflict formations that pursue 
violent strategies It is, perhaps, too early to undertake a comprehensive comparative 
study o f this independent variable
But a number o f factors predicted to be important by pohtical-economy theorists, both 
those who fall into the ‘greed’ or ‘grievance models o f conflict (de Soysa, 2000 4-5), 
are appropriate for empirical testing on a data set ‘Lootable goods’ that characterise 
conflict-prone economies, according to the greed model, are approximated using the 
degree to which the economy is dominated by primary commodities the generic quality 
of most primary commodity goods makes it more difficult to trace their origin, thus 
making them more susceptible to lucrative black-market trading Also, the way m which 
they are extracted and the export routes on which they depend makes them far more
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susceptible to predatory taxation than other manufactured goods (Collier, 2000 93)
The incremental stabilisation of government and governance that a successful 
implementation process should bnng may threaten this lucrative black market and its 
trade roots, and facilitate an economy that immediately offers far less opportunity to 
those who control power hierarchies and resources
Collier uses the ratio o f primary commodity exports to GDP to measure this proxy It is 
also measured as the proportion of primary commodities to overall exports (de Soysa, 
2001 4) or as the extent to which exports of manufactured goods exceed export o f food 
(primary) commodities (Gissmger and Gleditsch 14) Sachs and Warner (1997 15) 
argue that the former -  primary commodity exports as a percentage of GDP - is the best 
proxy of the importance of primary commodities to an economy as it gives the best 
estimate o f the wealth effect caused by primary commodities It is thus judged to be the 
best estimate of the value that conflict formations would place on controlling them the 
lower their value, the less incentive there is to incur the costs of rebellion to control 
them
De Soysa (2000, 2001) differentiates between different types o f primary commodity 
goods, arguing that where a country has vast amounts of mineral resources it is more 
conflict-prone The potential quick-profit earning from trans-border trade m mineral 
resources is, he explains, so high that it presents rebels with strong economic incentives 
to continue conflict (de Soysa, 2000 115) The extraction of subsoil assets requires little 
m the way of bargained outcomes between elites and the masses of society (de Soysa 
126) It therefore creates little incentive for the development o f good governance 
Frequently referred to as ‘Dutch Disease’ (Sachs and Warner, 1997), this concept has 
been used to explain the weaknesses in governance in the Congo as stemming from its 
vast mineral resources (Gissmger and Gleditsch, 1999 16) De Soysa uses the natural 
resource stock per capita,9 splits it into renewable and non-renewable resource stock, 
and finds a very strong relationship between the incidence of conflict and high 
quantities of non-renewable resource stock
0 This is a new indicator developed by the World Bank De Soysa obtains the information from World 
Bank, 1997 Expanding the Measw e oj Wealth Indicatois o f  Environmentally Sustainable Development 
Washington, DC Woild Bank See table 4 6  below
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The greed model also suggests that the utility o f conflict is reduced, and the costs 
incurred by persisting with conflict are heightened, if many other income-earning 
options exist for members o f conflict formations, or, m other words, if the strength of 
human capital is high Where the level of education amongst young men is low, yet the 
proportion of young men in the population is high, the political economy offers fewer 
options to members of conflict formations (Collier, 2000 94) Collier finds that, along 
with lootable goods, educational levels amongst men relates inversely to the incidence 
of civil conflict De Soysa (2000 131) uses pre-civil war per capita income to capture 
this variable, describing it as a stronger proxy o f earning potential m the formal 
economy, as it takes into account a host o f political and social factors such as the 
provision of health services, infrastructure and other public goods (2001 16-17)
In an earlier article, Collier (1999) argues that the extraction of primary products, such 
as minerals or agriculture, are civil-war invulnerable activities and are thus more likely 
to dominate war economies Economies tend to see a shrinking of the manufacturing 
and other more diversified sectors as civil conflict ensures This seems to result m a 
circular argument once wars begin, the dynamics resulting from the war economy 
present obstacles to conflict management Thus, it may be that the longer the civil war 
ensues, the more entrenched the war-sustaimng political economy becomes, and the 
higher the obstacles presented by the political economy to conflict management But 
Collier finds that duration actually has a determining impact on the likelihood that an 
economic dividend will ensue m the early years after a settlement (implementation) 
peace dividends, i e the rapid growth of war vulnerable activities and of the economy m 
general m the immediate post-war penod, are found to be larger for long, intractable 
civil conflicts (Collier, 99 179-81) Thus, the prediction goes in the same direction as 
the prediction of Zartman's theory concerning the mutually-hurtmg stalemate the longer 
the civil war the more successful will be the implementation process This assumes that 
a transition to a peace-time economy occurs during the implementation process
The overall proposition denved from the greed model o f conflict is that implementation 
processes will face enormous and potentially insurmountable obstacles where structural 
politico-economic vanables accommodate the selfish agendas and the financial 
sustainability o f conflict-formation elites These variables serve to make the material 
benefits from continued civil war a more attractive and useful option for elites and
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sub-elite members o f conflict formations One would thus expect the outcome o f  
implementation to be closer to failure the greater the economy's reliance on primary 
commodity exports, the higher the natural resource stock per capita and the lower the 
human capital, whether measured by education or per capita income (GDP per capita)
For each case, these proxies are used to assess the extent to which a conflict-prone 
political economy exists m the penod immediately prior to the negotiation of a 
settlement To examine whether or not a post-settlement political economy creates 
obstacles to implementation, it is arguably desirable to detect changes m the degree to 
which the variables associated with conflict prevail m the political economy over the 
course of implementation, and thus alter the politico-economic incentives for conflict 
There are two problems with this approach Firstly, there is the potentially endogenous 
nature of this van able a worsening political economy (1 e changes that are 
hypothesised to create or perpetuate incentives for conflict) could be interpreted as the 
result o f a failure to implement settlements and to prevent the continuation of civil war 
Equally so, an improving political economy may be the result o f the stability brought by 
a relatively successful implementation process Secondly, the up-to-date data that such 
an analysis would require are unavailable for many cases, especially for the most 
recently-agreed settlements Therefore, the relative presence o f conflict-prone elements 
is compared across10 cases Values are taken for years as near as possible to the year of 
signing, and, where feasible, average values over a few years immediately preceding the 
implementation process are taken
Despite the lower availability of the data, a measure of inequality is added, where 
available, to investigate the possibility that high levels o f inequality impact negatively 
on efforts to implement peace agreements A measure of structural inequality is taken, 
using the method employed by Gissmger and Gledistch, and supplemented by a dataset 
complied by Deminger and Squire (1996)11
10 Collier (2000) and de Soysa (2000, 2001) compare across cases in their empirical analyses of political 
economies prior to escalation
11 The concentration of income in the top 20% of the population is taken and it is assumed that it is 
measured before taxes -  this cited as a weakness Some countries use the gmi index of inequality and 
others the share of income in top the 2 0  percent
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The comprehensive application of the credible economic commitment theory to 
implementation is discussed further m the concluding chapter The current empirical 
examination of the economic commitment on the outcome to implementation is limited 
to including a measure of the average level o f growth m the economy both before and 
after the implementation process begins While the limitations o f this measure are clear, 
it should give some indication of the ‘extent of opportunities available for advancement’ 
(de Soysa 17), or the extent to which lack o f finance and a weak economy can impede, 
or be used as a pretext to stall, the implementation of a settlement
Lastly the coding of the IFF hypotheses on sequence, timing and procedures for 
implementation is addressed Each case was examined to detect the rules, procedures 
and institutions that were outlined m the settlement, and those that were eventually 
adopted to govern the sequence and timing of implementation Cases were examined for 
the presence of any of the four features of issue hierarchy, for phased parallel 
sequencing and for issue breakdown For each case a chronology of implementation 
was generated, and any renegotiation of the institutions to which power to implement is 
allocated, or adjustments to the rules and procedures governing output, was detected 
The texts o f peace agreements and a range of newswire and pnnt media sources, UN  
documents and reports, regular country reports (see bibliography for details), Jane’s 
Intelligence review and Jane’s Sentinel accounts, Keesmg’s record of world events,
1 2
journal articles and book chapters , were used to code the hypotheses for each case
Issue breakdown underpins design if provisions outline clear, incremental steps that 
together constitute the full implementation of an issue For example, issue breakdown 
on the issue of elections to governing bodies might include a number of steps through 
which a formation is transformed into, and is legally recognised, as a political 
movement, whereby the system for elections is altered to prepare for a more level 
playing field, and transitional bodies to manage disputes over the organisation of  
elections and to monitor elections are established Further issue breakdown would 
include initial elections to transitional or permanent power-shanng institutions, or a 
phased decentralisation of political power m the run-up to elections Issue breakdown of 
a military issue, such as demobilisation, might provide for the incremental assembly of
12 For books and chapters consulted and not included in the mam bibliography see Additional sources 
consulted for coding Appendices A and B
116
militias or armies m groups of ten or twenty per cent, followed by a similarly broken- 
down movement towards full demobilisation, disarmament or re-mtegration On issues 
of xeconciliation or justice, issue breakdown might entail the establishment of a body 
through which the grievances and complaints of victims of violence are registered and 
addressed before a body dealing with punishment or justice is established For issue 
breakdown to be effective, the steps must be reversible or reciprocal and thus not 
undermined by issue hierarchy demands
In order to ensure the most accurate reflection of the hypotheses on issue breakdown, 
evidence of issue breakdown m every key issue of the settlement (either set down m the 
agreement or agreed subsequently in the implementation process) is sought before 
coding the principle of issue breakdown as an instrumental part of process design Some 
implementation processes include issue breakdown on many issues, while at the same 
time leaving important issues uninfluenced by it For example, m the case o f Cambodia, 
issue breakdown appeared to underpin the provisions that called for the establishment of 
neutrality across political bodies with the power to influence the elections, from the 
army, to the police, to the civil service, and for the establishment o f viable political 
parties, before the election process was underway 13 By requiring that the elected body 
function firstly to draft and approve a new constitution for Cambodia, before it was 
converted into a legislative assembly, a breakdown of political issues was envisaged 1 e 
parties had to agree the basis for the new, multi-party, democratic political system 
before the new assembly was formally established The demobilisation process was 
also marked by some issue breakdown and it was to take place m stages On the other 
hand, issue breakdown did not characterise the implementation of agreements on the 
important issue of public security, the functioning of the judiciary or the full integration 
of former combatants into the Cambodian Army In other words, issue breakdown was 
present but it did not underpin implementation design across all issues
Issue hierarchy is created by the design of the implementation process if actors agree to 
abide by the following ordering and sequencing Firstly, if  the provisions agreed for the 
implementation of one full issue or sub-issue (for example on all military issues or the 
demobilisation of armies) must be fully implemented before the implementation o f
13 Paris Peace Agreements, Cambodia UN, Blue Helmets, 1996
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other full issues commences Secondly, if one conflict formation is required to fully 
implement all o f its commitments on one issue (or sub-issue) before the other conflict 
formation(s) commences implementation of its commitments This sequence places a 
unilateral demand at the centre of design and is frequently accompanied by a specific, 
unilateral timetable This form of issue hierarchy prevails if the moves for each actor 
(on each issue) are not reciprocal and/or reversible Thirdly, if the concept o f issue 
holdover, as defined in chapter three, is explicitly or implicitly required by the design of 
implementation Fourthly, if a tight and specific deadline for the holding of ‘winner- 
takes-alP elections is included and means that these elections will take place early m the 
implementation process
Some of the difficulties encountered during the coding process are briefly outlined A 
clear definition of the rules and procedures that lead to issue hierarchy helps to make the 
empirical analysis as accurate as possible For this reason, the presence or absence of 
the four features o f design that create issue hierarchy are separately established before it 
is concluded that ‘issue hierarchy’ is, or is not, a feature of a process However, during 
the coding process it became clear that it was difficult to separate the issue hierarchies 
caused by the first type of issue hierarchy - ordering of entire issues for implementation 
before others commence - and by the existence o f ‘unilateral deadlines’ for one party or 
the other Each case was therefore coded as either ‘including or not including’ these 
either of these forms of issue hierarchy (combined issue hierarchy) Cases were also 
coded as to whether or not they included dated unilateral deadlines (unilateral TT) 
During the course of the coding process it also became clear that m no case where either 
issue holdover or early elections were features o f design was the issue hierarchy created 
by ‘issue hierarchy V  or ‘unilateral deadlines’ not also present Therefore, it was 
difficult to assess the individual effect of issue holdover or early elections on outcome
Furthermore, while the hypotheses would suggest that the complete absence of issue 
hierarchy means that parallel sequencing must govern the implementation process, the 
two are coded separately to make for a more thorough and accurate coding process For 
example, some agreements do not endorse issue hierarchy but neither do they provide 
for parallel sequencing Also, it is possible to imagine a situation where issue hierarchy 
is eventually adopted in a process m which neither issue hierarchy nor parallel 
sequencing were a part of design, but where the implementing institutions were not
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insulated Further, parallel sequencing as clearly defined m chapter three, may be 
explicitly provided for in the settlement, or it may be facilitated by the absence o f rules 
and procedures that encourage issue hierarchy and eventually adopted Therefore, there 
are two indicators for parallel sequencing it is either an explicit part of implementation 
design (parseq2) or it is eventually adopted as the guiding principle o f implementation 
design (parseq) Appendix B4 displays each indicator for all 25 cases14 and appendix B5 
provides a bnef explanation for the coding of each case
Cases were next coded for the presence or absence o f insulated institutions For each 
case, the bodies with overall responsibility for driving implementation, interpreting the 
agreement and resolving disputes regarding its implementation were identified 
Appointments to insulated institutions are not controlled by conflict formations, or, if  so 
controlled, are permanent appointments Where a number of independent commissions 
played a role m resolving difficulties with the implementation of a single issue or group 
of issues, alongside an independent body with the capacity and power to oversee the 
process by co-ordmatmg all institutions responsible for implementation, insulation of 
the process would be strongest However, for the purposes o f this comparative analysis, 
implementation bodies are coded as either ‘insulated5 or ‘not insulated’ for each case
Concerning the predictions of the hypotheses, while the eventual procedures adopted for 
sequencing and timing are the cntical ones, the hypotheses predict that if  any form of 
issue hierarchy - issue hierarchy 1, unilateral timetables, issue holdover and/or early 
elections - is clearly endorsed m the terms of the settlement, the barriers to adjusting the 
timetable are high and the sequence and timing is unlikely to change sufficiently to alter 
outcome If the agreement is unclear on implementation procedures and mechanisms, 
not explicitly providing for issue breakdown and parallel sequencing, yet neither 
specifically providing for any form of issue hierarchy, the eventual adoption of a 
sequence and timing conducive to a successful outcome might be possible, and 
damaging issue hierarchy might be avoided In this case if insulated institutions control 
implementation design, the chances of success are increased
14 For both Djibouti and Niger the information available was not sufficient to make a judgement on the 
ailes and procedures outlined in the agreements or developed duung the couise of its implementation
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The empirical analysis through which the accuracy of the IFF model and its hypotheses 
is established is next outlined It begins with a descnption o f the statistical techniques 
employed The findings of this analysis are then presented, and conclusions are drawn 
on the overall capacity of the IFF model's hypotheses to explain the dynamics o f the 
implementation process
STATISTICAL TECHNIQUE
Advanced statistical methods, such as logistic regression and ordered logistic 
regression, are frequently used m social scientific research where the data is categorical, 
1 e has a small number of values These methods are best suited for the type of data that 
research on the outcome of civil wars throws up, and given the small number of 
dependent variable values successful, partially successful and failed But unfortunately 
some analysts, such as Hartzell, (1999) and Walter (2002), use these methods despite 
the fact that the number of observations available is less than would be desired by 
statisticians m order for the results to be reliable Long (1997 54), whose work 
concentrates specifically on categorical or limited dependent variables, says that it is 
risky to use regression models for categorical variables
‘with samples smaller than 100, while samples over 500 
seem adequate First, if there are many parameters, more 
observations are needed A rule of at least ten observations per 
parameter seems reasonable This does not imply that 
a minimum of 1 0 0  is not needed ’
Given that the current empirical study involves 25 observations, and the parameters 
include all the proxies developed for the independent vanables discussed above and 
displayed in appendix B, the exploration of the hypotheses does not rely on these 
statistical methods Instead, cross tabulation, a statistical method more suitable for a 
small number of observations, is used to explore the statistical significance of 
independent variables Withm cross tabulation there are a number of relevant tests of 
significance, of which the chi-squared is the best known and most commonly used It, 
however, overestimates significance when the expected cell count is small (<5) As this 
will often be the case in this analysis, the more reliable Fisher's exact test is used m 
conjunction with chi squared to estimate the significance of independent variables The 
cross-tabular test is, in effect, a test of independence between two vanables A low
1 2 0
probability or a low Fisher’s exact value (0 05) indicates that there is a very low 
piobability that the two variables under examination are independent of each other (1 e 
a high probability that there is a relationship) A chi squared is a relatively high figure 
where a relationship exists, but the chi squared must be read with the probability or with 
the Fisher’s exact test to assess the impact of a vanable
For non-categorical data, such as the contribution of primary commodity exports to 
GDP, or the 1-10 scale estimate of hurting stalemate, the proxy data was collapsed into 
categorical data suitable for a cross-tabular test, using stata’s kmeans cluster analysis to 
generate the three, most homogeneous categones For example, the value o f primary 
commodity goods exports to GDP that appear in appendix B (lootable 1) was divided 
into categones of low, medium and high contnbution to GDP, and the ability o f these 
categones to explain outcome was explored Similarly duration, battle deaths and 
intensity were categorised into three groupings of low, medium and high intensity The 
categones suggested by the statistical package were, by and large, judged to accurately 
reflect the theories under analysis, but the vanables were re-categonsed manually in 
other groupings to ensure that the explanatory power was not lost m the categorisation 
process 15
Finally, given the number of observations, it is not methodologically sound, even in the 
context of the cross-tabular tests, to analyse the effect of two independent vanables 
together with a view to estimating the extent to which one may correlate with the other 
The statistical tests simply cannot give a reliable estimate for this Each independent 
vanable is thus examined separately for its effect on the dependent variable outcome
FINDINGS
The empmcal findings on the explanatory value o f both the implementation design and 
external variables are next presented A reflection on the significance of the empirical 
results to the generation of an overall theory on the dynamics o f the implementation 
process concludes the chapter The results of cross-tabular analysis for all independent 
variables are reported m table 4 4, which gives the chi-square test, probability and the 
Fisher’s exact for each vanable
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Table 4.4 Results of Cross-tabulations of Independent Variables
Variable name Pearson’s chi square_________DF*______ Probability Fisher’s exact
Insulation 5.4878 2 0.064 0.082
Issue Breakdown 7.9307 2 0.019 0 . 0 2 2
Parallel Sq 19.4014 2 0.000 0.000
Parallel Sq 2 3.9828 2 0.137 0.172
Combined Is. Hierarchy 17.1868 2 0.000 0.000
Unilateral TT 3.9828 2 0.137 0.172
Issue HoldOver 7.9307 2 0.019 0.022J
Cred Commt 0.4051 2 0.817 1.000
Strength Cred C 0.9838 6 0.986 1.000
Guarantees Comb 9.9219 6 0.128 0.234
Guarantees 
(Terr & Pol as one)
5.2644 4 0.261 0.405
Stalemate 2.5752 4 0.631 0.809
Duration 2.9823 4 0.561 0.632
Intensity 2.9016 4 0.574 0.641
Regional Conflict C 7.1912 2 0.027 0.027
Lootablel 4.9524 4 0.292 0.301
Lootable2 0.6967 4 0.952 1.000
Lootable3
(Commodity dominance)
6.0667 6 0.416 0.617
Years Education 1.500 4 0.827 0 . 8 6 6
Income Group 
(GDP pcapita)
4.3876 6 0.624 0.739
GDP per capita 2.9792 4 0.561 0.783
GNP% change 2.1429 
*DF = Degrees of Freedom.
2 0.343 0.474
The results provide much support for the IFF model hypotheses on the design of the 
implementation process. The chi squared test and the Fisher’s exact, more rigorous test 
of independence17 indicate that all features of issue hierarchy - unilateral deadline, issue 
hierarchy 1 and issue holdover features of ‘issue hierarchy’ - are strongly related to the
l5Non-categorical data was also run using logit. A relationship with logit may have suggested (despite its above 
reported questionable reliability) that the categorisation process had distorted the data. Also, by using logit the 
methods used by others to establish relationships were replicated. See below.
This should not be interpreted without reading the text on page 118. It highlights the fact that the nine cases that 
included either the ‘issue holdover’ or ‘early election’ indicator also included other forms of issue hierarchy. This 
made it difficult to determine the separate effect of these particular forms o f issue hierarchy and it supports the 
conclusion that any form will inhibit implementation.
17 The Fisher’s Exact should be generally below 0.05 if a relationship exists. At this there is only a one in 
twenty chance that the two variables are independent of each other.
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Ioutcome of implementation This indicates that the presence of issue hierarchy is 
significantly, and negatively related to the outcome of the implementation process 
While there is no apparent relationship between the presence of dated umlateral 
timetables and failed outcomes, unilateral timetables were coded as ‘present5 only if  an 
actual specific unilateral date is included m the text of the agreement The finding thus 
supports the contention that it is the unilateral demand (coded in combined issue 
hierarchy), as opposed to the inclusion of a date per se, that creates the bamers to 
implementation
Therefore, the presence of ‘combined issue hierarchy5 is very strongly related to 
outcome, meamng that the inclusion m the agreement or a subsequent timetable 
agreement of a basis on which to justify a demand for issue hierarchy presents steep 
barriers to successful implementation outcomes and tends to result m stalled or failed 
outcomes For example, the Dayton peace agreement endorsed issue hierarchy, by 
including strict deadlines for the implementation by all parties of the military cease-fire 
and the holding of election issues, while omitting any provisions or guidelines for the 
sequence and timing o f all other issues, on which detailed compromises had been 
documented These included cntical issues such as demobilisation and re-integration of 
combatants, the creation of a new civilian police force, the institutionalisation o f human 
rights, the re-settlement of citizens and other political provisions of the Accord 19 This 
issue hierarchy has presented enormous obstacles to the implementation of these latter 
issues Both the 1996 and the 1997 treaties beween Russia and Chechnya, by leaving 
the question of independence open and, more specifically, deferring it for five years, 
allowed hardliners (spoiler factions) m both camps to continue to concentrate on one 
issue - the constitutional status of Chechnya - at the expense of all others By omitting 
agreement on the establishment of an institution through which its status might even be 
worked on, the five-year deadline before which the status o f Chechnya would be 
decided endorsed issue holdover and ensured, as the hypotheses outlines, that any other 
provisions of the agreement were unlikely to be implemented m any serious way Issue 
hierarchy, m particular unilateral demands, were central to the implementation design of 
the failed 1987 Sn Lankan accords The government agreed to release Tamil prisoners,
1 &
18 Issue hierarchy and umlateral demands were together coded as combined issue hierarchy This is 
because they both ultimately lead to a unilateral demand
19 For more detail see the Dayton Accords and see Cousens and Kumar, 2001, especially page 129
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but this was dependent on their prior implementation of demobilisation and 
disarmament programmes (Hancock, 1999: 95). Formal devolution of powers to the 
Northern and Eastern regions was also dependent on the demobilisation of the 
insurgencies, and demobilisation was itself to take place over a number of days, and in 
the absence of provision for the parallel reintegration of insurgents into society 
(Hancock, 1999: 97).
Furthermore, as predicted by the IFF model, the instance of issue breakdown and 
parallel sequencing are both strongly related to outcome, the latter displaying a 0.000 
Fisher’s exact value, meaning that there is little or no chance that the outcome o f  
implementation and parallel sequencing are independent of each other. This supports the 
hypotheses that the presence o f issue breakdown, and the eventual presence o f parallel 
sequencing in the rules and procedures for implementation increase significantly the 
prospect of a successful outcome. Their absence is related to partially implemented or 
failed processes. For example, in Mozambique, the gradual introduction of rules and 
procedures that guaranteed issue breakdown and parallel sequencing of issues coincided 
with an ultimately successful outcome. Demobilisation was initially closely phased with 
reintegration of combatants and with political issues, and, for example, a voluntary trust 
was established to assist the insurgency, RENAMO, to establish itself as a political 
party before demobilisation began. However, deadlock prevailed until an agreement was 
struck which introduced issue breakdown to the extension of central administration, by 
allowing RENAMO to retain a considerable and institutionalised presence in the areas 
formally under its control as a part of the process. The introduction of this procedure 
paved the way towards a final breakthrough in the implementation process in October 
1993, when parties agreed on procedures for the parallel implementation of all issues in 
a type of package agreement: On the procedures for the assembly and demobilisation of 
RENAMO and government troops, the simultaneous disarmament of all paramilitary 
forces, irregular and militia troops, on the quick establishment o f local police 
commissions and sub-committees (UN monitored) to monitor police behaviour in 
parallel to all other issues, and agreement on the composition of the National Elections 
Commission, and the system and timetable for finalising the electoral law.
124
There does not, at first glance, appear to be a relationship between the presence or 
absence of insulation and outcome On the other hand, there does appear to be a 
relationship between the presence o f insulation and outcome when the coding o f  the 
dependent variable is altered slightly and is coded as a dummy variable when conflicts 
were coded as either ‘successful’ or ‘not successful,’ with the latter including all 
settlements that were partially implemented or failed, insulation is related to outcome 
(Table 4 5)
Table 4 5 Cross Tab, Insulation with dummy outcome
Qutcomedum Insulation
m 0 1 Total
0 9 6  15
1 1 7_____________ 8
Total 10 13 23
Pearson chi2(l) = 4 7902 Pr = 0 029
Fisher’s exact = 0 074
1-sided Fisher's exact = 0 038
* Where 0 = failed or partially implemented and 1 = successfully implemented and 0 for insulation means 
its absence and 1 signals its presence
While the relationship would be stronger if both Fisher’s exact figures were below 0 05 
(rather than only the one-sided result given in two by two cross-tabulations being below 
0 05), the result supports the contention that stalled and failed processes are more 
common where no provision is made for insulated institutions, while success is not 
guaranteed by their inclusion This suggests that insulation alone will not guarantee full 
implementation, but that its absence appears to facilitate stalled and failed outcomes 
This is useful for the discussion of a further prediction
It was predicted that if an implementation process does not explicitly provide for 
parallel sequencing and issue breakdown, the presence o f insulation will encourage its 
development It was not possible to examine this prediction statistically, given the low 
number of cases, but an examination of the data provides some support for this 
contention As appendix B shows, parallel sequencing is explicitly provided for 
(parseq2) m few peace settlement texts, and it is present in far more settlements as a 
result of dispute resolution during the implementation process But not all settlements 
with insulated institutions managed to bring about rules and procedures that facilitated
20 See United Nations , 1996 Blue Helmets 321-338 UN Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project 
Mozambique
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parallel sequencing, and the six settlements with insulated institutions that failed to do 
so were either partially implemented or unravelled Significantly, out o f the six, all were 
characterised by issue hierarchy21 This suggests that the presence of insulation will 
facilitate success if  issue hierarchy is not inherent m the settlement Thus it appears that 
while insulated institutions have the capacity to guide implementation towards issue 
break down and parallel sequencing, they are unlikely to do so if  issue hierarchy is 
entrenched in the rules and procedures for the process In other words, insulation will 
not alone guarantee a successful outcome, and insulated institutions will face obstacles 
to the incorporation of procedures for issue breakdown and parallel sequence, if  issue 
hierarchy is clearly endorsed by the rules and procedures of the implementation process 
It therefore appears that the absence of issue hierarchy is the key requirement if the 
possibility for the adoption of parallel sequencing is to be kept open In fact, it appears 
that the two are mutually exclusive
In sum, the evidence suggests that the strongest predictors o f a successful 
implementation process are the presence m implementation design of issue break down 
and parallel sequencing and the absence from process design of any form of issue 
hierarchy Furthermore, the absence of insulated institutions is quite likely to result in 
failed or partial outcomes
Concerning other explanatory variables, on the one hand, the ‘regional conflict 
complex' vanable appears to be related to outcome If a ‘regional conflict complex’ is 
present at the time of signing or emerges during the course of the implementation 
process, the outcome of implementation appears to be negatively effected This supports 
the equilibrium-maintaining or equilibrium-breaking proposition at the heart of the IFF 
model any shift or dramatic change in regional relations that creates a ‘regional conflict 
complex’ or worsens an existing one may open or close up military options that make 
pro factions’ strategies more difficult to pursue, and provide ‘legitimate’ pretexts on 
which to stall for the opposite spoiler faction A ‘regional conflict complex’ that 
emerged m Angola in 1997 may be understood as contributing to the unravelling of the 
stalling process The ‘regional conflict complex’ m Central Asia associated with the
21 Angola 2, Cambodia, Sierra Leone 1, Sierra Leone 2, Liberia, Western Sahara
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civil war that ensued m Afghanistan can be understood as contributing to preventing the 
partially successful outcome in Tajikistan from being fully successful
On the other hand, there appears to be no relationship between the outcome of 
implementation and the presence of a credible commitment or o f power-sharing 
guarantees While a credible commitment might be necessary for the successful 
negotiation of a settlement, its presence m 21 out of the 25 cases supporting this 
proposition, the data suggest that its presence will not ensure successful implementation 
without the appropriate design of the implementation process The power-sharing 
proxies which test the strength of Hartzell’s theory when applied to implementation, 
whether tested individually or combined (on a scale of 1-4 and 1-3), appear to have no 
apparent relationship with outcome Nor do the proxies used to estimate the extent to 
which a mutually-hurting stalemate exists appear to explain the outcome of 
implementation22
Non-categoncal, independent variables were run using the cross-tabular and the ordered 
logistical regression programmes, despite the question mark over the reliability o f the 
latter signalled above Firstly, this allowed the use of political economy and stalemate 
hypotheses data as seen m the appendices, before it was transformed into categorical 
data to make it suitable for analysis using the cross-tabular method Secondly, it was 
considered important to report a significant result using this method, given that other 
analysts have used it However, neither the proxies for politico-economy and economic 
commitment variables nor any of the proxies used to measure a mutually-hurting 
stalemate appeared to be significant when ordered logistical regression was used 23
Neither a high availability of ‘lootable’ goods, nor low human capital are related to the 
outcome of implementation, regardless o f the proxy or the statistical technique used, the 
cross-tabular or logit regression This supports the IFF model, which predicts that given 
their presence at the time of signing, structural politico-economic conditions are 
unlikely to present the key barrier to implementation m the short-term Neither did high 
levels o f inequality appear to coincide with unsuccessful processes or low levels of
22 Neither did the logit test reveal a relationship with either of the proxies
23 Only non-categorical variables were run The ologit method in Stata was used
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inequality with successful ones What is more, empirical evidence presented by 
Gissmger and Gleditsch (1999) illustrates that a high percentage of primary agncultural 
exports, a measure similar to Collier’s primary commodity export proxy, lead to lower 
economic welfare, high inequality and political unrest, this suggesting that the proxies 
for greed and grievance motivated conflict may in fact correlate, and that formations are 
simultaneously motivated by greed and grievance That none o f the proxies appear to 
explain the outcome of implementation supports the IFF model predictions that in the 
immediate implementation process external factors will significantly impact on 
implementation only if  they dramatically shift to alter the equilibrium at signing
The possible impact o f De Soysa’s ‘sharper measure’ of lootable goods (2000 125-6), 
the total per capita stock of non-renewable, natural resources, was considered He uses 
this proposition to test the theory that it is not the poverty that tends to exist in countries 
with a high density o f primary commodity exports (grievance) that causes the conflict, 
but the greed associated with the high density of non-renewable primary commodity 
resources According to his findings, the higher the per capita stock of non-renewable 
resources, the higher the incidence of civil conflict Data on per capita availability of 
natural resources are available for only 13 out of the 25 conflicts and are over­
representative of the successful value of the dependent variable (Table 4 6) The data 
' does not cover a sufficient number of cases to use statistical methods to estimate the 
ability of de Soysa’s proxy to explain outcome However, despite the tow number of 
cases, and the drawbacks with using data that represent an entire country as opposed to 
the entity in which conflict has been concentrated, a quick examination of the data 
suggests that the relationship is at best questionable
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Table 4 6 Renewable and Non Renewable Resources per Capita (Lootable Goods)
Civil War Dependent V Total Naturai Capital 
Stock per Capita 24
Total Subsoil 
Assets per capita $
Total
Renewable R 
per capita
Country Dep Var Natcap Ssa d minus j
Bangladesh P 3110 20 3090
ElSalvador S 1150 1150
Guatemala S 1720 60 1660
Mali S 4840 4840
Morocco F 2210 80 2130
Mozambique S 1130 0 1130
Namibia S 7180 1860 5320
Nicaragua S 3690 0 3690
Niger P 12340 0 12340
Philippines P 2730 80 2560
SierraLeone F (96) F (99) 3040 120 2920
SouthAfrica S 4200 1340 2860
SriLanka F 3480
}
0 3480
The estimates give the net worth of the stock o f renewable and non-renewable natural 
resources m per capita terms for a given country (de Soysa, 2001 19) While the two 
failed processes in Sierra Leone coincide with relatively high levels of subsoil assets per 
capita, they do not nearly approach the levels m two successful processes, Namibia and 
South Africa While the absence of known quantities of subsoil assets m Nicaragua, El 
Salvador, Mozambique or Mali may indicate that this vanable m some way explains 
success, m Guatemala the process has been relatively successful despite comparatively 
high levels of subsoil assets per capita While the stalling process m the Philippines and 
Bangladesh may be explained by the presence (albeit low) of subsoil assets, especially 
m the latter case given that a considerable extent o f these resources are concentrated m 
the CHT area, the stalling process m Niger cannot be, nor can the failed outcome m Sn 
Lanka
Finally, only one proxy was included m the analysis to measure the extent to which the 
macro-economy might be able to support implementation, and no relationship was
24 Source de Soysa, 2001 Data was forwarded to the author by the de Soysa (See footnote 9)
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found between this -  GDP growth levels in the years immediately preceding the 
settlement -  and the outcome of the implementation process. Further, the IFF model 
prediction on the impact of a high availability of resources on the process is supported 
by empirical data from six case studies in Foreman and Patrick’s volume (2000: 27-31). 
They conclude, after detailed investigations of the resources pledged and made available 
to six implementation processes, that ample resources will not sufficiently alleviate 
distributive and other cleavages in conflict-prone societies to guarantee lasting peace, 
and in the end ‘the critical determinants of successful peace-building and sustainable 
recovery are likely to be internal (2000: 31).’ They proceed to recommend that 
resources injected into implementation processes must be informed by peace-building 
priorities. They recommend a strategy of peace conditionality for donors, an important 
concept which is revisited in chapter eight.
CONCLUSION
What can the findings contribute to a general theory on the implementation process? 
What factors appear to facilitate successful or failed outcomes? At the very least it is 
possible to assert that there is a relationship between the design of the implementation 
process - the rules and procedures that govern sequence and timing - and the outcome of 
process, a relationship predicted by the intra-formation faction model. It also appears 
that, while explanatory variables such as the presence of a credible commitment, of 
power-sharing institutions, o f a mutually-hurting stalemate appear to play a significant 
role in the successful negotiation of a peace settlement, they do not best explain the 
barriers to consolidation or the outcome of the implementation stage. What is more, 
though structural, political-economic conditions associated with the incidence of  
conflict might raise the barriers to successful implementation for pro factions, their 
presence or absence does not appear to explain the outcome of implementation. It is 
argued that this is because conflict actors agreed to endorse a settlement in the context 
of these structural variables, and the results conform to the hypothesis that only in the 
context of a dramatic change in the political economy o f an entity, would outcome be 
effected. The empirical findings on the importance of the emergence or worsening of a 
‘regional conflict complex’ to outcome appear to support the idea that external variables 
are significant to outcome, in that, where they change, they can have an equilibrium- 
maintaining or breaking effect on the process. This supports the IFF model predictions 
and suggests that dramatic changes in other variables, such as a credible commitment, a
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mutually-hurting stalemate or the political economy of an entity, might have an impact 
on outcome
However, m none of the 25 cases studied, regardless o f outcome, was there any such 
dramatic change m the political economy o f the entity, or to the presence of a credible 
commitment, this suggesting that vanety m outcome is not well explained by a dramatic 
change to the political economy of an entity, or in a shift in the level o f credible 
commitment to the process The absence of these conditions ensured the maintenance of 
the status quo on the political economy and credible commitment variables, this 
allowing the analysis to focus on elements that do appear to impact on the 
implementation process
The predictions on the significance of process design, and the relative significance of  
external vanables to outcome, are derived directly from the mtra-formation faction 
model, itself based on the premise that sub-elite and elite members of conflict 
formations are driven by ‘multiple motivations’ to support, be sceptical of, or to oppose 
implementation The findings lend support to the interpretation that independent 
vanables are significant to outcome, to the extent that they influence the struggle 
between spoiler, sceptic and pro factions that make up individual conflict actors
Given the small number of observations, the results must be treated with care, but the 
avoidance of selection bias m the development of an inclusive data set increases 
confidence in the findings The m-depth case studies that follow are designed to 
explore the findings m greater detail, to strengthen the reliability of the analysis As 
indicated m chapter two, m the selection of the m-depth case studies an attempt was 
made to control for different values of alternative explanatory vanables, with a view to 
focusing the case studies on the IFF model predictions on design, and its impact on the 
implementation process The empmcal findings in this chapter give increased 
methodological legitimacy to using the case studies to concentrate on further examining 
the impact of design on the ultimate outcome of implementation Cases are specifically 
designed to assess the capacity o f issue hierarchy, issue breakdown, parallel sequencing 
and insulation to explain the events and the ultimate outcome of implementation They 
are presented m chapters five, six and seven
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CHAPTER FIVE
ANGOLA,
BICESSE, LUSAKA 
AND BREAKDOWN
In May 1991 the parties to the Angolan civil war -  the MPLA and UNITA1 -  concluded 
peace negotiations with the endorsement of the Bicesse Accords Promising to bring 
almost 16 years of civil war to a close, the Accords provided for a cease-fire, the 
demobilisation of the MPLA and UM TA7 s armies, the formation of a unified, national 
army equally representative of both parties and the neutralisation of the police force 
The parties also made a number of commitments that would ensure the establishment of 
newly-democratic laws and institutions to replace the coercive, one-party system that 
had been abolished on paper m March 1991 (Tvedten, 1997 53) In so far as the 
designers considered the implementation of the settlement, they clearly hoped that the 
MPLA-UNITA power struggle could be channelled into the new, democratic 
institutions Political reforms were to pave the way for free and fair elections to a multi­
party system The ultimate goal during implementation seems to have been to gradually 
replace civil war with the institutionalisation of political competition and reconciliation
But the ‘road map’ that guided the parties to this destination was seriously flawed 
Eighteen months later, and m the immediate wake of Angola’s first ever popular 
elections, the compromises o f the stalling process unravelled and Angola was once 
again engulfed m civil war After two more years of intense fighting the parties once 
again reached a settlement m November 1994 The result of several rounds of 
negotiations which were led by the special representative o f the UN Secretary General 
(SG), the Lusaka Protocol offered a new hope for peace to the war-weary population of 
Angola But the Protocol was followed by stalling, the cosmetic implementation of 
commitments, cease-fire violations and continued re-arming by both parties Lusaka’s 
compromise gradually unravelled and Angola returned to full-scale civil war m 
December 1998
Analysts have highlighted a number o f aspects specific to the Bicesse Accords as 
undermining the inter-party trust required for their successful implementation the lack
1 Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
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of political and financial support from the international community (Janes Intelligence 
Review (JIR), 06 93), the weak UN mandate to manage the implementation of Bicesse 
(SWO, 1996 8, Anstee, 1996 77-8), the strict election timetable (SWO, 1996 9) and 
the unsuitability of elections that pitted former warring-parties against one another m a 
wm-lose contest to a country with no democratic tradition (Wesley, 1997 101, Anstee 
534, Tvedten, 1997 60) But while these explanations do m part explain the failed 
outcome, they do not explain why a greater UN presence and mandate, more committed 
international support, a flexible election deadline, and the introduction of power sharing 
did not prevent the Lusaka process from unravelling
Others blame the failure of Bicesse on mutual intransigence on the part o f the MPLA 
and UNITA For example, Alex Vines (1994 5) argues that both processes failed to end 
civil war because intransigence ultimately characterised the actions of both the MPLA 
and UNITA For Barbara Walter, Savimbi’s intransigence is largely responsible for the 
failed outcome (2002 85) One US observer presents intransigence as a constant, 
arguing that the political will to implement never existed UNITA and MPLA have 
never trusted each other, hence all accords, no matter how lofty, have been cosmetic 
(Knudsen et al, 2000 16) But these explanations overlook the fact that intransigence 
characterises all actors to civil wars at some point m time, hence civil wars are 
sustained Factors that facilitated the re-emergence of intransigence within both 
formations, despite their endorsement of the settlements, should be directly considered 
and are the subject of this chapter
The chapter analyses the implementation processes and explores the ability of the IFF 
model and its hypotheses on the design of the implementation process to explain the 
failed outcomes It considers the possibility that the rules, procedures and mechanisms 
that governed the implementation of the core commitments of both Bicesse and Lusaka 
enabled spoiler factions to dominate the strategies of both the MPLA and of UNITA In 
doing so it argues that the rules and procedures that create incentives for a cross-party 
alliance between pro factions during implementation were starkly absent from both 
processes This facilitated the domination of the spoiler faction m each party Moreover, 
the failure of rules and procedures to reduce the risk that sceptical factions associated 
with supporting the pro factions made it easier for spoiler factions to stall and to
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dominate the implementation process. This made it unlikely that either agreement 
would bring peace to Angola.
In sum, it is proposed that the incentive structure created by the design of the 
settlements made failure the most likely outcome, regardless of the enormous obstacles 
to implementation presented by logistical and economic conditions, which added to the 
devastation of the breakdown. However, while the rules and procedures that governed 
the implementation of the Bicesse Accords placed a form of issue hierarchy at the heart 
of the implementation process, the obstacles that this issue hierarchy presented were 
hugely reinforced by the winner-takes-all political system that the settlement endorsed.2 
On the other hand, the failure to implement the Lusaka Protocol can be best explained 
by the incentive structure that arose directly from the inadequately designed 
implementation process. This chapter explains how the centrality of issue hierarchy to 
the rules and procedures of the Protocol’s implementation, and the failure to adequately 
sequence the implementation of issues concerning the political economy, undermined 
the positive effect that the power-sharing aspects of the settlement and the insulation o f  
oversight institutions could have had on the outcome.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Following a 14-year war of independence in Angola and a successful coup in Lisbon, 
the new Portuguese government withdrew from Angola in 1975. The withdrawal gave 
way to a three-way power struggle between the rival, regionally and ethnically 
mobilised, Angolan independence movements: the MPLA, UNITA and FPLA.3 
Following a weakly institutionalised and poorly-monitored attempt by the Portuguese to 
set up a transitional, three-way, power-sharing government, two of the movements - 
UNITA and FPLA4 - together withdrew their ministers, formed a military alliance and 
heralded civil war in July 1975. On the eve of the 'formal5 handover of power to the 
Angolan movements, the MPLA5 had soundly defeated the FPLA in Angola’s capital.
2 See Chapter Four, 115-116 for discussion of the impact of the detail of constitutional settlements on 
incentive structure during the implementation process.
3 National Front for the Liberation of Angola.
4 UNITA was sponsored by South Africa. The US and Zaire sponsored the FPLA and later sponsored 
UNITA.
5 Cuba and the USSR backed the MPLA. Most sources point to November 1975 as their arrival date.
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This enabled it to convincingly establish itself as the government of Angola on 11 
November 1975 But the undefeated UNITA continued the civil war with the MPLA 
government from its bases m the south and central, Omdivimbu-dormnated, rural 
heartlands of Angola,6 and was able to create basic insecurity m 80 per cent of the 
country7
Central to the conflict was a struggle to control the state and the resources and 
patronage associated with it The extent to which existing ethnic, social and regional 
divisions were, in themselves, sufficient to contribute to an escalation to full-scale civil 
war is largely unexplored or at least inconclusive m the literature8 It can be assumed 
that ethnic and rural-urban divisions, which certainly existed m the social fabric of 
Angolan society,9 were encouraged, harnessed and intensified by political elites m their 
efforts to build the anti-colomal (subsequently civil war) conflict formations External 
and regional powers, encouraged by the wealth that the mineral and diamond-nch 
Angola had to offer, added not only a devastating intensity to the conflict, but also 
obstacles to a political solution
UNITA based its internal ideology on the resurgence of black hegemony and the wealth 
and power of the Ovimbundu people, who make up the largest ethnic block m Angola 
(Tvedten, 1997 5 0 )10 It presented the MPLA government as urban, northern- 
dominated, anti-Ovimbundu, Portuguese-educated and mestizo (mixed race) (Vines, 
1994 8) Its ethnically focused, internal rhetoric on black hegemony sat uneasily with 
its alliance with the South African apartheid regime and against the ANC, the 
contradiction revealing the extent to which its leadership has been motivated first and 
foremost by the quest for political power and resources Furthermore, despite its ongin 
m 1966 as a Maoist-influenced communist movement (Tvedten 30), UNITA quickly 
denounced all forms of communism and presented itself as a powerful, pro-western,
6 UNITA had most complete control over the south-east and central provinces of Moxico and Cuando 
Cubango Moving eastwards it established some control in Lunda Sul and westwards towards Benguela 
and Cuanza Sul It pussed northwards and established some control in Cuanza North, Malange, Bengo, 
Uige and Zaire Tvedten, 1997 38
7 See Tvedten, 1997 for background
8 In an overview of literature concerning Angola and its political history, Niemann cites this is a general 
weakness in many accounts of the civil war Niemann, 1999
9 Guimaraes 1998, Tvedten, 1997 9-33, 101-109 andMaeir 1996 42-5, provide some historical insights 
mto the effect of centuries ot Portuguese colonial government rule on shaping the social fabric o f society
10 Savimbi broke away trom Holden Roberto’s FNLA in 1966 He protested against the over- 
repiesentation of the Bakongo ethnoc-linguistic group in leadership positions Tvedten, 1997 29-30
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anti-communist force Using its control over information and sources of patronage 
(Vines, 1999 197, Tvedten, 1997 35-6), it mobilised the support of large sections of 
the Ovimbundu people in the rural, south-eastern and central plains of Angola (Maier, 
1996 81) While UNITA had some ties to the civilian population which were based on 
health and educational provision, it used political persuasion and primarily coercive 
means to mobilise support (Tvedten, 1997 50-1) In fact, according to Alex Vines, in
1995 UNITA remained ‘a strict, military machine with a political face,’ and its leader, 
Jonah Savimbi,11 was believed, after thirty years, to still rule with an ‘iron fist’ (Vines, 
99 197)
The first Angolan independence movement, the MPLA, was established in 1956 Its 
communist ideology is judged to have had some conviction but to have been mostly a 
reaction to the international environment (Tvedten, 1997 45) Popular support for the 
MPLA government was motivated m part by ethnic and regionally-based loyalties 
associated with distrust of the more numerous Ombivindu people who were considered 
by many of the Mbundu and assunilados peoples to be backward and rural (SWO,
1996 3) Popular-based support was reinforced by the MPLA’s compiehensive takeover 
of the institutions of the state m 1975 Under president Dos Santos12, the MPLA 
introduced an extraordinary degree o f centralism to the political system (Tvedten 46-7, 
Vines, 1999 181) This concentration of power was facilitated by its control of Luanda 
and the relatively widespread international recognition of its legitimacy and the constant 
civil war with UNITA provided the pretext The centralisation of government was also 
driven by the MPLA’s quest to eliminate relentless internal power struggles (Tvedten,
1997 44) The network o f patronage on which the MPLA was based was reinforced by 
the civil war and meant that people of Ovimbundu origin were underrepresented at all 
levels of the party, especially the central institutions of the state This m turn played into 
the hands of Savimbi and increased his ability to mobilise on ethnic grounds
In the late 1980s, two developments opened a window of opportunity to resolve the 
internal Angolan conflict through negotiations the warming of US-USSR relations and 
the settling of regional power struggles with an agreement on Namibian independence 
m 1988 The Angolan civil war was highly linked to the cold war, with the US and
11 Leader of UNITA since its foundation in 1966 until his death in the civil war in 2002
12 President of the MPLA and of Angola since 1979
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South Africa heavily backing UNIT A in its fight against the Soviet and Cuban-backed 
MPLA government It was also highly linked to the Namibian conflict between 
SWAPO13 and South Africa For 25 years, SWAPO had been fighting the South African 
Defence Forces for independence m Namibia With UNITA heavily backed by South 
Africa, the Angolan MPLA government and its Cuban sponsor supported SWAPO in its 
war of independence against South Africa It allowed SWAPO to set up bases m Angola 
and thereby gave the South African government the pretext on which to directly 
intervene in Southern Angola on behalf of UNITA, m 1981-3 and m 1988 International 
pressure against the South African apartheid regime facilitated the settlement of  
Namibian independence, which included a commitment by the Angolan government to 
allow and to ensure the withdrawal of Cuban troops from both Namibia and Angola 
The settlement o f the Namibian civil war therefore removed regional obstacles to 
negotiations between the Angolan parties by facilitating the formal withdrawal o f South 
African and Cuban troops (and of SWAPO bases) from Angola
A number of failed pan-African attempts to facilitate agreement amongst the Angolan 
parties followed m 1989 until m 1990 and 1991, with their interests no longer requiring 
civil war m Angola, the USSR and the US together with Portugal (the troika), facilitated 
six rounds of intricate negotiations between UNITA and MPLA delegations These 
negotiations led to the signing of the Bicesse Accords in May 1991
UNITA, THE MPLA AND FACTIONALLISM
Both UNITA and the MPLA’s command structures are a product of the civil war In this 
sense, ‘the maintenance of authority’ was largely ‘dependent, on the continuation of 
underlying insecurity* (SWO, 1996 20) Given this, there were big incentives for elite 
members m UNITA and the MPLA to adopt intransigent positions associated with 
spoiler factions UNITA members who were either against or sceptical o f the settlement 
would have perceived the risks that peace, stability and a more accountable political 
system presented to their centralised, coercive hold over the UNITA organisation as too 
high Similarly, those m the MPLA who were sceptical about the merits of the 
settlement or resolutely against the settlement, would have thought that it placed the 
government’s carefully-balanced, coercive hierarchy of control at risk Rather than 
stemming from a simple absence of trust between the UNITA and MPLA leaderships,
13 South West African People’s Organisation
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this fear of a final settlement stemmed predominantly from mtra-formation power 
struggles and the unknown impact that implementation might have on the shape and 
composition of the leadership
The incentive to prevent the implementation of the settlement did not only exist for 
leaders and those m their immediate mner-circles All elites and sub-elites who were 
benefiting from the coercive and patronage-based power hierarchies that characterised 
both the MPLA and UNITA had incentives to oppose the settlement But incentives also 
existed for the development o f pro factions m both parties The pro factions would have 
foreseen the future development of the conflict formation and their own position within 
it as dependent on the implementation of a political settlement and of a more transparent 
political system These pro factions included a significant number of UNITA and 
government officials who were closely involved in and identified with negotiations, and 
whose political careers were secure if the negotiated agreement were implemented
Sources and events suggest that these different tendencies existed in UNITA and 
disunity frequently resulted m the adoption of contradictory strategies by the different 
UNITA factions While even those heavily involved m the implementation processes 
remain unsure of Savimbi’s initial intentions towards the peace agreements,14 evidence 
suggests that he did away with any real challenges to his leadership, surrounding 
himself with loyal, political and military leaders It appears that whatever his position at 
the signing of the settlement, Savimbi felt threatened by a strong, pro faction during its 
implementation This faction saw UNITA’s future purely m political terms, regardless 
of the election results It what appears to have been a reaction to this threat, in March 
1992 Savimbi ordered the torture and death of high-ranking UNITA officials and their 
families for dissenting behaviour and questioning of his leadership strategy (Vines,
1994 11) Among the victims was ‘Chingungi,’ a well-respected senior UNITA leader 
who was the organisation’s lobbyist m Washington Reflecting on these events, 
Savmibi’s former biographer believed that Savimbi had prepared his own downfall by 
eliminating Chingungi and other gifted rebel leaders whom he perceived as potential 
rivals he killed the politically-minded people that he needed for the democratic phase
14 By 1997 it had become common to point to Savimbi s intransigence as the key stumbling block, but 
both Anstee and Hare’s accounts ot the first and second implementation processes lespectively, leflect the 
uncertainty of those in highest diplomatic circles about his true intentions
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(Bridgeland, AP, 31-10-92) Highlighting another incentive for the development o f a 
strong spoiler faction, Bridgeland maintained that Savimbi would ‘have to defend 
himself against further accusations’ if he were to enter the political process (AP,
31 10 92)
A number of senior UNITA officials, arguably belonging to this pro faction, deserted 
Savimbi after the details of the murders emerged m early 1992 (FT, 15-1-93)15 Disunity 
was increasingly characterising the UNITA elite in the run up to the September 
elections, following the defection of two leading members 16 Some analysts predicted 
that m the event of renewed civil war the movement would split along regional lines 
reflecting these defections (JIR, 06 93 285) In the post-election battle of Luanda m 
October 1992, many UNITA casualties were leaders judged to have been part o f a ‘pro 
faction’ who were ‘willing and able to continue with the implementation process’ (JIR, 
06 93 284) They included Chitunda, UNITA’sVice President and a chief negotiator of 
the Bicesse Accords Savimbi was reported to be unable to effectively control his troops 
without Chitunda, who had ‘brought about the Biccesse Accords’ (Anstee, 1996 290- 
91) UNITA’s (later discussed) initially confused strategy m the immediate aftermath of 
the September 29-30 election would appear to support the contention that the leadership 
was severely weakened by the loss of its politically-mmded elite and severely divided 
on strategy
Withm the historically factional MPLA, divisions over the post-agreement strategy can 
also be clearly discerned Following the death of its founder (Neto) m 1979, Dos Santos 
was widely believed to have been the only person m the position to unite opposing 
interests (Tvedten, 1997 50) He achieved unity by increasingly centralising power in a 
hierarchical system, based on coercion and patronage, and facilitated by civil war 
Maier’s account of the multiple intelligence systems put m place by the MLPA 
leadership to ‘spy’ on its own members (Maier, 1996 21), while a standard feature of 
Marxist-Lemmst regimes, are an indication of the persistent distrust that existed 
between the rival MPLA factions
ls In March 1992 factionalism was evidenced by a breakaway group calling itself Democratic Unita
16 Tony da Costa Fernardes and Miguel Wizau Puna were both senior members of the Unita leadership
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The impact of the 1990-1991 negotiations on the MPLA appears to have created more 
division m an already-divided organisation Many factions opposed the leadership’s 
strategy which was itself a reaction to severe pressure from the international community 
to democratise and to sign an agreement (Vine, 1996 7, Wesley, 1997 102) The 
movement is described as having been ‘disumfied’ and m 'considerable political 
disarray’ m 1991 (Messamt, 2001 303) In fact, many observers expected it to split and 
collapse in the post-Accord interval between the cease-fire and the elections That 
officials m the MPLA anticipated electoral defeat (Vines, 1996) would have only served 
to increase their sense o f insecurity about the merits of the Accords
There was certainly a faction within the MPLA and the armed forces who perceived full 
implementation to be the best strategy (Maeir, 1996 51-2, 83) This faction was 
primarily made up of personnel who were closely associated with the negotiations 
Margaret Anstee (1996 316) was of the opinion that some MPLA factions were 
committed to implementation, but that significantly large sections were only 
conditionally so committed committed in the event of an electoral victory It was 
unclear the extent to which the MPLA (collectively) was committed to implementing 
the terms of the agreement in the event of an electoral defeat The current power 
holders, the MPLA, had much to lose collectively, including access to resources used by 
Dos Santos to maintain his position at the top of a centralised power hierarchy Wesley, 
who is generally sympathetic to the MPLA’s position and presents it as ‘more genuine 
in its commitment to the peace process’ (1997 105), argues that neither the government 
nor UNIT A appeared totally committed to abandoning the war for democratic peace, 
and that it is unclear how comfortable the MPLA would have been with a Savimbi 
government (1997 102) Others argue that the MPLA had ‘no intention of opening 
access to the structures of power’ m 1992 (Messiant, 2001 290), and that the electoral 
win provided them with the legitimate pretext on which to refuse to do so
The uncertainty amongst analysts over the level of commitment to full implementation 
withm either the MPLA or UNIT A can best be understood as a product of the 
factionalism that characterised them Factions who could see a way to preserve power m 
opposition were more likely to push other factions to implement the full terms o f  
Bicesse, those unable to were more likely to seek to adopt spoiler tactics to bnng the 
process down Members of this faction evoked ‘legitimate’ reasons for refusing to
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proceed with implementation For example, it appears that some MPLA members 
planned to reject the result of the elections in the event o f a UNITA victory, on the basis 
that the UN had behaved partially and had given more assistance to UNITA (Vines,
1994 11) This faction refused to allow the UN to implement provisions that would 
have addressed their concerns this was because they aimed to reserve the concerns as a 
pretext on which to reject the entire process at a future date
In sum, evidence suggests that factionalism characterised the elite and sub-elite circles 
of both UNITA and the MPLA prior to and dunng the implementation of Bicesse The 
impact o f the design of the Bicesse and Lusaka implementation processes on this 
factionalism and on the ultimate strategy of each formation is next considered
THE BICESSE ACCORDS
The Bicesse Accords (Appendix C) committed UNITA to recognising the Angolan 
state, the presidency, and the presidency’s responsibility for running the state dunng the 
transition period (Vines, 1999 15) In return, from the moment that the cease-fire went 
into place, UNITA was entitled to all the rights of a legitimate political party in the 
newly-created, multi-party system The MPLA government agreed to hold all-party 
discussions concerning the constitutional amendments necessary for the holding o f ‘free 
and fair,’ internationally-supervised, multi-party elections17 and the consolidation of a 
democratic political system Both the MPLA and UNITA would simultaneously 
implement a ceasefire and both committed to cooperate with a prisoner release 
programme that would be supervised by the International Red Cross The neutralisation 
of the police, mutual cantonment and demobilisation of existing armies, and the
I 8completion of a process that would form a neutral, national army (FAA), would be 
followed by the formal extension of central administration to the whole county All of 
this would be implemented by the parties before the holding of elections, which would 
take place 18 months after implementation had commenced, between 1st September and 
30th November 1992 UNITA and the MPLA, with the support of the United Nations, 
were to guarantee the neutrality of the newly-formed army dunng the election campaign 
(Fundamental Pnnciples 6) A tnple-zero clause forbade either formation from re­
arming and committed the former sponsors - the ‘tnoka’ (US, USSR, Portugal) - to
17 UN technical assistance to organise the elections was agreed in December 1991
18 Armed Forces of Angola
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lefiam fiom supplying either formation with military equipment dunng the 
implementation period (Vines, 1994 10)
RULES, PROCEDURES AND INSTITUTIONS
The entire implementation process was to be driven, overseen and interpreted by a 
series o f commissions each made up of an equal number of UNIT A and GOA 
representatives A Joint Political and Military Commission (CCPM) was to ‘guarantee 
strict compliance with all political and military understandings’ and to make ‘decisions 
on possible violations’ (Protocol of Estonal II) Its supervision of the implementation of 
the cease-fire and the assembling of troops was withm the framework of the subordinate 
Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (CMVP) Both Commissions made 
decisions by consensus and included troika representatives as permanent observers19 
CCPM also oversaw a Joint Commission for the Formation of the Angolan Armed 
Forces (CCFA) and a Joint Political Commission
The CCPM -  the commission charged with ensuring that implementation would follow 
the agreement - was not insulated from intra-formation factionalism Given this, it 
would find it difficult to introduce adjustments that would sequence and time issues so 
as to facilitate a more successful outcome In fact, the Joint Commission structure, 
chaired as it was by the representatives of the Angolan formations, made Bicesse a 
‘self-implementing’ peace agreement UNAVEM n, established on 3 1st May20, was to 
‘verify this verification process’, m particular where the cease-fire, the neutrality of the 
police and the preparations for elections were concerned A UN representative was not 
entitled to be part of the CCPM structures and, when invited, only had observer status 
While UNAVEM would find itself attempting to play the role of a mediator, to instigate 
procedures for dispute resolution and to alter sequence and timing to facilitate 
implementation, m particular prior to and m  the aftermath of the September 1992 
elections, there was no support for such a UN role in the Accords The formations were 
not obliged to co-operate with these dispute-resolution efforts and could point to the 
Joint Commissions which, regardless of their inability to function effectively and
19 UN, Blue Helmets 238
20 Appointed in February 1992, SG special representative, Margaret Anstee co-ordinated all aspects of the 
UN role in verifying the verification process The cease-fire, police and election divisions (UN on 
Angola 2)
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independently of intra-formation conflict, were the point o f authority on interpreting 
and implementing the Accords
SEQUENCING TIMING AND SUBSTANCE OF THE ACCORD
The parties agreed to establish a unicameral, presidential democracy A strong and 
powerful President would be elected by the people using a majority system with 
recourse to a second round (Tvedten, 1997 53) The president would appoint his own 
executive and a national Assembly (legislature) would be elected by the people through 
a system of proportional representation at the national level 21 The heads of the 18 
provincial governments and of local governments would still be appointed by the 
president and would therefore remain unaccountable to the provinces’ populations 
New rights including the freedom to assemble, freedom of speech, freedom to set up 
and to join a political party, and universal respect for human rights agreements were 
enshrined m the constitution But an active civil society and a free media were very new 
concepts m Angola and the reforms, even had they been fully implemented, in reality 
could have done little to prevent the persistence of a highly centralised, relatively 
unaccountable political system with a very powerful, relatively unaccountable president
In fact, the full implementation of the peace Accords was obstructed first and foremost 
by the nature of the post-conflict political institutions that the parties had agreed on In 
this way, the procedures through which the parties had agreed to implement the new, 
democratic political system, as well as features of the political system itself, created 
insurmountable obstacles to the full implementation of the settlement The winner- 
takes-all nature of the new political institutions and the centralisation of power withm 
them created high mcentives for all elite and sub-elite members of UNIT A and MPLA, 
regardless of the faction to which they belonged, to initially comply with the military 
aspects of the agreement This compliance ensured their entry to an electoral process 
that could see them winning ‘legitimate’ control over the most powerful office m 
Angola This pnze was made even more attractive by the failure of the Accords to 
outline any steps towards the decentralisation of political power, despite a rhetorical 
commitment to démocratisation This explains why, despite much foot-draggmg, the
11 See Bicesse Accords, Protocol of Estoril, I Elections
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Bicesse Accords did hold until the election had taken place The terms of the Accords 
and the implementation process had clearly created incentives for all factions in UNITA 
and in the MPLA to abide, at least tactically, by the agreement Even spoiler factions 
saw the advantages of a cessation of violence and some implementation of the military 
terms of the agreement In the period prior to the elections there is little evidence that 
either spoiler faction perceived open opposition to the agreement to be m their interest
The question remains as to whether or not an alternative settlement, which outlined 
different procedures for the implementation of a democratic political system, could have 
made the continued observance of the cease-fire and the full implementation of military 
provisions an attractive option for each conflict formation In other words, it is possible 
that a settlement with different procedures for implementation and with an alternative 
route to démocratisation could have closed off the opportunities to dominate that the 
Bicesse process so clearly presented to spoiler factions This argument is examined m 
more detail below along with further analysis of implementation design
SEQUENCING AND TIMING
The sequence and timing outlined m Bicesse includes few of the conditions associated 
with a successful outcome according to the IFF model On the one hand, neither parallel 
sequencing nor sufficient issue-breakdown was central to the sequence and timing 
outlined in Bicesse On the other hand, issue hierarchy was written into the agreement 
Issues essentially fell into political, military and policing issues, with agreement on 
legal and human nghts unspecific, aspiring or absent, this absence reinforcing obstacles 
to parallel sequencing On the implementation of military issues, the rules did call for 
some reciprocal moves by the parties Beginning on the same date (May 31st), the two 
were to begin a reciprocal process o f quartering for UNITA and confinement to 
barracks for MPLA This was to be completed by August 1st and to be followed by the 
simultaneous demobilisation and disarmament of the assembled troops Arms were to 
be left in the hands of UN observers this procedure could have insulated the 
implementation of disarmament from spoiler factions’ tactics After demobilisation, 
socio-economic programmes for the reintegration of combatants into civilian life were 
to run alongside the process of incorporating troops into the new national army Troops 
were to have been selected from both formations by a joint Commission on the FAA 
established by the CCPM These provisions introduced some step-by-step, reciprocal
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implementation to military issues It also made some provision for the parallel 
implementation of military and socio-economic issues, a sequence that is predicted to 
facilitate implementation
But the rules and procedures did not facilitate the full breakdown of military issues to 
provide for their step-by-step implementation no specific steps towards demobilisation 
and disarmament were outlined, such as the quartering, demobilisation and reintegration 
of troops m small groups of 10 or 20 per cent Instead the agreement required that all 
troops would be fu lly  quartered before demobilisation and reintegration began 
According to the hypotheses, this makes the pro-faction vulnerable to the tactics o f the 
spoiler faction which uses the enormity and complexity of the requirement that all 
troops be cantoned before any movement on demobilisation takes place, to delay any 
movement on demobilisation and to thereby stall the implementation process And this 
feature o f design was by no means the only barrier to implementation
Full parallel sequencing o f implementation was not a feature o f implementation design 
no procedures required the parallel implementation of military issues and the above- 
mentioned socio-economic issues with other aspects m the process, such as the closely 
related police reform In fact, the provisions guiding police reform presented wide-open 
opportunities for spoiler factions to adopt ‘legitimate’ stalling tactics on all issues The 
provisions were vague and unspecific and there were two basic problems while 
committing the parties to set up an impartial police force into which UNIT A members 
would be incorporated, they provided little guidance on the steps that would be required 
to do this, let alone on the sequencing and the timing of their implementation Secondly, 
its implementation was not clearly linked to the other provisions o f the process A 
twelve-month delay m establishing police monitoring units meant that the process of 
incorporating UNITA combatants into the police force did not begin But this had no 
further consequences for other aspects of the process as its implementation was not 
sequenced to it Yet it provided legitimate pretexts on which both UNITA and MPLA 
spoiler factions could justify their refusal to comprehensively implement the military 
provisions of the Accords
Given the vague nature of the provisions on policing, it might have been possible for the 
body driving implementation to design an implementation sequence But according to
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the terms of Bicesse, the parties had to set up joint, mobile monitoring groups m the 
immediate aftermath of the ceasefire Only after these groups were set up would 
UNAVEM’s police component have a role to play in its implementation (Bicesse) As 
the setting up of these monitoring bodies was m the hands of the non-insulated CCPM 
and was not tied to the implementation of any other provisions, there was little 
institutional or process-related support for factions who were in favour of fully 
implementing the compromise reached on policing As a result, when pro factions 
managed to achieve agreement to set up the police bodies almost a year late m June 
1992, the date for the election was known (29/30 September) Spoiler factions had 
plenty of legitimate obstacles, including logistical ones associated with the short time 
scale, to prevent furthering the process of setting up an impartial police force before the 
elections
In sum, because the implementation of the military issues was not governed by issue 
breakdown, actors were faced with an initial high-risk, one-step move to quarter their 
troops This would be followed by a second move full demobilisation Equally so, issue 
breakdown did not feature m the provisions that guided the implementation of policing 
provisions and the failure to link the implementation of policing and military issues 
reinforced obstacles to a pro faction strategy Spoiler factions m both parties could with 
relative ease create legitimate, politico-logistical pretexts on which to avoid the 
implementation of steps to reform the police, while still apparently pursuing a policy o f  
implementation Given that the rules and procedures o f design allowed this to happen, 
pro factions could do little to persuade sceptical factions to oppose it and to prevent 
spoiler factions from leading it For example, the MPLA was able to legitimately, or at 
least technically withm the terms of the agreement, create a new, powerful, anti-riot, 
paramilitary police force (Anti-Riot Police), into which it allegedly transferred 30,000 
of its best FAPLA (MPLA army) troops 22 The government’s anti-not police in turn 
provided UNITA spoiler factions with legitimate pretexts on which to persuade sceptic 
factions of the absolute necessity for UNITA to retain a ‘hidden army,’ which existed in 
violation of the reciprocal military provisions of the Accords (Anstee, 1996 51-2) It m 
turn fuelled the perceived need for a further strengthening of the anti-not police This 
mutual lack of compliance with the letter and spirit of the police and military provisions
22 UN, Blue Helmets 242-3 Anstee (150) writes that ‘ there were reasons to believe that the anti-not 
police contained the government’s best troops, but there was no way of proving it’
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later provided justifications for those in UNIT A who refused to recognise the election 
result (Anstee: 73-4). Had it lost the election, the same justifications would have been 
available to the spoiler faction in the MPLA.
A number of efforts to overcome stalling and investigate the alleged breaches that 
characterised the implementation of military and policing aspects o f the Accords 
highlight the space to dominate that existed for the spoiler factions. In a letter to 
Margaret Anstee, UNITA’s representative on CCPM, Elias.S.Pena,23 highlighted the 
potential danger that the anti-riot police posed to free and fair elections. When Antsee 
suggested ways in which the commissions could monitor and thus eliminate this danger, 
UNITA leaders were reluctant to co-operate (Anstee, 1996: 73-77). The MPLA 
suggested to the UN mission that obstacles to fair elections existed in UNITA’s alleged 
hidden army and in UNITA’s grip on its Jamba heartland (Anstee: 51-2). But when a 
practical solution involving a degree of issue break down was suggested, what appeared 
to have been deliberate inactivity prevailed (Anstee: 137). Both reactions suggest 
disinterest on the part of both parties in investigations that might have increased the 
sceptical faction’s confidence in the process. The rules and procedures of 
implementation, in particular the failure to sequence military and policing issues in 
parallel, and the absence of powerful, insulated institutions, provided no institutional 
backing for factions willing to employ these mechanisms.
Turning to the sequence, timing and detail of the provisions that governed political 
competition and national reconciliation, issue breakdown and parallel sequencing with 
military and policing issues are also starkly absent. The MPLA government was to alter 
the constitution to allow for elections in the recently legalised multi-party system. 
UNITA was to transform itself into a political party to take part in these elections.
While the government was obliged to ‘invite’ other political parties to discuss 
constitutional changes, and UNITA had representatives on the government body 
planning the elections, no provisions that might have broken down the issue of 
allocating political power existed. In this way, the allocation of political power was 
governed by a zero-sum election to a centralised political system. A democratic political 
system that inherently institutionalises a constructive role for the opposition, de-
23 A senior Unita official, a chief negotiator of Bicesse and Savimbi’s nephew.
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centralisation of the state and its disentangling from avenues of social mobility was 
implicitly but not explicitly part of the agreement. As a US official, George Moose, 
subsequently remarked:
‘the assurance, that win or lose a meaningful voice in governing the 
country’ would exist for an opposition was clearly missing from the 
provisions (Knudsen et al, 2001: 6 ).
The opportunities that the rules and mechanisms governing the implementation o f the 
new political system provided for spoiler factions are more clearly evident in the 
aftermath of the elections of October 1992. Following his relatively narrow electoral 
defeat (Table 5.1)24 Savimbi cried fraud and as one analyst comments:
‘The passions that Savimbi can now exploit could have been defused 
by a constitution offering proportional representation in the country’s 
executive, a decentralised government which gives provincial 
administrations real power and a revenue allocation formula that 
ensures that all regions receive an equitable share of Angola’s oil 
wealth’ (FT, 5.11.92).
As the above quote suggests, the lack of issue breakdown in the implementation of  
political provisions not only reduced incentives to implement a more de-centralised 
political system but it also resulted in a failure to address the need to incrementally 
breakdown the almost complete control that the MPLA had over the political economy. 
Instead, during the implementation period, the leadership of the MPLA was able to use 
its monopoly o f the state, its institutions and resources, to ‘neutralise its intemal- 
opponents’ or factions (Messiant, 2001: 294) and to:
‘intensify predation of oil revenue, reorganise its appropriation of 
public wealth through legal privatisations, and to extend the scale of 
redistribution through its clientelist system’ (Messiant, 2001: 290).
By permitting both parties to implement the policing and military provisions in a 
cosmetic way and including no mechanism to breakdown political issues or to 
postpone the elections if provisions were not genuinely implemented, the MPLA’s
24 Dos Santos won 49% of the vote, Savimbi 41.1%.
148
ability to institutionalise its grip on the Angolan political economy was ignored This 
m turn provided more pretexts for the UNIT A spoiler faction it refused to implement 
the provisions that would transfer areas under its control to central authonty m advance 
of the elections Regardless, the design of provisions governing the transfer o f central 
authonty was unlikely to facilitate either pro faction to follow its preferred strategy 
Parties had committed to study the practicalities o f extending central authonty in joint 
MPLA-UNITA teams But the extension of central authonty effectively amounted to 
the implementation of an MPLA secunty presence m all administrative areas As well 
as constituting a single step, it was,\m effect, a unilateral demand on UNITA Without 
a commitment m the accord to decentralisation, there was no basis for any kind o f  
provisional or local power shanng with UNITA, which was accustomed to controlling 
these areas 25 With the police force remaining an MPLA one, the FAA only 
cosmetically established in a rush to remove all potential obstacles from the elections 
m August 1992, and no provision that would alter the mechanisms for allocating 
political power and implementing decentralisation, efforts to fully extend the central 
government’s control over Angola proved fruitless UNITA’s spoiler faction had by 
this stage ample opportunity to secure its sceptical faction’s support for lesisting 
anything but a cosmetic implementation of all terms of the Accords In the event o f an 
electoral defeat, the MPLA spoiler faction had ample opportunity to point to UNITA’s 
failure to fully implement the Accords as making elections illegitimate
Yet there were even further deficiencies to implementation design On top of the stark 
absence of issue breakdown from political provisions, there were no mechanisms to 
guarantee the parallel, sequenced implementation o f political, military, policing and 
socio-economic provisions This was because the election date was set m stone, a rule 
that served to make it implicitly unconditional on the fulfilment o f other provisions In 
fact, Savimbi repeatedly remarked to Antsee that if  the elections were not held within 
the nght time-frame, ‘UNITA was under no obligation to implement the agreement’ 
(Anstee, 1996 88) His threats revealed what little sway was held by the aspmng, but 
not institutionally under-pinned, provision m the Accords that called for the full
25 Compare this with the design of the Salvadorian process where the extension of central administration 
was facilitated by UN brokered local power-sharing arrangements between returning mayors and FMLN 
and local bodies, which had filled their vacuum It was also clearly sequenced with military and policing 
aspects of the Accords and its implementation began 18 months before elections
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implementation of the military, police and political provisions, alongside the 
preparations for and before the actual holding of the elections Without provisions 
explicitly providing for issue breakdown and parallel sequencing, and with the rigid 
election deadline, these pre-conditions were simply not implemented The rigid election 
deadline created institutional support for what was m effect a form of issue hierarchy
This design meant that the elections would be held first and the military conflict 
subsequently sorted out But holding the election was, m fact, the key to reinforcing the 
military conflict m Angola Anstee (1996 78) maintains that military provisions were 
implemented to the point where the ceasefire held, because neither conflict formation 
wanted to imperil the elections, which were regarded as the best route (Anstee 150) in 
their bid for total power But rather than explaining this over-ndmg aim to gain power 
at the expense of the other as evidence of the persistent ‘zero-sum’ nature o f the 
conflict, it is essential to recognise that the rules, procedures and mechamsms m place 
to transform the words o f Bicesse into action shaped the choices available to conflict 
formations, and promoted the domination of this strategy The firm deadline for 
elections and the failure to include mechamsms to precipitate a step-by-step, sequenced 
implementation of other provisions ensured that the pro factions could not dominate 
The process instead allowed the spoiler factions to remain outwardly umted to their 
respective pro and sceptical factions, while they simultaneously practiced spoiler tactics 
and ensured that stalling dominated all aspects of the process The process supported the 
spoiler faction’s strategy to go along with the implementation process until the 
elections, to accept the process if their formation won the elections and to reject it, using 
process based justifications that they had the opportunity to create, and the military 
forces that the rules and procedures had allowed them to retain, if they lost
The lack of incentive for inter-party trust created by winner takes all elections is 
correctly highlighted by analysts (Wesley, 1997 101, Anstee, 1996 534) as partly 
responsible for the collapse of the Bicesse process But the timing of these elections and 
the failure of design to ensure the pnor, step-by-step implementation of the democratic 
political system aspired to in the Accords and the parallel implementation of military 
and policing provisions, allowed the spoiler factions m both formations to dominate 
This worsened further the effect of ‘winner-takes-alf elections Without lecourse to re­
negotiate elements of the agreement to make the holding of the election conditional on
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the bioken-down, phased implementation of the military and policing commitments,
‘pro factions’ had no institutional backup to pursue their strategy Without a process 
that committed formations to the step-by-step implementation of a de-centrahsed 
political system with a role for an opposition, pro factions would get little support from 
their sceptical factions in their endeavour to genuinely implement military and policing 
commitments In fact, the failure to effectively sequence political and secunty issues 
and to break them down into broken small, reciprocal steps, left the pro faction with 
little or no leverage to implement the military commitments along with their 
preparations for the elections This ensured that the winner-takes-all elections were held 
before other aspects o f the process were implemented To accept defeat m a contest over 
who controls a centralised political system, in a state where few alternative routes to 
accessing power existed, let alone an institutionalised role for opposition, was a step too 
large for any pro faction to take m the face o f powerful spoiler factions with ample 
justification to resist it
In sum, the issue hierarchy caused by the election deadline and the absence of adequate 
issue breakdown or parallel sequencing allowed stalling to charactense every aspect of 
implementation the process of confining UNITA and the MPLA’s troops to Assembly 
Areas and barracks was slow and incomplete and the UN supervised collection o f arms 
(SWO, 1996 7) was hugely incomplete and Tess than effective ’26 Yet UNITA and the 
MPLA insisted that they were complying with the agreement On 26 August 1992, 
UNITA and MPLA Generals together formed the General Command of the new FAA 
Its formal establishment, along with the constitutional revisions to legally underpin the
27elections, occurred less than a month before the elections (AP, 27 08 92) when the
28demobilisation of huge numbers of surplus troops had not taken place (SWO, 1996 7)
UNITA soldiers should have been undergoing a process of demobilisation or of 
incorporation into the FAA Many had left the assembly areas and they were able to cite 
process-related pretexts for doing so, such as the long waiting times and the inadequate 
facilities for incorporation into civilian life (Vines, 1994 15) The demobilisation of
26 UN and the Situation in Angola, UN Ref paper, 1995 5
27 Through some reports suggested 8,000, there appear to have been about 2,000 troops in the FAA on the 
eve of election and its institutional establishment was very far from complete (JIR 06 93)
28 It appears that only 41% at best of all UNITA and government troops were demobilised
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government troops appears to have been more complete (SWO 19) However, the 
spontaneous demobilisation of significant numbers of MPLA troops (SWO 19) was 
partly responsible for this and further highlights the disunity that characterised the 
MPLA These informally demobilised soldiers, with few opportunities and little 
assistance with re-mcorporation into civilian life, would provide fodder for the civilian 
militias later mobilised by the MPLA to fight UNITA m the post-election period
Long waiting times for ex-combatants stemmed from a form of issue hierarchy in the 
disarmament and demobilisation process which called for demobilisation after all 
soldiers were quartered Accentuating the difficulties caused by this sequencing was the 
lack o f an adequate and parallel socio-economic programme for demobilisation While 
the agreement had provided for this type of programme, the failure to closely sequence 
quartering and demobilisation (not to mention poor resources) meant that it came too 
late to be effective This effectively left cosmetically demobilised armies mobilised In 
UNITA’s case, demobilised soldiers appeared to remain under officers’ orders (Vines, 
1996 9) This helps to illustrate the drawbacks of a process in which little focus was 
placed a well-co-ordmated reintegration process sequenced m parallel with 
demobilisation The stalling that this process allowed ultimately resulted m the 
‘legitimate breaches’ that allowed UNITA to retain an apparently ‘hidden army,’ and 
the government to build up a new, well-equipped, anti-riot police force The role o f the 
anti-not police m the subsequent phase o f civil war, gives credence to the allegation that 
the MPLA had incorporated 30,000 of its best forces into i t 29
This was the picture on the eve of the September 1992 elections Efforts to implement 
an inadequate settlement that was characterised by issue hierarchy, insufficient issue 
break-down, no parallel sequencing or insulated mechanisms to introduce it, were 
stalled And in the immediate aftermath of the elections as the stalled process 
unravelled into civil war, the deep factionalism within both parties became even more 
apparent
UNRAVELLING LEADS TO CIVIL WAR
Despite the stalling implementation process, the elections (Tables 5 1 and 5 2) passed
29 UN, Blue Helmets 242
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off peacefully and recorded a turnout o f over 90 per cent However, unofficial souices 
emanating from the NEC30 m the immediate aftermath of the elections suggested that 
the MPLA would win a majority m the legislature, and would, perhaps, win the
presidency on the first count
Table 5 1 Parliamentary Elections (September 1992)31
Party Members o f Parliament
MPLA 129
UNIT A 70
Partido Renovacao Social, PRS 6
Partido Liberal Democratico, PLD 5
Angola Democratico, AD 
Forum Democratico Angolano, FDA
Partido de Alianca Juventude Operarios e Camponeses de Angola, PAJOCA 
Partido Democratico para o Progresso de Alianca Nacional de Angola, PDP-ANA 
Partido Renovador Democratico, PRD 
Partido Social Democratico, PSD 
Other 4
Total (220)
Source, Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Angola to 2000, Prospects for Recovery London Economist 
Publications, 1993
The UNIT A leadership’s reaction revealed the disunity and confusion that prevailed 
amongst its strategists Some members, including Savimbi, cried electoral fraud Pena 
and Chivukuvuku (CCPM), the UNIT A leaders who appeared to be most associated 
with its pro faction, requested that UNITA’s charges o f electoral fraud be jointly 
investigated before any formal announcement of the election results was made (AP,
5 10 92) The pro faction arguably presented the adoption of this strategy as a 
reasonable request to its more bellicose, spoiler faction who favoured dismissing the 
results outright on the basis o f fraud, and threatened to return to war (AP, 3 10 92)
The leadership’s priority was to ensure that it would retain enough power to lead a 
unified and powerful organisation Two factors associated with electoral defeat 
threatened to prevent Savimbi from achieving this objective and raised questions about 
his power at the centre of UNITA Full demobilisation, the acceptance o f electoral 
defeat and of UNITA’s status as only a political party threatened his authority m 
UNITA, which, without control over the levers and resources of the state, depended on 
a state of insecurity Secondly, the result of the elections raised questions about
30 National Electoral Council Government institution, including UNITA representatives Organised
elections with UN assistance 
There are 18 provinces in Angola
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Savimbi’s greatness amongst mid-elite and lower-rankmg members of UNIT A and 
contributed to Savimbf s Caccute paranoia’ (Antsee, 1996 211) Maeir witnessed an 
incredulous reaction to Savimbi’s defeat in many UNITA-controlled areas This helped 
to create a crisis of legitimacy (Maeir, 1996 81) and it undermined the logic of 
Savimbi’s hitherto accepted rhetoric on UNITA’s right to rule Angola The option of 
leading UNITA into opposition m 1992 risked allowing another leader to step into the 
‘strongman’ role to lead a guerrilla struggle and thereby control the coercive structures 
that still kept the organisation together This was especially true given that the 
implementation of the police and military provisions of the Accords was stalled and the 
extension o f central government even more so In other words, given that 
implementation had progressed so little, without the rule o f the iron fist Savimbi could 
not control these factions
Table 5 2 Presidential Election Results (September 1992)
Candidate Party Votes (%)
Jose Eduardo dos Santos MPLA 49 57
Jonas Savimbi UNITA 40 07
Alberto Neto Partido Democratico Angolano 2  16
Holden Roberto FNLA 2  11
Honorato Lando Partido Democratico Liberal de Angola 1 92
Luis dos Passos Partido Rrenovador Democratico 1 47
Bengue Pedro Joao Pardido Social Democratico 0 97
Samao Cacete Frente para a Democracia 0 67
Daniel Chipenda Partido Liberal Democratico de Angola 0 52
Analia Pereira Partido Liberal Democratico 0 29
Rui Pereira Partido Reformador Angolano 0 23
Source, Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Angola to 2000, Prospects for Recovery London Economist 
Publications, 1993
Given this knowledge, UNITA’s pro faction appears to have initiated a strategy that 
used brinkmanship to save the agreement A senior UNITA leader, Valentim,32 played 
down Savimbi’s war-like comments as no more than a ‘bid to boost the moral o f  
UNITA supporters’ (AP, 4 10 92) Valentim’s comments were followed by the 
withdrawal of UNITA’s Generals from the FAA The generals demanded that 
consideration be given to the intimidating tactics of the anti-riot police dunng elections, 
and that a review or a cancellation of the electoral process be undertaken (FT, 7 10 92) 
UNITA called on the MPLA government to postpone the official announcement of the 
election results until an investigation and a deal was made This response supports the
32 Senior Unita leader, Chief information officer 1992-8 onwards, Leading negotiator for Lusaka
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idea that a damage limitation exercise was underway So too does UNITA’s agreement 
to take part in a UN-led fraud investigation involving joint commissions and to accept 
UN arbitration of the dispute over the election (FT, 8 10 92) Its strategy appeared to be 
based on the premise that the investigations would prove fraud, and thereby provide 
support for a re-negotiation of the agreement (Anstee, 1996 212), and facilitate their 
need to provide their leader with ca dignified solution’ (Anstee 213) The actions of 
Pik Botha, South Africa’s foreign minister, also lend support to this interpretation
Long-time ally of UNIT A, Botha was perhaps m the best position to understand 
Savimbi’s needs m October 1992 He outlined a compromise that involved genuine 
power sharing and some form of new administration in the provinces where UNIT A had 
registered strong support33 (FT, 14 10 92) When an improvement m Savimbi’s poll in 
mid-October made a second round of the presidential election probable, Botha still 
advised against holding them and instead proposed a transitional government of national 
unity (GNU), with real power shanng and full UN presence for the next round o f  
elections (Anstee, 1996 233-4) His proposal supports the view that UNITA needed 
issue breakdown, a transitional government and some shanng of power at national and 
local level, if  the implementation of the rest of Bicesse was to be possible 
Recommending that the official announcement o f the results be delayed, Botha called 
for a comprehensive investigation’ of the elections and the provision of ‘a face-saving 
device for Savimbi’ (Anstee 224-5) Botha’s efforts, like those of UNITA’s pro faction, 
appeared to be based on the assumption that investigations would reveal sufficient fraud 
to create space for a deal (FT, 14 10 92) In this sense, his strategy failed to adequently 
consider for the obstacles to a deal presented by the MPLA’s spoiler faction
The MPLA had just defeated UNITA in elections, which, following investigations by 
the UN and the joint commission, were approved as ‘free and fair ’ The legitimacy that 
this gave to the MPLA, and in particular to factions that were against further 
accommodation with UNITA, cannot be underestimated The MPLA’s actions must be 
understood from within this context Reports indicate that the MPLA was divided into 
hard-liners and soft-hners (Anstee, 1996 215) Its pro faction, who may have favoured 
the implementation of an institutionalised form of power shanng in recognition that
13 Bie, Humbo and Benguala and Cuando Cubango were mentioned
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only this would avoid further civil war, had no process mechanisms to back a strategy 
that agreed to re-negotiate parts of the agreement Dos Santos issued conciliatory 
statements, promising to immediately set up a GNU, but only in the event of UNITA’s 
demobilisation and its acceptance of the results (FT, 9 10 92) The MPLA spoiler 
faction had a process design on which to base this issue hierarchy Following the 
announcement o f the results, the MPLA could claim legitimacy when it continued to 
make this demand UNITA ‘must demobilise its soldiers and allow the extension of 
state administration to all parts o f Angola, before a GNU is negotiated, and before 
preparations for the second round are put into place (AP, 19 10 92) UNITA’s pro 
faction could not recommend this to the formation, given the issue hierarchy at the heart 
of the sequence which its spoiler faction was clearly in the position to exploit At this 
point and with these demands the return to civil war seemed unavoidable It began on 
October 31, when a pre-emptive strike by the new government o f Angola (GOA) on 
UNITA resulted m the death o f thousands o f elite and supporting members of UNITA 
in Luanda (Vines, 1996 3)
Some argue, including many m the MPLA, that troop movements by UNITA pnor to 
October 31 had indicated its intention to re-take large sections of Angola before staging 
a coup d'etat in Luanda (FT, 8 10 92) However, most neutral analysts argue that 
UNITA was engaged m a policy of brinkmanship, one that reflects a last attempt by the 
pro faction to dominate the formation The diaries of high-ranking UNITA elite who 
were captured m Luanda m October 1992 support this interpretation (Vines, 1994 19) 
Analysts also point out that large sections of UNITA’s political elite were unprotected 
m Luanda on the day on which hostilities broke out (October 31), and point to the 
contribution of the government’s anti-not police to the incremental outbreak of 
hostilities (Vines, 1994 19), as evidence m support of the argument that UNITA was not 
planning to stage a coup d'etat in Luanda (Vines, 1994 19) Instead, it would appear 
that with the prospect of a deal fading, UNITA’s pro faction aimed to threaten the 
MPLA government, with what Savimbi referred to as ‘controllable pressure’ (Anstee, 
1996 216) With this pressure it hoped to force enough concessions to enable UNITA 
to remain part of the process Most probable, of course, is that some factions of UNITA 
were involved in a policy of brinkmanship with a view to secunng a negotiated solution, 
while other factions were engaged m one which sought a justification to return to civil 
war
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As Angola slipped back into civil war, Savimbi and other surviving UNITA leaders 
referred constantly to the deep divisions within the organisation The extent to which 
the cries o f disunity were genuine or part of a brinkmanship that aimed to force 
concessions is impossible to discern However, that UNITA was not under clear, cential 
control is evident Pressure for a return to hostilities from military commanders in the 
field appeared to climax m the aftermath of the battle of Luanda Several commanders 
reportedly started military engagements on their own initiatives, while civilians took up 
arms m the names of both UNITA and the MPLA to settle old grievances (Vines,1994 
19) Anstee (1996 283) believes that the leadership of UNITA had seriously ‘over­
reached itself5 She points to men ‘akm to warlords/ who were conducting attacks 
around the county and who ‘might not easily respond to ceasefire commands’ 
Furthermore, Savimbi left Luanda for UNITA’s base in Huambo immediately after the 
elections The purpose o f his departure was, according to a high-ranking UNITA official 
(Jardo Meukalia),34 to calm generals and their supporters who threatened a violent 
reaction to the election result (FT, 6 10 92, AP, 8 10 92) Days before he was killed m 
October 1992, E S Pena told Anstee that ‘for once Savimbi was in a minority, by taking 
a more moderate position than many of his immediate collaborators ’ (Anstee 231) Yet 
it is inaccurate to depict Savimbi as simply at the mercy o f the ‘hard core,5 hawkish 
factions o f UNITA Savimbi and his closest associates were making calculated 
decisions as to which strategy would be most effective m the pursuit o f their key goal 
to maintain control over the leadership o f a strong and united UNITA Whether they 
would adopt the strategy favoured by the bellicose generals, or that advocated by the 
pro faction and the international community, would depend on this calculation
Despite efforts to negotiate a cease-fire, and despite the formal negotiations that took 
place in Nimibe m November 1992, the spoiler factions appear to have gamed the 
initiative m both formations The mutual game of blame and counter-blame for the 
escalation of violence that followed highlights the efforts of the spoiler factions to 
legitimise their actions (see AP, 4 12 92) When the Prime Minister offered UNITA one 
ministerial post in a government of national unity which was established m December, 
he added that UNITA should be banned (AP, 3 12 92) Even if the MPLA government
34 Senior Unita official (Financial Times 6  10 92)
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had responded to a beleaguered call by Valentim for an increase in UNIT A ’s role to 
match its electoral support, it was at that stage unlikely to have stemmed the re- 
escalation of the war that followed
FROM CIVIL WAR TO LUSAKA
Heavy fighting ensued from late 1992 and UNIT A made important strategic advances m 
1993 However, efforts to reach a new settlement continued despite the heavy fighting 
and a draft protocol was produced in mid-1993 It reflected the situation on the 
battlefield, and envisaged that political concessions would be made by the government 
in exchange for military concessions by UNITA (Vines, 1996 5) But mtra-formation 
divisions within the government (Anstee, 1996 469-70) and UNITA (Anstee 481-6) 
were highly evident towards the close of negotiations and talks ended when Savimbi 
refused to agree to withdraw from the areas illegally occupied by UNITA since October 
1992, without the simultaneous presence of a UN security force This presence could 
not be guaranteed, much to the frustration of Anstee, who argues that the conditions 
surrounding the 1993 Protocol were more favourable for a successful outcome than any 
conditions that existed, before or afterwards (Anstee, 1996b 73) While Antsee’s 
argument is quite convincing, UNITA’s final communique suggests that the successful 
implementation of the draft protocol may have faced at least some barriers similar to 
those eventually faced by Lusaka In it, UNITA insisted that its withdrawal and its 
demobilisation would only have been agreed in the context o f a simultaneous 
demobilisation of the government’s troops (Anstee, 1996 494)
Diplomatic efforts continued into 1994 under the leadership of the new UN SG’s 
representative (Beye) and m 1994 these negotiations resulted in the Lusaka Protocol 
The Protocol was signed in the context of a militarily and politically weak UNITA vis- 
a-vis the MPLA, which had successfully eroded UNITA’s military advantage 
throughout 1994 (Vines, 1996 6)
THE LUSAKA PROTOCAL
Although it included some improvement m design, especially by avoiding ngid 
deadlines, improving insulated dispute-resolution procedures, and including a far 
stronger UN military presence, at heart of the process there were enormous obstacles
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These largely stemmed from the zero-sum elections of 1992, and they served to make 
issue hierarchy, issue holdover and inadequate issue breakdown almost unavoidable
IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS
The Lusaka Protocol outlined a clear and strong role for a neutral mechanism to 
oversee, supervise and verify implementation This body was relatively insulated from 
the obstacles to implementation presented by mtra-formation factionalism The 
agreement gave the UN SG’s representative the power to chair and to set the agenda in 
the joint commission for implementation, which replaced the CCPM Dispute-resolution 
mechanisms were centred in this body, which would investigate allegations of non- 
compliance with each element of the implementation process This gave it the power to 
ensure that the sequence and timing outlined m the agreement was upheld, and 
implicitly gave it some power to influence parties to agree to alter sequencing and 
timing as part of an effort to improve the prospects of implementation But barriers to 
the adoption of issue breakdown and parallel sequencing were inherent in the unilateral 
demands and other issue hierarchy central to the implementation process
SEQUENCE AND TIMING
Despite evidence that there had been some recognition of the need for reciprocity, on 
close examination the terms governing military and policing issues do not facilitate the 
breakdown of issues into a series of ‘reciprocal or reversible’ steps Nor do they endorse 
parallel implementation Largely due to the political context which had conferred 
legitimacy on the MPLA and the outcome of the discredited Bicesse process, the terms 
o f Lusaka more or less demanded of UNIT A that it implement a series of unilateral, 
non-broken down military moves which would together dismantle its military capacity 
Meanwhile the government's FAA was to be confined to barracks and to implement 
some demobilisation, the anti-not police to initially remain mobilised
The deployment of additional UN observers and the armed peacekeeping force was 
conditional on the completion of the first phase of the ceasefire This involved the 
establishment of a ceasefire m situo and the completion of a UN-supervised separation 
of forces where they were in contact It also required generals from UNIT A and the 
FAA to begin negotiations on the procedures for the FAA’s transformation, including 
agreement on the number of UNIT A forces that would be incorporated into it These
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negotiations would take place through a newly-established commission chaired by the 
United Nations j5
The second phase would begin after the UN Peace-Keeping force had begun 
deployment (Annex 3 Timetable, Phase 2) This phase involved the following actions 
the UN would verify the withdrawal, quartering and demobilisation (and disarming) of 
UNITA troops and would simultaneously verify the FAA’s return to barracks, or to 
agreed verification locations A UN operation to collect and store all UNITA’s lethal 
war matenal m locations separate from the quartering areas would form part of the 
demobilisation process This would be immediately followed by the return of UNITA’s 
generals to the high command of the FAA, and a subsequent start to the selection of 
quartered and disarmed UNITA troops for the FAA, and of UNITA and FAA elements 
for return to civilian life
While logistical preparations for other provisions were to be simultaneously laid, their 
implementation would not begin m practice until the first major stage of the military 
process -  the quartering of all o f UNITA’s troops and the full stationing m banacks of 
FAA -  was complete While the UN’s police monitors were to be in place, the 
quartering of the controversial anti-not police and its transformation, which included 
the implementation of changes to its armament and equipment and its role in public 
security, were to begin after the ‘public order situation’ was considered to have 
improved sufficiently
The unilateral demands were reinforced m April 1995, when the parties agreed to adopt 
a procedure known as ‘global incorporation’ to incorporate UNITA soldiers into the 
FAA before implementing a gradual reduction of FAA, which it was agreed m August 
1995 would number 90,000 (SWO, 1996 25) The global incorporation mechanism as 
designed in Angola increased opportunities for parties to insist on issue hierarchy The 
selection of the 26,300 UNITA elements for incorporation into the FAA remained 
conditional on UNITA’s pnor compliance with the quartering and disarmament clauses 
of the agreement, including the requirement that it handover all lethal material to the 
UN In other words, all 50-62,000 UNITA troops were to withdraw from the areas
35 After Umta generals withdrew forces from FAA, the newly established FAA remained the army of the 
government
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under UNITA control, hand in their weapons, and await demobilisation Meanwhile, the 
at least 110-120,000 strong FAA (SWO 25), while confined to barracks, remained 
armed and the anti-not police were fully mobilised In fact, the anti-riot police would 
only begin the process of confinement to barracks once UNITA was fully quartered and 
demobilised The process of disarming civilians, this mainly refemng to the MPLA- 
created armed civilian militias that had emerged in October 1992, was to begin during 
the final stage o f UNITA’s quartering and demobilisation (Annex 3, Timetable, Phase 
2)
Implementation design provided no clear opportunities for UNITA’s pro faction to 
make reasonable requests of its spoiler faction The pro faction had little opportunity to 
expose the spoiler faction’s intransigence and to thereby limit the appeal of its spoiler 
faction to its sceptical faction Instead unilateral, irreversible moves were required and 
demanded a sequence that was based on issue hierarchy This provided clear pretexts on 
which spoiler factions could win support for a strategy that was dominated by stalling 
and characterised by a refusal to fully quarter, let alone to disarm troops For example, 
UNITA spoiler factions would have wasted no time m pointing out the danger o f  
quartering troops while the anti-not police, who UNITA held responsible for the 
massacre m Luanda m 1992, remained in strategic positions
At the same time the MPLA’s spoiler faction could use the terms of the agreement to 
resist any adjustment to sequence that might have facilitated the efforts of UNITA’s pro 
faction to implement the agreement As detailed below, relatively successful efforts 
were made by UNAVEMII and the Joint Commission to remove the obstacles that the 
unilateral demands presented to UNITA’s efforts to quarter its troops But the 
government’s spoiler faction could support its objection to new timing arrangements 
with an insistence that parties stick to the timetable outlined m the agreement On this 
basis it could ‘legitimately’ refuse to move the anti-not police to barracks before 
UNITA was fully quartered
Further issue hierarchy, an absence of sufficient breakdown in political provisions, and 
the failure to sequence political, politico-economic and other issues m parallel 
reinforced the obstacles created by this unilateral demand, and are described below
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POLITICAL ISSUES
The run-off between President Dos Santos and Savimbi was still pending since the 
disputed elections in September 1992 This election to the most powerful executive 
position in the country was to take place when all other provisions of the Accords, 
including the extension of central government authority to the country, were judged by 
the UN SG’s representative to have been implemented The omission of a fixed date 
removed the focus from the winner-takes-all presidential elections and could have 
created space for the step-by-step implementation of other political provisions But, as 
detailed below, other provisions created ample obstacles to implementation
The provisions under the national reconciliation section of the agreement committed all 
parties to uphold the elections of 1992 as legitimate UNITA was therefore to return its 
70 elected MPs to the National Assembly But this could only happen provided UNITA 
had implemented its military commitments sufficiently for the GOA to legalise the 
movement (Annex 1 and 2) Unless sufficient issue breakdown could be introduced, 
this made the implementation of political provisions conditional on the pnor 
implementation of military provisions (SWO, 1996 39) This was the first threat of  
issue hierarchy
In an effort to breakdown the implementation of issues concerning political power, 
administration was to be decentralised and local government office holders, previously 
directly appointed by the president (SWO 21), were to be elected These elections 
would be supported by legislation to be passed under the existing constitutional 
provisions for decentralisation (Annex 6 II 5) In addition to this, the agreement 
outlined a special, constitutional status for UNITA5 s president as leader o f the largest 
opposition party (Annex 6 II 6) Details of this position and of security arrangements 
for the UNITA elite, while agreed in principle, were to be subsequently negotiated 
between Dos Santos and Savimbi Agreement on the latter was cntical given Savimbi’s 
persistent refusal to go to Luanda on security grounds Specific party facilities and 
offices reflecting its electoral strength were also to be given to UNITA (Annex 6, II 16)
Further issue breakdown is evidenced (Annex 6 Modalities 8, Specific Principles 10) 
in the government’s commitment to appoint UNITA members to positions m
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government and state administration,36 and to promote professionally-qualified UNITA 
people to carry out some functions in the public administration But the concrete 
modalities of UNITA’s participation m the government, state administration and 
diplomatic missions abroad were to be specified m a letter to be written by the Angolan 
authorities to the leader of UNITA (Annex 6 IH 1) This underlines the fact that not 
only was the power-sharing aspect of the agreement less than institutional, but that the 
degree of power offered to UNITA was the government’s prerogative to choose 
Furthermore, rather than being presented as a bargain, the allocation of some degree of 
political power to UNITA was dependent on UNITA’s implementation of its military 
provisions
In sum, the political agreements concerning the location of power were broken down m 
theory, in that the agreement provided for administrative decentralisation and local 
elections But the commencement of this step-by-step implementation not only 
depended on the full implementation of military terms, but the extension of central 
administration (1 e government control) to all o f Angola was a prerequisite to its 
implementation Even then it was not subject to any firm timetable Consequently, 
UNITA, which actually governed the areas it controlled with its own political and 
policing structures, power hierarchies, and even with its own currency (JIR, 08 98), was 
to ‘surrender’ all o f this land and control before it was included m a non- 
mstitutionalised power-sharing government (albeit with an institutional position for 
Savimbi), before positions were allocated to it in the police and the administration, and 
before local elections and other initiatives were undertaken to decentralise power
POLITICO-ECONOMIC ISSUES
In the words of UNITA’s General Ben Ben, ‘diamonds were UNITA’s life and blood’ 
after the return to civil war m 1992 In fact, UNITA controlled up to 90 per cent of 
Angola’s diamond areas between 1992 and 1994, and while this declined during 1996 
and 1997, UNITA still controlled about two thirds of Angola’s diamond output m late 
1996 (Vines, 1999 132-3) Given UNITA’s heavy financial reliance on the diamond 
output, agreement over the access to diamonds had to be a central part o f the Lusaka
Provisions did not reflect electoral strength Unita was to nominate a provincial governor in only one of 
the four provinces where it emerged as the largest party in 1992, while it is to nominate the governors in 
two other provinces where MPLA was the largest party (SWO, 1996 40)
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peace process As diplomats argued, if the MPLA’s administration was to extend to the 
diamond areas, UNITA would require resources to finance a political party
However, the protocol failed to comprehensively address the diamond issue (Vines,
1999 133) and provisions were either stated in vague terms, or were left 'completely 
un-addressed’ (Knudsen, 2000 9) It appears that the UN and the pro factions expected 
that the diamond issue would be settled during the implementation process, especially 
given its close connection to the extension of central administration to Angola But 
while there were intermittent, secret negotiations on the issue, it was not settled and it 
was, in effect, held over for settlement until other issues, such as full demobilisation, 
were implemented By failing to sequence the settlement of this issue to the 
implementation of the central administration one, the Lusaka Protocol gave institutional 
back-up to those willing to stall on the negotiations concerning diamonds while still 
insisting that UNITA allow the extension of central administration
FACTIONALISM AND STALLING CHARACTERISES IMPLEMENTATION
Samakuva was UNITA’s representative on the joint implementation commission and 
is perceived to have been part of UNITA’s pro faction throughout the implementation of  
Lusaka He argued m 1994 that if implementation were to succeed £a space for UNITA’ 
was needed (JIR, 05 00) But the sequence and timing described above provided ample 
opportunity for UNITA’s spoiler faction to question whether or not political space 
would ever open up Equally so, it gave the MPLA’s spoiler faction ample opportunity 
to close that political space In fact, a process can be discerned whereby the strategies of 
the spoiler factions gradually gamed ground in both conflict actors
There were factions in the MPLA who were clearly unhappy with the terms of the 
Lusaka Protocol In fact, significantly powerful sections of its military believed that if a 
Peace Agreement were to be implemented, UNITA would have to be comprehensively 
defeated (SWO, 1996 13) In 1996 Tvedten (1997 64) identified people m the MPLA 
who for personal and generally politico-economic motivations did not want peace or 
stability even given the MPLA’s dominant position in the political system
37 Senior Umta member, elected to parliament and chief representative on the post Lusaka implementation 
commission (CCPM)
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UNITA was also very divided While General ‘Ben Ben38’ and de Matos (MPLA)39 
made early progress on the implementation of military issues early (AP, 11 01 95), and 
the joint MPLA-UNITA commission made progress in preparations for demobilisation 
m early 1995, Savimbi signalled disunity and warned that his army was not ready to 
demobilise (FT, 24 01 95) According to Savimbi, in the immediate aftermath of the 
agreement disunity m the organisation meant that UNITA was suffering the ‘biggest 
crisis since its foundation’ (AP, 21 12 94) At a party conference in Bailundu in 
February 1995, Savimbi was reported to be fighting for control o f the movement, which 
was ‘split over the accords, with hard-line military brass pressing Savimbi to fight on, 
instead of accepting the power-sharing deal’ (FT, 13 3 95) Savimbi is believed to have 
re-stamped his control over a divided movement at Bailundu (Vines, 1999 96 7) He 
used the event to dress down Samakuvu m front o f the assembled delegates, to remove 
Manuvoakola, UNITA’s Secretary General and signatory o f the Protocol, from his post, 
and to win approval for a strategy that appeared to neither reject or endorse Lusaka 
(Hare, 1998 76-7)
But despite Hare’s interpretation, the re-shuffle at Bailundu appears to have been 
against those most associated with Lusaka This can be read m one of two ways Firstly, 
it can be interpreted as a gesture towards the spoiler faction, designed to give Savimbi 
some breathing space to continue a policy o f engagement with the process On the 
strength of this engagement he would aim to alter sequence and timing procedures and 
to thereby secure a larger role m the political system for UNITA This would allow 
further engagement, including the summit meeting with Dos Santos m May 1995 
Alternatively, it can be interpreted as a decisive move by the previously-sceptical 
Savimbi towards the adoption of the spoiler faction’s agenda This would have been m 
response to a leadership challenge from a UNITA spoiler faction which was 
strengthened in the context of the Lusaka Protocol’s demands Many accounts 
subsequently suggested the latter interpretation, citing the moves at Bailundu as 
evidence of Savimbi’s increasingly intransigent stance One dissident UNITA 
commander’s account of Bailundu supports the interpretation that the conference 
marked Savimbi5 s movement off the fence to the strategy of continued civil war (AP
38 General Arhndo Chenda Pena -  Chief of Staff of Umta armed forces (FALA) and Joint Chief of statf 
(temporarily) of the FAA (before the Umta pullout)
39 General de Matos, MPLA Chief of Staff (FAA)
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25 2 95) However, others suggest that he reserved his decision for later and remained 
firmly m the sceptical faction (see below) Regardless of interpretation, most analysts 
believe that Savimbi and his immediate associates re-asserted authority on the factional 
UNITA movement at Bailundu (Vines,1999, Hare,1998, Tvedten, 1996) and that, if  not 
at Bailundu, by 1997 Savimbi had progressively moved away from the faction that can 
be identified as a pro faction The degree to which this incremental triumph of the 
spoiler faction can be explained by the design of the implementation process is assessed 
below
Savimbi officially endorsed the Lusaka Protocol m May 1995, three months after the 
Bailundu conference and he made an unprecedented pledge to demobilise his army (AP 
8 5 95) m accordance with the terms of the agreement In the absence of further 
significant moves by either party to implement their commitments, some momentum 
was maintained by the UN which guided the agreement on new modalities for the FAA 
and facilitated some understanding on political issues An important summit meeting 
between Dos Santos and Savimbi took place in May 1995 and both leaders reiterated 
their commitment to the peace process But despite this, for most o f 1995 stalling 
dominated both UNITA and the MPLA’s implementation of troop disengagement, 
prisoner releases and the repatriation of mercenaries Genuine logistical obstacles 
existed, especially when the 7,640 strong UN force was not yet m place (AP 26 9 95) 
This, along with the unilateral demands outlined above, created uncertainty and 
facilitated the stalling that plays directly into the hand of the spoiler factions
Progress resumed and a start to the quartering process was announced by UNITA in 
November 1995 (AP 16 11 95) However, in the immediate aftermath of this 
announcement, officers o f the FAA illustrated their ability to quickly move from 
‘disengaged5 positions, when they took control o f several locations m the oil-producmg 
region of Soyo Whether or not they were acting on orders from central command 
and/or with a view to provoking UNITA’s spoiler faction, the risks exposed by this 
troop movement provided the UNITA spoiler faction with a pretext (and with its 
sceptical faction’s support) on which to stall the quartering process UNITA responded
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with a suspension of its quartering process,40 a move that effectively deadlocked the 
process once again
The deployment of more UN troops41 improved the security situation m late 1995 and 
removed some pretexts for stalling Talks that were monitored by the UN subsequently 
resulted m an agreement by both parties to re-design the implementation process with a 
view to overcoming deadlock the MPLA agreed to introduce reciprocity to some 
aspects o f the process, agreeing to quarter the anti-not police m return for UNITA’s 
commitment to resume its quartering and demobilisation process (AP, 23 01 96) 
Following this, the MPLA released some UNITA prisoners, declared an end to a 
contract with a South African mercenary company, announced that is would station the 
anti-not police in barracks and withdrew forces from the areas where UNITA was 
supposed to be quartered 42 At this point, the government appeared to be ‘meticulously 
fulfilling’ its commitments and this removed some of the pretexts on which UNITA’s 
spoiler faction could justify continued stalling Savimbi’s immediate response to the 
MPLA’s moves was to suggest that the mercenaries had simply changed their corporate 
name (instead of leaving Angola), and to question whether or not the anti-not police had 
really been withdrawn to barracks 43 He also argued that the absence o f an amnesty law 
prevented UNITA from further fulfilment of its implementation promises The last 
pretext for inaction was promptly addressed when the government passed an amnesty 
law, and Savimbi’s other ‘pretexts’ were generally considered by the UN to have run 
out (Hare, 1998 98-9) Coupled with this heightened international pressure, this 
reciprocity eventually resulted m some commitment by UNITA to the process It 
quartered and demobilised 7,000 troops, and pledged to the US to demobilise 16,500 
troops by 16 February 1996 The government simultaneously confined 2,000 anti-not 
police to barracks (AFPI, 7 2 96) But, despite some reciprocal progress, the pretexts 
still existed on which the UNITA spoiler faction could persuade its sceptical factions to 
continue to stall
40 UN, Blue Helmets 261
41 The full force was not deployed until late 1996 (Vines, 1999 2) March 1996 336 military observers, 
6,376 troops and support personnel and 226 civilian police officers (Blue Helmets 365)
42 AP 25 1 96
4 International Herald Tribune, 15-01-96
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In fact, the ability o f UNITA’s spoiler faction to present its military obligations under 
the agreement as unilateral moves remained evident, m spite o f the adjustments to 
sequence and timing The Secretary General himself reiterated the unilateral demands 
after the timetable adjustment he publicly pointed to a disturbing lack of progress in 
UNIT A cantonment, called for the implementation of all military issues first and 
prioritised the disarmament o f UNIT A as the most important part of the peace process 
(AFPI, 2 2 96) The message m the international media reinforced the issue hierarchy, 
and argued that Savimbi must
‘quarter all his forces, not just some of them This unlocks the door to 
government recognition of his political party, to his participation in a 
temporary unity government and to discussion on amnesty for his 
men5 (International Herald Tribune 17 2 96)
It was during this short penod of movement that Savimbi began to seek the breakdown 
of ‘political and national reconciliation issues5 and their parallel implementation with 
military issues Interpreting the legal expiration of the 1992 legislature’s term as an 
opportunity to alter the provisions of Lusaka, Savimbi declared himself to be against the 
government’s proposal to extend to the parliament’s mandate Instead, he recommended 
that a ‘transitional government’ prepare conditions for reliable and transparent elections 
which would seal off the peace agreement (AFPI, 18 02 96) He proposed too that 
sequencing be altered to make UNITA’s implementation of its military provisions 
dependent on the government’s implementation of these new provisions concerning 
national reconciliation
“UNITA makes military compromise through the disarmament and 
quartering of troops and the government makes political compromise 
by integrating UNITA civil servants into the administration and the 
government” (Savimbi, AFPI, 18 02 96)
Perhaps m response to this proposal, the parties agreed to alter sequencing m a way that 
arguably softened the issue hierarchy demand m March 1996 The changes were agreed 
at a summit meeting between Dos Santos and Savimbi m Gabon which was organised 
by the United Nations The quartering and disarming of UNITA tioops and the selection 
of its troops for incorporation into the FAA would take place simultaneously, and not 
consecutively, before June 1996 The incorporation process would immediately follow 
and would take place between June 1 and July 31 (SWO, 1996 15) It was agreed, on
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UNITA’s request (Hare,1998 123), that the establishment of a GNU would take place 
immediately after the June deadline had been met It would also coincide with the final 
step in the formation of the FAA, and would happen before the extension of central 
administration This constituted a significant change to the procedures for sequencing 
and timing, given that the extension of central authority to Angola had originally been 
sequenced to take place immediately after the quartering process was complete and 
before the implementation of political provisions began
These changes suggest that the pro factions may have been gaining the initiative But 
while subsequent events indicate some evidence of the pro factions’ influence, the 
adjustments to sequencing and timing did not facilitate pro factions m their quest to 
fully control the strategy of their respective formations This is explained below as the 
result o f obstacles created by the issue hierarchy that was still upheld m the provisions 
governing the extension of central administration, the politico-economic issues, and to a 
lesser extent m the military and policing clauses These barriers limited the success of 
efforts to introduce parallel sequencing and issue breakdown to all issues - military, 
policing and political -  and are discussed below
In May 1996, UNITA had reportedly encamped and demobilised 54,040 soldiers (AP,
17 7 96), this going some way towards meeting the newly-agreed timetable for 
demobilisation It stalled on full demobilisation by declaring its intention to maintain 
some forces as a presidential guard, and giving no indication as to when it would hand 
over lethal military matenal Perhaps more significantly, it stalled on the concurrent 
process o f selecting its troops for the FAA, and this delayed progress towards the 
subsequent deadline for the full transformation of the FAA While it would 
subsequently emerge that a significant number of demobilised UNTIA soldiers had been 
bogus (AP, 11 10 96)44, at this point the concern was with its failure to select troops for 
the FAA and reports By August 1996, it appeared that only 3,500 UNITA troops had 
been incorporated into the FAA (AFPI, 30 8 96) This concern was all the more pressing 
given that the m the absence of a parallel, comprehensive, socio-economic programme 
for demobilisation, some 10,000 ‘encamped’ UNITA troops had deserted UN 
demobilisation camps m July/August (AFPI, 30 8 96) Less emphasis appears to have
44 Meaning that not all were UNITA soldiers but forced recruits, often farmers
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been placed on the government’s failure to implement its commitments, a factor that 
reinforced the perception of unilateral demand However, a number of international 
commentators noted m late 1996, that the government had failed to simultaneously 
confine the anti-not police to barracks and to complete the FAA’s confinement to 
barracks (AFPI, 14 10 96)
As m the first implementation process, desertions by UNITA’s soldiers were frequently 
under the orders of former UNIT A commanders This again highlights the obstacles to 
implementation created by the failure to demobilise and reintegrate combatants in close 
sequence and in small groups The logistical problems associated with keeping soldiers 
occupied m quartering camps while the implementation process was stalling left them 
open to exploitation by the spoiler faction New arrangements did not alter the fact that 
full quartering and demilitarisation remained a precondition for the implementation of 
the internationally-supported programme to demobilise and reintegrate ex-combatants 
into society Notwithstanding the financial requirements and logistical difficulties with 
implementing an effective reintegration programme (SWO, 1996 27-8), a well-funded 
and well-timed programme may have lessoned the coercive hold that many UNITA 
army officers had over soldiers, even after demobilisation
While demobilisation stopped and started, Savimbi publicly rejected the government’s 
offer o f a newly-created position of joint vice president Modelled on the South African 
position, Savimbi refused to accept it on the grounds that the UNITA party had voted 
against i t 45 It has been suggested that Savimbi and his closest allies had considered the 
allocation of this position to another UNITA member This would have left Savimbi 
free to negotiate a transitional government, m which UNITA would have a bigger share 
of power (AFPI, 30 8 96) This proposal was quickly ruled out by the MPLA In fact, it 
is quite likely that Savimbi wanted to avoid associating himself institutionally with the 
Protocol at this point m the implementation process Such an association may have 
placed him at the mercy of the spoiler faction, over which he appeared to have 
maintained control up to this point Savimbi’s obsession with not leaving UNITA 
headquarters (despite pledges of huge security protection from the government), while 
perhaps indicative o f his lack of trust of the MPLA, also suggests that he perceived as
4S The offei had been the product of direct Savimbi-Dos Santos negotiations in 1995 and 1996
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more dangerous the rogue UNITA factions that sought a return to war than the UNITA 
members which he would agree to send to Luanda m 1997
After he rejected the Vice Presidency, Savimbi persisted with his quest to negotiate 
institutionalised power sharing for Angola He proposed the creation of a special post 
for himself as leader o f the opposition, and the revamping of the National parliament 
into a multi-party constitutional assembly (AP, 11 10 06) In late 1996, Savimbi 
appeared to seek Nelson Mandela’s endorsement of a more powerful role for UNITA m 
the structures of Angola’s government But the government was quick to refuse a role 
for South Africa (AFPI, 9 01 97), and important and increasingly vocal MPLA actors 
argued that there was no basis m the political system for post-Lusaka concessions to 
UNITA (Tvedten, 1997 63) Some of these actors were likely to have been motivated 
by their distrust o f UNITA But the MPLA faction who awaited an opportunity to return 
to war with UNITA would also have voiced these objections It would have cited the 
protocol to present reasonable and legitimate justifications to reject UNITA’s requests, 
which, if  granted, may have undermined UNITA spoiler faction’s opportunity to use 
tricks, and facilitated a pro faction strategy
Many point to Savimbi’s delaying strategy m 1996 as evidence that he personally had 
no intention whatsoever of implementing any major Lusaka commitment, or no 
intention of making peace without becoming President o f Angola However, there is 
evidence to suggest that the implementation of the power sharing on offer m Lusaka 
would have been unlikely to enable Savimbi and his inner elite circle to retain control 
over a strong and unified UNITA The power-shanng on offer was, according to 
Messiant, ‘hugely insufficient to come near to breaking the MPLA’s hold over the 
Angolan pohtical-economy’ (2001 289-91) And m late 1996, media sources suggested 
that UNITA believed that strict adherence to Lusaka would ‘destroy its military might 
and bring a slow, political death’ (AP, 11 10 96) Most of UNITA’s deserters suggest 
that UNITA began to re-arm in earnest m mid 1996, and not m 1995 (JIR, 08 98, APM 
02 99) This supports the contention that, until some time in 1996, the faction 
influencing UNITA’s leadership perceived minimum implementation, alongside efforts 
to alter sequence, timing and the interpretation of some terms, as compatible with 
letammg the leadership and maintaining the strength and unity of the organisation In
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1996 Tvedten (1997 63) identified a UNITA faction ‘that wants increased political 
transparency and faster implementation of the 1994 Accords ’
UNITA’s factions appeared to be at odds with each other over the wisdom of accepting 
the power-sharing outlined m the Protocol and subsequently agreed with the 
government The moderate or ‘pro faction’ Samakuva announced m January 1997 that 
UNITA ‘still has some problems to resolve ’ (AFPI, 9 01 97) Reflecting these 
problems, the establishment of the GNU was postponed four times m 1997 and UNITA, 
according to a government minister, did not appear willing to implement until 
Savimbi’s special status was agreed (AP, 31 1 97) Indeed, the agreement o f (and the 
parliament’s ratification of) Savimbi’s special status, along with enormous international 
pressure, including the threat of immediate sanctions on UNITA, finally resulted m the 
establishment o f the GNU m Apnl 1997 (AP, 9 04 97) Following this, UNITA’s 70 
MPs gradually took up their seats m parliament
But the spoiler faction withm UNITA could still convincingly argue that the 
unacceptable issue hierarchy associated with its unilateral demobilisation, inadequate 
power sharing which was implemented in a manner which ignored the demand for issue 
breakdown (decentralisation), and the holdover of agreement on politico-economic 
issues, justified its continued stalling on military and policing issues This helps to 
explain why, despite the establishment of GNU, UNITA continued to drag its feet on 
military provisions (Le Monde Diplomatique, 07 1999), and failed to select its allocated 
number of personnel for incorporation into the FAA or the police force (Hare, 1998 
122-3) This was despite the fact that the government had announced the completion of 
the quartering and demobilisation process m December 1996 (AP, 17 12 96) On the 
other hand, the MLPA’s spoiler faction could protest at the establishment o f the GNU 
before the letter of the agreement had been upheld On this basis, it could justifiably 
create obstacles to the fulfilment of its military commitments, and to the introduction of 
any further mechanisms for issue breakdown to the political and politico-economic 
issues Meanwhile, UNITA combatants awaiting demobilisation continued to desert 
camps (FT, 12 04 97), and m May 1997 the war m neighbounng Zaire introduced 
further instability into an already unstable process
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The imminent fall o f President Mobutu, a long-time ally o f UNITA, threatened 
UNITA’s political economy and its hold over the diamond areas in Angola. In this 
context, the MPLA, which it later appeared had directly supported Kabila’s military 
effort to overthrow Mobutu (APM, 05.97), launched attacks in the increasingly insecure 
UNITA diamond areas along the Northern border with Zaire in May and June 1996. 
These attacks, which closely followed the establishment of the GNU, exacerbated the 
insecurity that UNITA associated with Mobutu’s fall, and resulted in UNITA’s threat to 
pull out of the Lusaka process (APM, 05.97):
“We still want to go forward, but obviously if this offensive continues 
we will call a halt to it. If the army.. ..insists on taking these areas 
militarily, then there will be no more peace process for UNITA".
(Samakuva, APM, 05.97).
The process had been characterised by sporadic breaches of the ceasefire, but this 
episode was the most blatant breach yet. Most report it as a FAA offensive which the 
government justified as an effort to protect the border area from Zairean refugees (AP, 
24.06.97). But the timing of the attacks indicated that at least some faction of the 
MPLA saw it as an opportunity not only to win important diamond areas from UNITA 
against the terms of the Protocol, but to provide pretexts for UNITA’s spoiler faction to 
further establish itself as the driving force behind UNITA’s policy. If this was the 
strategy of the majority of those behind the MPLA’s breaches, it arguably had the 
desired effect.
Kasanja, a deserter from the higher ranks of UNITA, claims that it was UNITA’s 
decision to counter attack these advances on diamond areas that precipitated his 
decision to desert (AFPI, 24.06.97).46 This counter-attack threatened to derail the last 
part of the implementation process - the extension of central authority. While he 
testified that prior to the incident UNITA had been undergoing a process of re­
organisation and strengthening in the north and centre of Angola, his testimony
46 Clearly deserters have their own agendas, and seek to clear their names to avoid arrest, and some 
perhaps seek to keep both formations onside, in the case of a change in fortunes. But if Kasanja was 
motivated to lie by a fear that the MPLA would not accept that he had deserted, he would surely have 
given a far more damning account of UNITA, its goals, and the coercion that had prevented him from 
earlier desertion. This would have been quite credible, for example, when Manuvoakola escaped to 
Lusaka in 1997, he had reportedly been held by UNITA under duress for a number of months (Vines, 
1999: 19). If, on the other hand, Kasanja was motivated to protect UNITA, he was unlikely to reveal that 
the decision to attack in 1997 had been taken on central orders.
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supports the IFF model’s interpretation of the implementation process: whether or not 
Savimbi had settled on a return to civil war before May 1997, he had not done so 
openly and was likely still in the process of playing factions off against each other, and 
still ‘justifying’ actions as legitimate in the context of agreed implementation 
procedure.
The incident also serves to highlight the obstacles that were presented by the 
unresolved nature of the diamonds issue, which designers had failed to sequence with 
other issues and in particular with the linked and pending task of extending central 
administration to all of Angola. As long as the rules and procedures o f implementation 
demanded that the extension of central administration take place in the absence o f real 
decentralisation, o f the establishment of local government structures, and the 
settlement of the diamond issue, the unilateral demands that created issue hierarchy 
remained central to implementation design.47
The diamond issue is first considered. Efforts had been made to design mechanisms to 
implement a compromise on the diamond issue. The ministry o f mines was offered to 
UNITA in 1996, but the ministry was regarded to have little power if  UNIT A had to 
relinquish vital territory (SWO, 1996: 38). A memorandum of understanding reached 
in November 1996 envisaged granting UNITA the right to control or to participate in 
the exploitation o f specified diamond areas through a legal holding company (Hare, 
1998: 125). It confirmed vague commitments made in Lusaka, but did not result in a 
comprehensive agreement. It appears that the government planned to divide the 
diamond regions into concessions, which would be offered to mining companies who 
would pay tax and market diamonds through the state-owned diamond company, 
Endiama. Sources suggest that UNITA-controlled companies would have been part of 
the arrangement (SWO: 38-9). The attacks by the MPLA on UNITA’s diamond areas 
in May 1997 reportedly stalled the talks, this outcome highlighting another possible 
motivation for the attacks (Vines, 1999: 134). In October 1997, it was reported that a
47 The Protocol stipulated that it take place alongside the distribution of 150 state administrative positions 
and the incorporation of UNITA workers into administrative structures. But as the chapter argues these 
provisions for decentralisation and the allocation of political power were insufficient and did not reflect 
the broad commitment to decentralisation agreed in the Protocol.
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delicate negotiation process was working towards a settlement, whereby the handover 
of many UNITA-controlled areas would coincide with the legitimisation of its control 
over some diamond areas (APM, October 1997) The IFF model predicts that an 
agreement that promised a parallel, sequenced implementation of the diamond issue 
and the extension of central administration would have reduced the obstacles to 
implementation A package deal certainly appears to have been the aim of the 
negotiating parties until, and even in the aftermath of, June 1996 But a number of the 
other process-related obstacles continued to present obstacles to the reaching of a 
package deal political issues remained uninformed by issue breakdown and parallel 
sequencing of different aspects o f military and police issue implementation remained 
elusive
1997 AND 1998 OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION PERSIST
By 1997, the implementation process had resulted m the incorporation of a significant 
number of politically-minded UNITA officials and members o f the assembly into the 
government and the structures of the Angolan state (GNU), the incorporation of 
approximately 8,000 out o f 18,500 selected (and 26,000 agreed) UNITA combatants 
into the army (APM, April 91), and an even smaller proportion of allocated numbers 
into the police (Hare 100-01) A rapid demobilisation and reintegration programme was 
launched after the GNU was formed m April 1997, this far too late to introduce real 
issue breakdown to the implementation of military provisions and parallel sequencing of 
military and politico-economic issues It was implemented over two years after 
quartering had begun It had little success m the task of demobilising at least 100,000 
FAA and UNITA forces (APM, Vol 3 7), many of whom had left the demobilisation 
camps Thus, at least partly as a result of these shortfalls m design, UNITA was widely 
believed to have an army of at least 30,000 (Le Monde Diplomatique 07 99) in 1997 A 
vital agreement was pending over the shanng of the diamond resources on which 
UNITA had become increasingly reliant, while a nominally joint FAA (which was m 
leality controlled by the government) was to lead the process of extending central 
administration to all o f Angola To make matters even worse, at this time when armed 
UN personnel were arguably most needed, UNAVEM III was m the process of 
demobilising and the smaller MONUA observer mission was taking over
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The IFF model’s hypotheses help explain why the process of extending central power, 
which was led by the FAA whose formation process was declared to be complete, could 
do little more than stop and start throughout late 1997 and 1998 While m October 1997 
a deal on diamonds appeared close, and m early 1998 Savimbi handed over much of the 
diamond areas as part o f the process of expanding central administration (Vines, 1999 
134), UNITA had alternatives at this point The incomplete process of demobilisation 
and the resources already drawn from diamond mining meant that UNITA’s army was 
well rebuilt A series o f deadlines for UNITA’s full demobilisation were made and 
missed and UNITA’s stalling was twice met with the imposition of UN sanctions m 
October 1997 and in August 1998 (diamond trade) In October 1997, Samakuva, a 
moderate UNITA representative, warned that the sanctions were “nothing but a new 
obstacle in the peace process” (AP, 30 10 97), and indicated that they only fuelled the 
agendas o f those who wished to renew the civil war As if  marking the words of 
Samakuva, m 1998 the mtra-formation factionalism evident m UNITA’s persistent 
stalling broke under the contradictory pressures of the implementation process This 
break up was closely followed by renewed civil war
THE UNITA SPLIT
While still united, UNITA had protested vehemently against the fresh sanctions 
introduced by the UN m July 1998 and it withdrew from the Joint implementation 
Commission m protest On its united return to the commission at the end of August, it 
faced an ultimatum by the government that it implement all outstanding provisions 
concerning the extension of state authority to all regions before August 31 1998, or face 
suspension from the GNU on the grounds of non-compliance with the agreement 
(Vines, 1999 26) This, m effect, demanded that UNITA transfer its administrative 
headquarters to its Luanda base, which had opened in June 1998, and hand over all 
sensitive zones to the government, including the headquarters o f Savimbi and the 
military core of UNITA 48 It was m this context of this threat that the UNITA split 
occurred
Denouncing the rest of UNITA, the Renovation Committee of UNITA was established 
by sections o f UNITA’s ‘pro faction’ who were very associated with the negotiation and
48 The towns of Andulo, Bailondo, Mungo and Nharea JIR, August 1998 37
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implementation of Lusaka Valentim and Manuvoakola were its most significant 
leaders Its establishment appears to have been sponsored by the MPLA government 
(Vines, 1999 26-7) m a move that seems to have been designed to provoke a return to 
civil war with UNIT A, or with its more militant factions Immediately after the 
establishment o f UNIT A Renovada (R), the MPLA government announced that it 
would only negotiate with it, and other factions, which included members o f the 
National Assembly, were subjected to attacks and harassment by the government 
security forces, who referred to them as ‘criminals’ (Vines 26-7) This forced a second 
split m UNITA led by Chivukuvuku
Chivukuvuku was a high-ranking member of UNITA’s inner circle who was very 
associated with the negotiation of the Bicesse Accord With the support o f the majonty 
of UNITA’s National Assembly deputies, he declared that his faction had severed all 
contact with Savimbi in September 1998, while it did not intend to join UNITA R 
(Vines, 1999 27) Despite the bribes and threats from the government’s security forces, 
this larger bulk of UNITA was not prepared to follow Umta R, which it perceived to be 
a government-instigated party (APM Vol 5 2)
The split between Chivukuvuku’s faction and Savimbi’s faction was formalised on 
October 27 1998, when the National Assembly, with its MPLA majority, abrogated a 
law that granted a special status to Savimbi as the leader of the largest opposition party 
This decision was attributed to Savimbi’s failure to fulfil his party’s obligations under 
Lusaka (Vines, 1999 27) In December 1998, Dos Santos made the ‘total isolation of 
Savimbi’ the official policy of the MPLA government and he called for the termination 
of MONUA’s mission This hardened stance notably enabled him to strengthen his 
position at the centre of the MPLA conflict formation, this indicative of the powerful 
position that spoiler factions occupied in the conflict formation 49 Just pnor to the 
opening of the MPLA congress at which this strategy was announced, government 
forces launched a military attack on the well-prepared UNITA troops m central Angola 
The parties had finally returned to full-scale civil war, and, on January 27 1999, the 
National Assembly declared Savimbi a war criminal and an international terrorist In
w Tie simultaneously implemented a cabinet leshufflt The changes ieflect a strengthening of ihe position 
of Dos Santos and the new Secretary General -  Lourenco -who is tipped to be his successor Angolan 
Peace Monitor Vol 5 4 1998
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July the Angolan authorities issued a warrant for his arrest on charges of rebellion 
sabotage, murder and torture, of kidnapping, robbery, the use of explosives and the 
planting of landmines (Vines, 1999 29)
The renewal of civil war rewarded both spoiler factions, whose journeys to dominance 
m both organisations were facilitated by the design of the implementation process As 
one analyst subsequently noted, the government could not risk any move that would 
bring the civil war to a definitive end as this would have entailed resolving the deep 
social cnsis that existed m Angola This risked undermining the entire social logic o f  
the MPLA regime and the power hierarchies on which it rested (and rests) 
(Messiant,2001 302-3) Analysts point to the Chivukuvuku-led faction of UNIT A, 
which was publicly launched in November 1998, as a thorn m the government’s side 
(Messiant, 2001 303, APM, Vol 5 3) By presenting themselves as a ‘clean hands’ 
opposition (APM, Vol 5 3), perhaps more appealing to the masses, it serves as an 
example of an alternative to the persistent civil war It is a faction of UNITA that is 
willing to be critical of yet willing to negotiate with the MPLA The civil war ensures 
that the MPLA retains its coercive hold on Angolan society, and the current MPLA 
leadership its hold of the MPLA But with its rejection of the Savimbi-led faction of 
UNITA, the Chivukuvuku-led group has perhaps reduced the strength of MPLA spoiler 
factions, who continue to seek total defeat of UNITA on the battlefield For example, m 
September 1998 it forced the government to swiftly lift its unilateral suspension from 
the GNU The president did so but at the same time highlighted the weakness o f the 
Lusaka Protocol’s power-sharing provisions by dismissing one UNITA minister and 
one vice minister Fifty-three UNITA deputies signed a declaration that sought 
clarification of the dismissals
Heavy civil war ensued from December 1998 until Savimbi’s death at the hands of 
government forces m February 2002 This incident has offered Angola an exit from the 
circle of power relations that has sustained civil war and its first real chance for peace 
since 1991 With UNITA severely weakened by over three years of fighting, and its 
soldiers emerging weak and starving, the current de-escalation process is more definable 
as one that follows a military victory than as a post-settlement implementation process 
But arguably some of the lessons from 1992 and 1994 apply without a broken-down 
and phased implementation process where reintegration programmes accompany
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quartering and demobilisation, and de-centralised socio-economic programmes m the 
territones that were formally held by UNITA accompany demobilisation, and an 
eventual opening up of the political economy to allow for political and economic 
competition, Angola will remain a society ‘at peace but at war,’ and UNITA factions 
will re-group and return to insurgency and warlordism
CONCLUSION
The IFF model’s hypotheses on implementation design predict that where issue 
hierarchy is entrenched m the rules and procedures for implementation, the obstacles to 
the implementation of peace settlements are insurmountable Where issue hierarchy is 
entrenched, the prospects o f introducing real issue breakdown and parallel sequencing 
are minimal, even given the presence of insulated institutions for implementation The 
Lusaka Protocol, like the Bicesse Accord before it and despite some progress m 
implementation, was arguably doomed to failure from the start by its implementation 
design
The strength of the UNITA pro faction and its ability to ensure the unity o f the conflict 
formation largely depended on its convincing the highly sceptical Savimbi that his 
personal interests -  power and continued unity o f his formation - would be served by 
implementing the Lusaka Protocol But the process through which the terms of Lusaka 
were to be implemented, m particular the barriers to the true introduction of issue 
breakdown to all aspects o f the agreement and to the replacement of unilateral demands 
and issue hierarchy with reciprocity and parallel sequencing of implementation issues, 
severely undermined the capacity of UNITA’s pro faction to pursue the strategy 
necessary to deliver implementation The procedures for the implementation of power 
sharing actually placed the degree of political power available for MPLA pro factions to 
offer to UNITA at the discretion of the MPLA formation, thereby limiting the amount 
of issue breakdown that could be introduced to facilitate implementation Reinforcing 
these obstacles was the failure to sequence the implementation of political 
decentralisation with power sharing and the military issues This made the 
implementation of military issues by UNITA extremely unlikely The absence of 
institutionalised power sharing, itself rooted in the accepted legitimacy of the zeio-sum 
elections of the Bicesse Accords, along with the issue hierarchy that required the full 
implementation of military before political provisions, contributed to the obstacles to
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the implementation of the military provisions o f the Accords That the monumental 
task of extending central government control was eventually undertaken m the absence 
o f both agreement over the highly controversial diamond issue and the decentralisation 
of political power made it impossible for a pro faction UNITA to convince its sceptical 
faction of the benefits o f Lusaka, or that a realistic opportunity for Savimbi to win a 
further presidential election existed
Despite the efforts o f the LIN to use the insulated implementation mechanisms to alter 
the rules of sequence and timing during Lusaka, unilateral demands, issue hierarchy and 
the resistance o f some issues to issue breakdown gave legitimacy to the MPLA’s spoiler 
faction It refused to accept adjustments that would have helped UNITA’s pro faction 
Therefore, the MPLA’s pro faction was consistently under pressure from its spoiler 
faction, who cited legitimate rules and procedures of process inherent in the Bicesse and 
Lusaka agreements to support a position that conceded very little to UNITA’s pro 
faction The MPLA’s spoiler faction played on the fears and insecurities of its sceptical 
faction that a real role for UNITA would involve a reduction m the government’s power 
and m the patronage and resources available to it It would therefore present a threat to 
its own position in this hierarchical system Furthermore, after the 1992-4 period, the 
general command of the armed forces had collectively become a relatively autonomous 
power player in the government conflict formation (Messiant 2001 303) Continued 
conflict with UNITA allowed its influence, or the influence of powerful elements within 
it, over government policy and the political economy to continue
In 1999, Kofi Annan criticised the MPLA government for ‘a lack of mutual tolerance 
and an unwillingness to engage m mutual accommodation ’(Le Monde Diplomatique 
07 99) But Bicesse and Lusaka had given legitimacy to and opportunity for the 
MPLA’s spoiler faction to use the process to justify this unwillingness, and to secure the 
retention of politico-economic resources for the MPLA, returning the country to civil 
war if necessary m the process of doing so It is difficult to envisage any political 
settlement that could have maintained a pro-implementation equilibrium which did not 
include a commitment to implement a step-by-step de-centralisation of the political 
system alongside institutionalised power sharing at least at the local level, parallel steps 
to reform the police system, to reciprocal demobilisation of armed formations m small 
stages, to simultaneous reintegration of former combatants, and to the formation of a
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neutral joint army The extension of state authority, which is arguably the final step of 
both political and secunty issues, required simultaneous agreement on the cntical issue 
of access to diamonds
Central to the political system that Bicesse and Lusaka upheld was the possibility for 
only one organisation to hold power There was not enough power to spread around 
significant sections o f both conflict formations to ensure peace unless implementation 
design had provided for small and parallel steps, which could serve to break down the 
power structures at the heart o f the system The ‘profound lack of institutional capacity’ 
(Knudsen et al, 2000 11) resulting from over twenty years of civil war added structural 
bamers to the prospects of developing a step-by-step, phased implementation process
Furthermore, the relegation to the sub-text o f a commitment to human rights standards, 
which included no implementation mechanisms (Vines, 99 2), arguably strengthened 
the hands of those who perceived the persistence of coercive power hierarchies and 
systems of control to be m their political interest Further structural obstacles are found 
m the coercive networks that dominate the political economy m Angola It is argued 
however, that given the availability of implementation-supporting resources and the 
right sequence and timing, these obstacles are surmountable and the equilibrium that 
existed at endorsement maintainable
Those who perceive the MPLA and UNITA to be unified formations, and attnbute 
failure to their intransigence, might argue that neither party would have endorsed an 
agreement that included the conditions hypothesised by the IFF to guarantee success 
Indeed, even those who do recognise that factions might exist withm the organisations 
aigue that spoiler factions would have blocked such an agreement and that the need to 
include the features that guarantee a successful implementation process would thus have 
precluded a settlement But these arguments fail to take into account the reality that 
1990-91 provided the best window of opportunity for the negotiation of a successful 
peace agreement in Angola Pro factions had more room to manoeuvre m both 
formations in this pre-agreement stage, this m part due to the pressure on parties to 
reach a settlement from the international community and from former sponsors o f the 
civil wax and m part due to the structural difference between inter-party bargaining in 
the pre and post-settlement phase Indeed, that Dos Santos emphatically ruled out a
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multi-party system in 1989 twelve months before he unilaterally changed the 
constitution to provide for one (Wesley, 1997 102) helps to illustrate the power that 
international pressure can play m creating space for a settlement
The Angolan case reveals that negotiations that prioritise the reaching of an agreement 
over the reaching of an agreement that includes provisions to facilitate its 
implementation, not only put at risk the prospect of a successful outcome to 
implementation, but risk creating structural conditions beyond the relevant Accord and 
its implementation, which can close the window of opportunity for settlement, obstruct 
further negotiations and result m a long-term reversion to civil war Recognising the 
potential for the design outlined in settlements to present hostile obstacles in the 
implementation penod, Margaret Anstee (1996 535-6) implicitly warns against the 
temptation to prioritise agreement when she says
‘In any negotiations, the desire and need for compromise plays a large 
role, not seldom inimical to effective implementation later ’
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CHAPTER SIX
NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE
GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT
This chapter will use the IFF model’s hypotheses to explain why stalling has 
overwhelmingly characterised the process of implementing the Good Friday Agreement 
and has on a number of occasions placed m danger the institutions central to the 
management o f the conflict Sequence and timing of implementation was not clearly 
outlined m the agreement This has provided opportunities for the spoiler factions 
within both unionism and nationalism to repeatedly use the agreement to make 
unilateral demands These unilateral demands create the issue hierarchy that has fuelled 
continual stalling However, institutions that are relatively insulated were given the 
power to oversee the implementation process, this partly a consequence of the
constitutional position of Northern Ireland and the important role played by the British
\
and Irish governments in the pre-agreement negotiation process This facilitated the 
gradual introduction of issue breakdown and parallel sequencing to the procedures 
determining the sequencing and timing of implementation This eventually helped to 
undermine the issue hierarchy demand at the heart o f the spoiler factions’ strategies and 
enabled pro factions to move forward on implementation m late 2001 and early 2002 
The efforts to introduce parallel sequencing and issue breakdown were helped by the 
absence of clear, unequivocal, issue hierarchy m the actual terms of the agreement The 
chapter concludes that unless issue breakdown and parallel sequencing continue to 
inform sequence and timing, the relatively successful outcome to implementation is in 
real danger of reversal
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
At its most basic level, the Northern Irish conflict is about the unionist preference to 
maintain the union o f Northern Ireland with Britain, and the nationalist preference for 
an end to partition and for a united Ireland But these majority unionist and minority 
nationalist communities lived together m relative peace for almost fifty years (1920- 
1968), despite the disputed partition of the island and the Irish government’s 
constitutional claim to Northern Ireland In fact, Irish Republican Army (IRA) activists 
point out that there was little support dunng the 1940s and 1950s fiom the nationalist, 
primarily Catholic community, for their ongoing efforts to use armed struggle to unite 
the island (Taylor, 1998 21-2) The roots of escalation instead he m the extent to which
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the entity and its institutions, the parliament, electoral system, administration, local 
government, security forces, legal system and the economy in general were subject to 
the hegemonic control o f the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), which formed the 
government for almost fifty years.1 While there is some disagreement amongst analysts 
as to the extent of discrimination resulting from this concentration of power, few deny 
that it existed and many perceive a persistent, ‘irrefutable pattern of deliberate 
discrimination’ (Darby and McGinty, 2000: 78). Thus Catholic or nationalist grievances 
tended to concern discrimination in public housing, gerrymandering of electoral 
districts, a heavy-handed security force (the B Specials), and a Special Powers Act, 
while protestant or unionists’ concerns focused on a growing and increasingly organised 
minority population, and the threat that this posed to their power (White, 1990: 195).
Two external events exposed the system as untenable (O’Leary and McGarry, 1993: 
155-9). The first, the improving relationship between the Irish and British governments 
appeared to reduce the immediate threat to the union from the Republic of Ireland. This 
weakened the Unionist party’s justification for such a high concentration of unionist 
power. The second, the introduction of the welfare state to Northern Ireland created a 
new and educated, nationalist middle class, from which emerged the civil rights 
movement of the 1960s. While aspiring to a united Ireland, the civil rights movement 
rejected the hither to accepted nationalist policy of abstaining from political institutions. 
Instead it advocated active engagement with the system in order to achieve the reforms 
vital for the reduction of discrimination. Under pressure from the civil rights movement 
to reform, the conservative UUP split into those who perceived reforms as necessary if  
the union and the political system were to survive, and those who resisted them at all 
costs, claiming that the civil rights movement was a cover for the IRA and its 
republican (united Ireland) agenda. While some sections of unionism and loyalism 
feared reforms, others used this fear to mobilise support. The political forces resistant to 
reform later converged around the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and militant forces 
immediately converged around the re-strengthened and re-emerging loyalist 
paramilitary groups.
1 For detailed accounts see O’Leary and McGarry, 1993: 110-141; White, 1990: 164-69.
2 From which the SDLP (Social Democratic Labour Party) emerged in 1970.
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Loyalist paramilitaries, m collusion with the B-Specials and elements of the regular 
security forces (RUC), reacted violently to the civil rights marches This response 
confirmed for many nationalists the discrimination that they had long contended lay at 
the heart of the system For other nationalists, it justified the vigilante groups that 
emerged in response to the violence Amidst the widespread inter-community violence 
that followed, and the clear evidence of security force collusion with heavy handed 
targeting of Catholic communities, the republican movement (Sinn Fein and the ERA)3 
saw an opportunity for the remvigoration of the IRA (Taylor, 1998 39) The movement 
infiltrated and took control of the vigilante groups
The escalating mter-commumty violence of the late 1960s and the inability o f those in 
the UUP who wanted to introduce reforms and to control the security forces to do so 
gave way to a wave of violence across Northern Ireland in the summer of 1969, which 
prompted the Northern Irish Prime Minister to request the dispatching of British troops 
(O’Leary and McGarry 173) By the time reforms were forced on the UUP by the 
British government m the early 1970s, what may have satisfied many nationalists in 
1965-8 was no longer enough Coupled with the introduction of coercive security 
measures by a struggling, deeply divided UUP government, the attempt to reform 
played into the hands of the more radical elements in both communities Violence 
involving nationalist paramilitaries (primarily IRA), loyalist paramilitaries (UVF, 
UDA), the Northern Irish security forces and the British army spiralled from 1969 and 
the Westminster government responded by closing down the Northern Ireland 
parliament and introducing direct rule m 1972 This afforded Northern Ireland a degree 
of stability rarely available to entities on the verge of civil war, but it did not ameliorate 
the security situation, instead freezing it and prompting a vicious, low-level civil 
conflict that has ensued for almost three decades
The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) was the direct product o f multi-party negotiations, 
which took place m 1997-1998, but were built on many years of bi-party and tn-party 
talks, paramilitary ceasefires (1994) and Bntish-Irish negotiations The late 1980s saw
3 Sinn Fein is the political wing of the republican movement and during the 1980s it is judged to have 
incrementally become more influential in the overall republican mov ement
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the incremental emergence of a Bntish-Irish axis,4 through which the Downing Street 
Declaration (1993) and the Framework Document (1995) which together provided the 
vision on which the GFA would be negotiated were agreed The later negotiations were 
unprecedented m that they brought together for the first time the elite and sub-elite of all 
Northern Irish political parties,5 including those linked to paramilitary groups (Sinn 
Fem, PUP, UDP) The Agreement was signed in April 1998
THE AGREEMENT
The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) set out to re-defme three sets of relations central to 
the thirty-year conflict relations between the Northern Irish parties (GFA, Strand 1), 
North-South relations (GFA, Strand 2) and East-West or Bntish-Irish relations (GFA, 
Strand 3) Fundamental to the Agreement is a compromise on the constitutional status 
of Northern Ireland which is guided by the ‘principle of consent ’ This confirmed 
Northern Ireland’s position m the UK unless the majority o f its population decide 
otherwise m a constitutionally-provided-for-referendum and it guarantees this change if 
so voted for Alongside this, the agreement provided constitutional guarantees for dual 
nationality, for agreed, power-sharing institutions6 m Northern Ireland now and in the 
future, and for over-archmg and interdependent Bntish-Insh and North-South 
institutions (GFA, 2 1) Critical to the viability o f the GFA was agreement on other 
issues that were central to the conflict These issues concerned the management o f civil 
rights, safeguards and equality of opportunity, the decommissioning of paramilitary 
weapons and effective demobilisation of paramilitary organisations, secunty and 
demilitarisation, policing and justice, and prisoner issues, which are together frequently 
referred to as ‘confidence-buildmg measures ’
The agreement provided for the replacement of direct rule from Westminster with an 
elected (PR STV), power-sharing Assembly, with potentially extensive devolved, 
executive powers (O’Leary 1998 4) A First and Deputy First (DF) Minister would be 
elected from the Assembly to serve as joint, interdependent ‘presidents’ of the
4 The Anglo Irish Agreement (1985) gave the Irish government an institutional, consultative role in the 
governing of Northern Ireland It was fiercely resisted by all shades of unionism except for the Alliance 
Party
'  Although the DUP and UK Unionist Party walked out of talks in 1997
6 Including proportionality across the civil and public service
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Executive Difficult to remove during the lifetime of an Assembly, the agreement 
almost ensures that a unionist and a nationalist will share these top two posts (O’Leary 
1998 3) Ministers would be allocated7 to the executive of between six and ten 
members on the basis of their strength in the Assembly (GFA Ch 3) All key executive 
decisions m the governing of Northern Ireland would be subject to rules, checks and 
balances that uphold the principle of power sharing at the heart of the agreed 
consociation 8
The parties agreed to establish a North-South Ministerial Council through which 
ministers from the Irish government and Assembly Executive would meet to cooperate, 
consult and develop policy on areas o f mutual interest (GFA, 4 1) Crucially for 
nationalists, the Council would have institutional, executive powers Crucially for 
unionists, the Council would not have full executive powers m that it cannot make 
decisions without the approval of the power-sharing Assembly (and the Irish 
parliament) The Council would be a fundamental part o f the institutional set up m that 
neither the Assembly nor the Council can function alone (GFA, 4 1-6) The parties also 
agreed to establish a consultative and consensus-buildmg Bntish-Irish Council for 
representatives o f the devolved governments of the UK, the British government and the 
Irish government Of critical importance to umomst negotiators was the agreement to 
replace the despised Bntish-Irish architecture, which had in 1985 (Anglo-Irish 
Agreement) given the Irish government an institutional, consultative role in 
policymaking for Northern Ireland, with a new Standing British-Irish Intergovernmental 
Conference (GFA, Ch 5 1-9) This was more acceptable to unionists because it would 
exist alongside power shanng and as the governments would not have the power to 
override the democratic arrangements established by the GFA (GFA Ch 5 9) 9
Having outlined the key features of the agreement, the incentives for the development of 
spoiler, sceptical and pro factions in both conflict formations are next considered
7 The d’Hondt procedure
s Key decisions must be agreed by a parallel majority procedure or by a weighted majority procedure that 
l equires 40% of nationalist and unionist Assembly members and 60% of the Assembly Key decisions 
include budget, election of chair, of first and deputy first ministers, standing orders
9 If agieement could not be reached on the establishment of the institutions the conference would 
contribute to a review of the agreement The British government introduced a new power to ‘suspend’ the 
institutions in early 2000 on the basis that it came fiom the doctrine of paihamentary sovereignty Given 
the unilateral power that it bestows on the British government, it has been argued that this bleaches the 
agreement and the rules and procedures it established for implementation See O’Leary B, 2001 6 6
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FACTIONALISM
The membership of factions is fluid and therefore it is subject to changes under the 
pressures of the implementation process. For this reason the IFF model suggests that 
those designing the process of implementation should not be obsessed with identifying 
particular individuals as either pro or anti-implementation. But for the purposes o f this 
analysis, it is helpful to point to some individuals as most likely fitting into the pro, 
sceptical or spoiler factions of unionism or nationalism in Northern Ireland.
The endorsement o f the GFA by the SDLP and Sinn Fein, the two main nationalist 
parties, and by 94 per cent of the Catholic population in a referendum, suggests that the 
nationalist formation comprises a more than sizeable pro faction. But this does not mean 
that sceptical or spoiler factions were, or are, absent. Given that the agreement gave 
nationalists an unprecedented say in the governing of Northern Ireland, without 
precluding the future pursuit of a united Ireland, their support for it can be seen as a 
‘good each way bet’ (O’Leary: 1998, 15). There was arguably little scope at the outset 
for members o f nationalism who were fundamentally opposed to implementation 
(spoiler faction) to couch their rejection to the agreement in acceptable, sceptical terms, 
when regardless of its merits it improved the status quo.
Some members o f the pro faction within nationalism can be identified. The SDLP had 
since its inception prioritised the attainment of genuine power sharing and of reforms 
that would guarantee parity of esteem for the nationalist community. On this basis it is 
accurate to assume that the elite and sub-elite sections of the SDLP by and large 
belonged to the pro faction.10 The picture was more complex within Republicanism 
which comprises Sinn Fein , the IRA and other armed republican groups1 Since the 
mid-1980s, the combined leadership of the Republican movement appears to have been 
slowly preparing republicans for a settlement that would be short of a united Ireland 
(McAuley, 1997: 39-40). The incremental pace of this change in strategy was designed 
to preserve the unity of the movement (Tonge, Gilligan, 1997: 10-12) which was 
threatened by a more militant wing that wished to continue the armed struggle. A breach 
of the 1994 IRA ceasefire in February 1996 is frequently interpreted as the outcome of a
10 For SDLP’s peace process policy see McGovern Mark, in Gilligan and Tonge, 1997.
11 David McKittrick suggests in this article that the credibility of Gerry Adam’s leadership of the 
republican movement would have been lost if it had chosen in mid-1996 to re-enter negotiations that 
subsequently turned out to be a ‘charade.’
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temporary shift in power towards the more militant wing (Independent 14 05 96) 12 On 
Sinn Fein’s return to negotiations m September 1997, an openly anti-agreement 
republican faction formally split from it (Dixon, 2001 268) Publicly defending 
themselves on primarily ideological, nationalistic grounds, anti-agreement republican 
groups argued that the agreement was ‘partitionist’ and contrary to the goal of a united
i -j
Ireland They comprise the ‘32-County Sovereignty Group’ and two separate armed 
groups associated with its viewpoint (Hennessy, 2000 197) the Real IRA (rIRA) which 
split from the IRA m 1997,14 and the Continuity IRA15 which split from the IRA in 
1986 The INLA (Irish National Liberation Army) served as another dissident, militant 
group, although it did subsequently sign up to the GFA
The breakaway groups are small, but they provide a potential alternative for 
disillusioned elite, sub-elite and grass-root elements16 And it certainly appears that 
there are disillusioned sceptical and, perhaps, spoiler factions withm mainstream 
republicanism who have taken a ‘wait-and-see’ approach 17 Demonstrating the different 
attitudes withm the movement towards the GFA is a poll commissioned by the Sunday 
Tribune m April 1998 at a Sinn Fein Special Conference attended by 138 delegates, 44 
per cent were in favour, 28 per cent against and 28 per cent were ‘don’t knows’ (Dixon, 
2001 271) In fact, it was only after much internal debate during which the pro faction 
tried to persuade the sceptical faction of the merits of the agreement that Sinn Fem 
finally endorsed the Agreement (Darby and McGinty, 2000 8 0 )18
Aside from objecting to its failure to deliver a United Ireland, republicans who were 
against the agreement pointed to process-related issues For example, the adequacy of 
the commissions on equality, human rights and policing were questioned on the basis
12 David McKittrick suggests in this article that the credibility of Gerry Adam’s leadership of the 
lepublican movement would have been lost if it had chosen m mid-1996 to re-enter negotiations that 
subsequently turned out to be a ‘charade ’
13 Radio Free Eireann, January 3 1998 interview with Bernadette Sands
14 See Taylor, 1998 3 5 5 -6 2  about the multiple motivations that drive these republican factions 
Linked to Republican Sinn Fein, which still regards the Irish state as illegal and disagrees with Sinn
Fem taking positions in its institutions CIRA and rIRA are believed to co-operate on the ground
16 See Independent, 4 6  00 for an overview of the rIRA
17 According to Taylor (1998, 355-8), the former IRA Quarter Master Geneial, who led the split was 
outmanoeuvred by the rest of the leadership which managed to secure nine out of the twelve votes on the 
Provisional Army Executive (IRA governing body) m favour of its cease-fire and talks strategy, mstead 
of the seven to five vote it had originally feared
15 This conclusion was drawn aftei the authors interviewed a senior member of Sinn Fem on 27 Apnl
1998
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that they would be appointed by the British government 1 e could not act impartially 
(Dixon, 2001 271) It is likely that a significant proportion of those raising these 
concerns were sceptical factions, distrustful o f the British government and fearful of the 
consequences of implementation for their faction and their community However, 
spoiler factions tend to focus on the process-related difficulties with implementing the 
agreement They do so with a view to couching m reasonable terms what are their more 
fundamental objections to the agreement and the break-away factions also raised these 
concerns It is accurate to assume that a proportion of these internal objectors belonged 
to a spoiler faction withm mainstream republicanism Indeed as O’Leary points out in 
his analysis o f the agreement, some hardliners withm republicanism may have 
calculated m April 1998 that they should ‘insist on the full letter o f the agreement’ 
during implementation in the knowledge that ‘non implementation might provide them 
with the pretext of a return to civil conflict’ (O’Leary, 1998 17)
Some analysts, such as Schulze and MLR Smith, dismiss the extent to which the 
struggle between the pro faction and the intransigent spoiler faction explains the stalling 
which later characterised the strategy of the republican movement They instead argue 
that stalling is an age-old brinkmanship tactic (Jane’s Intelligence Review (JIR), 09 99 
19) But it is impossible, and perhaps futile, to try to prove that dissident republicans 
who present themselves as anti-agreement are simply part o f an elaborate Republican 
strategy to use the threat of renewed violence as a means to squeeze more concessions, 
rather than illustrative of genuine divisions and power struggles withm the movement 
In fact, most evidence would appear to be to the contrary Moreover, even if it were the 
case, and thus the entire republican movement were ‘spoilers’ who aimed not to 
implement the agreement but to tnck unionists into implementing it, it is an essential 
contention o f the IFF theory that such a strategy will work for spoilers unless the spoiler 
faction is prevented from adopting this strategy by the design of the implementation 
process In fact, it is likely that both of these motivations -  those associated with 
sceptical and spoiler factions - exist withm republicanism However, many neutral 
observers believe that most of the current Smn Fem leadership, and m particular Gerry 
Adams and Martin McGumness, have calculated that implementation of the agreement 
is m their interest
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A majority of unionists endorsed the GFA (Hennessy, 2000: 195). But it was a bare 
majority and the size of the anti-agreement unionist block following the June Assembly 
elections has allowed it to ‘constantly challenge whether the Agreement and its 
implementation has the support of a majority of Unionists’ (O’Leary and Evans, 2000). 
Thirty of the fifty-eight Unionist MLAs were members of parties that had endorsed the 
agreement: UUP (28) and Progressive Unionist Party (2). Twenty-eight o f the elected 
MLAs were anti-agreement, despite having contested elections to an institution created 
by it: dissident UUP (3), DUP (20), UKUP (United Kingdom Unionist Party) (5). While 
another party - the Alliance Party - chose to define itself as neither ‘nationalist’ nor 
‘unionist’ but ‘other’, it is traditionally associated with unionism and its 6 seats can be 
added to the 30 pro-agreement representatives of unionism.
Most members of the loyalist political parties -  the PUP and the UDP19- and the 
paramilitary organisations to which they are respectively linked -the UVF and UDA - 
can be identified as initially part of the pro faction of unionism. Both were prepared to 
back a power-sharing solution in return for important gains. In its pre-negotiation 
document (Six Principles) the PUP and its leader, David Ervine, had prioritised the 
attainment of a genuine power-sharing government within the context o f a re­
strengthened union. The UDP had similarly outlined its support for power sharing as 
part of an overall settlement in its pre-negotiations document entitled ‘Common 
Sense’(McAuley, 1997: 39-40). The early prisoner-release programmes, and the 
opportunity for loyalists, both leaders and grass-root supporters, to re-build their lives in 
a Northern Ireland which would be free from IRA violence, were considered to be 
important gains for pro faction loyalists in the paramilitary organisations. Equally 
important was the security of the loyalist identity and security of the union between 
Northern Ireland and Britain that the agreement seemed to offer. But the factionalism 
within the parties and the fluidity o f dividing lines between the pro, sceptical and spoiler 
faction groups within loyalism are most clearly evidenced by the disunity and the 
eventual dissolution of the smaller UDP in 2001 and the mounting violence by dissident 
loyalist paramilitary elements to which it is connected, mostly in the UDA (Ulster
,0 Progressive Unionist Party: Political party linked to the UVF loyalist paramilitary group. Ulster 
Democratic Party: Political party linked to other loyalist paramilitary group, the UDA.
191
Defence Association) Despite formally approving the GFA in 1998, the very divided 
UDA formally revoked this approval m 2001
Constitutional unionism has been similarly fragmented Since the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement m 1985, most moderate unionists from the largest party (UUP) had accepted 
power sharing as the only way m which it might regain some of the power it had lost 
through the imposition of direct rule Power sharing was also seen as a bargaining chip 
with which to secure the union (Darby and McGinty, 2000 99) It was on this basis that 
Ken Magmms (UUP Westminster MP) expressed support for the agreement he argued 
that it fulfilled the goal of unionism by guaranteeing a united Northern Ireland within a 
pluralist United Kingdom (Magmms, Cox et al, 2000 67) According to the UUP 
leader, David Tnmble, the GFA had achieved the unionist goal of ‘placing Northern 
Ireland’s future withm a wider British-Irish context than the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 
1985 ’ The agreement was, he argued a ‘partitionist resolution based on the principle of 
consent’ (Cox et al 67) In fact, David Tnmble, along with the rest o f his pro faction 
amongst the elite and sub-elite o f the UUP, have more or less staked their political 
future on the implementation of the GFA The failure to implement the GFA would 
likely expose Trimble’s pro-agreement strategy and his willingness to work with 
republicans as a failed initiative This would serve to increase both the threat to his 
leadership from sceptical and spoiler factions within his own party and the threat from 
the rival DUP to the UUP’s brand of unionism The latter threat would itself reinforce 
the former threat
However, despite some dissent, a sizeable UUP pro-faction existed that was willing to 
support the leadership’s strategy at the outset 53 out of 79 UUP Executive Officers and 
540 as against 210 m the UUP ruling council (UUC Ulster Unionist Council) voted m 
favour of the settlement (Dixon, 2001 272) This show of support was despite the fact 
that six out o f the UUP’s 10 Westminster MPs had declared themselves to be against the 
agreement, a stance that was quickly adopted by the Orange Order21 (Dixon, 2001 271) 
However, the UUP’s constitution makes the executive council highly accountable to the 
ruling body (UUC) This body is itself constituted by a pre-allocated bloc voting
20
20 Sometimes then cover name is used Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF)
21 A large, mass based unionist club with lodges all over Ulster dating since 1795 and named m honour of 
King William of Orange
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system which is no longer considered to be representative of the party, but over­
representative of its most intransigent elements, such as the Orange Order and the 
Young Ulster Unionists 22 Despite this or, perhaps, because of this, Trimble has 
consistently sought the approval of the UUC for his strategy The different outcomes to 
the votes taken by the UUC over the implementation penod highlight the existence of 
sizeable sceptical and spoiler factions in the party They also illustrate the fluidity with 
which some members move from pro to sceptical and from sceptical to spoiler faction
It can be concluded that a sizeable minority o f the UUP elite is not only sceptical o f the 
GFA, but could be classed as ‘spoiler’ factions, who by definition bide their time before 
openly challenging the process Anti-agreement unionists argue that the agreement 
promotes ‘a Northern Ireland m transition to a united Ireland and’ those m favour of the 
agreement are accused of collaborating with British disengagement (Cox et al 70) The 
Republican movement’s support for the agreement is portrayed as a tactical strategy to 
advance the course to a united Ireland (Cox et al 71) Process-related objections, such 
as the objection to having ‘terrorists’ m government and prisoners released before 
decommissioning has taken place, are constant themes (Dixon 271)
The difficulty m distinguishing the sceptic from the spoiler lies in the fact that both are 
motivated to highlight process-related issues as concerns The deputy leader of the 
UUP, John Taylor, articulated a sceptical position when he argued that his insistence on 
the completion of decommissioning by the IRA before the establishment of power- 
sharing institutions was ‘not based on a desire to exclude any grouping,’ but was an 
attempt to decrease insecurity amongst unionists about the real intentions o f the IRA 
(John Taylor, Hennessy 198) But a spoiler faction making the same decommissioning 
demand was demanding what it believed the IRA would not, or could not, deliver This 
faction hopes to expose the unionist pro faction’s strategy as a failed one and to create 
for itself the opportunity to take over unionism Distinguishing between the sceptical 
and the spoiler factions can be extremely complex and, m many cases, impossible 
However, for a number of reasons outlined below, the UKTJP and the majority of the 
DUP party can by and large be assumed to belong to the spoiler faction within 
unionism
22 Irish Tunes, 9 03 02
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The DUP’s MLAs tend to be far more willing to share power with the parties linked to 
the loyalist paramilitaries than with Smn Fein, despite the fact that they publicly defend 
their opposition to power sharing with Smn Fein as resulting from their unwillingness to 
share power with ‘terrorists’ This suggests that many hold a fundamentally anti- 
power-sharing position, rather than an aversion to being m government with groups that 
remain linked to armed, paramilitary organisations In fact, two aspects of the DUP’s 
strategy suggest that a significant proportion fall into the spoiler faction Firstly, this 
desire to couch m legitimate terms what appears to be a fundamental objection to power 
sharing with nationalists, or at least with republicans (Independent 01 06 00), secondly, 
a practical tendency within the DUP which makes it willing to accept the institutions of 
the agreement, and perhaps to even accept the agreement in order to guarantee its 
position within umomsm, i e ensuring inclusion while awaiting a justified pretext on 
which to unravel the GFA The significant percentage of DUP grass-roots who declared 
that they voted for the agreement m the referendum would fall into this category, while 
a proportion would fall into the sceptical faction and do appear to like certain aspects of 
the agreement
Intra-formation competition not just involving the DUP and the UUP, but also the DUP 
and the smaller paramilitary-linked parties,24 has clearly driven the DUP’s strategy and 
has, m fact, ensured that the DUP partakes in aspects of the process that it has been 
unable to obstruct A number of activists appear to be warming to aspects of the 
agreement (Independent 28 05 00) and the general argument o f the rest of this chapter 
points to process design as largely responsible for this behaviour
RULES, PROCEDURES AND INSTITUTIONS
Power and responsibility for implementing the GFA was quite clearly allocated to a 
series o f what can be described as insulated mechanisms The Bntish-Insh Conference, 
and the British government’s retention of the nght to legislate for Northern Ireland m 
areas that have not been devolved,25 gave the two governments the power to review and 
to settle implementation disputes (including a subsequently introduced power to
23 Ulster Marketing Survey, 1998
24 While the threat from the UDP decreased, during the negotiation years a number of DUP councillors 
defected to the UDP The UDP and the PUP see Paisley as favouring a sectanan brand of unionism 
Gilligan and Tonge 13, 40
Clause 43 of British Government’s Northern Ireland Act, 1998
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suspend the institutions) But the British government had ‘no power to override the 
democratic arrangements set up under the agreement’ (GFA, 5 18)26 Evidently 
anticipating process-related barriers, m particulai the probability that actors would 
present different interpretations of their obligations under the agreement, the architects 
of the process provided dispute-resolution rules and procedures that give the joint- 
government driving force considerable agenda-setting and chairing power, while at the 
same time it included provision for a formal, independent, review process (GFA, 11) 
The latter provision deprived spoiler factions of one justifiable pretext on which to base 
a refusal to accept or to recognise the outcome of a review - on the process-related basis 
that it is ‘partial’ Therefore, aspects of the agreement could be reviewed at British 
government or joint government-chaired meetings of parties to which the issue m 
question was relevant Alternatively representatives of the two governments and all 
relevant parties could meet under independent chairmanship to review implementation 
of the agreement as a whole (GFA,Ch 1 1 4 )
Outside o f the power vested m the two governments to oversee implementation, a 
number of independent commissions were created to oversee the implementation of 
individual issues Together with the governments, they have ensured that relatively 
insulated mechanisms have responsibility for driving, overseeing and designing the 
implementation process The Commissions are most appropriately dealt with m the 
sequence and timing section below
SEQUENCING, TIMING AND MECHANISMS
Following the endorsement o f the GFA by conflict actors a six-month transitional 
period was to begin and would end with the full implementation of constitutional 
changes It was envisaged that the implementation of other provisions would 
commence, but would not necessarily be completed, during this period But 
endorsement of the agreement required not only that the majority of political parties 
declare their support for it Approval was sought from the people of Northern Ireland in 
a referendum (May 1998)27 and the implementation process could not begin in practice
26 Westminster’s assumption m 2000 of the power to suspend the institutions can be mterpieted as a 
breach of tins commitment (see footnote 9) Suspension is discussed in more detail below
27 The agreement included a commitment by the Irish government to amend articles 2 and 3 of the Irish 
Constitution and this commitment was also subject to a referendum, which took place on the same day as 
the refeiendum on the agreement in Northern Ireland
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until this approved had been won The referendum was to be followed on 25 June by 
elections to the newly-approved Assembly But did the referendum requirement, by 
demanding that one issue -  the referendum -  be complete before the implementation of 
other issues commenced, place issue hierarchy at the heart of the implementation 
process9
The form of issue hierarchy that could be m question is the deliberate sequencing of the 
implementation of an entire issue, like for example demobilisation, disarmament, 
constitutional changes, new institutions or policing reform, before the implementation 
of another has commenced But on examination, the requirement to hold a referendum 
on the agreement before the commencement of the implementation process did not 
introduce this form or any form of issue hierarchy First o f all, the referendum was not, 
m itself, an entire ‘issue’ m the implementation process It did not require parties to take 
steps to fully implement a core compromise of the process Instead, the approval of the 
agreement by a referendum provided the mandate for the Assembly elections (O’Leary 
and Evans, 2000 87) The parties’ reciprocal co-operation with the referendum might 
therefore be interpreted as part of the procedure through which the new institutions 
would be established
Secondly and alternatively, the referendum can be interpreted as actually preceding the 
implementation process and therefore as part of the endorsement process It was a 
device with which the designers of the settlement hoped to legitimise the agreement in 
both communities, and perhaps, to deprive those factions who were against its 
implementation from claiming that it did not have popular support Had the result of 
the referendum been negative instead of 71 per cent in favour of the agreement, the 
implementation process would not have commenced However, it is correct to argue 
that without the support of the majority of both nationalist and unionist (bare majority) 
communities, the result would have increased the obstacles to implementation Had the 
bare majority of unionists in support of the agreement been instead a bare minority, the 
vulnerability of sceptical unionist factions to their spoiler faction partners would have 
dramatically increased In that sense the mechanism employed for endorsement may 
have been risky But this obstacle would not have been created by issue hierarchy, 
instead by insufficient grass-root support for the endorsement o f the settlement As it 
was, the designers calculated (with the help of opinion polls) that the best time to seek
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to legitimise the agreement with the approval of the electorate was prior to the 
commencement o f the implementation process Either way, the positive result triggered 
the beginning of the implementation process
The agreement sought to sequence the implementation of constitutional issues by all 
parties reciprocally The formal establishment of the Assembly, North-South and East- 
West institutions, and the formal entering into force of the British-Insh Agreement 
(effectively enacting the constitutional changes underpinning the principle of consent 
and the new institutions) was to coincide exactly with the Assembly’s assumption of  
legislative and executive powers But the holding of the elections did not automatically 
lead to the establishment of the Assembly and its executive Until the formations, 
through their newly-elected Assembly representatives (MLAs), agreed to formally 
establish the executive using the Assembly’s cross-community consent procedures, the 
governments’ moves to implement the constitutional compromise inherent m the 
agreement had no legal force Parallel sequencing thus linked the implementation of 
provisions underpinning the new constitutional status to the implementation of those to 
establish the power-sharing and linked institutions
An attempt was made to introduce issue breakdown to the process of establishing the 
executive the Assembly would meet m shadow format and undertake a number of steps 
towards implementation These included the election of shadow First and DF Ministers, 
the creation of a shadow cabinet (Strand 1 35) and agreement on the number of  
ministers The shadow cabinet would then put m place procedures, including agreement 
on standing orders and working practices of the Assembly and preparations for the 
eventual functioning of the Assembly and that of the Bntish-Irish Council, the North- 
South Council and its implementation bodies
Parallel sequencing ensured that none of the constitutional and institutional provisions 
for which the two governments were responsible would be legally implemented without 
the formal establishment of the executive A start to the implementation of the other 
issues of the agreement, which ‘are plainly mter-lmked, but are not explicitly tied’ 
(O’Leary, 1998 13) to the construction of the new political institutions, would 
simultaneously take place But obstacles to the formation of a ‘stable executive’ existed 
In fact, a stable executive would not be formed without the implementation of measuies
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to ensure that progress was made on the implementation of the other issues The 
procedures that sequenced and timed the implementation of these controversial issues28 
were not explicit and were open to exploitation by the spoiler faction m each formation
DECOMMISSIONING
While referred to as the most ‘ambiguous area of the Agreement’ (Hennessy, 2000 184- 
5), the GFA was clear on the fact that no formal surrender was demanded of any 
paramilitary organisation (O’Leary 1998 13) Yet the agreement aimed‘to achieve the 
decommissioning of all paramilitary weapons withm two years following an 
endorsement of the GFA m referendums, North and South,’ and cm the context o f the 
implementation of the overall settlement’ (GFA, 7 1 - 3 )  This apparent clarity on the 
need for parallel, but not pnor, implementation of decommissioning was blurred by a 
provision that called for the exclusion from executive office of those who use means 
other than ‘democratic, non-violent means’ (GFA, 3 25) and a clause that required 
shadow ministers ‘to affirm their commitment to non-violence and exclusively peaceful 
and democratic means,’ and their opposition to any use o f or threat of force by others 
for any political purpose ’(GFA,3 35) Unionist parties would use these provisions to 
support the demand that IRA decommissioning precede the establishment o f the 
executive They also used a connected promise made by the British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair on the eve of the settlement that it was his view that decommissioning 
should start straight away (O’Leary Brendan, 2002 80)
The agreement endeavoured to depohticise the issue of decommissioning by giving 
responsibility for its design to an apolitical, technical body, which is subject to agreed 
rules and procedures It formally empowered29 an already established Independent 
International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) to develop workable bases for 
achieving decommissioning, and to monitor, review and verify progress on the 
decommissioning o f illegal arms, while reporting regularly to both governments (GFA,
7 2 and 4) The agreement required that all signatories work constructively with the 
body, and ‘use any influence that they may have’ to achieve decommissioning (GFA,7
4)
28 Negotiations on the confidence building measures were leportedly even moie tortuous than those on the 
new institutions and constitutional status SDLP negotiator, DCU, April 2000, Darby McGmty 99
29 The British and lush governments are responsible for providing and updating wheie necessary 
legislative back up to its role
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POLICE REFORM AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
The GFA recognised that an opportunity for ‘a new beginning to policing’ existed and it 
aspired to 4 a police service capable o f attracting and sustaining support from the 
community as a whole’ (GFA, Ch 9 1) But clear procedures for the implementation of 
this reformed police force are not included Instead, m an attempt to insulate a 
potentially divisive issue, an independent Commission with clearly outlined and 
relatively extensive terms of reference was to be established It would address and make 
recommendations on the procedures and reforms necessary to transform the existing 
police force into the police force agreed to by the parties to the agreement (GFA, Ch 9 
3) The Commission was required to report by the summer o f 1999, a year before the 
two-year deadline for the completion of the decommissioning of weapons was up This 
sequence is assumed to liave been deliberate, and indicates that agreement on 
procedures for the introduction of police reform was viewed as important if  
decommissioning were to be achieved30 This would later provide opportunities for the 
introduction of parallel sequencing to these issues m an endeavour to unblock the 
process
DEMILITARISATION AND NORMALISATION OF THE SECURITY SITUATION 
The GFA committed the British government to ‘begin a series of phased developments 
to de-mihtanse Northern Ireland5 (O’Leary, 1998 14) This included the removal of 
security installations, the reduction of armed forces to levels compatible with a peaceful 
society, and the removal o f emergency powers (GFA, 8 1-2) The power to implement 
demilitarisation clearly lay m the hands of the British government and, more 
specifically, m those of the Secretary of State and his advisors 31 Timing depended on a 
reduction m the security threat, which was itself linked to decommissioning, policing 
and the establishment of workable, power-sharing institutions
PRISONERS
Consistent with the ‘no-surrender5 principle inherent m the decommissioning clauses, 
both governments committed to introduce mechanisms for rollout, early-release 
programmes for prisoners who were affiliated to the organisations judged to be on
O ’Leary, 1998 13 says that it was plainly intended to be available as a confidence building measure 
1 The agreement commits the Secretary to consult with the Irish government and the Northern Irish 
parties The Irish government undertakes to simultaneously review the Offences Against the State Act 
(GFA, Secunty, 4 and 5)
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‘unequivocal ceasefire ’(GFA, Prisoners, 30) In its requirement for a phased scheme, 
the design implicitly included issue breakdown In its automatic triggering, dependent 
only on the maintenance of cease-fires, it was reciprocal, sequenced in parallel with 
other aspects of implementation, and insulated from the post-implementation bargaining 
process Proposals during negotiations to link prisoner releases to prior 
decommissioning would almost certainly have precluded either the signing or the 
implementation of an agreement by placing a unilateral demand - issue hierarchy - at its 
centre Though not explicitly linked to prisoner releases, provisions serving to assist
32victims of violence were to be implemented m sequence with the early release of  
prisoners (O’Leary, 1998 14) This broke down the enormity of the prisoner release 
issue for victims of violence, and those willing to use their difficulties with the releases 
to mobilise support against the agreement
EQUALITY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
The implementation of provisions under the ‘rights, safeguards, and equality of 
opportunity’ chapter of the agreement was to a large extent insulated from post­
agreement conflict The provisions were inherently broken down and in parallel 
sequence with the rest of the implementation process With the automatic, government- 
initiated incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into Northern 
Irish law (GFA, 6 2), further implementation of the agreement’s equality provisions was 
phased and controlled by independent commissions These Commissions - the new 
Statutory Equality Commission and a new Human Rights Commission - would 
constantly monitor the new Northern Ireland institutions The functioning of the 
Equality Commission as envisaged m the GFA ultimately depends on the establishment 
of the new institutions, but the commissions could be and, in fact, were set up in the 
absence of their establishment
In an endeavour to deal with the republican’s allegations that inequality and corruption 
were inherent m the criminal justice system, rather than agreeing the concrete 
provisions for its reform, the agreement included the terms of refeience for an 
independent commission The commission would be appointed early in the 
implementation process and would review the criminal justice system and make 
îecommendations for its reform This mechanism enabled the governments to diffuse
' 2 GFA, Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity Chapter
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the issue and to maintain control over the sequencing and timing of its 
recommendations, which it could consider m tandem with the implementation of other 
issues By appointing a commission to work m parallel with other implementation 
efforts, the nationalist spoiler faction was deprived of a justification to stall on the 
implementation of all other issues on the basis that the omission of the criminal justice 
issue was issue holdover However, by omitting detail of the exact reforms, and instead 
outlining principles and terms of reference, a ‘reasonable request’ was made of the 
unionist spoiler faction it was, at least temporarily, prevented from presenting reforms 
as large, unacceptable steps to re-orgamse a criminal justice system which its members 
perceived to be fair, and in which many have a stake
In sum, while parallel sequencing and issue breakdown were not explicitly provided for 
on all issues, neither did the GFA clearly and unequivocally endorse any form o f issue 
hierarchy This is the case, despite ambiguities that created opportunities for spoiler 
factions to convince the sceptical factions m both formations to insist on it During over 
four years o f implementation, a relentless endeavour by pro factions, the governments 
and the bodies responsible for implementation to agree on an implementation design 
based on issue breakdown and parallel sequencing is evident The series of endeavours 
that have attempted to circumvent the stalling that has plagued the process include the 
Hillsborough Declaration, the Way Forward and Failsafe initiatives, the Mitchell 
Review, the introduction of weapons inspectors, the introduction by the UUP of step- 
by-step sanctions, and the Weston Park talks Where it remained possible to promote 
any form of issue hierarchy, initiative after initiative failed until October 2001, when a 
formula informed by adequate issue breakdown and parallel sequencing appeared to 
improve the prospect of a successful outcome to implementation The initiatives are 
explored in detail below and are explained using the IFF hypotheses on sequence and 
timing
ISSUE HIERARCHY, MISSED DEADLINES, BREAKTHROUGH AND SUSPENSION 
Intra-formation factionalism was highly visible during the election campaign that 
followed the agreement m June 1998 The disunity within his party forced David 
Trimble to make a significant public announcement concerning the sequence and timing 
of implementation that the UUP’s support for the agreement was based on the premise 
that it would not form a power-sharing executive that included Sinn Fein unless the
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IRA had decommissioned weapons (Hennessy, 2000: 197). Trimble’s declared 
interpretation of the implementation process was facilitated by the lack of clarity on the 
sequencing and timing of decommissioning and by Prime Minster Tony Blair’s 
assurances to unionism. This unilateral demand for ‘guns before government’ 
introduced issue hierarchy to implementation design. This issue hierarchy, on which the 
spoiler faction in nationalism insisted in reverse - ‘government before guns’- was to 
create the single biggest obstacle to implementation.
Despite the looming issue hierarchy crisis over the sequence and timing of executive 
formation and decommissioning, when the 31 October deadline for devolution 
approached, issue breakdown and the insulation of some issues from post-agreement 
bargaining had facilitated the implementation of some reciprocal or reversible issues 
and the parallel commencement of implementation on others. For example, Westminster 
and Dublin passed constitutional legislation33 underpinning the principle o f consent 
which would automatically take effect with the establishment of the executive. The 
Assembly met in shadow format on 1 July,34 elected the transitional First and DF 
ministers (Trimble, UUP and Mallon, SDLP). Meanwhile the governments began a 
phased, parallel implementation of the agreement’s provisions on equality, prisoner 
releases, police reform and constitutional change. With the passing of the NI Police 
Act, the Police (Patten) Commission, which had been appointed prior to the elections 
(NIO), was empowered to set about its investigation of policing issues. The Northern 
Ireland Sentences Bill (July 98) automatically triggered the implementation of 
provisions on prisoner releases by laying down constitutional requirements for the 
release programme. Although highly contentious during negotiations, the prisoner- 
release scheme initiated the first wave of releases in September 1998 and the last in 
2001 and created less stalling than was anticipated by many analysts.35 This was 
arguably facilitated by the manner in which it was implemented: provided paramilitary 
organisations remained on unequivocal ceasefire,36 prisoner releases were automatic, 
insulated from post-agreement bargaining and implemented in steps, which were, in
33 The Northern Ireland Bill received royal consent on 19th November 1998.
,4 All elected MLAs took their seats, including those from parties against the agreement.
35 In November 1998 it is noted that releases had been proceeding with less disruption than might have 
been expected. O’Leary, 1998: 14.
36 Responsibility forjudging the nature of the cease-fire falls to the Secretary of State.
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fact, reversible The British government simultaneously appointed the independent 
commission to review the criminal justice system, and moved to start the 
implementation of demilitarisation m Septembei 1998, announcing the demolition of a 
number of installations and checkpoints (CAIN, 2001)
But despite some progress on these issues, the issue hierarchy at the heart of the 
opposing ‘guns before government /government before guns’ demands, ensured that 
parties stalled and missed the October 31 GFA deadline for the formal establishment of 
the executive The unionist pro faction was unwilling even to agree the technicalities of 
the new institutions with the SDLP m the absence of an agreed decommissioning 
timetable (Hennessy, 2000 197) Without movement on these issues, it is possible to 
argue that progress on other issues would ultimately stall
The first m a series of intense, jomt-govemment initiatives to circumvent the issue 
hierarchy took place from November 1998 to April 1999 The initiative focused on 
encouraging actors to take steps to deepen the roots of the institutions in shadow format 
The logic behind the formula appears to have been that if  the new power-sharing and 
North-South bodies could function m shadow format, nationalist pro factions could 
demonstrate the advantages, stability and irreversibility o f the institutions to its 
significantly large sceptical faction Based on this logic, when the institutions were fully 
established m shadow format and on the point of legal establishment, the nationalist pro 
faction would be m the position to persuade its sceptical faction to commit to a specific 
decommissioning process This would remove the ‘government/guns’ issue hierarchy 
and open up the way for parallel sequencing of the two
Some progress followed and by February 1999, the pro factions agreed on the structures 
of the Assembly and of the North-South implementation bodies and guaranteed the 
endorsement of this by the Assembly and the British and Irish legislation to underpin it 
(Hennessy 198) This arguably increased the stability o f the power-sharing structures 
and helped to advance the two governments’ formula for breakthrough According to 
the hypotheses, movement was possible for a number of reasons associated with design
37 Prisoners could be re-arrested if the security forces had consistent evidence of continued paramilitary 
activity The re-arrest of loyalist pusoner Johnny Adair in August 2000 gave credibility to this 
leversibility
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the step-by-step moves to establish the details of power-sharing and North-South 
institutions could be presented as reversible to the sceptical faction of unionism in that 
they could ultimately refuse to establish the executive should no move be made on 
decommissioning The issue breakdown inherent m the executive’s shadow format 
prevented the umomst spoiler faction from convincingly claiming that they were taking 
a umlateral step on the establishment of the executive However, the short-comings m 
design out-weighed the positive features and they allowed spoiler factions to continue to 
demand issue hierarchy The ultimate failure of the initiative, which culminated m the 
‘Hillsborough Statement’ of April 1999, is explained as follows
The Hillsborough Declaration focused on the decommissioning and the executive- 
formation issues It proposed breaking them down into a number o f steps that would be 
undertaken by both formations To begin with, the relevant parties38 were to nominate 
ministers to the executive This was a reversible move and was to be followed by ‘a 
collective act of reconciliation’ which would involve the ‘putting beyond use’ of 
weapons Withm a month of the nominations, the IICD would issue a report that 
verified the decommissioning move This verification would coincide with the entering 
into force of the Bntish-Insh agreement which legalised devolution and formalised the 
executive’s formation Without the decommissioning move, the Assembly would not 
confirm the ministerial nominations (Hillsborough Statement)
The Hillsborough Declaration describes decommissioning not as a pre-condition, but as 
an ‘obligation’ derived from the GFA, which will happen ‘where implementation is 
actively moving forward5 (Hillsborough Statement) Central to the formula was the 
need to assure those moving to establish the executive that their step would be 
revocable if decommissioning did not follow While the initiative introduced issue 
breakdown and reversibility to the establishment of the executive, this was less so the 
case where decommissioning was concerned Despite attempts to disguise it, the 
sequence effectively upheld the ‘guns before government’ issue hierarchy The formula 
seemed to require a commitment from republicans to make a verifiable start to 
decommissioning and to agree to complete it by May 2000 before the executive and the 
power-sharing institutions were established
38 UUP SDLP, DUP and Sinn Fem as the largest parties m the Assembly
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Howevei, the design of the implementation process allowed the spoiler faction within 
nationalism to argue reasonably that, while it was not opposed to decommissioning m 
the context of an overall settlement, the Hillsborough formula required that it respond to 
a unilateral demand with an irreversible move That other key issues, such as policing 
and demilitarisation , were not yet part of the equation was equally problematic and 
reinforced the issue hierarchy at the heart of the sequence and timing of implementation 
Despite the introduction of some issue breakdown, the govemment/guns issue 
hierarchy, and the lack of parallel sequencing ensured that stalling prevailed Illustrating 
this, Gerry Adams39 denounced the formula saying that while the proposals may ‘have 
merit’ they amount to ‘an ultimatum to armed groups ’ McGumness40 said that ‘the IRA 
would not accept decommissioning as a precondition to Sinn Fein’s entry into power- 
sharing’ (CAIN, Chronology), and Sinn Fem formally rejected the initiative on Apnl 13 
on the ‘reasonable’ basis that it ‘moved away from the GFA ’4I Given the republican 
movement’s rejection of the formula, the UUP was not forced to accept or to reject it 
However, despite some objections from the UUP (CAIN, Chronology), the government 
interpreted as a given its commitment in Apnl 1999 to nominate and form the executive 
m parallel with a start to decommissioning
The next formula - the ‘Way Forward Document’ and the Failsafe Initiative (2 July 99)- 
reflected a shift in focus The formula called for the immediate implementation (by July 
15 1999) of the de Hondt procedure to nominate ministers, followed by the laying of the 
Devolution Order before Westminster to take effect on July 18 and the 
decommissioning of all paramilitary weapons to be earned out in ‘a manner determined 
by the IICD’ by May 2000 (The Way Forward) The IICD outlined a decommissioning 
formula which, beginning with urgent discussions with points o f contacts appointed by 
all paramilitary groups, would be followed by two progress reports in September and 
December 1999 before a final report m May 2000
The Way Forward quite clearly envisages devolution before decommissioning, a 
position that the Irish Taoiseach had, controversially, publicly endorsed in June (CAIN) 
But to guarantee the establishment of an executive and thereby to secure devolved,
39 Gerry Adams, leader of Sinn Fem and an MLA, and believed to have been a member of the IRA
40 Martin MacGuinnes, Sinn Fem, MLA and Minister for Education He was the commander of the Deiry 
unit of the IRA m the 1970s
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power-sharing government, the IRA was required to give ‘an absolute commitment to 
decommissioning’ (Blair, 23 06 99, CAIN) and to engage fully with the IICD A 
Failsafe Clause was proposed and it was m draft legislative form It would have ensured 
that if commitments m relation to either decommissioning or devolution were not met 
the governments would ‘automatically and with immediate effect’ suspend the 
operation of the GFA institutions Therefore, if the institutions o f the agreement were 
not working as a result of the UUP’s unwillingness to establish or work in an executive 
with republicans, the May 2000 decommissioning deadline would not hold Equally so, 
‘if  the IRA failed to deliver on decommissioning the executive would be suspended and 
a review of the process would take place’ (Irish Taoiseach, CAIN, 10 July 1999)42 In 
this way, the Way Forward and Failsafe initiative introduced reversible steps with a 
reciprocal effect, while retaining the aspects of issue break down inherent m the 
Hillsborough declaration The question thus remains as to why both Sinn Fein and the 
UUP simultaneously rejected it on 14 July'?
By July 1999, the UUP’s pro faction leadership appeared to have gained the sceptical 
faction’s support for the parallel implementation of the ‘guns and government’ issues 
(CAIN, 2001) By undermining its spoiler faction’s ability to reject what was, in effect, 
a ‘reasonable request/ the pro faction increased the sceptical faction’s confidence m the 
process But if the pro faction were to endorse the formula that the ‘Way Forward’ 
document outlined, it was moving one step further than parallel implementation without 
actually secunng any decommissioning While the Failsafe legislation essentially made 
the establishment o f an executive that included Sinn Fem a reciprocal or reversible 
move, it was only reversible according to the interpretation o f the governments This 
provided the unionist spoiler faction with an opportunity to persuade its sceptical 
faction that the failsafe would not be ‘safe enough,’ and that the British and Irish 
governments would never be persuaded to undo the establishment of the institutions 
once established, whether or not the decommissioning commitment were carried 
through The vague and secret steps in the decommissioning process enabled spoiler 
factions to further increase the doubts of sceptical factions The UUP was able to reject
41 Mitchell McLaughlin Statement, 13 04 99
42 The initiative ultimately failed and the draft legislation discussed by the two governments for the 
Failsafe initiative was never passed But the suspension powers at the heart of the Failsafe proposal were 
contioversially passed m legislation by the British government in the Special NI Act, 2000
206
the formula reasonably they declared that no resistance existed to a fully inclusive 
executive, provided that decommissioning took place 43
Foi the nationalist sceptical faction, the Failsafe legislation was, perhaps, more 
problematic It left the pro faction vulnerable to the accusation that the institutions were 
simply ‘British rule’ under a different guise The spoiler faction could point out that 
suspension was not part of the GFA and that it effectively constituted a unilateral 
deadline for decommissioning, imposed not by the IICD but by a British government 
vulnerable to unionist pressure Some factions withm nationalism had ideological 
difficulties with accepting devolved power sharing instead of a united Ireland this 
formula appeared to dilute even devolved power shanng by making it dependent on 
‘the stroke o f a Westminster pen ’ Whether or not the pro faction genuinely believed 
that the Failsafe was any more than a formula to guarantee implementation was 
irrelevant as long as the spoiler faction could credibly persuade the sceptical faction that 
the devolved power-sharing on offer was unstable, and decommissioning governed by a 
unilateral demand
For the reasons outlined, both the nationalist and the unionist formation rejected the 
initiative In response to the rejection, the governments evoked the formal review 
procedure A ten-week review chaired by the US Senator, George Mitchell, commenced 
and focused exclusively on two issues decommissioning in the context o f the IICD and 
the establishment o f an executive (IT, 15 11 99) This was the focus of the review, 
despite the recent publication of the Patten recommendations on police reform m 
September 1999 The review proposed a new formula which called for the formal 
establishment of the executive alongside the break down of the decommissioning issue 
into small steps Sinn Fem was to publicly condemn all forms of violence as a form of 
political behaviour, the IRA and all other paramilitary groups were to appoint 
interlocutors to enter into ongoing discussions with the IICD about the modalities of 
decommissioning, and the IICD was to issue a progress report withm ten days of the
44executive appointments
4' UUP Implementing the Agreement, October 1999
44 Report of IICD to the GFA Review 15 11 99
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The UUP party appeared to be generally opposed to this formula (McDonald, 
Independent, 19-09-00; Daily Telegraph, 20-11-99). Like the Way Forward formula, it 
required the immediate formation of the executive while it did not guarantee 
decommissioning. It could be, in effect, interpreted as issue hierarchy. However, the 
UUP pro faction was persuaded to take a number of conciliatory steps, which were 
presumably designed to decrease the uncertainty of the nationalist sceptical faction, and 
which could be presented to the unionist spoiler faction as reasonable requests. These 
steps included a number of UUP statements which recognised the aspirations o f  
nationalists as legitimate, embraced the principles of inclusivity, equality and mutual 
respect, and more or less reaffirmed the position of the UUP as not opposed to sharing 
power with the republican movement in principle (IT, 16.11.99). A ‘reciprocal’ IRA 
statement (17.11.99) committed the IRA to peace, to the GFA, to the leadership o f Sinn 
Fein in the negotiations, and agreed to nominate a representative to enter discussions 
with the IICD. Following these steps, the Mitchell review appeared to facilitate a 
historical breakthrough. The UUP agreed to establish the power-sharing executive that 
included Sinn Fein. This triggered the replacement of direct rule with devolution and 
formalised in law the changes to their respective constitutions which had been prepared 
by the British and Irish governments. Following the meeting of the executive on the 2 
December,45 the IRA delivered on its commitment and announced the appointment of 
its representative to the IICD (IRA, 2.12.99).
While the formula recommended by the Mitchell review had differed in one important 
way from earlier initiatives and had succeeded in advancing the implementation 
process, on closer scrutiny the dynamics that promoted issue hierarchy remained. In 
fact, the UUP’s agreement to establish the executive had been facilitated less by the 
formula and more by its own introduction of two procedures to implementation design: 
issue breakdown and reversibility to its own step and a unilateral deadline to the 
decommissioning step. To secure the backing of the UUC, Trimble had submitted a 
post-dated letter to the chair of the UUC that tendered his resignation as First Minister46 
if the IRA had not de-commissioned by February 2000. With this move he hoped to
45 The DUP initially refused to attend this meeting.
46 If either the First of Deputy First Minister resigns the other also ceases to hold office. This inter­
dependence agreed to in the GFA is also legislated for in Article 14.6 of the Westminster N1 Act 1998. 
Trimble’s resignation meant that the assembly would be without executive leaders and the election of new 
leaders required approval by parallel consent by the Assembly.
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make a stable executive directly dependent on decommissioning by the IRA and with 
this self-mtroduced, ‘time-lined’ entry into government, the UUC endorsed the Mitchell 
review by 480 to 349 votes (27 11 99, CAIN) Given the close result, it seems unlikely 
that the unionist pro faction would have secured the support of its sceptical faction 
without this move
The difference between the suspension clause m the draft Failsafe legislation (July 
1999)47 and Tnmble’s post-dated letter of resignation was that the latter made the 
stability o f the institutions automatically dependent on IRA decommissioning by 
February 2000, the former on the government’s reading of the extent to which IRA 
decommissioning had progressed This difference sheltered the unionist pro faction 
from the tactics of its spoiler faction and enabled it to establish the executive In the 
immediate aftermath of the move Trimble challenged republicans with the refrain - 
‘we’ve jumped’, now it’s your turn’ (BBC News, 27 11 99) But this challenge obscured 
the fact that while the UUP had clearly made its move reversible, and m doing so 
highlighted the powers o f the First Ministry to threaten the feasibility of the institutions, 
it called on republicans to take a large, irreversible step m response to a unilateral and 
specific deadline This formula was clearly vulnerable to breakdown And m February 
2000, with the deadline for Tnmble’s resignation approaching and no moves on 
decommissioning by the IRA or by any other armed group, it did breakdown (IICD 
Report, 11 02 00)
Responding to the cnsis, Westminster evoked the special NI Suspension Act (2000) to 
suspend the devolved institutions just before Tnmble resigned The controversial Act 
had been hastily passed in early 2000 It embodied the suspension powers which had 
been part o f the draft Failsafe legislation (which was, itself, never passed) The move to 
suspend the institutions momentanly ‘froze’ the implementation process which was on 
the verge of collapse, and it arguably bought space for more dispute resolution 
However, its impact on the stability of the institutions was controversial and it served to 
transform the issue of executive formation into the more complex issue of institutional 
stability
41 Which Secietaiy of State, Peter Mandelson , confirmed as an option inNovembei though it was only in 
draft form  (IT 22 11 99)
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The central role that factionalism played in the crisis is confirmed m Anthony 
McIntyre’s explanation for the stalling and the breakdown A declared pacifist, yet anti- 
GFA insider of the republican movement, Anthony McIntyre explained that
Trimble has made the leap but crucially has held his party together 
Adams has not made the leap, presumably because he feels he could 
not hold republicans intact If it were a question of choice, Adams 
would accept decommissioning (though not necessarily hand over to 
Bntish Government), while Trimble would not demand i t 48 ’
Adams responded to the UUP’s challenge by re-statmg Sinn Fein ’s commitment to 
decommissioning (Newry, 27 01 00) The IRA stated that the peace process was ‘under 
no threat’ (IRA, 5-2*00) But the unionist pro faction accused the Republican movement 
of failing to take ‘a single step forward/ and being ‘openly m defiance of the 
democratic will of the whole of Ireland ’ (Magmms IT, 7-2-00) Magmms’s reference 
to a ‘single step’ may indicate that a small move withm the February deadline would 
have been sufficient to reduce the unionist pro faction’s vulnerability to its spoiler 
faction However, as it was, Sinn Fein and the IRA’s failure to move created to a good 
opportunity for the unionist spoiler faction (both withm and without of the UUP) to 
threaten the credibility of the pro faction’s strategy The last-hour, IRA promise that it 
would ‘consider how to put arms and explosives beyond use m the context of the GFA 
and of the removal of the causes of the conflict’ (IICD, 11 02 00) was, regardless o f  
timing, not enough to enable the unionist pro faction to remain m the executive The 
step did not prevent the spoiler faction m Unionism from presenting the continuity o f 
the executive as the capitulation of the unionist formation to issue hierarchy
FEBRUARY -  MAY 2000 BREAKTHROUGH9
During the suspension period, which lasted from February to May 2000, disunity withm 
the nationalist conflict formation was marked David Trimble’s threat to resign and the 
suspension of the institutions presented its spoiler faction with an opportunity to 
credibly highlight the instability of the institutions and the continued power of the 
British government to overrule nationalists (Adams, IT 12 2 00) The spoiler faction 
could present decommissioning as a unilateral demand which would not guarantee
Mclntyie Document, 2000
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stable institutions m return On this basis, it could persuade sceptical factions to be 
cautious m its strategy towards the agreement and its implementation Reflecting the 
pressure on the pro faction m nationalism were inflammatory statements by Sinn Fem m 
February 2000 which painted the process as near to collapse and questioned its own 
participation m any post-suspension review (IT, 14 2 00) The IRA in turn announced 
that it would no longer cooperate with the IICD (IRA, 15 2 00) Gerry Adams 
subsequently called on Smn F em ’s followers to return to the streets, and to demand 
democracy m the face of suspension and the ruling over their heads by the Secretary of 
State’s (IT, 26 2 00)
Critically to the dynamics of mtra-formation conflict, nationalism’s unequivocal pro 
faction - the SDLP -  was also critical of the UUP’s February deadline for 
decommissioning, and considered it to be ‘fictional ’ Even more critically, while wary 
of the inflammatory speeches, the SDLP perceived the republican movement’s refusal 
to move on decommissioning m February 2000 as a function of disagreements in Smn 
Fern’s ranks and within the IRA’s leadership, and not of Smn Fern’s fundamental 
rejection of decommissioning, 49 or adoption of a spoiler faction’s position The 
factionalism withm both unionism and nationalism was accentuated by the persistent 
ability of their respective spoiler factions to use the implementation process to force a 
collective strategy of stalling And despite Trimble’s standing up to the IRA m February 
2000, his strategy was increasingly under pressure from the spoiler faction withm his 
conflict formation who consistently portrayed his move as capitulation to issue 
hierarchy Illustrating the depth of the crisis was Trimble’s victory by only 56 8 per 
cent to 43 2 per cent o f the ruling council m an anti-agreement leadership challenge in 
March 2000 (IT, 25 3 00)
Despite the controversy, one event m particular helped to soften the contradictory 
demands for issue hierarchy that caused the suspension crisis While the institutions 
were suspended, Tnmble managed to secure a commitment from his sceptical faction 
(l e won UUC approval) to return to the assembly ‘without prior decommissioning, 
provided that the issue was dealt with’ (IT, 17 3 00) On the strength of this window o f  
opportunity, low-key, multi-party talks chaired by the governments m the two-month
49 April 21 2000 Talk by leading SDLP MLA and GFA negotiator
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suspension period, produced a new formula (Independent, 8 05 00) At the heart of the 
formula was a promise by the UUP to return to the executive and to secure the 
institutions of the GFA m return for a start to step-by-step, concrete movement on 
decommissioning by the IRA Beginning this process, the IRA issued a promise to 
immediately ‘initiate a process that would completely and venfiably put their arms 
beyond use’ (06 05 00) This would begin with the admission of two independent, 
international weapons inspectors to inspect the security of IRA weapon stocks (BBC 
News, 6 5 00)
The May 2000-formula led to, what was perhaps, the biggest breakthrough on the 
executive formation and decommissioning issues to date On 15 May 2000, 
international weapons inspectors working through the IICD held meetings with the 
Northern Irish parties Following this, the parties and the governments agreed to 
formally restore the institutions on 22 May (BBC News, 16 5 00) The IFF hypotheses 
can help to explain the partial success of the formula
The clear break down of decommissioning into verifiable steps prevented the spoiler 
faction withm unionism from presenting the move to re-establish the executive as a 
unilateral one to which the IRA would never respond with decommissioning The 
‘reasonable request’ inherent m the concrete and verifiable decommissioning steps and 
the omission of an explicitly clear May 2000 deadline, which was removed through the 
review, undermined the ability of the nationalist spoiler faction to resist its 
endorsement The decommissioning request was reasonable, reversible and reciprocal 
Inherent m the design of the formula was the idea that if  the decommissioning issue 
were left to progress m steps under the insulated IICD and the executive were secure, 
the emerging and d iv is ive  issue of police reform could be worked out between the pro­
agreement parties and the governments
But while the IFF model helps to explain the temporary success o f this formula, it also 
suggests, that without parallel sequencing all implementation issues are vulnerable to 
stalling The process for implementing the agreement’s policing and demilitarisation 
provisions remained unclear and unlinked to the rest of the implementation process 
Further, despite the introduction of the weapons-mspectors, the May formula did not 
entnely circumvent the ‘government before guns’ or the ‘guns before government’
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controversy over issue hierarchy Nor, as the below account outlines, did it entirely end 
Trimble’s problems which were caused by insufficient issue breakdown In fact, 
according to the IFF theory, it was unlikely that the May 2000 formula would produce 
the ultimate breakthrough required
It appears that the republican pro faction was seeking during the negotiations of May 
2000 to decouple the guns and government hierarchy with, what appeared to be, a move 
to introduce parallel sequencing The Republicans presented the IRA’s initiation of the 
decommissioning process as part of an all-encompassmg agreement on the sequence 
and timing of implementation They argued that decommissioning depended on British 
government-initiated demilitarisation, the delivery o f the report on the reform of the 
criminal justice system, and agreement on and the initiation of police reform In this 
context, the British government made a number of promises m May 2000 to begin 
implementing the demilitarisation provisions of the agreement m parallel with the 
moves on decommissioning While this, alongside the re-establishment o f the executive, 
was to facilitate the capacity of the nationalist pro faction to take concrete steps towards 
decommissioning (inspections took place m June 2000 and October 2000 IIDC, 26-10- 
00), it was to simultaneously undermine the ability of the unionist pro faction to 
guarantee the stability o f the executive Full reciprocity and reversibility was absent 
from the UUP’s step of re-entering the executive, this contributing to its spoiler 
faction’s efforts to present the move as one adhering to issue hierarchy Furthermore, as 
the above suggests, the move was not sequenced with other issues, in particular with 
policing
From day one these difficulties left the formula, and the return to the executive, 
vulnerable to fierce, unrelenting spoiler tactics In fact, the UUP’s decision to re-enter 
the executive was only backed by a very narrow majority m the Ruling Council An 
alternative proposal by Teffrey Donaldson, who belonged to either the sceptical or to the 
spoiler faction, seriously challenged the May 2000 proposal to re-enter the executive 
(459 -403, Independent, 25 5 00) Donaldson insisted that decommissioning take place 
prior to the formation of the executive, and proposed that the UUP re-enter the 
executive m shadow format until the IRA delivered Unionism’s spoiler faction 
appeared to be gaining the support of its sceptical faction In fact, the ascendancy of 
sceptical and spoiler factions was not confined to the UUP and the DUP sections of
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unionism, but was also apparent within the loyalist paramilitary groups This became 
very evident throughout the summer of 2000, which marked the prelude to a deadly 
feud within loyalism, and to increasingly violent behaviour by dissident republicans
MAY -  OCTOBER 2000 BREAKDOWN OF FORMULA
The DUP rejoined the executive m May 2000, while at the same time declaring its 
intention to use the Assembly to ‘defeat the Republican’s agenda and the GFA’ 
(Robinson, Independent, 1 6 00) This decision to re-enter the executive suggests that its 
leadership recognised that the policy of insisting on decommissioning before the 
formation of an executive had lost a small part of its reasonableness given the IRA’s 
move m May 2000 It signalled a recognition that, despite its rhetorical stance against 
the GFA, ‘now’ was not the nght time to move to spoil the agreement’s institutions 
from without Instead, it announced its plan to ‘periodically disrupt business’ and to 
gather enough UUP votes to oust David Trimble as First Minister (Ind 1 6 00) From 
withm the Assembly, the DUP relentlessly demanded issue hierarchy by calling for the 
expulsion of Sinn Fein on the grounds that the IRA had not yet decommissioned At the 
same time it sat m government with Sinn Fem Attempting to highlight the spoiler 
tactics at the heart o f the DUP’s strategy which aimed to bnng the agreement down 
while avoiding any risk of self-isolation m doing so, the UPP’s Reg McGimpsey 
responded with the challenge nothing can disguise the fact that the DUP are in 
government with Sinn Fem (McGimpsey,50 Independent 27 6 00)
Outside of the Assembly, the marching season and the annual protest at the blocking of 
an Oiange Order march at Drumcree became a rallying point for ‘uncompromising 
loyalism ’ Threatening the implementation process from without, the Orange Order 
called for a peaceful, anti-agreement protest to bnng Northern Ireland to a halt 
(Independent 9 6 00) ’ Facilitated by the failure of the IRA to decommission, the public 
display of defiance by increasingly militant anti-agreement factions worked to heighten 
the fears of those sceptical of the agreement’s benefits for unionism This served to 
increase the potential benefits that the unionist spoiler faction could gam from openly 
adopting spoiling tactics
so UUP MLA and Ministei (Industry) m the Assembly Perceived to be one of Trimble’s key supporters m 
the senior assembly party
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The intra-loyalist feuds which emerged m the second half of 2000, and the subsequent 
violence between loyalist groups and Catholic citizens and loyalist groups and 
republican dissidents, can be interpreted m one of two ways The first interprets the 
events as the result of the loyalist spoiler faction’s efforts to provoke the IRA back to 
violence, or to at least to prevent it from decommissioning If the IRA refused to take 
any more decommissioning steps, the successful implementation of the GFA would 
become far less certain This would facilitate the spoiler faction’s goals by making the 
successful implementation of the GFA less likely This interpretation perceives the 
violence as more-or-less driven by the politics o f implementation the loyalist pro 
faction feuded with its anti-agreement faction who were mostly in the UDA and who 
were attempting to prevent the pro-agreement loyalist and republican factions from 
cooperating with the agreement This is closest to the PUP leader, David Ervme’s, 
interpretation of the violence51 The second interpretation dismisses the loyalist feud as 
a turf war between ‘gangsters’ (Sunday Tribune, 27 08 00) But while there are certainly 
gangster elements within loyalist organisations, m particular within the UDA, it would 
be inaccurate to argue that the feud was apolitical Even if  the key motivation of loyalist 
paramilitaries is to control their own turf, most are likely to see the implementation of 
the GFA as either facilitating or impeding this aim
Regardless of which way the loyalist violence is explained, as events both withm and 
without of the Assembly were to prove, the May 2000 formula had lost the support o f  
nearly all elements of unionism early on, despite confirmation that arms dumps had 
been inspected and were secure The IFF theory explains this as follows Without a 
further, more substantial step towards putting arms beyond use, the pro faction withm 
the UUP, the PUP and the UDP were still at the mercy of the spoiler and sceptical 
unionist factions, for taking a large, non-reciprocal step to re-establish an executive that 
included Sinn Fem It was also increasingly apparent that the petceived  concessions to 
nationalism m the Patten Report on police reform (IT, 6 6 00), despite its dilution by 
Peter Mandelson, were placing the unionist pro faction under further pressure to 
denounce the agreement (Trimble, IT, 26 6 00) The escalating violence was m part a 
reflection of this
M David Ervine, RTE 2FM10 10 00 Radio Interview
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Factionalism within the UUP climaxed m the run up to a critical UUC meeting held on 
28 October At the meeting, the UUP’s pro faction sought to expose the trick at the 
heart of the spoiler’s tactics with a proposal to introduce more issue break down, 
reversibility and reciprocity to the ‘security o f the institutions’ issue This would make 
it difficult foi the spoiler faction to continue to stall without revealing its ultimate 
objection to a settlement It proposed the imposition of a six-pomt sanction plan against 
Smn Fem, which would only be removed when the IRA engaged substantially with the 
nCD (BBC News, 28 10 00) The UUC agreed to the initiative if  the first sanction were 
imposed with immediate effect Trimble would use his powers as First Minister to 
ensure that Smn Fem ministers would not be nominated to attend North-South 
Ministerial Council meetings
The sanctions facilitated the unionist pro faction’s goal to remain m the executive 
Sanctions made its continued participation m the executive reversible and subject to an 
internal review in January 2001 (BBC News, 28 10 00) This meant that only a subtle 
difference remained between the demands of the ‘no’ unionist camp and those loyal to 
David Trimble The former, which is assumed to driven by spoiler and sceptical 
factions’ motivations, was still demanding a specific decommissioning deadline The 
latter - the pro faction -  demanded that a decommissioning process begin m 
consultation with the IICD, an institution which it urged to take a more proactive stance
The sanctions clearly placed the nationalist pro faction under pressure from spoiler and 
sceptical factions They once again threatened the security o f the power-sharing and all- 
lsland institutions, on whose implementation the nationalist pro faction had staked its 
strategy The republican movement’s reaction was swift Blaming the British 
government’s failure to deliver on its commitment to step up the removal o f troops and 
border watchtowers, and to replace the RUC with a police service acceptable to 
Catholics, the IRA reversed its decision to co-operate with the IICD The SDLP 
criticised Trimble’s abuse o f the First Minister position and Slim Fem mounted a legal 
challenge that aimed to legally prevent the First Minister from using sanctions to 
undermine the stability of the institutions (Independent 29 10 00)
In the wake of the events of 28 October, the alliance between the nationalist and 
unionist pro faction that is predicted to be critical to the implementation process was at
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its weakest The perpetual stalling appeared to be in danger of worsening and of leading 
to an unravelling of the process The obstacles to implementation can be summed up as 
revolving around four interconnected issues the stability of the institutions, 
decommissioning, police reform and demilitarisation Some issue break down, which 
included reciprocal or reversible steps, characterised both the decommissioning and the 
stability of the institutions issues, although the mutually exclusive issue hierarchy 
demands over the order of ‘guns and government’ was not entirely resolved and was to 
worsen These issues are considered m more detail below
Concerning the decommissioning issue, the unionist spoiler and sceptical factions 
seized upon a new deadline An ambiguous clause m the 1999 legislation under­
pinning the IICD52 appeared to give the Commission a mandate until May 2001 While 
the BCD did not consider itself to be working to a timetable,53 the clause was 
alternatively interpreted as a deadline, the interpretation depending on the goals o f the 
faction m question If the IICD’s mandate collapsed, the agreement would most likely 
collapse (Sunday Tribune, 11 3 01) Those who interpreted the mandate as subject to a 
June 2001 deadline argued that if  the IRA failed to deliver by June 2001 Smn Fein 
would be expelled from the GFA process Most neutral sources suggested that the 
IICD’s mandate would run out unless something substantial was happening on the 
decommissioning front
Concerning the policing issue, Westminster’s legislative response to the Patten report 
(Police Bill NI) was passed on 21 November 2000 It was much criticised by all shades 
o f nationalist opinion, including the Irish government, the SDLP, the Catholic church 
and Smn Fein Amidst the criticism, the focus shifted to the publication of an 
implementation plan by the Secretary of State It would bring the legislative reforms 
into effect and would outline the content, sequence and timing of reform, and the nature 
of the body that was to replace the existing police authority (BBC News, 22 11 00) To 
guarantee implementation the proposals m the plan had to be acceptable to a sufficiently 
large proportion of each conflict formation This was a tall order given the diversion of
52 The legislation following the April 1999 Hillsborough Statement STribune, 11-3-01 
It believed that it was to recommend its own disbandment if no conciete progress on decommissioning
weie made (IT, 20 4 01)
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the policing bill from Patten’s recommendations and the reaction by nationalists to this 
diversion (Independent 6 06 00)
The implementation of demilitarisation was sequenced to take place m parallel steps 
with decommissioning By this stage in the implementation process, it had become clear 
that for any demilitarisation to happen the stability of the institutions was also required 
But the extent to which demilitarisation could take place m parallel with other initiatives 
depended on the extent to which violence by dissidents prevented it from happening 
Spoiler factions from either conflict formation who were willing to use violence had the 
potential to pose enormous obstacles to any demilitarisation and, therefore, to the entire 
implementation process The intra-loyalist feud and a sharp increase m dissident loyalist 
attacks on Catholics beginning m late 200054 provided a perfect pretext on which the 
nationalist spoiler faction could base its resistance to further movement on 
decommissioning The increasingly active rIRA55 was likely motivated by a calculation 
that its continued campaign provided pretexts for a continued loyalist campaign, could 
worsen the loyalist feud, and perhaps make sceptical republicans even more weary o f  
decommissioning Those members o f the unionist and nationalist spoiler factions who 
were unwilling to use violence were not unwilling to use the climate o f violence and 
uncertainty to incite fear and insecurity amongst the general population This would 
ensure that the climate of violence persisted and would make further, even step-by-step 
implementation, very difficult for all pro factions
Thus m late 2000, the implementation process was in deep cnsis the IRA was not 
engaged with the IICD, the UUP was operating a programme o f sanctions against Sinn 
Fein and subject to meet m January 2001 to up the pace of sanctions The SDLP was 
still deeply concerned about the shortcomings of the proposed police reform and the 
enormous step that its implementation presented, and violence m the province escalated 
close to pre-ceasefire levels This impending crisis, and the intense mtra-formation 
competition that was anticipated m the immediate run up to the Westminster elections
mA long campaign of loyalist paramilitary pipe bomb attacks on catholic homes began m January 2001 
(Guradian, 3-4-01) Intel -community violence, especially m Belfast, was like pre ceasefire times 
^The iIRA was believed to be responsible foi bombs m June 2000 (Hammersmith Bridge), July 2000
(Ealing railway line), September 2000 ( M l6 ), February 2001 (Shepheid’s Bush)
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of June 2001, prompted the governments to prioritise January -  March 2001 as a period 
of concentrated negotiations 56
THE SEARCH FOR A PACKAGE SETTLEMENT
The Hdlsborough Round Table talks took place in early March 2000 With these talks 
the governments aimed to produce a formula that would ‘break the deadlock over the 
issues of policing, disarmament and demilitarisation’ (BBC News 8 3 01) However, the 
governments and the pro factions failed to secure agreement on sequencing procedures 
that would facilitate any real movement Instead, they only managed to freeze the 
process, to shield it from collapse and from a ‘formal review’ (UTV, 8 3 01) The 
freeze of the stalled implementation process was facilitated by a one-step movement by 
the IRA back to its pre-October 2000 position it committed to ‘re-engage with the 
decommissioning body on the basis of the statement it had made in May 2000 ’ This 
basis held the British government accountable for moving forward with the human 
rights, equality, justice, demilitarisation and policing aspects of the 
GFA (BBC News 8 3 01)
Some analysts interpreted the republican’s move as a miscalculation on the basis that no 
moves had been made m return to increase the security of the institutions (Sunday 
Tnbune, 11 03 01) But the IFF model can explain the republican’s move to re-engage 
with the HCD as logical The move remained a reasonable request to nationalism’s 
spoiler faction Engagement with the HCD was a move that had already been reversed 
once and therefore the republican’s spoiler faction could not question its reversibility 
Furthermore, that it was not a response to a unilateral deadline served to reinforce it as a 
‘reasonable request ’ On the other hand, the step served to benefit the republican pro 
faction on three counts Firstly, it served it in its quest to ensure that the British 
government re-made its promises to link the implementation of police reforms and 
demilitarisation to the IRA’s decommissioning process This link, which provided for 
some parallel sequencing, was critical if  the sceptical faction was to be kept on board
5i> Reid replaced Mandelson as Secretary for State m January 2001 Mandelson’s removal was the result 
of a political scandal m Britain and not out of matters relating to Northern Ireland But the move was 
aiguably helpful for implementation as many nationalist actors objected personally to Mandelson, some 
considering him to be a securocrat’ (Gerry Kelly Dublin City University Nov 2000) These objections, 
some oi which appear to have been justified, presented barriers to implementation and gave republican 
spoiler factions opportunities with which to attract sceptical factions
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and the spoiler faction to be weakened. Secondly, it helped Sinn Fein’s leadership in its 
electoral quest to ensure that it appealed to the large pro-agreement section of the 
electorate. Electoral success would further reduce the spoiler faction’s ability to 
question the strategy of the pro faction leadership. Thirdly, it shielded the GFA from 
collapse by effectively ‘freezing’ the stalling.
The failure to break the stalling that blocked implementation in March can be attributed 
to similar dynamics as before: the absence of procedures for parallel sequencing and the 
persistence of issue hierarchy demands. If the pro factions were to reduce the appeal of 
the spoiler factions in March 2001, a package settlement, in which all issues for 
implementation were agreed and implementation sequenced in parallel, was required. 
But the procedures for governing the sequencing and timing of implementation did not 
change as no package proposal was reached. Given the impending election and the 
pressures that the campaign would have on intra-formation factionalism, it was unlikely 
to be reached until after June.
The battle between the DUP and the UUP was at the heart o f the electoral campaign and 
at the outset the UUP’s pro faction was highly vulnerable. Internal UUP sources 
indicated that high amongst the concerns of its pro faction was the increasingly likely 
prospect that in place of the GFA would emerge a political order in which the power of 
‘mafia-style’ paramilitary groups was dramatically increased,57 along with the power of 
extremist and intransigent elements within both conflict formations58. In such a 
scenario, the political relevance of the UUP, and especially of its pro faction, would 
sharply reduce. If the UUP’s pro faction was to retain the power to implement the GFA, 
it needed the IRA to take a step towards full decommissioning before June. This caused 
commentators to say that a move on decommissioning before June was necessary if the 
GFA agreement was to be saved from collapse (IT, 20.4.01) and the UUP’s pro faction 
saved from the above-described fate. However, it appeared unlikely that such a move 
would be forthcoming.
57 According to one report teenagers were flocking to loyalist paramilitary groups, even though they were 
on cease-fire and the organisations were signing members by the 100s, The Guardian, 3.4.01. Alleged 
death threats from a republican terror group (Utv, 20.04.01) heightened tensions.
Chatham House Rules, Talk by senior UUP MLA and negotiator in early 2001.
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Re-acting to this threat and in a quest to defuse the decommissioning issue hierarchy 
demanded by its spoiler and sceptical factions, the UUP leadership introduced further 
break down and reciprocity to the executive issue in May 2001. David Trimble 
submitted a pre-dated letter of resignation to the speaker of the Assembly, making 
credible his threat to resign on July 1 in the absence of a substantial IRA move to de­
commission (IT, 9.05.01). In the event of his resignation on July 1, the Assembly rules 
allowed six weeks before the GFA would automatically go into review, to new 
assembly elections (BT, 10.05.01) or to a further suspension under the Suspension Act. 
With the decommissioning issue temporarily shelved, Trimble had silenced his spoiler 
faction’s call for decommissioning before June, and had enabled the UUP to fight a 
more unified electoral campaign than would otherwise have been possible. However in 
spite o f Trimble’s threat, the spoiler faction and those sceptical who were increasingly 
dubious about the benefits of the agreement, made significant gains in the Westminster 
elections. An increase in the DUP’s representation at Westminster (Table 6.1), which 
was mirrored in local elections (IT, 13.06.01), raised questions about the ability of 
UUP’s pro faction to continue with its policy of implementation.
But equally significant to the increase in support for the DUP was the tone of the DUP’s 
election campaign. The campaign was unprecedented in that it almost amounted to an 
acceptance of the GFA.59 Speculation as to whether or not this was a tactical shift in 
policy (IT, 30.05.01) missed the point. It failed to highlight the significance of the shift 
which appears to have been a practical response to a growing realisation that full 
implementation could proceed without its support, and that in this scenario the DUP 
risked exposing itself as a spoiler faction. The sequencing and timing of implementation 
had limited its opportunity to ‘spoil’ from without and, arguably by June 2001 it had 
begun to limit its capacity to spoil the agreement from within: it may have been that to 
eclipse the UUP it would have to work the institutions of the agreement.
59 The DUP’s principles included support for devolution; support for the police; for ‘genuine equality’ 
and an accountable relationship with the Republic of Ireland. Interestingly, the DUP did not campaign on 
a return to the pre GFA ‘RUC,’ but on one to ‘restore the morale and effectiveness of the police force, 
and while opposed to power-sharing with Sinn Fein without de-commissioning this can be read as willing 
to share power in the presence of de-commissioning. DUP, Seven Principles Document.
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Table 6 1 Westminster Election Results, 2001 and 199760
Pait\> % o f  Votes Seats
UUP 27 6
DUP 2 2 5
SDLP 2 1 3
Sinn Fein 2 2 4
Alliance 4 0
Other Unionist 4 0
Others 1
18 (Total)
0
Party % o f  Vote Seats
UUP 33 10 (9) 61 (by-election, 2000)
DUP 14 2 (3) (by-election, 2000)
SDLP 24 3
Smn Fern 16 2
Alliance 8 0
Other Unionist 4 1
Others 1 0
18 (Total)
Source Northern Ireland Election Results since 1973 http //www aik ac uk/elections/gallsum  htm
Also highly significant m the WestMmster elections was the increase m Sinn Fein’s 
representation m both Westminster and on local councils (Tables 6 1 , 6 2  and 6 3) The 
result marked its surpassing of the SDLP to become the largest nationalist party This 
arguably increased the power of the pro faction leadership in Smn Fein vis-à-vis its 
sceptical and spoiler factions, but, as will be clear below, it also introduced tension to 
the pro faction alliance within nationalism
Table 6 2, Local (district council) elections, 2001
Party Votes % o f  Vote Council
Seats
UUP 181336 23% 154
DUP 169477 2 1 % 131
SF 163269 2 1 % 108
SDLP 153424 19% 117
Alliance 40443 5% 28
PUP 12261 2 % 4
UKUP 4763 1% 2
Women’s Coalition 3301 0 4% 1
UUAP 2648 0 3% 2
Independents 51997 7% 34 cllrs
Others 1%
Total valid vote 790,457
60 Uses a first past the post electoral system with one candidate elected fiom each of the 18 constituencies
61 In a South Antrim by-election held on 21 September 2000 as a result of the death of the UUP's Clifford 
FoKy, the Rev William McCiea (DUP) defeated the UUP candidate, David Burnside, with 37 95% of the 
vote to 35 25% Thus the DUP had one seat more and the UUP one less going into the 2001 election
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Table 6 3, Local (district council) elections, 1997
Patty Votes % o f  Vote Council
Seats
UUP 175,036 28% 185
SDLP 130,387 2 1 % 1 2 0
SF 106,934 17% 74
DUP 99,651 16% 91
Alliance 41,952 1% 41
PUP 12,051 2% 7
UDP 6,244 1 % 4
Women’s Coalition 3,380 1% 1
UKUP 2,945 0 47% 4
Labour 2,774 0 44% 3
Conservatives 2,634 0 42% 3
Ind Nationalists 2,450 0 39% 3
Ind Nationalist Community 
Candidates 1,905 0 30% 2
Newtownabbey Ratepayers 1,424 0 23% 2Association
Dem Left 560 0 09% 1
Other Unionists 10,376 2 % 15
Independents 23,695 4% 26
Others 1%
Total valid vote 632,197
POST ELECTIONS WESTON TALKS SEARCH FOR A PACKAGE SETTLEMENT 
Immediately after the election, the pro factions and the governments were faced with 
Trimble’s July 1 resignation deadline Despite the issue breakdown introduced to the 
issues concerning the stability o f the institutions and decommissioning, demands for 
issue hierarchy by both the UUP, the DUP and Smn Fem (and to a lesser extent now 
the SDLP) persisted m providing the single biggest obstacle to implementation 
Republicans argued that they had honoured the May 2000 deadline to be in discussions
ft* }with the ÏÏCD and were still awaiting a unionist reciprocal move to secure the 
institutions Unionists insisted that the IRA had honoured neither its May 2000 nor June 
2001 deadlines, and its pro faction called for a substantial move by the IRA to put its 
weapons beyond use63 before the institutions were re-secured (Independent 8 5 01)
According to the IFF hypotheses the parallel sequencing still absent from design was 
necessary to further implementation Lending some support to this hypothesis, the 
negotiations running up to the resignation deadline (August 10/11) were unprecedented 
in that they specifically pressed for a breakthrough on all issues as part of the one
62IRA -  IICD contacts continued throughout the March -  July period (I1CD Report, 3-7-01)
Spoiler and some sceptic factions still insisted on full de-commissioning
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package stability of the institutions, decommissioning, police reform and 
demilitarisation, as well as outstanding issues on human rights, criminal justice and 
equality (Independent 2 7 0 1 ,  IT 13701)  The initiative climaxed with the high- 
intensity, secret, proximity talks at Weston Park in England (9-14 July) These talks 
were held against the backdrop of the ‘marching season’ and mounting mter-community 
violence that resulted m the worst noting m nationalist areas m many years 64 The 
motivations behind this violence were undoubtedly political, and clear incentives 
existed for the spoiler factions to orchestrate it And reacting to pressures from the 
spoiler and sceptical factions that were part of his movement, m a provocative, public 
speech made dunng the course of the secret talks Adams declared that ‘the issue o f arms 
would not be resolved within the artificial deadline imposed by Trimble’ (IT 12 7 01) 
Meanwhile, pressure on the unionist pro faction intensified with an Orange Order call 
for the UUP to withdraw from talks (Independent 13 07 01)
The Weston Park initiative ended m stalemate, but this time the governments used their 
power as drivers of the implementation process to impose a deadline withm two weeks 
they would present a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ package to the parties outlining the sequence 
and timing that would govern the implementation of all issues in the process If the IFF 
theory is accurate, the package proposal would dramatically close-off the opportunities 
for spoiler factions to demand issue hierarchy, and would thus secure significant 
progress towards implementation, if  it included reciprocal and/or reversible issue 
breakdown and parallel sequencing of implementation
AUGUST -  SEPTEMBER THE PACKAGE SETTLEMENT
The ‘rescue package’ (August 1) was divided into four sections decommissioning, 
policing, demilitarisation and the stability of the institutions (Independent1 - 2 8 01) It 
centred on encouraging the unionist pro faction to take three clear steps towards the 
establishment of secure institutions the re-establishment o f a working executive (by 
Trimble), of inclusive North-South institutions, and the agreement to sign a statement 
preventing a First Minister from using his/her position to repeat actions like the refusal
64 Loyalists groups threw petrol bombs at police and nationalist estates m Portadown (IT 12 07 01), 
loyalist paramilitaries were firing on Shanklnll Road (12 07 01), tense nationalist riots m response to a 
paiade on the Ardoyne in Belfast resulted in the police shooting of 40 plastic bullets (IT, 13-7-01) 
Meanwhile a several-week blockade of a Catholic school on the Ardoyne in Belfast began (Independent, 
30-7-01)
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to nominate Sinn Fern to the North-South bodies 6:> But the package did not request that 
Trimble and his party take these moves first, and they were, m fact, subtly reciprocal 
with a more firm commitment from republicans to decommission Procedures for 
decommissioning were left to the IICD whose work on disarmament to date was defined 
by issue breakdown, but the package implied that a decommissioning step should 
precede the step to restore the stability of the institutions (Independent, 2 8 01) No 
deadline for the end of the decommissioning process was given and no rule or 
procedure presented the unionist spoiler faction with a clear deadline on which to seize 
(although clearly factions could use missed deadlines as a justification for the creation 
of new ones)
In keeping with the pnor-handlmg of the issue, demilitarisation was presented as a 
series of steps, a ‘progressive rolling programme’ to reduce troop levels and military 
installations, moving to close army bases, end army presence at police stations and 
destroy surveillance towers These steps were more or less reciprocal and they depended 
on movement from republicans on decommissioning But demilitarisation, m turn, 
depended on a decrease m the threat of violence m the province (itself clearly connected 
to decommissioning) The logic was that a move to de-commission by the IRA would 
enable the loyalist pro faction to decrease the insecurity that was evident amongst its 
grass roots and actively encouraged by the elite and sub-elite members of its spoiler 
faction Further, as later events indicate (October, November 2001), the British 
government had given Sinn Fem a commitment to immediately implement a number of 
these concrete steps m a response to a significant move on decommissioning
The governments, m consultation with the parties, had sought during the Weston Park 
talks to narrow the ground between Mandelson’s police legislation, which had aimed to 
win back unionist support for police reform, and the Patten report, which nationalists 
favoured 66 The package aimed to include enough, and as little, of the Patten Report’s 
outstanding recommendations to protect both the nationalist and the unionist pro 
factions from their sceptical and spoiler factions This would enable both to make the
Tumble’s refusal to allow Sinn Fem MLAs to sit on the North-South Ministerial Council was, m fact, 
successfully challenged by Sinn Fein who had lodged judicial review proceedings m November 2000
66 In fact, the British government was instigating a de facto return to tiy to implement the reforms 
outlined in the Patten Report This was arguably only possible as part of the implementation package
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critical move to endorse the newly-proposed Police Board by making nominations to it 
The logic of the implementation plan appears to have been that with the endorsement 
and establishment of the new inclusive, representative and accountable institution, all 
other aspects of police reform would be incrementally implemented Without its 
endorsement, the implementation of police reform, and consequently the whole 
implementation plan, would be stalled (IT, 19 09 01)
The governments’ approach to the policing issue appears to have been aimed at 
strengthening the hand o f both pro factions They first sought the parties’ acceptance of 
‘principles’ on which the governments would base the final police reform 
implementation plan With this approval secured, they would publish a revised 
implementation plan which would include details on the composition and powers of the 
police board 67 Therefore, any reasonable objections to the principles on which the plan 
would be based could be dealt with before the official plan was published and the pro 
factions could then present the ‘principles’ as a reasonable request to their respective 
spoiler factions Also part of the package were commitments to introduce draft 
legislation for an overhaul o f criminal justice system, to appoint a judge of international 
standing to investigate alleged cases o f loyalist paramilitary-RUC collusion, and to 
review the parades commission The latter was designed to meet unionists’ concerns, 
the former to meet those o f nationalists
There were potential difficulties with the rescue package The first difficulty was the 
broken-down nature of the decommissioning issue and the reciprocal yet less broken- 
down nature of the steps that were required to secure the institutions This may have 
given the spoiler faction withm unionism grounds for articulating reasonable objections 
to the deal why take such a large step m response to IRA moves that were still short of 
full decommissioning7 However, in a similar manner to the UIJP’s move to form the 
executive m May 2000, the move was reversible m the event of the IRA’s reversal of its 
parallel process o f step by step decommissioning Its reversal would automatically 
impair the stability o f the institutions once again, even if the UUP signed the mooted 
statement This reversibility, which might have assisted the pro faction within unionism,
67 The new Police Board was to incorporate ten elected representatives to be nominated by parties on the 
basis of their strength m the Assembly and using the de Hondt system It would also include 9 
independent members This gave elected members a majority See Irish Times, 18-09-01
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m turn highlights the potential difficulties that the package presented for nationalism’s 
pro faction The spoiler faction within republicanism could argue that if the unionist 
move to re-establish the institutions could be reversed in the event o f no ERA 
decommissioning, it could be reversed m the event o f IRA decommissioning The 
British government’s evident power to suspend the institutions (though on some 
occasions it was used m consultation with the Irish government) provided further fuel to 
this argument If the spoiler faction could convince the sceptical faction that the 
institutions would never be secure unless full decommissioning (surrender) had taken 
place and that, even after full decommissioning the security o f the institutions remained 
m doubt, the pro faction within the republican movement and nationalism m general 
would face insurmountable obstacles to implementation This would possibly 
precipitate an end to the cohesion between the SDLP and Sinn Fem
Reinforcing this difficulty for the republican pro faction, the consensus was that a move 
on decommissioning was essential first A number of questions thus abound did this 
provide the spoiler faction m the republican camp with a reasonable basis on which to 
refuse to implement7 Could the spoiler faction present this move as one that continued 
to demand an unchanged, unreasonable, unilateral move, to which the terms of the 
agreement did not bind them7 If this were the case, would the pro faction within 
nationalism be forced to take this line to maintain the unity of the movement7
Two factors central to the design of the implementation process worked against this 
scenario On the one hand, the formula did not call for the full decommissioning of 
paramilitary weapons, but only for a significant move to begin the phased process to 
which republicans had already agreed in principle The issue was broken into a stepped 
process and, while not ‘reversible5 m the technical sense, the size o f the move was not 
specified but secret It could possibly be presented as a reasonable request to the spoiler 
faction especially given Trimble’s agreement to reciprocate with three steps towards 
securing the institutions This breakdown decreased, but did not entirely remove, the 
spoiler faction’s opportunity to reject the package on the basis, that m its call for a 
decommissioning move to secure the institution, it demanded issue hierarchy But on 
the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, the move was not just presented as a 
preiequisite if  Tnmble was to secure the institutions It was to take place m conjunction 
with the implementation of other issues police reform and demilitarisation If police
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reforms were reasonable and their implementation sufficiently broken down, and if the 
promise to begin demilitarisation were real, it would prove difficult foi the spoiler 
faction to present a reasonable objection to a move to begin decommissioning
AUGUST -  OCTOBER 2001 RESPONSE AND BREAKTHROUGH
In response to the package and to the August 11 deadline (which the governments 
appeared likely to meet with a one-day ‘suspension)/68 the IICD announced that the 
IRA had agreed on a method for putting its armoury completely and verifiably beyond 
use (IT 7-8-01) With this unprecedented move (Independent, 7 8 01) the IRA had met 
two o f the three demands made by the pro, sceptical and spoiler factions of unionism 
commitment to put arms beyond use (May 2000) and commitment to a specific method 
of putting them beyond use Yet the move failed to give any timetable or any indication 
as to when the IRA might begin the actual decommissioning process Therefore, it was 
predictably too little for unionist pro faction who, after much consultation with the UUC 
ruling body, publicly announced that unless the blueprint for implementation delivered 
an actual decommissioning of (some) weapons, the Ulster Unionists could not support it 
(IT, 8 7 01) The IRA responded by withdrawing its offer on August 14 (IRA 
Statement) and blamed its decision on both the British government and the UUP’s 
rejection o f police reforms recommended by Patten (IRA Statement 14 8 01) This 
suggested that as long as the police reform implementation plan was pending there 
remained an opportunity for breakthrough
Some perceived the first IRA statement m August as part of a 'genuine attempt5 (Hume, 
IT, 15 8 01) by those m favour of implementing the agreement to meet the needs o f the 
unionist pro faction, by making a move to progress the process of decommissioning, 
while maintaining the unity of its organisation David McKittnck suggests that the 
republican movement’s pro faction perceived the UUP’s rejection of the move as an 
uppmg of the stakes (Independent, 12 08 01) Given the climate of violence, it would 
appear that this faction of Sinn Fem aimed to ensure the security of the institutions with 
one decommissioning step and to use the next decommissioning step to induce 
amendments to the police reform which should silence its spoiler faction Some 
members likely hoped that they could at once silence their spoiler factions and take
68 This mechanism gave anothei six weeks before the agreement would go into review or elections
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credit at the expense of the SDLP for further changes to police reform In fact, it is quite 
likely that both motivations were behind the move However, agreement on the rules 
and procedures for the implementation of police reform was critical for any 
breakthrough
The extent to which the pohcing-implementation body met recommendations of the 
Patten report would be highly significant If the plan for the implementation of police 
reform enabled the SDLP and the pro faction Smn Fein leadership to make reasonable 
requests of the nationalist spoiler faction, it would offer an opportunity for breakthrough 
on all issues, including decommissioning The position adopted by the SDLP towards 
the rest part of the package was cntical in this context It gave an important signal to 
the governments immediately after the package was published when it indicated that i f  
the implementation of police reform did not live up to its expectations one hundred per 
cent it would not reject it out o f hand (IT 9 8 01) Subsequently, m response to the 
revised implementation plan (August 17), the SDLP took a historic step m endorsing the 
new policing authonty (Independent 22 08 01) on 21st August69
The implementation plan provided for a powerfully accountable, over-arching, 
representative police board, which had the power to make the Chief Constable explain 
operational decisions and to sack him/her with majority support It also provided for 
representative District Policing Partnership Boards at local level, m addition to an 
Ombudsman office (implemented m October 2000) with a staff of 70 70 In a gesture to 
unionists, the RUC was not to be disbanded but to be renamed and to adopt a new badge 
and symbols that are free from any association with either the British or the Irish states 
(IT, 18 8 01) Substantial compensation was provided for police victims and their 
families Most analysts, including some members of the original Patten Commission, 
agreed that the accountability structures flowing from the police implementation plan 
were close to being compatible with Patten’s recommendations (IT 18 08 01,
69 As analysts explain, nationalists had never been prepared to concede legitimacy to a reformed RUC m 
the absence of an overall settlement to the constitutional issue, as without this, nationalism continued to 
reject the state that the RUC represented (O’Leary and McGarry, 2000 35) The SDLP’s decision to 
endorse the police reform implementation plan, suggests not only that reforms were deemed sufficient to 
truly transform the institution, but that they perceived the step as furthering the consolidation of the 
overall political settlement, which they required to ensure the legitimacy of the new police
70 Report of the Independent Commission on Policing for NI Updated Implementation Plan 18 August 
2001
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Independent, 21 08 01) Many groups ordinarily sympathetic to republican concerns 
about policing, including the Insh bishops, the Irish government and members o f the 
Patten Commission on policing (IT, 27 08 01, IT 22 08 01, IT 30 08 01), claimed that 
the implementation plan included provisions to deal with these concerns But in the first 
signs of real division in the pan-nationalist front, Adams called the SDLP’s 
endorsement ‘pre-mature and short-sighted’ (IT, 30 08 01) Significantly, however, he 
did not rule out the prospect of ever joining the police board
Smn Fein’s refusal to endorse the police board might be read as the action of a 
monolithic, spoiler faction, attempting to use process concerns on the issue of police 
reform to defeat the SDLP (pro faction) m the battle within nationalism Alternatively, it 
can be read as the move of a pro faction, unwilling to take an irreversible move until the 
avenues that would allow its spoiler faction to increase its sceptical faction’s 
unhappiness with the process were closed off If this were the case, they could be 
expected to move m the context of the overall package Furthermore, another 
consequence of Smn Fein’s decision not to immediately join the board was that the 
DUP did join This certainly served to make the policing board more stable and reduced 
some of the pressure on the pro faction withm the UUP and, perhaps, saved the board 
from the fate of the executive
FROM PACKAGE TO BREAKTHROUGH
The package proposal and the publication of the implementation plan for police reform 
increased the pressure that was mounting on the Republican movement Pressure 
climaxed when the SDLP, along with the UUP and the DUP, formally nominated 
representatives to sit on the board (Independent 21 09 01) The police reform issue, 
while far from resolved, was institutionally resolved and the three parties implicitly 
indicated their support for the reform, the implementation of which would be overseen 
by the board71 But room remained for spoiler factions to present obstacles to its 
implementation and the reciprocity inherent m its implementation is clear from an RUC 
Chief Constable security warning that followed the nominations without serious moves 
towards decommissioning by the IRA, followed by loyalist and other republican groups,
71 A seven member Oversight Commission on policing had been set up to ensuie that the 
recommendations m the Patten Report were implemented Tlus work was ongoing
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it will be difficult for the new police service to implement important policing changes 
(IT, 22 09 01)
Immediately before the approaching six-week deadline (23 September)72, and almost 
simultaneously to the nominations to the police board by the SDLP, the UUP and the 
DUP, the IRA announced that it had intensified its dialogue with the IICD This 
reversed its decision of August 14 to cut off communication with the IICD (20 9 01 
IRA Statement) But it was unlikely to secure a breakthrough and almost all parties 
immediately declared it as ‘welcome but not sufficient5 73 In fact, the move offered less 
than what the IRA had agreed with the IICD before the 6th August, and it did not give 
any indication as to when decommissioning would take place Therefore, the republican 
pro faction was most likely aware that the move would not enable the UUP to re­
establish the security o f the institutions Instead, the intention behind the move may 
have been to enable the unionist pro faction to persuade its sceptical faction to save the 
institutions by tolerating a further one-day suspension The unionist pro faction had 
been presenting this one-day suspension as difficult to accept unless there was a realistic 
prospect that decommissioning was going to happen5 (IT, 18-9-01) Its spoiler faction, 
which clearly had the support of some of its sceptical faction, demanded that there be no 
more one-day suspensions if  the IRA failed to disarm before the end of the six-week 
deadline 21 September (Donaldson, IT, 20-9-01)
However, the Secretary of State allowed what he referred to as the last one-day 
suspension on 21st September and this extended the life o f the process by six weeks 
Trimble’s move m the immediate aftermath of the suspension was a clear and direct 
response to the pressure from his spoiler faction Once again placing the stability of the 
institutions at the centre of a reciprocal bargain, he tabled an assembly motion to 
exclude Sinn Fein from the executive on the grounds that it had not lived up to its 
promises of May 2000 and May 2001 If, as anticipated, the exclusion motion were to 
fail to win cross-community consent, the UUP ministers vowed to resign one-by-one 
from the executive This would precipitate the fall of the Assembly unless the Assembly
72 A ‘one-day’ suspension of the institutions on 11th August had given the parties another 6  weeks to 
agree on a formula that would re-establish the institutions
7 They argued that it did not give a full response to the Weston Park proposals (IT, 21 -09-01)
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was once again suspended.74 Therefore, when the Secretary of State confirmed that 
further one-day suspensions were no longer tenable in the absence of progress 
(IT, 4.10.01), the implementation process faced its most defining moment: were no 
progress made that enabled the Assembly to re-elect (or elect) First and DF Ministers 
before the next six-week deadline, a formal review and direct rule or new elections 
would follow (IT, 10.10.01).
According to the IFF hypotheses, the UUP’s pro faction hoped to use the sanction to 
keep its sceptical faction onside and its spoiler faction at bay. At the same time it hoped 
to persuade the republican leadership to take the comprehensive step on the issue of 
decommissioning that the UUP’s pro faction believed it was in the position to take. The 
spoiler faction, especially those members of it who were outside of the UUP, would 
have welcomed the elections at this point. A second best to elections for the spoiler 
faction would have been a harder ultimatum to the IRA which would have surely 
ensured that the IRA did not deliver decommissioning. Then if the institutions 
collapsed, the spoiler faction within the UUP would cite the failure of the IRA to 
decommission as justifying its refusal to re-establish the Assembly. It would present this 
as a vindication of its strategy and would, perhaps, perceive the moment as an 
opportune one to challenge the pro faction-leadership of the UUP. But Trimble’s 
proposal to introduce sanctions was a reasonable request to his own spoilers. His 
decision to drag out the deadline by moving slowly towards ministerial disengagement 
(IT, 10.10.01) was most likely taken in the context of reports that internal debate over a 
comprehensive move ensued in republicanism (Independent, 10.10.01). The republican 
pro faction and the UUP’s pro faction needed each others’ moves for the survival o f  
their own strategies.
In the absence of any progress, the UUP’s motion to exclude Sinn Fein was triggered.
As anticipated, it failed to win cross-community support and this precipitated the 
incremental resignation of UUP ministers. The DUP ministers also resigned having
74 As Secretary of State, Mo Mowlam introduced a standing order which required the executive to have a 
proportionality of nationalists and unionists to be operative (July 1999). This had lapsed and so legally 
the resignation of the ministers did not make the executive inoperative. But politically the British 
government (arguably with the agreement of the Irish government) was unlikely to allow this to happen.
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declared that they would do so to ensure the integrity of the UUP’s resignations. In 
reality, the DUP ministers had to resign or be left in a very difficult position of being in 
government with Sinn Fein when the UUP was not. By 19 October all the unionist 
ministers had resigned from the executive. If the parties could not find a way to 
continue sharing power in the executive by 25th October, the Secretary of State would 
choose to review the agreement, to hold fresh elections or to impose direct rule and an 
indefinite suspension of all institutions75.
The pro faction of republicanism would have reacted to the crisis by considering its 
options: would a review of the agreement and the possibility of more elections, or the 
retention of the current assembly and a step in the decommissioning process, better 
serve its goal to maintain control over its organisation, to maintain the ground that it had 
made within the nationalist conflict formation on the SDLP and to implement the GFA? 
The pro faction within republicanism most likely calculated, that without 
decommissioning at this point, and in a subsequent election campaign in which its 
refusal to decommission could appear unreasonable, it could lose ground to the SDLP 
and thus increase the power of the sceptical faction in its own party. If a review without 
elections were to follow, it appeared unlikely that the restoration of the institutions 
would occur without this decommissioning step. In fact, it also appeared that in view of 
the settlement of other issues, the SDLP would insist on decommissioning in the event 
of a review.
A movement to de-commission could now open the way for movement that would 
secure the institutions and the sequenced implementation of both police reform and of 
demilitarisation. This narrowed options for the spoiler faction in republicanism and 
reduced the likelihood that it could use spoiler tactics to prevent the implementation of 
the agreement. The spoiler faction would have tried to argue that the actions of 
unionists exposed the instability of the institutions and that they should not respond to 
ultimatums that amounted to ‘surrender.’ However, there was a weakness in this 
argument which might have helped the pro faction to win the sceptical faction’s support
7:> The result of legislation underpinning the agreement and assembly, seven days after the executive no 
longer functions the Secretary of State must indicate which action he will take: Review alongside 
indefinite suspension of all institutions or dissolution of the assembly and new elections. Irish Times 
10.10.01 .
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for implementation The decommissioning move was part of a secret, step-by-step 
process which would be overseen by an independent commission and the security of the 
institutions could be perceived as actually dependent on the initiation of this process 
The police issue could be seen as more or less institutionally settled with the 
implementation of agreed reforms set to begin, demilitarisation had begun and a report 
of the criminal justice review was complete This surely weakened the spoiler faction’s 
case and protected the pro faction from the worst spoiler tactics Parallel sequencing and 
issue breakdown, at least temporarily, governed the entire implementation process
The presence of issue breakdown, the introduction of parallel sequencing by the 
package proposal and its near circumvention of the issue hierarchy demand should have 
given the unionist and nationalist pro factions the power to initiate a move while 
maintaining the unity of their movements But it was critical that the unionist’s response 
to a republican move would increase the nationalist sceptical faction’s confidence m the 
stability of the institutions Sinn F em ’s pro faction had to be assured that if it delivered 
the UUP was m the position to take the reciprocal step to re-instate the institutions and 
to leave the decommissioning issue to the CCD Re-instating the institutions would re­
instate Sinn Fein’s ministers on the North-South bodies (IT, 20 10 01) Sinn Fem 
appeared to receive these assurances from David Tnmble and on 22 October Sinn Fem 
publicly called on the paramilitaries to make a move on the arms issue (IT, 23 10 01)
On 23 October, in the biggest breakthrough of the implementation process, the IRA 
announced, and the IICD confirmed, that the process o f putting its weapons completely 
and venfiably beyond use had begun (IRA Statement, 23 10 01) Tnmble immediately 
moved to re-instate the executive and the full working of the North-South institutions 
(IT, 23 10 01)
CONCLUSION
Given the at least temporary vindication of the pro faction’s strategy, the unionist 
spoiler faction was prevented from undermining the agreement with the refrain that the 
IRA would never decommission And with Trimble at least temporarily in the driving 
seat, the pro faction sought to institutionalise the security of the institutions Before 
seeking re-election as First Minister in the Assembly, he called an emergency meeting 
of the UUP ruling council to win approval for a return to full participation in the 
Executive and the North-South Ministerial Council, and for an instruction to all
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Assembly members by the UUC to support this approval (24 10 01) Once again this 
lends support to the IFF model’s prediction that step-by-step moves remove many of the 
conditions that allow spoiler factions to undermine the implementation process without 
the approval of the UUC, Trimble would have been consistently vulnerable to the 
accusation that pro factions had over-estimated the significance of the decommissioning 
move With the approval, pro faction strategy prevailed, and the sequence and timing at 
least temporarily limited the spoiler faction’s opportunities 76
There has been much speculation on the extent to which two external events were the 
catalysts to the IRA decision to formally begin the decommissioning process the 
attacks on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001, and the August 2001 arrest 
of three men, formerly and possibly still linked to the republican movement for alleged 
collaboration with Columbian guerrilla insurgency, FARC But it is difficult to support 
the argument that pressure from the US administration following these events was the 
catalyst The American government’s priority m the immediate aftermath of the attack 
on the World Trade Centre was to secure the support of the British government in a 
‘war against terrorism ’ It would thus appear unlikely that the US administration wanted 
to interfere m Northern Ireland m any way that was incompatible with the British 
government’s strategy Thus, to the extent that the British government wanted to use the 
incident to put pressure on the IRA, it was important In fact, to the extent that pro 
factions withm the nationalist formation wanted to use it to highlight to nationalist 
sceptical and spoiler factions the futility o f any other course of action, it was perhaps 
most significant
One analysis considers the events of 11th September 2001 to have had ‘dramatic 
reverberations in Northern Ireland5 and, combined with the events in Columbia, ‘to 
have changed the terms of trade’ and ended the ‘proverbial logjam’ m the process77 The 
hish Times published a letter which articulated a view that with the events of 
September 11th ‘the shadow world between paramilitary and legitimate politics m winch
76 Despite this UUC’s ruling, two of the 28 UUP assembly members voted against the motion to re-elect 
Trimble as Fust Minister m November A feature of the consociational settlement helped to avoid the 
cnsis m executive formation that this nearly created Assembly parties had to adopt eithei a ‘unionist,’ 
‘nationalist’ or ‘other’ label, but this label was amendable Following the action of the dissenting UUP 
MLAs, the Alliance Party -  a traditionally unionist party but with middle ground support - changed its 
label from ‘other’ to ‘unionist5 Trimble needed the Alliance party votes to pass the motion by the cioss- 
community consent procedures
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Sinn Fein operates, ended’ (IT, 10-10-01) But suggesting that it ended on September 
11th is, at best over-simplistic and, at worst highly inaccurate The most important 
consequence of the US support for Sinn Fein is the licence that this gives it to fundraise 
there and to substantially enrich the party each year The majority of its US support 
groups had backed its peace process strategy, had been hugely instrumental m the 
promotion of Smn Fem with the US administration, and had invested energy and 
enormous resources m promoting Smn Fein’s commitment to democratic politics and 
the GFA (Darby and McGmty, 2000 90-1) That they would have continued to support 
a Smn Fein that was evidently refusing to let go o f its bullet and ballot box strategy, 
where it was no longer perceived to be a legitimate one, is unlikely There is a strong 
argument to suggest that Sinn Fern’s ability to indefinitely operate m this shadow world 
while maintaining the capacity to raise the funds so important to its strength m the US 
had ended m 1994 or, if  not then, in 1998, provided that the agreement was perceived as 
being implemented by other parties to the conflict And m September 2001 this did 
indeed appear to be the case implementation had progressed to the point where a 
package that appeared to guarantee implementation was dependent on the Republican 
movement taking one step to initiate a decommissioning process This was the crucial 
catalyst 78
An approach that interprets the October 2001 IRA move on decommissioning as a direct 
result of US pressure is based on one that perceives the republican movement as a 
monolith This approach tends to interpret the implementation strategy of the movement 
as one that seeks to use brinkmanship to squeeze concessions from the unionist 
formation and the governments (JIR 09 99 19), presumably with a view to getting 
closer to its umted-Ireland ideal But given this interpretation, it is difficult to explain 
why previous, tentative steps had been taken towards decommissioning the 
appointment of an IICD interlocutor, the agreement to allow weapons inspections, 
agreement with an independent body on a firm way of putting arms beyond use Nor 
can it explain the willingness of the republicans to negotiate about decommissioning as 
part of a package concerning demilitarisation, decommissioning, police reform and the 
security of the institutions The IFF model explains these events as resulting from a
77 Democratic Dialogue, November 2001
78 Off the record official Irish government sources have indicated that the leadership of Sinn Fem had 
given very positive re-assuiances about the intentions to de-comnussion before 1 1th September
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process whereby republican spoiler faction’s avenues were effectively curtailed by issue 
breakdown and parallel sequencing
The IFF model proposes that pro factions will be able to persuade sceptical factions to 
support initiatives that further implementation and to curtail the ability of spoiler 
factions to exploit issues to prevent their implementation, if  the sequence of issues 
accords to reciprocal and reversible issue breakdown, parallel implementation and the 
absence of any form of issue hierarchy Through sequence and timing procedures that 
approximated the above hypotheses, the most serious movement towards the full 
implementation of the Good Fnday Agreement was prompted m October 2001 The 
move on decommissioning was immediately followed by a senous start to the roll-out 
programme for demilitarisation m Northern Ireland (Irish Independent, 25 10 01) As 
the institutions functioned once again, and the police board was established as a 
working institution, a second move on decommissioning under the auspices o f the IICD 
followed m April 2002 (IT 09/04/02) UUP spokesman, Stephen King, interpreted the 
IRA’s ‘authenticated moves on decommissioning’ m Apnl as a severe blow to the 
opponents of the agreement, and as ‘proving anti-agreement unionists wrong twice ’(IT 
09 04 02) Almost completing the sequence and the implementation of all issues, Sinn 
Fem nearly endorsed the police authority on a number of occasions during the summer 
o f 2002 and gave its strongest indication that it would eventually join m September 
(RTE News, 19 09 02)
While the process continues to move m parallel sequence and small steps, it is safe from 
spoiler factions From October 2001 until Apnl 2002 the implementation of the issues 
concerning the secunty of the institutions, decommissioning, equality and human nghts, 
police reform, prisoners and cnmmal justice, were subject to issue breakdown, implicit 
reciprocity, and parallel sequencing The IFF model predicts that given the issue 
breakdown and parallel implementation at the heart of implementation design and the 
insulated institutions of the implementation process there should be further progress 
Given near agreement to the parallel implementation of all other issues, the full 
implementation o f the agreement is likely to require one further agreement on the 
simultaneous implementation of decommissioning and of measures that will fully 
secure the institutions On this basis it is argued that full implementation would be 
facilitated by the parallel sequencing of full decommissioning with a Bntish
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government (m consultation with the Irish government) rejection (m legislation) o f its 
powers to suspend the Northern Irish institutions The latter move would remove from 
republican spoiler factions a pretext on which to refuse to de-commission on the 
grounds that the British government could at any time undermine the democratic 
institutions of Northern Ireland This argument continues to provide a pretext for those 
who wish to encourage further scepticism in the sceptical faction of republicanism The 
former move (real decommissioning) would remove the pretext from the unionist 
spoiler faction that refuses to continue power-sharing with Sinn Fem on the basis o f its 
failure to disarm
But there is evidence of further difficulty m the sizeable groups who remain opposed to 
the consolidation of the GFA and willing to use and to incite violence to this end These 
groups are m the position to threaten the phased implementation of decommissioning, 
full police reform or demilitarisation, and to ensure that the institutions remain 
permanently unstable In September 2002, the biggest threat to the consolidation of 
implementation was perhaps the pretext that growing violence gives to those who 
continue to present ‘legitimate obstacles5 to implementation with a view to furthering 
spoiler agendas Cracks m the ceasefires open up once again the opportunity for both 
sides to demand issue hierarchy, beginning with a refusal to continue to implement until 
the ‘violence5 stops and until the IRA arms are fully de-commissioned A direct 
consequence of this uncertainty, m a clear illustration of the pro faction’s reduced 
ability to keep its spoiler faction at bay, the UUP’s ruling council passed another 
motion This re-mtroduced a decommissioning deadline and committed the UUP to pull 
out of the executive by January 2003 if  the IRA does not disband But the escalating 
violence, perpetuated by spoiler factions, provides republican spoiler factions with the 
pretext on which to refuse to de-commission This fuels the agenda of spoiler factions 
withm unionism
The uncertainty over the sincerity of the ceasefires spreads to uncertainty over the rights 
to continue prisoner releases, which m turn weakens further the support of some 
paramilitary groups for the process The more the paramilitaries5 support for the 
agreement weakens, the more pressure there will be on ceasefires and on the entire 
implementation process, including the stability of the institutions The Bntish 
government’s attempts throughout 2002 to re-unite the divided loyalists paramilitaries
238
undei a combined leadership or loose organisation illustrates the degree to which this 
disunity is perceived to threaten the agreement Further, m an endeavour to insulate the 
issue of whether or not the IRA or loyalist paramilitaries are breaking their cease-fires, 
the Secretary of State announced the appointment of an independent adviser m 
September 2002 The independent advisor will judge, m an agreed way, the degree to 
which violence is orchestrated, and thus the extent to which ceasefires are being 
breached (RTE NEWS, 19 09 02) With this, the governments hope to ensure that 
parallel sequencing of implementation continues and to prevent credible allegations that 
might justify the re-introduction of issue hierarchy demands The power to introduce the 
independent advisor stemmed from the relative insulation of the institution with 
oversight powers m the Northern Irish peace process Whether he proves to be 
sufficiently insulated may have an important bearing on the eventual outcome of the 
process
In sum, the model predicted that the closer the institutions that shape and set agendas m 
the implementation process proximate institutions insulated from post-agreement 
political wrangling, the more likely that the sequencing and timing that facilitates unity 
between the pro and sceptical factions will be put m place Facilitated by the power of 
the two governments and the existence of a number of independent commissions, many 
of the agenda setters m the implementation of the Northern Ireland agreement are 
insulated and have prioritised implementation above all else This has ensured 
considerable progress m implementation, despite continued efforts by spoiler factions to 
insist on issue hierarchy The ultimate outcome depends on the pro faction’s continued 
ability to resist the issue hierarchy demands that spoiler factions insist on and to replace 
them with parallel sequencing and reciprocal or reversible breakdown
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CHAPTER SEVEN
EL SALVADOR 
IMPLEMENTING THE CHAPULTEPEC PEACE ACCORDS
In January 1992 the government of El Salvador and the FMLN insurgency1 signed the 
Chapultepec Peace Accords. The Accords committed both parties to implement a series 
o f substantive agreements which had been negotiated since July 1990 according to the 
timetable set out in the final agreement. Chapultepec encompasses all o f the agreements, 
at the heart of which was a basic compromise: the FMLN would bring its insurgency to 
an end, would disarm, demobilise and accept and compete constitutionally in the 
political system, in return for a series of institutional reforms that would alter the civil- 
military power structure that had characterised the Salvadorian political system for over 
seventy years.
A number of substantive agreements were reached in 1990 and 1991 but spoiler factions 
were able to persistently undermine these compromises by disrupting efforts to agree on 
the procedures for their implementation. The barriers which they presented were finally 
overcome in late 1991 when a General Agreement was reached on the procedures, 
sequence and timing that would govern the implementation of all issues. This chapter 
will firstly use the IFF model to explain how the design of the process between 
September and December 1991 helped to facilitate pro factions in reaching this 
agreement. It then proceeds to explain how the design of the implementation process 
contributed to the ultimately successful implementation of the Accords. Ambiguities in 
the timetable initially presented opportunities for spoiler factions to demand issue 
hierarchy and to refuse to sequence the implementation of all issues together. This 
presented barriers to implementation and served to make it a tortuous and conflict- 
ridden process. These barriers, and the stalling that they encouraged, were eventually 
overcome by the careful introduction of parallel sequencing, issue breakdown and 
reciprocity, a task facilitated by the relatively insulated implementation mechanisms and 
the absence of clear issue hierarchy in the terms of the settlement.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The roots of the Salvadorian conflict lie in the depth of the political and socio-economic 
crisis which emerged from widespread poverty, the concentration of wealth in the hands
1 Frente Farabundo Martí Liberación Nacionale.
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of a small landowning class, and the strength of its over fifty-year long alliance with the 
military (CIIR, 1994: 3; Juhn, 1998: 7). The persistent refusal by the oligarchy and the 
military to introduce any reforms, even in response to political, non-violent pressure for 
change, radicalised the resistance movements and social and political unrest escalated to 
violent conflict in the 1970s. Mirroring the decoupling of traditionally strong 
conservative alliances that preceded the escalation of conflict in Northern Ireland, a 
reformist-led coup in 1979 heralded the escalation of conflict to civil war. For many of 
its instigators, the reformist coup aimed to reduce the appeal of the extreme left, by 
breaking the domination of the narrow oligarchic-military alliance to incorporate 
moderate, democratic politicians (Christian Democratic Party -  PDC) and forward- 
looking capitalists into a reformed political system (Byrne, 1996: 53). But conflict of 
interest between the differently-motivated members of the junta over the degree of  
reform that would be introduced and the degree to which positions o f power would be 
opened up to moderate ‘leftist elements’ resulted in disunity. This disunity helped to 
ensure that the repression of peaceful protest continued as it had under the previous 
government. Ultimately the reformist junta was replaced with a new government which 
was based on a pact between centrist elements of the PDC and the conservative victors 
of the military power struggle (Juhn, 1998: 34).
Given the failure of the coup to introduce even moderate reform and the subsequent 
PDC pact with the military, the support for both moderate and radical-leftist opposition 
increased. The mass organisations and parties that had left the junta were unified into 
Zamora’s FDR behind a platform for democratic, revolutionary government (Byrne, 
1996: 61). Five left-wing, guerrilla organisations founded during the 1960s and 1970s 
united into a well-organised, coalition movement with a combined military command 
and with considerable grass-root support: FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation 
Front). Ultra-right civilian and military squads with institutional connections to the 
divided armed forces were incensed and fearful of the threat that even minor reforms 
would bring. They were to further fuel the conflict and in the aftermath of the reformist 
coup they launched a brutal campaign of violence against both leftist guerrillas and the 
PDC elements of the government.
2 Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR)
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In 1980 the repression of the civilian population by the army and the deaths squads was 
unprecedented in its intensity (Stanley, 1996: 2). The military government’s actions 
were in part motivated by the threat posed to its power by the successful leftist 
revolution in Nicaragua. Its actions can also be explained by the dramatic increase in 
financial support from the US that followed this revolution. In response to the 
increasingly violent actions of the government, in 1981 the FMLN3 launched a country­
wide insurgency which rocked the foundation of the state. The threat posed by the 
insurgency dramatically confirmed the balance of power within the PDC-military 
government in favour of the military and its repressive, counter-insurgency policy. 
While the strong US support enabled the armed forces to achieve a stalemate in the war 
from 1983 until the settlement (Stanley, 1996: 3), the cycle of violence continued for 
almost a decade and resulted in over 75,000 deaths from 1981 to 1992.
While there were certainly many amongst the FMLN leadership and some amongst the 
rank and file who were ideologically driven to set up a socialist state, it would appear 
that other motivations were on balance more significant. The six-point platform agreed 
by its five leaders in December 1980 was pragmatic and moderate (McClintock, 1998: 
56-7). During the civil war, the most frequently mentioned rationale for pursuing the 
armed struggle by the elite, sub-elite and rank and file was the impossibility of 
instigating change through elections, the repression of dissent by the military and 
economic grievances (McClintock, 48-63; 250-271). Many were also motivated by a 
sense of fear and by the need for protection from the military and the ultra-right death 
squads, who threatened those with even a tenuous connection to the left movement 
(Stanley, 1996: 223). When the counter insurgency adopted a new policy which opened 
up the political system slightly in the 1980s, some middle-class support for the violent 
struggle was lost. These political developments would arguably have strengthened the 
moderate factions of the FMLN who, rather than seeking to overthrow the political 
system, were prepared to use the war to force the government to negotiate and to change 
the political system (ECA, 03.89: 177).
There were hugely conflicting aims within the military-centrist-oligarchy coalition. It 
was most united in its desire to defeat the ‘communist’ insurgency. However, the
3 Supported by both the USSR and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.
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military was most concerned with its survival as a powerful, autonomous, political 
institution, and financial and military support from the US and the continuation of civil 
war were perceived as central to this goal by many of its members. The PDC elite hoped 
that they could reduce the appeal of the left and rebuild its own popular support base 
which was destroyed after the failure of the 1979 coup. In pursuit of this goal they 
coalesced with the military to facilitate the implementation of its US-backed moderate 
and limited democratic reforms. Funded by wealthy landowners, right-wing opponents 
of the moderate reforms driven by the centre colluded with, and sometimes operated 
directly out of, official military agencies such as the National Police and the National 
Guard (Nacla, V o l, 23,2: 16). They formed a third faction in the counter-insurgency 
formation. They perceived the FMLN as threatening the very viability o f the 
landowning classes, and death squads sought to violently wipe out FMLN social bases 
(Byrne, 11996: 76). In 1982, Roberto D ’Aubuisson4 formally established this shady 
third force as a political party (ARENA).5 The extent to which intra-formation 
divisions determined the strategy of the counter-insurgency movement is seen in 
D ’Aubuisson’s attitude to the Christian Democratic party: the opposition were ‘all 
communists’ but the Christian Democrats were the worst as ‘they lent legitimacy to the 
communist project’ (Stanley, 1996: 189). Policy disputes and power struggles both 
within and between each member of the counter-insurgency coalition ensured that no 
adequate political response to the insurgency arose other than repression on the verge of  
anarchy, which served to concentrate power in the hands of the military.
In 1985 the unity of the increasingly powerful ARENA party was threatened when 
factions announced their intention to establish a separate party, dissociated with 
D ’Aubuisson, the death squads, and the anarchy. A negotiated takeover of the 
leadership by a faction led by Crisianti, a coffee baron who was more moderate and 
‘acceptable’ than some of those associated with D ’Aubuisson, managed to preserve the 
unity of the party. Critically they managed to keep the influential D ’Aubuisson faction 
firmly within the ARENA organisation (Zamora, 1998: 56). Cristiani promised to 
promote a narrow democracy by ‘respecting the legal and electoral process’ (Nacla, 
23.2: 16-18). Members of the Cristiani faction of ARENA had clear interest in a
4 D ’Aubuisson had formally been a high ranking member of the armed forces and maintained institutional 
links with sections of it. (Juhn, 1998: 36-8; Stanley, 1996: 190-2).
5 Alianza Républicana Nacionalista.
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controlled, limited democratic transition, but they faced major opposition from the more 
radical faction of the party and its ally - the death squads. This Cristiani-led faction of 
ARENA also had a clear interest in limiting the power of the armed forces, which it 
perceived as encroaching on the power of the oligarchy and the business classes. This 
interest intensified when it won the elections and formed a government in 1989: if  
ARENA was to avoid the fate of the severely-weakened Christian Democratic Party, it 
needed to reduce the power of the army. The army’s power would only be reduced in 
the context of peace. This meant that the insurgency would have to be brought to an end 
(Juhn: 1998).
Thus after 1989 some elite members of the FMLN insurgency and of the ARENA 
government had incentives to negotiate. What is more, improved regional relations 
between the Central American presidents (Esquipusal 11, 1987), the end of the Reagan 
administration in the US, and warming US-USSR relations6 provided a favourable, 
structural framework for negotiations. Although another three years o f civil war were 
to ensue, with a dramatic and relatively successful offensive by the FMLN in November 
1989, UN-sponsored negotiations, which began in earnest in December 1989, 
culminated in the final accord in January 1992.
THE ACCORDS
Chapultepec committed the ARENA government to dramatic institutional reforms that 
would place the institutional protection of human rights at the heart of the political 
system, to implement a reformed and impartial judicial system, a civilian-led 
government and an electoral system that would ensure free and fair elections (Appendix 
C). These changes were dramatic, given the exclusive, military-oligarchic political 
system that had long prevailed in El Salvador. The political system had never known 
inclusion or free and fair elections. Between 1931 and 1979 military elites used 
repression and electoral fraud to exclude the political ‘left’ (including the Christian 
Democratic centre) from power and between 1979 and 1982 exclusion and human rights 
violations afflicted an even greater variety of social groups (McClintock, 1998: 93). 
Repression by the state and political exclusion continued throughout the 1980s despite a
6 In 1989 the consensus in the US congress and administration developed in favour of a negotiated 
solution to the settlement in recognition of the failure of ten years of counter-insurgency. Juhn, 2 998 :2. 
Dramatic changes in the Soviet Union and the Sandinistas defeat in Nicaragua prompted logistical 
problems and soul searching in the FMLN about the future direction of its struggle. Byrne, 1996: 185).
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slight opening up of the political system by the counter insurgency in 1982 with the 
creation of an elected, constituent assembly and of an elected presidency. Members of 
the 84-seat, legislative assembly are elected to serve three-year terms by direct popular 
vote using a list PR system. The first elections took place in 1982 and they were 
followed by presidential elections in 1984 when, for the first time in El Salvador’s 
history, the head of the executive was directly elected. As indicated the impact o f these 
reforms was relatively cosmetic. However, the parties agreed in the Accords to maintain 
these institutions and, following a series of reforms to change the civilian-military 
balance of power, to hold presidential, legislative and local government (mayorite) 
election in March 1994. The government also committed to implement a number of 
mechanisms that would underpin socio-economic reform and specific provisions for 
land reform which was, perhaps, the most controversial issue o f the conflict.
If the Accords were to create space for the real introduction of these reforms, the 
implementation of provisions concerning the role o f the army and public security forces 
were critical. ARENA promised to radically reduce the legal powers and to increase the 
accountability o f the military, to purge the military of violent and corrupt officers, to 
dismantle the existing military-controlled internal security forces, to exclude the army 
from responsibility for maintaining internal order, to create a completely new civilian 
police force designed to safeguard the rights and safety of citizens, and to incorporate 
the erstwhile guerrillas into the political life of the country as a legal party. The FMLN 
was to implement a definitive ceasefire, to separate and concentrate forces, to undertake 
a phased disarmament under the supervision of the UN (ONUSAL) and a phased 
demobilisation programme, which was referred to as the ‘reintegration’ of combatants 
into civilian life. Part of the government’s commitment to socio-economic reform, 
socio-economic, development programmes and land reform were to facilitate this re­
integration and would be implemented simultaneously to demobilisation. The parties 
also agreed that former FMLN combatants could make up 20 per cent of the new 
national civilian police force.
The incentives for the development of spoiler, sceptical and pro tendencies in both 
conflict formations are considered before the potential of the IFF model hypotheses on 
implementation design to explain outcome is explored.
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FACTIONALISM
Most analyses support the interpretation that while the FMLN was quite united over the 
policy of cautiously entering negotiations, especially after the 1989 final offensive 
(Stanley, 1996: 241), many of the FMLN were higly sceptical about the wisdom of the 
policy during the negotiation process (Juhn, 1998: 95; Standley, 1996: 242). In a series 
of proposals issued by its joint command in 1989, the FMLN identified the reforms that 
it required for the transformation of the political system. In return for its willingness to 
consider a ceasefire and demobilisation, it demanded fundamental changes to the 
political system that would institutionalise a framework for a democratic system 
through which it could pursue its socio-economic goals (ECA, Jan-Feb 89: 57). The 
leaders of the FMLN are reported to have had much trouble convincing its own sub­
elite and rank-and-file of the value of electoral politics (Stahler-Sholk, 1994:32), 
especially given past experience and government foot-dragging during and after the 
negotiations. According to its chief negotiator - Samayoa7 - the debate within the 
FMLN was far more difficult than any negotiation with government (Byrne, 1996: 190- 
1).
At the heart of the internal political debate was the price it would (and could) demand 
for its demobilisation and reintegration into political life. Two of the five component
o
groups, ERP-RN , tended to see the Accords in themselves as a general fulfilment of  
their goal. On the other hand, the FPL, PCS and PRTC9 interpreted the Accords as a 
development that would enable the FMLN to use non-violent means to continue its 
struggle to implement the socio-economic reforms that would resolve the inequality that 
underpinned the conflict (Byrne, 1996: 214). Popular movements, whose activity had 
formerly been subordinated to the FMLN, emerged to make divergent demands on the 
FMLN. This increased pressure on unity across the elite and sub-elite sections of the 
organisation (CIIR, 1994: 20-1).
7 Salvador Samayoa, FMLN leader and chief negotiator. 1995 interview cited on a number of occasions in 
Byrne, 1996.
8 ERP: Ejercito Revolucionario del Peublo, founded in 1972 by leaders who tended to be more middle- 
class. Led by Villalobos since 1978 and during the negotiation of the accords. RN -  Resistencia Nacional 
withdrew from ERP in 1978 over the execution of a Marxist poet by the ERP leadership.
9 FPL -  Fuerzas Populares de Liberación. Worked from its founding (1970) to incorporate large numbers 
of peasants and workers and aspired to achieve a true Marxist-Leninist party. PCS -  Communist Party in 
El Salvador, founded by Farabundo Marti in 1930 and led by Handal. PRTC -  Partido Revolucionario de
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At the outset, the majority of elite and sub-elite members o f both strains in the FMLN 
appear to have belonged to the pro faction. They believed that the implementation of the 
Accords would further their political goals and they more or less staked their political 
future on full implementation. During negotiations, the FMLN’s joint command had 
placed more emphasis on institutional reforms than on socio-economic restructuring. 
While this strategy may seem to be odds with the FMLN’s historical ideology 
(Standley,1996: 6),10 it most likely reflected the common ground on which the FMLN’s 
individual parties could agree: accords could provide the space to introduce the 
irreversible, structural changes to the political system that they sought.11
But if events during the course of implementation were to change the more sceptical 
faction’s perception that the Accords could, in fact, enable them to further their 
objectives politically (Zamora, 1998: 250-1), the danger of power passing to more 
extreme and militant elements within the movement existed (Villalobos12: Juhn, 1998: 
107). Evidence suggests that some members of the formation did retain more radical 
agendas and a number of these members certainly awaited the opportunity to pursue 
them to stall the implementation process. Reports point to several ‘Marxist-Leninist’ 
guerrilla organisations, six of which had publicly launched themselves as alternatives to 
the new political system, but note disunity as weakening their strategy (Arm the Spirit 
Report: 08.95). A post-1995 assessment predicts that provided that major FMLN 
players continued to observe the Accords, intransigent, insurgent elements seemed to be 
reduced to ‘criminal bands’ without political significance.13 This suggests that a 
‘spoiler’ faction was marginalized during the implementation process.
The disunity that characterised the FMLN during the implementation process was 
illustrated in 1994 by an open split. The split occurred in after the 1994 elections and 
the immediate context of the political split was a decision by ERN and sections of RN
los Trabajadores (Worker’s Party) was the smallest member and latest to be found. It emphasised regional 
revolution. (McClintock, 1998: 48-53)
10 Standley says that many sympathetic observers of FMLN were puzzled that the strongest guerrilla 
movement in the Western hemisphere would lay down their guns at the peak of their military power in 
exchange for institutional reforms. But he points out that the implementation of the institutional reforms 
were in fact just what the country needed to break the ‘protection-racket’: The over seventy year reliance 
by elite classes on the coercion of the military to control El Salvador. Standley: 6-7.
11 The leadership promoted the logic that ‘the stroke of a pen could not guarantee the radical 
transformation of a society in which authoritarianism was so deeply rooted’ (Canas and Dada, 1999: 74).
12 ERN Leader.
13 Jane’s Information Group, Jane’s Sentinel: Dec 00-May 2001:8-9.
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to support an ARENA-led directive to redistribute the allocation of agenda-setting 
power in the assembly (Zamora, 1998: 251-3). But the dispute must be understood as 
the product of years of bitter internal party debate about the organisational structure of 
the new party, and its positioning on the left or centre-left of the political spectrum. 
According to Zamora14 (1998: 251) it was only a matter of time before the long-running 
dispute publicly erupted. The split suggests that some elite and sub-elite members of the 
FMLN would not go as far as other members to secure the ‘pro-faction GOES-FMLN 
alliance’ and thereby ensure sufficient implementation. After the split the FPL, PCS and 
PRTC presented the FMLN as a unified, revolutionary party, and made it quite clear 
that it would not include those willing to accept the neo-liberal agenda o f ARENA 
(Zamora: 254). Critically for the success of the implementation process, these divisions 
emerged as a formal split in the context of the new political structure established by the 
Accords and not as a challenge to it.
The FMLN’s organisational structure was highly de-centralised and constant internal 
deliberation, negotiation and debate was needed before strategies could receive the 
sanction of the five commanders (McClintock, 1998: 91). Zamora (1998: 221) points to 
its organisational structure as necessary for its peace strategy and for its smooth 
incorporation into the system of political parties. It also helped to ensure that its strategy 
in the implementation process had the approval of all significant factions and this 
arguably facilitated the pro faction in its quest to keep the sceptical faction on board.
But that an equilibrium in favour of signing the agreement existed for the five factions 
in January 1992 does not necessarily imply that it would hold during implementation. 
This is especially true given the strategy of the spoiler and sceptical factions within the 
government camp.
ARENA’S roots did not make it naturally disposed towards peace with the FMLN. The 
pro faction feared most of all that its spoiler faction would instigate a successful coup 
d'etat or that civil war would once again break out (Juhn, 1998:116-7) and place them 
at the mercy of the armed forces. The only way it could deal with this threat was to 
implement the provisions of the Accord in the most minimalist way possible so as to 
keep the FMLN on side, while not decreasing its own power vis-à-vis its internal
14 Founder and leader of FDR (Frente Democtatico Revolucionario), the civilian leftist opposition to El 
Salvador’s regime. Banned from competing politically throughout the civil war.
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challengers. The minimalist interpretation of its obligations under the settlement would, 
it hoped, ensure that it would be sufficiently accredited with implementation and 
reconciliation to retain the support of significant sections of the bourgeois classes and 
urban poor classes. In a more open and competitive political system, the support of 
these groups might be less certain. ARENA perceived it to be vulnerable to the policies 
of the Christian Democrats and, at some point in the future, to the FMLN’s policies.
Given the conflicting strategies of the counter-insurgency coalition during the civil war, 
it is hardly surprising that it was rife with division during the negotiations and the 
implementation process. The pro faction needed to triumph in the intra-formation power 
struggle and to this end it aimed to end the FMLN’s insurrection in order to re-draw the 
balance of power in the state away from the armed forces and in favour of ARENA. 
Some members of the pro faction were motivated by a desire to end the wartime 
command economy which it perceived as damaging to business. They hoped to use the 
Accords to consolidate a neo-liberal, capitalist state (Juhn, 1998: 126). If this required 
allowing the FMLN to take part in narrowly-defined electoral democracy, it was a price 
worth paying and thus the Accords would have to be implemented. President Cristiani 
appears to have belonged to this pro faction and his unyielding resistance to the full 
implementation of the Accords (below) is perceived here to be a product o f his ‘divided 
coalition’ (Juhn, 1998: 95). For ARENA’S pro faction, implementation made sense but 
only if  they could keep the powerful ARENA coalition of interests together (ECA,
06.89: 424-8). And salient rationales existed for the existence of sceptical and spoiler 
factions within the counter-insurgency formation.
First of all, the pro faction’s strategy was in fact exclusive and based on the 
presumption that ‘liberalism would disarm the left and depoliticise,’ and, in other 
words, weaken ‘the military’ (Juhn: 127). Given that any settlement would include an 
agreement to reduce the power o f the military, it was inevitable that large sections o f the 
armed forces were not only sceptical of the merits of the Accords, but were openly 
prepared to adopt spoiler tactics to block them. Some members o f the Army High 
Command, the Officer core and the rank and file who would not benefit from Cristiani’s 
patronage had little incentive to favour the Accords. In fact, Cristiani’s strategy rested 
on dividing the armed forces into pro and sceptical factions and this is illustrated by his 
choice o f army representative at the negotiations: General Vargas. While a graduate of
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the notoriously repressive and powerful Tandona military academy,15 Vargas was one of 
the less intransigent and was known to have connections with the Christian Democrats 
(Juhn: 82). By appointing him, Cristiani was arguably attempting to sideline powerful, 
hard-line military elements, while keeping an important body of sceptical elements 
onside.
Not only did the peace accords threaten the power of the army but large elements o f the 
civilian elite and a considerable percentage of the population also perceived the Accords 
as threatening. For example, populist right-wing organisations mobilised over 50,000 
people in a week-long, violent protest (LAM, October 91) against the substantive 
agreements reached in New York in September 1991. Powerful groups of individuals 
who were associated with the death squads and with the complicit public-security 
institutions (Stanley, 1996: 228) allied with a powerful civilian elite to form a large 
spoiler faction. The spoiler faction was prepared to use violence to provoke the left and 
to incite fear o f the Accords amongst those on the centre-right o f the political spectrum. 
It subsequently appears that these spoiler factions had some active support in the pre 
and post-1994 ARENA governments (Guardian 23.5.94). Without securing 
D ’Aubuisson’s support and the support of other elite and sub elite figures who had most 
control over the popular base of the ARENA party and the ultra-right, popular 
organisations, it was unlikely that Cristiani would be able to pursue a pro faction 
strategy.
After a highly comprehensive analysis of the negotiation process, Juhn (1998) 
concludes that intra-formation factionalism presented the critical obstacle to reaching 
final agreement on implementation design in December 1991: the axis was, she writes, 
not FMLN versus the GOES, or even FMLN versus the Armed Forces (AFES), but 
those who were pushing for a final agreement and those who pushed for anything less 
(Juhn: 116). In a private memo to FMLN negotiators on the eve of the final talks, US 
mediator, General Hamilton said that the final push was designed to encourage those in 
favour o f implementation ‘to rally around the talks, and to isolate extremists through 
confidence- building measures’ (Juhn: 118). Furthermore, a number of FMLN sources 
admitted privately during December 1991 that their concessions in the field were
15 This class of graduates from the 1960s were in high-ranking, powerful positions in the military and 
were known for highly repressive military strategy.
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‘designed to shore up Cristiani’s resolve to finish negotiations, against a growing chorus 
of dissent from the far right of his own party’ (Miami Herald: 3-12-91).
In sum, both conflict actors were factionalised and included a pro faction, a sceptical 
faction and a spoiler faction, the latter more clearly powerful in ARENA than in the 
FMLN. The chapter now proceeds to give an account of the mechanisms, rules and 
procedures governing implementation and to examine their impact on the ability o f pro 
factions to pursue the implementation of the settlement. The degree to which the design 
of the process facilitated or impeded pro factions in their efforts to retain control over 
their formation while implementing the agreement is the focus of the analytical 
narrative that follows.
RULES, PROCEDURES AND INSTITUTIONS
The Accords delegated extra-legal power to the UN mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), 
which incorporated three divisions (Chapultepec: 7).16 The parties also agreed to 
establish COPAZ, a multi-party Salvadorian institution, which included the FMLN. It 
was made officially responsible for ensuring the implementation of the political 
agreements (New York Agreement, 1991). According to Cristiani, ONUSAL and 
COPAZ were together ‘the mechanisms’ empowered to ‘control and verify the 
implementation of the agreements’ (BBCWWM: 3.1.91).
ONUSAL operated a relatively wide interpretation of its powers in the implementation 
process. Led by the Secretary General and his representatives (de Soto, Goulding) and 
the leaders o f the three ONUSAL divisions, it acted as chief mediator and agenda setter 
in the initiation of dispute-resolution procedures, particularly as the process progressed. 
According to one analysis, it served as a ‘channel of communication, and an 
authoritative interpreter of the Accords, ‘proposing solutions when crises developed, 
requesting concessions and commitment from both sides, and verifying compliance 
(Stahler-Sholk 1994: 41).
ONUSAL’s divisions were also mandated to oversee and verify specific aspects o f the 
process, and this had the effect of insulating these issues in some way from conflicting 
interpretations. These related in particular to the establishment of the new police force
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(PNC), the monitoring of human rights and the implementation of institutional human 
rights provisions, the oversight of the cease-fire, the phased demobilisation and 
disarmament of the FMLN, the demobilisation of sections of the army and the overall 
reduction of the armed forces according to the agreed timetable.17 Some of the most 
controversial issues of the implementation process related to military reform and the 
demilitarisation of the political system. These issues were in the hands of the UN- 
appointed Independent Commission on the Truth (Mexico City Agreement, 1991) and 
the agreed, government-appointed Ad hoc Commission (New York Agreement, 1991), 
whose recommendations would be binding. While this would not preclude factions from 
disagreeing fundamentally with the recommendations of both Commissions, the 
independence of the commissions served to make it difficult for the spoiler faction to 
use process-related, reasonable arguments to resist the implementation of the 
recommendations.
Some provisions, including many of the commitments given by the government 
concerning the reform of the political and judicial system and many of the Truth 
Commission and the Ad Hoc Commission’s impending recommendations, would 
require the approval of the legislative assembly for their implementation. For this 
approval the unity not only of ARENA, but also of elements of its main competitor in 
the counter-insurgency coalition, the Christian Democrats (PDC), would be required. 
This fact, and the absence of the FMLN from any institutions of the state, was the key 
rationale behind the creation of COPAZ. COPAZ’s existence signalled a permanent, 
institutional commitment to the implementation of the Accords. It would facilitate the 
consensus required on the procedures for implementation, not only between the FMLN 
and the government, but also between ARENA and the rest of the National Assembly. 
Accordingly, COPAZ was to establish a number of working commissions which would 
facilitate agreement on certain disputed issues in the Accords, in particular on the 
composition of the new civilian police force (PNC), on furthering the implementation of 
land reform and of the socio-economic provisions of the Accords (New York 
Agreement, 1991). But while COPAZ was envisaged to be a chief mechanism for 
dispute resolution, the UN was also assigned this role. The UN was generally more
16 UN, Blue Helmets: 425.
17 UN, Blue Helmets; 429-431; UN and ES: Chapters III & IV.
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successful in practicing it, in particular in resolving disputes that were driven by 
political conflict (Guardian: 23.05.94).
SEQUENCING AND TIMING OF IMPLEMENTATION
From September 1991 to January 1992 the mediators and the parties to the Salvadorian 
conflict struggled through intense rounds of negotiations to reach agreement on 
implementation design. In fact, agreement on implementation design preceded the final 
signing of Chapultepec, and disagreement over the sequence, timing and content o f each 
move in the implementation process threatened to unravel all that had been previously 
agreed. The factors that facilitated agreement and enabled negotiators to endorse the 
final agreement in January 1992 are therefore highly significant to the exploration of the 
IFF model hypotheses. They are next explored.
EARLY PARALLEL SEQUENCING: LAYING THE GROUNDWORK 
Two events facilitated the early introduction o f phased, broken-down, parallel 
sequencing of issues in the Salvadorian process. Firstly, following a proposal by the 
Secretary General, the parties agreed to establish mechanisms through which the 
implementation of the San José agreement (July 1990) on human-rights standards could 
begin. This meant that the monitoring of human right’s standards would begin well 
before a cease-fire and a final settlement were agreed. The neutral international body
charged with managing this transition process -  ONUSAL’s Division for Human Rights
18- began work m May 1991 . Given the small-step nature of this move -  i.e. to allow an 
international body to oversee the monitoring of human-right’s standards, it did not 
present the spoiler faction within the government with easy pretexts on which to reject 
the recommendation. Yet with the agreement came the initiation of a long, incremental 
process to improve El Salvador’s institutional capacity to monitor and protect citizens 
and groups from human rights abuses.
Secondly, in Mexico City in April 1991 the parties agreed on the concrete steps that 
would underpin the transition that would make genuine political central to the political 
system. The changes agreed included:
18 Its mandate was to verify compliance with human rights conventions and to investigate citizen or group 
complaints of human rights abuses.
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(i) Security reforms that prepared a new military doctrine for the armed forces, 
which would exclude them from public security duties;
(ii) Judicial reforms including Supreme Count reform, the creation of the 
National Council for the Defence of Human Rights, and a Commission of 
the Truth;
(iii) Electoral reforms providing for the creation of a Supreme Electoral Tribunal, 
with the mandate to impartially organise elections.
These substantive agreements were critical if  a final settlement was to be reached in El 
Salvador. However, it was necessary to agree on the procedures through which these 
difficult changes could be implemented. In fact, the procedures would determine the 
government’s ability to implement the changes. And that the design of the process 
facilitated the immediate initiation of a phased, broken-down, process of implementing 
most substantial issues facilitated pro factions in their quest to reach a final settlement. 
The question of how these procedures were agreed is next addressed.
For their implementation the reforms required the amendment of the constitution. The 
Salvadorian constitution required the approval of two successive national legislative 
assemblies, with two-thirds of the votes in the second one, for amendments to the 
constitution.19 As legislative elections were to take place at the end of April 1991, the 
pre-election Assembly would have to approve the constitutional amendments before its 
dissolution. If it did not, the prospect of legally implementing substantial aspects of the 
accords would have been delayed until a further Assembly sat after March 1994. This 
would very arguably have prevented the reaching of a final agreement and the civil war 
is likely to have continued well into the 1990s.
To avoid that scenario, Cristiani had to rush the amendments through the ARENA- 
dominated, pre-election, assembly. But he faced enormous resistance from spoiler 
factions to this move. Factions in ARENA had frequently employed spoiler tactics in 
the past and had initially used the unconstitutional nature of some of the reforms 
demanded by the FMLN, as a pretext on which to base their refusal to negotiate an 
agreement (Juhn, 1998: 39; 82). But the rules (described above) governing the process 
of amending of the constitution introduced a natural two-step mechanism to the process
19 UN, Blue Helmets: 426.
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of implementing these substantial reforms and this reduced the scope for spoiler 
factions to form a blocking coalition. As the amendments had to be approved by two 
successive assemblies before the reforms were fully implemented, spoiler factions were 
unable to present a move to approve the amendments in April 1991 as a huge, unilateral 
move that capitulated to issue hierarchy. Its two-step nature reduced the susceptibility 
of sceptical factions to any effort by the spoiler faction to present the move as 
irrevocable and dangerous to ARENA and their own interests. At the same time, by 
taking the first step to approve the amendments in April 1991, ARENA reduced the 
fears of those in the FMLN who were sceptical about the sincerity of ARENA’S 
commitments to a peace process (Stanley, 1996: 252). This most likely enabled the pro 
faction of the FMLN to partially recognise the Salvadorian political system for the first 
time in April 1991 by ‘urging its supporters to vote in the April 1991 elections’ (Juhn: 
82). This in turn made it more difficult for ARENA’S spoiler faction to undermine the 
peace process on the basis that ARENA could not negotiate with an insurgency that had 
long indicated that it did not accept the legitimacy of the Salvadorian political system. 
Therefore, the prospect of consolidating the constitutionality o f the agreed reforms, 
including the subordination of the military to the civilian government, was kept alive 
after April 1991 but still needed the approval of the newly-elected assembly for full 
implementation. The second approval could be presented to ARENA deputies as more 
of a choice and as depending on progress in other areas. In fact, the second stage of the 
approval of constitutional reforms to change the position of the armed forces was 
delayed until all issues were agreed (Cordova: 85-6; BBCWWM: 31-1-92)20.
This simultaneous and early beginning to the implementation of human rights, 
constitutional and political issues did not signal an issue hierarchy demand. The step- 
by-step nature of procedures ensured that conflict formations were not required to 
implement all provisions agreed on one issue before the provisions for the 
implementation of another issue were agreed. It instead facilitated the commencement 
of a framework through which the political and judicial compromises inherent in the 
agreements would little by little be implemented. This framework proved crucial to 
further agreement on the precise provisions and implementation mechanisms for the 
issues that were still characterised by deadlock: land reform, the full content,
20 Those concerning human rights and the judiciary were held till October 3 1st.
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mechanisms and timing of military reform, the ceasefire and the de-escalation process 
through which the FMLN would be dismantled.
PHASE ONE: NEGOTIATIONG THE TIMETABLE
The most serious threat to final agreement on implementation (UN and ES, 1995: 20) 
was the insistence by the government and the FMLN on mutually-exclusive issue 
hierarchy, which would be mutually unacceptable and unworkable if  a final Accord was 
to be negotiated. Referred to as the cease-fire/demilitarisation ‘gordian knot5 (UN and 
ES, 1995: 15-6), the FMLN insisted that the situation was one of ‘two governments at a 
stalemate:’ it demanded that agreement be reached on the procedures for the 
simultaneous disarmament and demobilisation o f both the Armed forces (ESAF) and the 
FMLN military before a definitive cease-fire was negotiated, let alone put into place. As 
well as simultaneous demobilisation, it suggested that the FMLN’s combatants be 
integrated into the new, restructured armed forces (Byrne, 1996: 183). What served to 
make this issue hierarchy was the FMLN’s insistence that it be allowed to participate 
politically once it implemented a cease-fire, but before it disarmed, a prospect that 
Cristiani said was out o f the question (Juhn, 1998: 96).
The government-led formation, on the other hand, insisted that the FMLN implement a 
monitored and definitive (irreversible) cease-fire before final negotiations about the 
reduction or demilitarisation of the military forces and the re-incorporation of the 
FMLN’s forces into Salvadorian society. It was, they argued, a situation of ‘the State 
confronting irregulars (Juhn: 96) and in December 1991 Cristiani still maintained that 
‘the armed forces cannot be restructured as long as the violence persists’ (Latin 
American Newsline: March 92). It followed that the FMLN’s capacity to create 
violence must be demobilised, not only before the military was restructured, but before 
full agreement on restructuring was reached.
The Caracas Agenda (1990), which proposed that negotiations take place in two phases, 
gave some endorsement to the issue hierarchy that the government was proposing. It 
called for the discussion of the cease-fire in phase one of talks. In phase two, parties 
would negotiate about the conditions and guarantees associated with the reintegration 
into society of the FMLN’s combatants, an issue that was inextricably linked to military 
reform. But this agenda did not facilitate agreement and in an attempt to circumvent this
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order and to move forward simultaneously but separately on both sets of issues, the UN 
mediators set up two concurrent working groups in May 1991. The first concerned the 
nature and the procedures for the implementation of a cease-fire, the second the reforms 
to the military, including the issues of impunity, the purging of the Military High 
Command and the location of power in the new public security forces (Juhn, 1998: 95- 
96).
Despite the agreement on some details concerning the ceasefire,21 the unilateral demand 
that the government presented to the FMLN still prevented the parties from reaching 
full agreement. According to the ARENA government, the FMLN could not participate 
in the political system until it demobilised and it would have to implement a cease-fire 
before a final agreement on the reform of the military forces was made. The FMLN’s 
pro faction was not in the position to meet these unilateral demands. The demands 
presented its spoiler faction with much opportunity to persuade those sceptical in the 
FMLN to lose faith in the process. The FMLN’s leadership responded with a highly 
public campaign that served to highlight the unreasonable demand that the government 
was making: ‘if  you want our guns’ said the campaign, ‘win the war’ (Juhn, 1998: 98).
The issue-hierarchy knot was partly untangled during unprecedented talks that were led 
by the Secretary General in September 1991. The UN mediators adopted a compressed 
agenda. According to this ‘agenda comprimida \  which was originally the FMLN’s 
proposal, all outstanding issues would be negotiated in a single stage which would end 
with an agreement to ceasefire. In other words, nothing was agreed (i.e. agreements 
were reversible) until everything was agreed. The parties agreed that the implementation 
of the ceasefire would last until all other agreements were implemented and the 
implementation of all agreements would be governed by a pre-negotiated timetable 
(Juhn, 1998: 102). While its own unilateral demobilisation remained unacceptable to, 
and impossible for, the FMLN,22 in August it indicated its willingness to consider its 
own demobilisation in return for a profound reform, as opposed to the abolition, of the
21 It would be transitional, not benefit either side, would separate forces, be verifiable, promote 
reconciliation and not amount to any administrative division of the country or to any isolation of FMLN 
into small areas.
22 FMLN leader Villalobus explains this unwillingness in September 1991: We are not going to 
strategically weaken ourselves for a juncture that could be going nowhere: The militant sector of the 
FMLN is no longer an ideological factor, it is impossible to disarm it... It might be a bloody peace if one 
side is armed. FMLN internal notes, September 1991, Juhn: 107.
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armed forces. But this would only be considered in the context of the agenda 
comprimida (UN and ES: 20-21).
Through the compressed agenda the parties managed to overcome a series obstacles 
concerning sequencing and timing that helped to untie the ‘Gordian knot.’ The agenda 
facilitated agreement on a reciprocal, step-by-step and parallel sequencing that would 
govern the implementation of the ceasefire, the demobilisation of the FMLN and the 
profound reform of the military (Juhn, 1998: 107). This enabled the FMLN’s pro faction 
to drop the demand for the full disbandment of the armed forces without being at the 
mercy of its spoiler faction’s tactics.
The agreement on timing and sequencing also helped the ARENA pro faction to deliver. 
ARENA could never have committed to the demobilisation of the army as part of a deal 
involving the simultaneous demobilisation of the FMLN. But despite dramatic 
consternation within the ARENA formation, in the context of the agenda comprimida, 
ARENA had agreed to negotiate and commence the ‘profound reform’ of the military in 
September 1991. Further, having secured an FMLN promise to demobilise in return for 
this profound reform, Cristiani was able to agree to the immediate, legal establishment 
of the PNC (civilian police force), on its training curriculum and on the FMLN’s right 
to be a part of it. He also moved to get assembly approval for new laws on public 
security that excluded a role for the armed forces. Along with the promise to 
significantly reduce the size of the armed forces and to implement a separate ‘purge’ of 
the army high command, the above agreement met many of the needs of the pro faction 
in the FMLN on the profound reform of the military. In fact, one Christian Democratic 
party source believed that in agreeing to these profound reforms the oligarchy had 
‘negotiated away the army’ (Juhn: 112). Whether or not the pro faction in ARENA 
would be able to implement this reform was another question.
Through the agenda comprimida issue break down and parallel sequencing had been 
introduced to implementation design. It appears to have helped pro factions to re-focus 
the issue from the unquestionably large step that full demobilisation of the armed forces 
demanded onto a phased, step-by-step profound reform of the military forces. This, and 
ARENA’S beginning of early steps in the process of police reform, in part enabled the 
FMLN to drop its demand for the full demobilisation of the armed forces in return for
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its demobilisation. At the same time, the agreement to establish COPAZ, the new 
institution that would monitor implementation (New York Agreements), went some way 
to meeting the FMLN’s need to be included in the political system before the 
implementation of a ceasefire. Some progress was made on the establishment of 
procedures through which the land reform would be implemented (see table 7.1). This 
met the FMLN leadership’s aim that all issues, including socio-economic issues, would 
be included in the final agenda, even issues that ARENA had previously denounced as 
unrelated to the peace accords. However, despite the progress a number of obstacles 
remained because following the New York Agreement (September 1991) a number of 
opportunities remained for spoiler factions to demand that issue hierarchy govern the 
implementation process.
The parties had to agree on the design of the implementation process. The negotiations 
concerned the sequence and timing through which the full ‘profound reform’ of the 
military would be implemented, the degree to which demobilisation would extend to the 
military and public security forces and the mechanisms for its implementation, the 
modalities, timing and operation of the cease-fire, the procedures through which the 
FMLN would be separated, demobilised and re-integrated, and the mechanisms, timing 
and sequencing that would govern land reform and socio-economic issues.
In an effort to overcome the anticipated deadlock in these negotiations, the New York 
Agreements committed parties to continue to use the ‘agenda comprimida ’ (UN and 
ES: 21) to negotiate all outstanding issues. Thus the mediators demanded that all these 
issues be agreed before the signing of a definitive cease-fire agreement. According to 
the UN Secretary General’s representative, Alvaro de Soto, this agenda helped to 
eliminate uncertainties and to avoid the impression that parties were ‘jumping into an 
empty pool,’ an impression that widens spoiler faction’s room for manoeuvre. In the 
words of de Soto on Salvadorian radio:
‘All the agreements we have been reaching are on ice, but ready to be 
used. The New York Agreement (September 91) called for an overall 
agreement without partial agreements in the process. In other words, 
we either reach an agreement on everything or nothing will be signed’
(BBC WWM: 3.01.92).
259
During these final negotiations that followed Cristiani was clearly under pressure from 
high-level spoiler factions in ARENA, who mobilised ultra-right rallies against the 
September Accords, and launched a campaign o f intimidation against the international 
press and ONUSAL (UN and ES: 21). One government negotiator, Escobar Galindo, 
believed that at this point in ARENA,‘0.2 per cent supported the process and 99.8 per 
cent opposed it for various reasons’ (Byrne, 1996: 190). This challenge to ARENA’S 
‘pro faction’ leadership seriously restricted its ability to drop the unilateral demand that 
the FMLN implement the ceasefire and demobilise before the implementation of armed 
forces reform. Spoiler factions, who hailed from both the Army Command and the right 
wings of the Arena party, demanded what they believed the FMLN could not deliver.
As a result Cristiani’s stance became increasingly aggressive, and he threatened in 
November to walk out of talks ‘if the FMLN did not suspend its military operations’ 
immediately and before final agreement (Juhn: 114).
But the FMLN attributed Cristiani’s stance to pressure from the powerful minority in 
the army and the agrarian oligarchy, who were looking ‘for a way to get them to reject 
the New York Agreements, and to walk away from the table,’ (Juhn, 1998: 114, CPD 
memo, 14-11-91). Its assessment of Cristiani’s position persuaded its pro faction to save 
the negotiations with the introduction of a unilateral ceasefire in November 1991 
(Byrne, 1996: 191). Despite the issue hierarchy at the heart of Cristiani’s unilateral 
ceasefire demand, the FMLN’s unilateral cessation of violence did not, in fact, weaken 
its military structure. It was thus reversible and a reasonable request to make of its 
spoiler faction, provided that negotiations on all issues continued and nothing was 
agreed until everything was agreed. Furthermore, it served to remove more of the 
pretexts on which ARENA’S spoiler faction could base its calls to withdraw from 
negotiations. This was especially true for the Army High Command, which had refused 
to negotiate with the FMLN prior to their establishment of a cease-fire. In fact, the 
move heralded a final round of intensive negotiations in New York in December 1991.
The parties finally agreed to a package agreement that covered all outstanding issues on 
31 December 1991. The New York Accord was presented to the parties by the 
mediators23 following the negotiations and the FMLN, ARENA and the United Nations
23 UN, US, USSR and the four friends - Venezuela, Mexico, Columbia, Spain.
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endorsed the formula for implementation (AP, 1.1.92). As part of this agreement, both 
parties committed to finalising the timetable for implementation before the official 
signing ceremony on 16 January 1992. If they failed to agree on a timetable, they would 
implement according to one designed by the United Nations.
In a powerful endorsement of the significance that the IFF model assigns to pro faction 
unity, the US mediator at the Salvadorian negotiations, Hamilton, believed that ‘the 
success of implementation would depend in a large part upon the trust between those 
individuals who favoured negotiations and the end of war’ (FMLN Record, Juhn: 118). 
If a successful implementation process was to follow, this alliance between the pro 
faction in ARENA and the FMLN would need to be supported by implementation 
mechanisms that could maintain the equilibrium that existed in the intra-formation 
power struggles in January 1992.
PHASE TWO: IMPLEMENTING THE TIMETABLE
Despite agreeing (January 1992) to implement according to an intricate timetable (table 
7.1) designed to carefully balance and synchronise each side’s commitments (UN and 
ES: 23), the implementation process was ‘conflict-ridden’ (Stahler-Sholk, 1995: 9) and 
encountered barriers at several crisis points which threatened the very survival o f the 
process. A series of adjustments to sequencing and timing were agreed through dispute- 
resolution mechanisms before the Accords could be successfully implemented.24 They 
are next addressed.
While not explicitly declaring the principle of reciprocity, the timetable was clearly 
designed to dismantle civil-military relations through a phased, broken-down, 
implementation of military and public-security reform and a parallel construction of the 
new police force and the demobilisation of FMLN forces. As the IFF model predicts, 
this sequence and the parallel implementation of the short-term socio-economic 
provisions that ensured the existence of reintegration programmes, food and provisions, 
training and eventually land to demobilising combatants would prove essential if  the
24 The process is considered to be successful but it is argued that the lack of attention to the economic 
transformation was an oversight which if properly dealt with would have prevented the government from 
using the pretext (the true justification of which depended on the issue) of lack of funds for implementing 
socio-economic reforms, the absence of which did threaten the overall stability of the implementation 
process. See Spenser: 42-60; Boyce, 1998 and Wider, 1997.
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FMLN was to move on demobilisation ~ (Spencer, 1997: 45). The implementation of 
the land-reform provisions was also designed to be reciprocal: according to the 
timetable, the first land transfers would begin on the day that the FMLN implemented 
its first in five phases o f demobilisation. Land reform that would directly benefit ex­
combatants would be tackled first, a procedure that was clearly informed by the need to 
maintain unity within the FMLN and the armed forces on the benefits of continuing to 
cooperate with the process.
It is useful to view the implementation process as having six phases after the pre­
ceasefire phase, each phase marked by and generally beginning with a step towards full 
demobilisation by the FMLN, along with a series of simultaneous, phased steps by the 
government conflict formation on military or public security, political/institutional 
and/or socio-economic commitments (Table 7.1). The six phases were to bring the 
process to the formal end of military conflict on 31 October 1992.
9 *5
25 FMLN, Villalobos, 1994.
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PRE-CEASE-FIRE
January 27th: First phase o f the legalisation o f the FMLN (Legislation to be introduced to Assembly)
Military Reform: Issuance o f the agreement on the legal form and formalisation o f the Ad Hoc Commission, charged 
with the armed force purge (29 January).
Security: Ratification o f the constitutional reforms to underpin the changed role of the armed forces.
PHASE 1 -  CEASE FIRE & SEPARATION OF ARMIES PHASE
FEBRUARY 1 :D DAY 
The ceasefire was to officially begin along with phase one o f separation o f both armies.
Security: The end o f the practice o f AFES conscription;
Political: The full installation of COPAZ (National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace).
FEBRUARY 5 -M A R C H  1
Phase 2 of separation of two armies begins.
FMLN weapons to be concentrated under the supervision o f ONUSAL throughout Februray.
Institutional: The agreed new Supreme Election Tribunal would be selected;
Socio-Economic: The government would present its plan for national reconstruction to FMLN for input 
Security: The draft law for the National Civilian Police would be submitted (20th Feb).
MARCH 2 -  MAY 1
ONUSAL to assume control o f FMLN arms;
Security: Treasury Police and National Guard Disbanded; New State Intelligence Agency created;
Director General o f new PNC to be appointed; Political prisoners released.
Institutional: Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office created.
Socio-Economic: Reconstruction Fund Created by government (April 1).
PHASE 2, DEMOBILISATION (MAY 1992)
20% of FMLN forces, already gathered in their 15 concentrated areas, will be ‘reincorporated ’ into civilian life 
(demobilised and reincorporated using socio-economic measures in Accords);
Security: National Police Academy for PNC to begin operations and admit recruits;
Socio-E: Land Transfers to ex-combatants to begin;
Political: Second step in legalisation o f FMLN: Legality o f FMLN to become law.
Security: Ad Hoc Commission (legalised in January) to be installed and to begin evaluation (May 16).
PHASE 3, DEMOBILISATION (JUNE & JULY 1992)
Another 20% o f FMLN concentrated forces to be reincorporated into civilian life (31 May);
Security: Civil Defence (?)Dis-armed on 31 May and eliminated on 30 June;
Security: National Intelligence Directorate (DNI) dissolved;
Security: The first o f the five elite counter-insurgency battalions to be eliminated (July 17).
PHASE 4, DEMOBILISATION (AUGUST & SEPT 1992)
Another 20% o f FMLN concentrated forces (30 July) to be reincorporated (=60%)
Socio-E: Process o f legalising land tenancy in the zones of conflict to be completed (July 30)
Security: Ad hoc Commission evaluation to be completed;
Security: Second o f the five elite counter-insurgency battalions to be eliminated (Aug 17)
Security: Third o f the five elite counter-insurgency battalions to be eliminated (Sept 17)
PHASE 5, DEMOBILISATION (SEPT 28 -  OCT 28)
Another 20%  o f  FMLN reincorporated (28 Sept) (=80%)
Security: Process o f Purge o f Army High Command completed: Implementation o f Ad Hoc Commission 
recommendations;
Security: Fourth elite counter-insurgency battalion eliminated;
PHASE 6, DEMOBILISATION (OCT 28 -  NOV 20)
Security: Phase deployment o f the PNC to begin on 28 October;
Final 20% o f FMLN to be reincorporated (=100% demobilisation);
Security: Last elite counter-insurgency army group to eliminated (Nov 20).
Process of ongoing reduction of Military Forces: According to an agreed UN monitored timetable27
Table 7.1: Timetable And Sequencing For Implementation26
2(1 Capitulo 9, Calendario de Ejecucion, Acuerdos de Chapultepec. Also UN and ES: Chapter IV.
27 The government presented to the Secretary General a calendar for the implementation of the reduction 
of the armed forces (Chapter 4, Chapultepec Accords) and the UN mission is to verify the completion of 
this calendar. The process was to be complete before March 1994.
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While the implementation of most issues was governed by the timetable (Table 7.1), 
issues that fell outside it were governed by parallel sequencing. ONUSAL’s human- 
rights division continued to permanently monitor compliance with human-rights 
standards and to supervise the implementation of institutional reforms concerning 
human rights. ONUSAL’s police division worked to ensure that the steps taken to 
establish the civilian police force were consistent with the professional, civilian ethos 
agreed for the force. For the FMLN COPAZ would play a critical role in ensuring the 
government’s ongoing compliance with the socio-economic provisions of the 
agreement. Where provisions were vague, institutional commitment to the letter and 
spirit of the provisions was seen as critical if  implementation was to continue into the 
post-1992 period (Villalobus, BBCWWM: 3-2-92). ONUSAL monitored the reduction 
in the armed forces which, while time-tabled to end in 1994, was to begin before 
October 31, and to take place according to a timetable already agreed by ONUSAL and 
the government in the Chapultepec Accords (Ch. 4). The presidential, legislative28 and 
mayoral elections in March 1994 would complete the formal implementation process.
The original timetable comes close to meeting the conditions that will facilitate a 
successful outcome to the process according to the IFF model’s hypotheses. Issue 
hierarchy is nowhere explicitly endorsed in the timetable and design is informed by 
efforts to institutionalise both parallel sequencing and reciprocal, issue breakdown. 
However, a number o f weaknesses existed and served to illustrate that the process had 
not prevented some factions in the FMLN and ARENA from endorsing the agreement, 
while articulating mutually-exclusive interpretations of their obligations under the 
timetable.
For example, Cristiani made a number o f early public announcements, which explicitly 
denied the existence o f a link between the FMLN’s demobilisation and the restructuring 
of the armed forces: ‘there can be, he declared, ‘no symmetry between FMLN 
disarmament and the decrease in the armed forces’ (BBCWWM, 4.01.92). According to 
Cristiani’s defence minister, General Ponce,29 there could be no symmetry between a 
clandestine terrorist group and a professional and institutional arms corps (BBCWWM,
16.1.92). Ponce’s position highlights the pressure that was coming from factions within
25 Using a proportional representation electoral system.
29 Minister for Defence. Forced to step down on the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission.
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the armed forces that still insisted on using issue hierarchy to ensure that the FMLN 
could not comply with the settlement. This interpretation of the timetable was 
persistently articulated by ARENA’S pro faction which was under pressure from its 
spoiler and sceptical factions. It was used to support a call for the full demobilisation 
and disarmament of the FMLN by the October 31 deadline that was set by the timetable, 
despite the failure of the ARENA-led formation to implement its own commitments.
Those in the FMLN who wanted to implement the settlement appeared to recognise the 
barriers that the internal division in ARENA presented to the implementation process. 
Through its radio station the FMLN indicated that while it understood the difficulties 
presented to Cristiani by the ARENA elements that feared and resisted change, it 
warned against distorting the meaning of the agreements to prevent chaos within 
ARENA (BBCWWM, 6.1.92). But the UN Secretary General, who was the key 
authority on the Accords, initially supported the interpretation of the timetable 
articulated by these more sceptical ARENA factions and, consequently by Cristiani 
himself (CUR, 1994: 11). The Secretary General repeatedly told the FMLN that ‘a 
breach with one aspect of the agreement could not be used to justify a breach with 
another’ (UN and ES, 1995: 27). But this suggested that if ARENA was not fully 
implementing its promises concerning the land reforms, political reforms, reform o f the 
military and of public security, the FMLN had to meet the requirements o f the timetable 
regardless. This endorsed issue hierarchy and the Secretary General’s interpretation 
gave credence to the spoiler faction’s position. As the hypotheses o f the IFF model 
predict, these conditions present spoiler factions with the opportunity to stall the 
process. In fact, the successful implementation of the settlement was not guaranteed 
until the Secretary General gradually re-interpreted the timetable to be governed by 
issue linkage and the reciprocal or reversible step-by-step implementation of issues, an 
interpretation which he formally endorsed it in late 1992 (CIIR: 11-12).
A second, connected weakness in design was the unrealistic time frame in which the full 
demobilisation of the FMLN was expected. While this was sequenced with the 
implementation of many of the government’s commitments, a number of commitments, 
such as the report and implementation of the truth commission recommendations and 
the full UN-monitored reduction in the size of the armed forces, were not expected to 
take place within the timetable. Unless institutional reform was sufficiently deep to
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guarantee the implementation of the critical changes that lay outside the timetable, it 
might prove difficult to persuade the FMLN to implement its commitments by 31 
October. This weakness created incentives for the sceptical faction in the FMLN to 
insist on stalling and ultimately, the solution depended on the government and its ability 
to fulfil its commitment to lift all legal, political and security barriers to the full, legal 
participation of the FMLN as a political party before October 31: for the FMLN, this 
required that ARENA fully adhere to the implementation timetable.
These two features of design created opportunities for the government’s spoiler faction 
to adopt the following spoiler tactic. It used bureaucratic, logistical and financial 
obstacles, even those stemming from international financial agreements (Boyce, 1997), 
to ensure that ARENA could not fulfil its commitments in accordance with the 
timetable. However, justifying ARENA’S failure to implement with legitimate 
difficulties associated with governance, ARENA’S spoiler faction used the rules and 
procedures o f process to demand that the FMLN unilaterally fulfil its requirements 
under the timetable and to declare the FMLN to be in breach of the agreement if  it did 
not proceed. The IFF theory argues that the government’s spoiler factions aimed to use 
this strategy to cause the FMLN to stall. This stalling would signal an apparent 
unwillingness on the part o f the FMLN to implement its commitments and would 
strengthen the argument which ARENA’S spoiler faction would put to its sceptical 
faction that the FMLN’s commitment to the settlement was shallow. This would help to 
precipitate more stalling by ARENA. This stalling might further convince those 
sceptical of the government’s commitments in the FMLN to question its intentions to 
implement the settlement and to accordingly refuse to implement their own 
commitments. This chain of events would eventually unravel the process.
The stalling on the land issue exacerbated the obstacles outlined above. In fact, in the 
details of the land issue lay the third major weakness in design. It was different 
interpretations of the meaning of the provisions on land reform that presented the first 
major crisis in the implementation process. Further disagreements later led to delays in 
the entire process of demobilisation and reintegration (Spenser, 1997: 37). Negotiations 
over the procedures through which land reform would be implemented had been 
tortuous. Mediators had to bridge a major gap between the positions of the pro faction 
in both the FMLN and ARENA. On the one hand the relatively moderate, pro faction in
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ARENA was resistant to anything but very limited reform to the socio-economic 
system.30 On the other hand the FMLN’s pro faction was under pressure from those 
sceptical of and unwilling to accept the argument that institutional reform would enable 
the FMLN to pursue the socio-economic reforms necessary to create economic bases 
independent from the oligarchy and its new business class ally. The FMLN eventually 
accepted land reform and short-term socio-economic provisions that satisfied its 
minimal requirements and which it hoped to use to ensure sufficient socio-economic 
reform to satisfy its sceptical faction, through the mechanisms provided by COPAZ and 
through its own subsequent participation in the political system. But in order to bridge 
the gap and to facilitate a final settlement the provisions on land reform were left 
necessarily, but dangerously vague. As the below illustrates, vague terms facilitate 
spoiler factions in their quests to undo the settlement.
Land reform provided for the revival of the government’s land-tenure system.
According to this system, those occupying land in conflict zones would be allowed to 
remain there and to receive assistance to increase production until a final plan for land 
in these zones was found. The final solution would be legal: a transaction would take 
place between the original landowners and the occupiers. (Spenser, 1997: 37). If the 
landowner was unwilling to sell, the government undertook, through the land bank and 
COPAZ, to re-settle occupiers on similar land elsewhere (UN and ES, 1995: 27). Lands 
in excess o f 245 hectares (constitutional limit) would be used to meet the needs of small 
farmers in a programme of land distribution. Ex-combatants were to be prioritised in 
this distribution of land (Chapultepec, Chapter 5). Legal or re-settling problems that 
preceded the actual transfer were to be settled by May 1992. May 1992 was also the 
date for the beginning of the phased demobilisation of the FMLN and the public 
security forces and for the beginning of the land-transfer programmes.31
It was the identification of those occupying land in conflict zones and thus entitled to be 
part of the programme that first created controversy. Within days of signing, the 
government indicated that only those occupying ‘productive land’ were allowed to 
remain or were entitled to re-settlement (BBCWWM, 14.2.92). According to the
30 ARENA was more sensitive to the needs of the oligarchy than to the army, a trend strengthened since
ARENA’S time in government. Elements in favour of implementation of the peace agreement remained 
resistant to anything but a very minimalist interpretation of land-reform and socio-economic clauses.
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FMLN, the agreements respected the land-occupying situation that existed when the 
conflict ended. A prominent FMLN leader, Villilobus, argued that as productive land in 
conflict areas was scarce, the FMLN would never have agreed to the government’s 
definition: It would have reduced land reform to ‘a few charity handouts’ (Villilobus, 
Interview BBCWWM, 14.2.92). The ARENA government also queried the date 
interpreted by the FMLN as the ‘end of conflict,’ suggesting that the land-occupier 
situation at a date before FMLN’s deadline of 16 January 1992 was more appropriate 
(BBCWWM: 16.3.92).
The contentious land reform issue escalated to a crisis in the early months o f 1992. The 
National Cooperative Association, a group associated with the FMLN, interpreted the 
Accords as permitting landless peasants to settle on unused land without risk of 
eviction. It encouraged landless peasants to do this in January 1992, just after the final 
agreement and just before the ceasefire was fully implemented (LAM: 04. 92). The 
move by the National Cooperative Association was arguably opportunistic and outside 
of the letter o f the agreement but it presented opportunities for ARENA’S spoiler faction 
to undermine the entire settlement on land reform. This spoiler faction used the 
uncertainty over the legitimacy of these landless peasants’ claims to question the right 
of far more people to receive land than just those who had opportunistically seized land. 
In fact, they threatened those FMLN supporters who had genuinely occupied land for 
many years. To make matters worse, the National Guard, the notorious public security 
force that was to be soon abolished, forcibly removed the occupiers on the basis that 
this was against the terms of the peace agreement (LAM: 04.92) and the conflict over 
interpretation was heightened when more land seizures by peasant groups led to further 
forced evictions (LAM, 04.92). While some members of the government accused the 
FMLN of organising the ‘illegal land seizures’ against the Accords, the FMLN accused 
the government o f  sanctioning overly repressive policies to deal with the issue. Creating 
further barriers, the actions of the National Guard would have fuelled the suspicions of 
the FMLN’s sceptical faction that the government and military did not intend to change.
The crisis was to worsen further. As the National Guard forcibly evicted peasants, 
Cristiani began to promote a different understanding of provisions that governed its
jl kAcuerdo Complementario’, 22 December 1992
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abolition, and that o f the Treasury Police. He suggested that instead of their 
disbandment, a change in their responsibility away from public security was required. 
About 6-7000 of their members would, he said, join the military, and some members 
would be incorporated into the new police force (BBCWWM, 4.3.92). The FMLN 
fiercely rejected this interpretation, in particular the decision to incorporate some agents 
into the new National Civilian Police (BBC WWM, 6-3-92). This policy was seriously 
damaging to the argument of the FMLN’s pro faction. A civilian and non-repressive 
police force was critical if  the pro and sceptical factions in the FMLN were to stay with 
the process.
After much delay which the FMLN had blamed on foot-dragging by the government, 
COPAZ reacted to the crisis by setting up a (i) Land Commission and a (ii) Special sub­
commission. The latter was to ‘study reports o f the government’s failure to disband 
security organisations by the 1 March deadline and their incorporation into the army of 
public security bodies in what the FMLN referred to as a ‘flagrant violation’ o f the 
Accords (BBC WWM, 14.3.92). But despite these efforts, the land-reform crisis 
continued to endanger the implementation of all sections of the Accords in March 1992. 
The Land Commission was failing to overcome the land-reform disputes by consensus, 
as the agreement had envisaged. While suitable for working out technical details of  
agreed commitments, the COPAZ committee encountered frequently insurmountable 
obstacles to dispute resolution, arguably stemming from the absence of a neutral 
mediator or agenda setter. In the absence of break-through and with the spread o f the 
stalling to other issues in the implementation process, UN special envoy Mark Goulding 
was dispatched to initiate dispute resolution procedures for non-compliance claims 
(BBCWWM: 16.3.92).
Central to Goulding’s initiative appears to have been an aim to negotiate a separate 
agreement for a phased implementation of the land-reform issue. He most likely hoped 
that if  this could be achieved the land reform issue would be insulated from the rest of  
the process and it would not cause the FMLN to refuse to undertake its first 
demobilisation step in May 1992. Goulding persuaded the parties to reach a temporary 
agreement: while the implementation of the non-controversial aspects o f land reform 
would proceed, land seizures and evictions would be suspended to facilitate the 
processing of cases for legal entitlement and re-settling under the conflict-resolution
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mechanisms envisaged under the Peace Accords: the Land Bank and Land-reform 
Commission. To deal with the disputes over the groups who were entitled to benefit 
from the scheme, COPAZ was to form a special commission to settle land disputes by 
reviewing an inventory of occupied land, which the FMLN would present to it by 
September 1992 (UN and ES, 1995: 27-8).
But while the intervention managed temporarily to insulate the land issue, it did not 
break down issues sufficiently to enable the FMLN to complete its concentration of 
forces (by the end of phase 1) or to move to demobilise its first 20 per cent on May 1st 
(LAM: 05.92). Delays in the process of setting up the PNC, which parts o f the FMLN 
interpreted as indicating the government’s reluctance to ever disband the former public- 
security bodies, meant that the National Police Academy would not as agreed begin 
operations and admit recruits on the 1 May. Anticipating that the FMLN would respond 
by stalling on its first key deadline, Goulding restated the UN position: under no 
circumstances should fulfilment of one agreement be linked to the fulfilment of another 
one. (BBCWWM: 16.3.92). But the FMLN stalled, attributing its stalling primarily to 
the government’s failure to dissolve the National Guard and Treasury Police (LAM,
06.92), while criticising its failure to implement steps to set up PNC, to redistribute land 
(AP, 30.4.92) and to fully implement aspects of the national reconstruction plan to meet 
the needs of reintegration. In keeping with the implementation timetable, the FMLN 
declared itself a political party on May 1, while ARENA did not implement the back-up 
legislation. Cristiani responded to the FMLN’s stalling with a reiteration of the UN- 
backed issue hierarchy demand: non-compliance with one agreement cannot be linked 
to non-compliance with another (BBCWWM6.5.92).
As the IFF model predicts, issue hierarchy in the form of unilateral demands, in place of 
the parallel implementation of reciprocal or reversible, broken-down issues, results in 
deadlock. Without altering sequence and timing, deadlock would remain. But without 
adequate dispute-resolution mechanisms, how could the pro factions agree to alter the 
sequence and timing agreement?
The answer to this question lies with ONUSAL. The UN used the power that the 
Accords gave it to precipitate a re-negotiation of dispute-resolution procedures that 
would open up the opportunity to break the deadlock. An agreement on new
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mechanisms to expedite the implementation of the agreement was made, whereby the 
FMLN and ARENA would oversee implementation through the direct mediation o f the 
UN, which would be in constant contact with working groups from both formations 
(BBCWWM, 9.5.92). These mechanisms could bypasss COPAZ, which, according to 
many sources, had proved less effective than hoped (Guardian, 23.5.94).
But before the deadlock could be broken and the first major steps in implementation 
were taken, another serious incident threatened the process. A prominent activist from 
the FMLN’sl989 offensive was shot and seriously wounded. This served to threaten the 
security of the FMLN for the second time since January and cast doubt on ARENA’S 
promise to guarantee the security o f the FMLN. The incident was most likely the work 
of the ARENA spoiler faction who knew that the security of FMLN personnel was 
essential if  any demobilisation was to occur (LAM, 06.92). An FMLN leader Shafik 
Handal interpreted the incident (May) as another sign of the far right’s rejection o f the 
Peace Accords (BBCWWM, 2.3.92). As anticipated, the attacks prevented the FMLN 
from beginning its demobilisation process and the FMLN pulled out of COPAZ, 
declared all agreements frozen and demanded that the government make a reasonable 
request of its spoiler factions by launching a serious investigation into the threats to 
FMLN security (BBCWWM, 23.5.92). Despite much resistance within the ARENA 
government, after direct talks between Handal and Cristiani, the defence minister, 
General Ponce, agreed to launch the serious investigation requested, thus diffusing the 
issue and facilitating an FMLN return to COPAZ. But while concrete moves to 
implement the profound reform of the military pended, opportunities would remain for 
both spoiler factions to engineer insecurity and division within the FMLN.
That the threat was not the first serious threat to the FMLN’s security would have 
served to further heighten the fears of sceptical factions, hi March 1992 Bolivian and 
Honduran surveillance aircraft had appeared over the FMLN’s demobilisation fields. 
These areas were strictly off-limits to the government as demobilisation was to be a 
secret process overseen only by ONUSAL.32 The FMLN immediately suspected that 
the government, or at least some factions of ARENA, were gathering intelligence on 
their weaponry and it threatened a violent response to this serious challenge to its
32 UN, Blue Helmets: 430-1.
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security. ARENA moved to diffuse the situation by denying involvement and officially 
complaining to the Honduran government in an effort to highlight its innocence. But 
many reports suggest that that elements of the Salvadorian and Honduran militaries 
were attempting to maintain a war-threatening environment so as to prevent the 
demobilisation of the FMLN and to use this as a justification for refusing to implement 
the military reforms and the reduction in its size outlined in the Accords (LAM: 05. 92).
The threats to the FMLN’s security, not to mention the government’s foot-dragging on 
other issues, made it very unlikely that it would make any moves to implement in May 
1992. In the wake of this incident and immediately prior to the next deadline for the 
FMLN’s demobilisation, Cristiani agreed through the new ONUSAL mechanisms to 
take a first step towards the fulfilment of ARENA’S military and public-security force 
commitments: to complete the concentration of the armed forces, including the 
concentration of the infamous National Guard and Treasury Police. In Cristiani’s own 
words, the failure of the government to comply with these commitments could no 
longer be used by the FMLN ‘as an argument for not complying with the agreements’ 
(BBCWWM: 27.5.92). And while the FMLN still reneged on its next deadline (31 
May), ARENA’S move provided the space for the two formations to alter the sequence 
and timing of crucial commitments through UN dispute-resolution mechanisms. These 
changes allowed the implementation of the timetable to begin.
The adjustments implicitly breached the government’s interpretation of its obligations: 
that compliance with one agreement was independent o f compliance with others.
Instead it re-scheduled implementation to endorse the inter-dependence of issues, a 
procedure which was actually inherent in the timetable. The parties agreed that all 
forces would be fully concentrated on 25 June and on 30 June the first FMLN 
contingent (20%) would begin demobilisation. On the same day, the government would 
present a bill to the legislature for the definitive abolition of the Treasury Police and the 
National Guard, establish a special brigade for military security with no responsibility 
for civilian affairs, propose an electoral code to facilitate the legalisation of the FMLN, 
and take steps to implement the agreed procedures on land reform. On 15 July the first 
recruits (according to original quotas) would begin training in the police academy33
33 UN, Blue Helmets: 431-2
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before July 31 when the second group of FMLN troops would begin demobilisation. 
Despite the re-scheduling of other commitments, the October 31 deadline for final 
demobilisation was, on Cristiani’s insistence, retained (LAM: 06.92). This would soon 
create barriers to implementation.
As the IFF theory predicts, the agreement to implement issues in parallel and in 
reciprocal or reversible steps did help to bring about some progress in the 
implementation process. The FMLN implemented the first step of its demobilisation in 
July (BBCWWM, 2.7.92), and the government began to implement its commitments. It 
promoted the FMLN’s status as a legal party, concentrated the public-security force 
bodies and made legal preparations for their disbandment. On 18 July, the Salvadorian 
army began the demobilisation of the first of its five elite battalions and ONUSAL, 
a long with a special commission of the armed forces, verified the battalion’s inventory 
until the unit was fully dissolved (BBCWWM, 21.7.92).
But the obstacles to implementation had not all been removed and failure to advance the 
phased implementation of adequate socio-economic programmes for combatants in 
sequence with demobilisation prompted the FMLN to stall on the demobilisation of the 
second twenty per cent on 31st July (LAM, 09.92). The FMLN insisted that they would 
continue to stall if  the government persistently failed to ensure that these programmes 
were simultaneously implemented. It also insisted that the government simultaneously 
provide legalised land to ex-combatants as the land-reform provisions had promised and 
that the new police force be immediately legalised (BBCWWM, 31.7.92).
Despite some breakthrough, these issues which breached the rule of parallel sequencing, 
and a further controversy that had long threatened to emerge, presented further barriers 
to implementation. The controversy concerned the FMLN’s security commissions. In 
the absence o f the disbandment of the public security bodies and the establishment o f  
the new police force, in the early months of the implementation process the FMLN had 
re-established security commissions in parts of El Salvador. According to the FMLN, 
the commissions existed to protect citizens and were ‘necessary only until the new 
police force was established’ (BBCWWM, 21.8.92). However they were fiercely
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rejected by the government and the government’s spoiler faction were not slow to 
present them as evidence of the FMLN’s intentions to continue the war.
In the midst of the crises over this and the other deadlocked issues, Goulding was once 
against dispatched in August 1992. He aimed to mediate efforts to overcome the 
deadlock created by the government’s refusal to comply with parallel sequencing and 
the consequential stalling by the FMLN on its commitments. He did so by encouraging 
both parties to take a number of small, reciprocal steps on all issues. The government 
pledged to continue to comply with the demobilisation of the military and the military 
forces declared themselves to be ‘politically prepared to comply with the accords’ (AP,
15.8.92). The FMLN simultaneously agreed to place the remainder of the weapons in its 
inventory and submit all o f it to ONUSAL. The government promised to remove an 
immediate obstacle to demobilisation by implementing the programmes that would 
reintegrate former combatants into society (BBCWWM, 17.8.92). In the context of the 
August adjustments to the timetable and the concurrent beginning to FMLN- 
govemment negotiations on power-sharing mechanisms through which civilian 
authority (exiled, mostly ARENA mayors) would be returned to areas in conflict zones, 
the FMLN pro factions were able to dismantle these commissions, which had been a 
self-introduced breakdown of the military and public security issue. In other words, the 
FMLN would take the large step of trusting the government to play a role in the 
governing and the provision of public security in these areas, as long as power-sharing 
mechanisms existed. Given these agreements, both formations promised to get up to 
date on all their commitments within one month in an effort to meet the deadline o f 31 
October.
While not explicitly saying so, the newly-agreed rules and procedures further eroded the 
‘issue hierarchy’ previously demanded by the government. In fact, following the re­
scheduling of commitments a clear pattern emerged, whereby stalling on all 
commitments by the government was met with FMLN stalling and with FMLN 
proposals that ARENA make reasonable requests of its spoiler factions i.e. that the 
formation abide by the step-by-step implementation process agreed to in the Accords.
As long as this pattern continued there would be progress.
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Demobilisation of the five counter-insurgency battalions continued and the FMLN 
demobilised its second twenty per cent when the government increased its efforts to 
reincorporate ex-combatants (UN and ES, 1995: Ch.4). The August readjustments also 
facilitated the establishment of the police academy and a beginning to training 
programmes. But resistance by the military to the full deployment of the national police, 
which was due to be in place in January 1993, was clearly evident (LAM, 11.92). 
Furthermore, if  the implementation process was to be ultimately successful, two other 
issues required sequencing with the implementation timetable.
PURGING THE MILITARY AND INSULATING LAND-REFORM 
The Ad Hoc Commission reported to the government and the UN on 22 September
1992. Moves to implement its recommendations on a purge of the army high command 
would be essential if  the FMLN was to fully demobilise by October 31. But Cristiani 
refused to indicate how he would implement the purge of the high command. Even 
more controversially from the FMLN’s point of view he moved many on the purge list 
from the counter-insurgency battalions to other sections o f the army in an effort to 
protect high-ranking personnel whose removal would seriously divide the ARENA 
party. The government justified its stalling by once again using its spoiler facton’s 
interpretation of the FMLN’s commitment to fully demobilise by 31 October as 
absolute and unrelated to the government’s commitments. The government not only 
resisted the steps to implement the highly sensitive provisions to purge the high 
command, but bureaucratic, legalistic and financial obstacles were complicated in a way 
that seriously delayed the procedures for implementing land reform that had been 
agreed in March. This stalling ensured that the FMLN would not meet the unilateral 
demand made by the government to demobilise the remaining sixty per cent o f its 
troops. In turn ARENA’S spoiler faction, who continued to insist on the October 
deadline, was presented with pretexts on which to refuse to implement all commitments.
Insisting on issue linkage if it was to continue implementing the Accords (LAM, 10.92), 
the FMLN suspended stage three of its demobilisation in September, ‘to maintain the 
link in the original timetable.’34 It refused to demobilise until 1,890 plots of land were 
immediately distributed, and new dates were set for the fulfilment of other aspects of 
the agreement. The UN responded to the deadlock with a proposal to settle the
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implementation of the land-reform provisions separately, institutionally and for once 
and for all. The logic behind the initiative appears to have been to address the 
reasonable objections to the implementation of land reform such as logistical and 
bureaucratic barriers. By dealing with reasonable objections they could prevent 
ARENA’S spoiler faction from using these objections to hide their fundamental 
objections to land reform and to the settlement. After extensive discussions with both 
parties over issues such as the size of plots and the number of potential beneficiaries, 
the Secretary General presented a formula which he described as an ‘equitable 
compromise’ (Document 45/6: UN and ES, 1995: 257). This set the number of 
beneficiaries,35 guaranteed no more forced evictions and agreed that a COPAZ 
committee would determine the operational aspects of the proposal, including the 
amount of land available. According to Latin American Monitor (01.93), the initiative 
resolved the political debate at the heart of the land-reform issue. By setting in train its 
incremental implementation, according to an agreed set of rules and with dispute- 
resolution mechanisms, it was hoped that by sequencing a broken down implementation 
of land reform along with human rights and political issues, it could no longer be used 
to present obstacles to the remaining implementation of the security and policing issues. 
And although obstacles remained in the wake of the October initiative, some stemming 
from genuine financial and bureaucratic barriers, some from their deliberate 
complication by the government’s spoiler faction, by 1996 the land-reform programme 
agreed to in October 1992 had advanced significantly (Alvarez: 1998).
Furthermore and crucially for the prospects of successfully implementing the Accords, 
the agreement on a process of phased land reform and its insulation, at least temporarily, 
from other aspects of the process created space for a difficult re-negotiation of the 
sequence and timing of the rest of implementation.
MILITARY, PUBLIC SECURITY AND DEMOBILISATION
Despite some progress on the introduction of parallel sequencing, the implementation of 
military and public security issues remained in deeply stalled in October 1992. In 
response to the FMLN’s refusal to implement the commitments that it gave in August,
34 UN, Blue Helmets: 432.
35 The number would not exceed 47,500: 15,000 ex-army combatants, 7,500 ex-FMLN combatants and 
25,000 land holders in the former zones of conflict.
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the government froze the dissolution of the notoriously repressive Attacalt Battalion and 
pulled out of negotiations on October 21 (CIIR, 1994: 12). It then formally conditioned 
its continued demobilisation and its reduction in the size of the armed forces on the 
FMLN’s submission of all weapons in its inventory to ONUSAL and the official 
destruction of those weapons. But the FMLN linked the implementation of the Ad Hoc 
Commission’s purge with the demobilisation of the remaining 60 per cent o f its forces 
(UN and ES: 30) and the destruction of its weapons.
In the efforts to overcome the persistent deadlock, the formula that guided 
implementation was finally formally altered and an announcement by the Secretary 
General confirmed this: ‘for the first time compliance with certain points on the 
calendar by one side was actually formally made contingent upon the compliance with 
specific undertakings by the other’ (Secretary General, UN and ES: 30). Taking into 
account the unrealistic, final deadline and the need for issue linkage, the UN facilitated 
an agreement that would extend the process until December 15 1992 and would almost 
overcome the barriers to implementation. The land reform would proceed as agreed. 
Cristiani would implement the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission which 
involved the purging of at least 103 officers, and the government would complete the 
process of fully legalising the FMLN, a move which some of its members had been 
increasingly resisting. The FMLN would begin the process of full disarmament and 
weapons destruction and the FMLN and the government would continue with phased 
demobilisation, which for the government required the demobilisation of the anti­
insurgency battalions and for the FMLN the demobilisation of sixty per cent on October 
31, eighty per cent by November 20 and one hundred per cent by 15 December.
Goulding and de Soto (UN) were dispatched to El Salvador in November to deal with 
government resistance to some aspects o f the package and Cristiani agreed to inform the 
Secretary General of his administrative decisions concerning the purge of the armed 
forces by 29 November, following which FMLN would provide ONUSAL with its final 
inventory, conclude weapons concentration and begin destruction on 1 December 
(LAM, 01.93: UN and ES, 1995: 31).
The detail in the adjustments to sequence and timing highlight the importance of the 
order and content of each implementation move to pro factions in each conflict 
formation. Through dispute-resolution procedures that were driven by the UN, pro
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factions had agreed to break down issues and to implement them in parallel sequence. 
This agreement on design coincided with the most significant progress to date in the 
implementation process in late 1992: the FMLN was fully legalised and fully 
demobilised, Cristiani informed the UN of the administrative changes that he would 
make to fulfil the requirements of the Ad Hoc Commission, the PNC was further 
institutionalised with the first deployments taking place in February 1993 and the 
FMLN handed over its inventory and began the destruction of weapons on 6 December 
(UN and ES: 34). In a parallel initiative, which was essential for the holding of elections 
and important in convincing FMLN to finally demobilise, after months of negotiations, 
the UN facilitated the return of ARENA mayors to conflict areas after months of 
negotiations. Their return was made possible by power-sharing arrangements which 
were negotiated with the de facto authorities that had ruled the conflict zones 
throughout the civil war (LAM, 01.93). This helped to implement the full restoration of 
public administration in former zones of conflict, but it was implemented in small steps 
and avoided making a unilateral demand of the FMLN to simply hand over power. With 
these agreements and with progress being made towards the establishment of the new 
police force, the FMLN’ sceptical faction had less need to establish security controls to 
‘protect civilians’ in its former strongholds. This reduced the pretexts on which the 
spoiler faction could stall the process.
TOWARDS CRISIS AND FINAL DEMOBILISATION
Despite considerable progress, there were some serious threats to implementation in
1993. In January it emerged that Cristiani had reneged on his November promise to 
make public the list o f personnel who would be purged according to the Ad Hoc 
Commission’s recommendations. It also emerged that, contrary to the assurances o f the 
FMLN, the arms-destruction process was not complete.
The intra-formation conflict behind the barriers to full implementation is clear. On the 
one hand, ARENA’S pro faction had been able to dramatically speed up the process of 
reducing the size o f the armed forces and to complete the reduction ahead o f schedule 
on 31 March 1993. This was arguably because this process did not unduly threaten the 
most powerful elements in Salvadorian society and in the Salvadorian military. On the 
other hand, the implementation of the Ad Hoc Commission’s recommendations, and the 
implementation of the forthcoming recommendations of the Truth Commission,
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threatened those at the centre of power in both ARENA and the Armed Force’s High 
Command. This placed at risk its unity and presented the critical barriers to full 
implementation in 1993, which began with this failure by Cristiani to live up to his 
promise.
Equally threatening to the unity of the government were the recommendations o f the 
Truth Commission. The report held the Armed Forces responsible for 85 per cent o f  
human-rights violations and massacres during the civil war, the death squads 
responsible for ten per cent and the guerrillas for five. It recommended the resignation 
of a number of powerful members o f the Army High Command and the resignation of 
the entire supreme court which it judged to be ‘incapable o f fairly assessing and 
carrying out punishment’.36 In March 1993 The High Command of the Armed Forces, 
the President of the Supreme Court, and highly-ranked government officials (Spenser, 
1996:48) greeted the report with outcry.
Searching for a pretext on which to justify stalling and ultimately to avoid implementing 
any of the recommendations, the spoiler faction of the ARENA party and the Army 
High Command initially focused their criticisms on the rules and procedures o f process. 
They accused the Commission of grossly exceeding its mandate and they put Cristiani 
under pressure to refuse to recognise its recommendations on this basis. To temporarily 
defuse the issue, the UN Secretary General undertook to analyse the recommendations, 
to identify those compatible with its mandate, and to identify moves that both parties 
would take to fulfil their pledges to implement recommendations (UN and ES, 1995:
38). ARENA meanwhile announced its intention to implement only those aspects of the 
report ‘that fell strictly within its competence and were consistent with the constitution, 
the peace accords and national reconciliation.’ But Cristiani simultaneously moved to 
protect a series of powerful individuals from the implications of the legal 
recommendations37 by introducing a general amnesty to the legislative assembly. While 
the amnesty was deplored by human rights groups, the catholic church, and other civil 
society organisations (CHR, 1994: 20-21), the degree to which ARENA’S pro faction 
could implement all of the Truth Commission’s recommendations, while retaining 
control over its conflict formation, is highly questionable.
36 Report of the Commission on the Truth, published in UN and El Salvador: 290 -  414.
17 Recommendations were political, administrative and legal. CIIR: 7.
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All sections of the counter-insurgency coalition greeted the report with outcry and this 
outcry took place in the context of escalating violence against the pro factions, 
especially those on the left (below). Full implementation of the Truth Commission 
recommendations in the absence of an amnesty would almost certainly have increased 
the power of ARENA’S spoiler faction which was willing to sanction such violence. In 
fact, Cristiani suggested that if  the names of those who had testified had been made 
public, he would not have been able to guarantee their safety (Hampson, 1996: 156-7). 
In fact, it appears that the amnesty was intended to simultaneously enable ARENA’S 
pro faction to retain power at the expense o f its spoiler faction who hoped to use the 
Truth Commission’s recommendations to bring down the Accords. In this sense, it 
served to keep the implementation process alive. And the alliance between pro factions 
was tenuously held together when Cristiani promised to implement some of the 
commission’s recommendations.
Adding fuel to the crisis in the implementation process, in May 1993 it emerged that the 
FMLN had not given accurate accounts of its weapons inventory to ONUSAL. It had 
retained up to 30 per cent of its arsenal in secret caches in Nicaragua, Honduras and El 
Salvador (UN and ES: 41). Its refusal to comply with all steps of the demobilisation and 
disarmament process is a clear example of self-introduced issue breakdown. If sceptical 
elements of the FMLN had perceived full demobilisation to be too risky and too 
unreasonable a step in October 1992, the move would be broken down into smaller 
steps to ensure that sceptical elements remained supportive of the implementation 
process. It is not clear whether the move to conceal weapons was sanctioned by all five 
commanders or if was the separate work of a sceptical faction within the FPL but the 
revelations led to serious disunity within the FMLN ranks.
The revelations also clearly provided pretexts on which ARENA’S spoiler faction could 
base its refusal to implement any of the recommendations of the Ad Hoc or Truth 
Commission. And in response, some members of Cristiani’s party encouraged him to 
reverse the legalisation that legalised the FMLN (UN and ES: FT). Given that the 
elections were less than a year away, and given the formidable challenges faced by the 
FMLN to organise as a unified political movement and to find resources and media 
outlets through which to communicate its political campaign (CIIR, 1994: 22-3), a legal
280
challenge would almost certainly have thrown into question for the FMLN’s sceptical 
faction the viability of elections as an alternative to violence.
Once again the presence o f the insulated institutions helped to save the implementation 
process from breakdown. In May the UN commenced a three-month process of  
intensive negotiations with the FMLN through which the mediators hoped to reach an 
agreement on some mechanisms through which the full caches of weapons would be 
revealed and destroyed. Two factors may have helped the FMLN’s pro faction in its 
effort to persuade its sceptical faction to cooperate so as to save the implementation 
process: that the reduction in the size o f the armed forces was complete and that the 
PNC was partly deployed. Furthermore, in a simultaneous development, the result of  
ongoing bi-party talks between the UN and ARENA, Cristiani complied with more of 
(though not all) the Ad Hoc Commission’s recommendations, and with the 
recommendation of the Truth Commission to remove four senior military officers and 
replace them with moderates. Amongst these was the powerful defence minister and 
chief of staff (LAM, 08.93 ; 10.93). This move immediately preceded a final 
breakthrough in the UN-FMLN talks and in August 1993 the UN certified that FMLN 
no longer had a military capability (LAM, 10.93).
THE LAST SPOILER-INSTIGATED CRISIS?
In the immediate aftermath of the August 1993 breakthrough and before any elections 
had taken place, the UN, the FMLN and ARENA together agreed to institutionalise 
high-level tri-partite meetings. This was with a view to monitoring the implementation 
process closely and to clearing the board before the March 1994 elections and in 
September 1993 the parties agreed on a new timetable for the implementation of 
outstanding issues (UN and ES: 45-6). These were primarily concerned with steps to 
complete the implementation of issues: the phasing out of the National Police once PNC 
was fully operative, the speeding up of the land-reform process and the implementation 
of the remaining Truth Commission provisions, primarily those relating to the Supreme 
Court’s powers.38 The extension of ONUSAL’s mandate until May 31 1994 ensured 
that the police and human rights divisions would continue to ensure that the phased 
implementation of outstanding government obligations would continue until after the 
elections.
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In an initiative that was negotiated through these mechanisms, six of the seven 
presidential candidates signed a solemn pact which committed them to implement 
outstanding Peace Accord commitments beyond the election (March 1994). With these 
measures the FMLN, the pro faction of ARENA and the UN aimed to institutionalise 
the commitments. This was critical given the FMLN’s fears about ARENA’S 
presidential candidate, Calderon Sol, who received most o f his support from a faction of 
ARENA that was less devoted than Cristiani’s faction to the implementation o f the 
Accords (Guardian; 23.5.94; Spence et al, 1995: 18). Furthermore, in the immediate 
aftermath of the second round of the presidential elections39 and before Calderon Sol’s 
inauguration as President, the FMLN, ARENA and the UN endorsed a further timetable, 
in which they agreed to handle outstanding issues of the process with fortnightly tri­
partite meetings, joint working groups, the continued existence of COPAZ and its sub­
commissions, and the election (using new procedures) in the Assembly of a new 
Supreme Court.40
As the UN and the pro factions appeared to be carefully and successfully overcoming 
barriers to implementation with parallel sequencing, issue breakdown and the 
institutionalisation of mechanisms to deal with outstanding commitments, ultra-right 
groups, perhaps increasingly deprived of legitimate process-related opportunities to 
practice spoiler tactics, escalated their campaign of violence. Beginning just after the 
August 1993 breakthrough in the implementation process, between October 1993 and 
February 1994 fifteen FMLN personnel, including leaders, former commanders and ex­
combatants, were murdered in death-squad style attacks, which ‘raised fears o f renewed 
civil war and ‘put the peace accords in serious jeopardy’ (LAM, 12.93).
38 UN, Blue Helmets: 440.
39 The presidential elections went to a second round after Sol won 49.03% of the vote in the first round. In 
the second round ARENA’S Sol won 68.35% to Zamora’s 31.65%. See table 1.2. Given that most 
accounts point to the stakes as racked against the left and centre-left FMLN and MNR parties, the result 
was respectable and gave FMLN a political base with sufficient power through which to pursue its goals. 
See Wantchekon, 1999.
40 Despite the slow pace of implementation of judicial reform the post 1994 election of the new Supreme 
Court, through the new Council of the Supreme court and the new requirement for a 2/3 majority in the 
Assembly for approval, is considered to have resulted in a more professional, independent Supreme 
Court. Spence et al, Chapultepec 5 Years On: 16.
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But amidst the FMLN’s fears, ONUSAL’s Human Rights division promptly 
investigated and reported that, unlike the 1980s when death squads were associated with 
the army and the state, the violence was perpetrated by fringe elements and was targeted 
against the new democratic system worked out by FMLN and ARENA (UN and ES, 
1995: 46-7). Four right-wing members of the ARENA party were murdered (El 
diario/La Prensa: 17.10.93) and later murders by the death squads were directed against 
an ARENA mayor and a number of industrialists (LAM: 02.95). This appears to support 
the argument that the attacks were driven by a faction within ARENA that was against 
both ARENA’S and the FMLN’s pro factions.
The violence appears, therefore, to have been the result of intra-formation conflict. But 
there remained a serious ‘danger that the violence would be couched as violent conflict 
between the left and the right,’ (Villalobos, El Diario/La Prensa 13.11.93) and could 
thus prompt the process to unravel. The question remains as to what elements o f process 
might explain the inability of ARENA’S spoiler faction to precipitate the unravelling of 
the process that they clearly desired?
A number of elements associated with process design protected implementation from 
being reversed by these renewed threats. Firstly, the above described, carefully- 
sequenced timetable and the adjustments to it during implementation which saw the 
endorsement of reciprocal, broken-down moves and parallel sequencing had limited the 
spoiler faction’s opportunity to demand issue hierarchy. This had resulted in progress on 
all issues in the implementation process. That progress was on all issues had helped 
both pro factions to make reasonable requests of their spoiler factions: this reduced the 
legitimacy of spoiler faction’s campaigns and thereby helped pro factions to retain the 
support of their respective sceptical factions and to maintain the alliance between pro 
factions in favour of implementation. Secondly, the two-year presence of the ONUSAL 
Human Rights Division gave it both the ability and the credibility to promptly carry out 
a report on the escalating violence. This, and the timely dispatching o f Goulding to 
manage talks to initiate an institutional response to the crisis in November 1993, further 
facilitated the pro faction alliance in the midst of the potential crisis. It was agreed that
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an institutional, insulated mechanism would handle the crisis: a UN Commission41 that 
would investigate political murders by ‘illegal armed groups.’
The FMLN insisted that the UN lead the investigative commission, stating as its 
rationale the need to avoid an attempt to present what appeared to be an organised 
political campaign of murders as ordinary crime (El Diario, La Prensa, 17.10.93). The 
request that the UN lead the investigations was presentable as a reasonable request to 
ARENA’S spoiler faction that was unwilling to reveal its true intentions. When 
combined with increased security provision for the vulnerable elite and sub-elite o f the 
FMLN, the agreement to allow a UN-led investigation deal with the crisis reduced the 
incentive for its sceptical faction to seek a break with the process. The space that was 
created allowed other aspects of the implementation process to proceed without major 
cracks in the FMLN formation and without serious cracks in the ARENA formation. As 
the Commission investigated the ONUSAL-supervised elections took place.
Table 7.2 Presidential Election, First Round: 20th Marzo 1994
Candidate/ Party
Armando Calderon Sol (Arena) 49.3%
Ruben Zamora (FMLN & CD) 42 25.6%
Fidel Chavez Mena (PDC) 16.0%
Other 10.49%
Presidential Election, Second Round: 24th April 1994 
Candidate/Party
Armando Calderon Sol (Arena) 68.3%
Ruben Zamora (FMLN, CD) 21.6 %
Table 7.3. El Salvador, Legislative Assembly Elections, 1994 and 1997
Legislative Assembly Elections, March 199443
P arty  % o f  Vote Seats
ARENA 45 39
FMLN 24 21
PDC Partido Demócrata Cristiano 14 18
PCN Partido de Coalición Nacional 4
CD Convergencia Democrática 1
Unión Democrática (UD) _______________ 1
84 (Total)
41 The Commission members included the Procurator of Human Rights and Director of ONUSAL Human 
Rights division. El Diario, La Prensa, 17.12.93.
42 FMLN and CD (Democratic Convergence) jointly proposed Zamora as presidential candidate. CD 
included the left wing constitutional party which had been banned from participating in the system prior 
to the 1989 elections - Zamora’s FDR.
43 Resultados en las Elecciones de la Asamblea Legislativa, 20 de Marzo del 1994 
http://www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Elecdata/ElSal/leg94.html
284
ELECTION AND CONCLUSION
Judgement of the frequently-faulted 1994 presidential, legislative and municipal 
elections, which signalled the formal end of the implementation process, depends on 
one’s start point and expectations. The questionable impartiality of the supreme 
electoral tribunal, the near monopoly of both capital and print and broadcast media 
enjoyed by ARENA and clear irregularities in voter registration (Stahler-Sholk, 1994: 
24-5; Wantchekon, 1999), are correctly highlighted as reducing the democratic nature of 
the elections. But a measure of the success of the elections must be that the FMLN 
managed to win 21 seats out of 84 (Table 7.3) in a previously closed political system, 
where the odds, in particular the financial odds, were seriously stacked against it 
(Wantchekon, 1999: 815).44 Further, it was able, despite its disunity, to embark on the 
task of becoming a loyal opposition. A more serious question concerns the possibility 
that in the event o f losing the presidency or winning considerably fewer of the 39 
legislative seats, significant sections of the ARENA party would not have accepted the 
results of electoral democracy and would have chosen violence instead (Spence et al, 
1995:8-9; Wantchekon: 827).
The IFF model can explain this: handing over power would have been too large a step if  
the ARENA pro faction was to be protected from its spoiler and sceptical factions in
1994. But a progressive erosion of ARENA’S monopoly appears to have commenced, 
the slow nature o f which made continued implementation possible. In the 1997 elections 
(Table 7.4), the FMLN45 battled ARENA to a near tie in legislative seats (29-27) and to 
a mere 10,000-vote difference. While a third ARENA president was elected in 1999, in 
2001 the FMLN won more seats in the legislature than ARENA and won the mayoral 
election in San Salvador. This increases the prospect that there will be an FMLN 
president after the next election (Spence, 01: 2).
44 Conversation with an observer of the 1994 Salvadorian elections, Peader Kirby, in Dublin City 
University, September 1999.
45 At this point FMLN included FPL, PCS and PRTC. ERP and RN left FMLN in 1994 following their 
decision to support an ARENA directive in the assembly which heralded a new way of assigning power in 
the Assembly, perceived as an abuse of ARENA power by most of FMLN component groups. Zamora, 
1998: 250.
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Table 7.4 Legislative Assembly Elections, March 1997
Party % o f the vote Seats
ARENA 35.4 28
FMLN 34.3 27
PCN 8 .1%, 9
PDC 7.9%, 8
CD 3.8%, 3
PRSC 3.4%, 2
PLD 3.2%, 2
MU 2 .1%, 1
PD 1 .0 %, 1
other 0 .8 %; 3
(indeoendent).
84 (Total)
Elections in the absence of power-sharing structures or decentralisation will not 
guarantee that the process of transferring some power will be phased and broken-down 
as it has been in El Salvador. The holding of elections relatively late in the process 
arguably helped the sceptical faction in the FMLN to believe that it could access power 
through the new political system; therefore, institutionalised power sharing, frequently 
inappropriate or simply not up for negotiation, was not necessary to facilitate the power 
allocation issue. The breakdown into small steps and the parallel implementation o f  
political issues, such as constitutional changes, changes to the electoral system, the 
temporary element of power sharing in local government and efforts to institutionalise 
human rights in the political system decreased incentives to perceive the elections as a 
reason to stall on all other issues. Furthermore, the election was not, in fact, a ‘zero- 
sum’ election, in that other, significantly large parties existed in the political system, 
and because securing seats (through a proportional representation electoral system) in 
the legislature actually opened up space to incrementally win power. But without the 
parallel sequencing and issue breakdown that had led to the implementation of the 
immediate commitments in the Accords, including some reform of electoral system, the 
FMLN’s pro faction was unlikely to have been in the position to pursue this policy.
That the differences that emerged to divide the FMLN do not appear to have been along 
a military / political line, a factor in part explicable by its organisational structure, may 
also have facilitated the pro faction’s policy.
Factionalism within both ARENA and the FMLN was evident throughout the 
implementation process. But features of implementation design, either explicit to 
design, or implicit and eventually established during the implementation process,
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facilitated the implementation of the ambitious accords. According to the IFF model, 
the features - reciprocal or reversible issue breakdown, parallel sequencing and the 
absence of issue hierarchy -  served to preserve the unity of pro and sceptical factions in 
each party and to marginalize the spoiler factions.
While Villilobos (ERN) reportedly sounded more and more like a European socialist as 
the implementation process progressed, his co-leader Handal (FPL) declared himself to 
remain a Marxist communist (BBCWWM, 14.2.92). The maintenance of unity between 
these two factions of the FMLN was crucial if  implementation was to succeed. If the 
coalition had broken up before the 1994 elections, Handel’s faction may have extended 
its appeal to include extremist factions in a bid to remain the most powerful faction of 
the organisation. A power struggle like this would have made compromise with 
ARENA, particularly on divisive socio-economic issues such as the land issue, almost 
impossible.
ARENA is believed to be broadly split into three factions and its moderate faction, 
which is led by Cristiani, is persistently threatened by the old guard, a dangerous third 
force with connections to ARENA’S shadowy past. This third force was strengthened in 
the wake of the 1994 elections (Spence et al, 1995: 18-19). In fact, sources close to the 
UN Commission investigating the death squads did not rule out the possibility that 
members of government still actively support it (Guardian, 23.5.94; Report of the Grupo 
Conjunto).46 The newly-elected President Sol (1994) was believed to belong to a faction 
that straddles the moderate and far-right factions (Spence et al, 1995: 18-19). That the 
implementation process did not lead to a dramatic increase in the power of these 
factions on the far right, which together with Sol’s elements arguably make up a more 
numerous faction of the party, is a considerable achievement.
According to the IFF model, the ability of the pro faction to prevail in both the ARENA 
government and FMLN can be explained in a large part by the procedures and 
mechanisms of the implementation process. Time and time again when issue hierarchy
46 The Report o f  the Ginpo Conjunto, August 17th 1994. The commission concluded that there was no 
evidence of an institutionalised government policy to support the organisations but says ‘indications are 
that active-duty members of the Armed Forces and the National Police, or public functionaries make up 
these clandestine structures... some of these activities are directed, supported, covered-up or tolerated by 
the military, police, judiciary or members of local government’.
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prevailed and issue break down was insufficient - on issues from military, to public 
security, to political, to socio-economic, to the demobilisation of the FMLN - stalling, 
perpetuated by the need for intra-formation harmony, dominated. Stalling by the FMLN 
on its commitment to demobilise the first twenty per cent o f its military was in response 
to issue hierarchy. The issue hierarchy was created by ARENA’S delay in the 
establishment of the new national police and its unwillingness to disband the public 
security forces. ARENA refused to disband public security forces and used them against 
land seizures, when it argued that the FMLN’s interpretation of the land-reform 
agreements was inaccurate and demanded too large a step for the government 
formation. Further stalling by the FMLN was prompted by the government’s failure to 
establish adequate socio-economic and re-integration programmes. Demobilisation was 
too big a step for the FMLN pro factions, without the parallel sequencing of all 
implementation issues and, while the government continued to demand issue hierarchy, 
no movement was facilitated.
Time and time again when the insulated dispute-resolution mechanisms facilitated an 
agreement that altered sequence and timing, and served to reduce the number of pretexts 
on which to make unilateral demands, implementation progressed. Where issue 
breakdown and parallel sequencing of issues was not explicitly provided for, the FMLN 
appeared to introduce it itself Steps to handover its arms inventory to the UN were not 
only delayed, but, in what appears to have been a move motivated by those sceptical of 
the process (possibly with spoiler intent), sections of the FMLN concealed their 
retention of at least 30 per cent o f its military capability until ARENA completed 
number of its commitments; reduced the size o f the military forces, demobilised public 
security bodies and made significant moves towards the implementation of the Ad Hoc 
and Truth Commission’s recommendations. By late-1992, the rules and procedures for 
implementation called for a reciprocal, phased, broken-down implementation of issues, 
and implementation progressed.
Observers of the process have argued that in the wake of the 1994 elections:
‘although much remained to be done to implement the letter and the
spirit of the accords, the transition entered a new phase, one in which
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democratic norms, institutions and practices were to take root and to 
prevail’ (Canas and Dada, 2000: 70).
However, following the end of formal armed conflict in August 1993, the insulated 
dispute-resolution mechanisms remained in place. The institutions of the 
implementation process ensured that conflict management would remain an integral part 
of the political system and that the outstanding commitments would be largely 
implemented. Some serious socio-economic issues remain, but this arguably reinforces 
the argument underlying the IFF model: that slow, incremental change poses less risk to 
the implementation process than implementation processes that request large steps of 
those with vested interests in, and opportunities to, induce stalling. Further, the extent to 
which the root cause of socio-economic problems in El Salvador lie outside of, as well 
as inside of, the Salvadorian political economy should be considered. This theme is 
briefly considered in the concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION
The analysis in this thesis suggests that while external factors, such as the presence of a 
credible security commitment, of power-sharing agreements and the absence of a 
‘conflict-generating’ political economy, maybe important variables in the 
implementation process, they do not offer strong explanations for the varying outcomes. 
For example, in a number of implementation processes, credible commitments were 
given and power-sharing arrangements agreed, yet the implementation processes 
unravelled. In fact, some of the strongest third-party credible security commitments 
were given to processes that subsequently unravelled and dramatically failed, such as 
the 1999 process in Sierra Leone, the Lusaka process in Angola, or the Indo-Sri Lanka 
accord in Sri Lanka. The agreed power-sharing arrangements in the Lusaka Protocol 
were not sufficient to ensure implementation, nor were the power-sharing arrangements 
in Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, Israel-Palestine or Tajikistan, enough to guarantee success. 
Neither has the power-sharing arrangement agreed in the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
agreement in Bangladesh been sufficient to avoid serious stalling during the 
implementation process. The only external variable that seemed to contribute to 
explaining the outcome at the implementation stage was the worsening or re-emergence 
of a regional-conflict complex, this relationship supporting the hypotheses that external 
variables are significant to implementation, to the extent that they act as equilibrium- 
maintaining or equilibrium-altering factors.
On the other hand, the analysis in this thesis highlights some factors that are highly 
relevant to the management of implementation processes. Support was found in both the 
comparative study and the in-depth case studies for the hypothesis that internal features 
of the implementation process associated with its design have a strong bearing on the 
ultimate outcome. The absence of issue hierarchy in the rules and procedures for 
implementation and the presence of procedures that encourage parallel sequencing and 
issue breakdown, or at least the opportunity to agree on parallel sequencing and issue 
breakdown, were all strongly related to successful outcomes. In fact, no process was 
ultimately successful without the presence of issue breakdown and parallel sequencing 
and the exclusion o f bases on which to make issue hierarchy demands.
290
In cases from El Salvador, to Mali, to Nicaragua, to Guatemala, parallel sequencing and 
issue breakdown helped to overcome deadlock and to facilitate ultimately successful 
processes. For example, in Mali, elements of the military and the insurgency grew 
increasingly hostile to the implementation of the National Pact in 1994 and the intensity 
of the civil conflict (Lode, 1997: 64-5), and of intra-formation struggles within the 
insurgency and within military-government circles, dramatically worsened (Lode, 1997: 
71-2). It was only after a re-negotiation of the implementation plan that the prospect of 
successful implementation improved. The new implementation plan introduced issue 
breakdown to every move, and issue breakdown was accompanied by parallel 
sequencing of all issues, from the political process of decentralisation to the incremental 
withdrawal from the North of the most offensive elements of the Malian military, to a 
simultaneous and consultative process of insurgency demobilisation. These steps were 
accompanied by UNDP and NGO- managed socio-economic programmes, which were 
themselves developed alongside grass-root based, decentralisation initiatives and the 
civil society structures were formally converted into a level of local government in
1995. Thus, when the phased demobilisation process was being implemented, a degree 
of decentralisation had been simultaneously introduced. Perhaps more importantly, 
institutions were in place through which the implementation of decentralisation would 
continue.1
In contrast, partially successful and failed outcomes tended to include some form of  
issue hierarchy, these presenting obstacles to the adoption of issue breakdown and 
parallel sequencing and creating incentives and opportunities for spoiler factions to 
induce a stalled implementation process. For example, the stalled Taif Accords in 
Lebanon endorsed issue hierarchy, which prevented the emergence of the procedures for 
sequence and timing that encourage full implementation. While including a phased 
timetable for other issues, the Accords ‘provide no timetable for the withdrawal of 
Syrian troops,’2 which are associated with the parties that make up the Muslim ‘conflict 
formation’ in Lebanon (AP, 13.11.89). All issues were to be implemented before the 
negotiations on Syrian withdrawal were to take place and no mechanism, institution or 
rule was agreed to govern when and how it should withdraw troops (Malia, 1992: 87).
1 See Lode, 1998: 85.
2 Syria’s presence was tacitly linked to the presence of Israel in South Lebanon. But even a timetable for 
withdrawal that recognised this link was not included.
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This issue hierarchy provided Christian leader, General Aoun (who arguably led a 
spoiler faction), with a pretext on which to reject the Taif Accords. This, in turn resulted 
in stalling by other members o f the Maronite (Christian) formation, who because o f  
their fear o f splitting the Christian elite refused to become part of a new unity cabinet, 
despite their support for the principles of the Taif Accords. Pro factions feared a loss of 
power from within their own community, especially given the possibility o f successful 
action by Aoun (FT, 7.12.89). In fact, until Aoun was physically removed from Beruit 
in a further civil war, the implementation of Taif could not begin.
The implementation design provided for in the 1993 and 1995 Israeli-Palestinian 
agreements explicitly endorses issue holdover in its delay on the settlement of issues 
such as the final status o f Jerusalem, the Palestinian Authority’s status, borders and 
relationship with Israel and valuable water resources, until further negotiations. 
Implementation design further endorses clear issue hierarchy in its failure to sequence 
and time an end to the Israeli building o f settlements in the West Bank and Gaza areas 
to a simultaneous implementation of other aspects of the process (Le Monde 
Diplomatique, 11.2000). The April 2001 Mitchell Report on the Al-Aqsa Intifadeh 
appears to recognise the barriers to implementation presented by issue hierarchy and it 
recommends that, if  implementation is to be facilitated, Israelis must freeze all 
settlement activity, including the natural growth of settlements in order to prepare for a 
parallel process of agreement and implementation. The analysis in this thesis suggests 
that the formula for the Middle East peace process, which calls for the incremental 
implementation of agreements while negotiations over some substantial issues continue, 
is fundamentally flawed in its explicit endorsement o f issue hierarchy. Intra-formation 
factionalism clearly presented the key barriers to progress during the implementation 
process (JIR, 05.96) and that implementation design created more incentives for spoiler 
factions to disrupt the process, than for pro factions to pursue with implementation, 
helps to explain the dynamics behind the dramatic breakdown in the process in 2000.
Issue hierarchy characterises almost every unsuccessful or partially successful 
implementation process in the data set. For only two of the unsuccessfully or partially 
implemented processes is it not possible to explain the outcome by the formal 
endorsement of issue hierarchy in implementation design. And, both o f these processes 
- the Philippines and Tajikistan - are partially successful processes. In the Philippines
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the partially successful outcome might be explained by the fact that neither issue 
hierarchy nor parallel sequencing have been fully endorsed by the designers of the 
implementation process. Furthermore, in both the Philippines and Tajikistan the 
partially-successful outcomes may be partly explained by the additional obstacles 
presented by anti-agreement spoiler or sceptical factions who operate formally outside 
the implementation process.
Concerning the institutions of the implementation process, the empirical results suggest 
that the absence of insulated institutions with the power to oversee and to design the 
implementation process is closely related to failed and partially- implemented 
settlements, while the presence of insulated institutions was not alone sufficient for 
successful outcomes. The presence of issue hierarchy appears to explain this finding. 
Insulated institutions for implementation cannot generally overcome the barriers to 
implementation presented by issue hierarchy, but they can facilitate the breakdown and 
parallel sequencing o f issues in its absence. This helps to explain why, despite the 
presence o f provisions for insulated implementation institutions, the processes in 
Liberia and Cambodia were only partially successful, the Lusaka Protocol process in 
Angola and both processes in Sierra Leone unravelled, and the Western Sahara 
settlement has remained stalled to the point of failure. In all six cases a form of issue 
hierarchy was central to implementation design. On the other hand, the presence of 
insulated institutions, for example in Mozambique, Northern Ireland, El Salvador and 
Guatemala, facilitated the adoption of rules and procedures that introduced issue 
breakdown and parallel sequencing to overcome some of the most stringent barriers to 
implementation.
The findings o f the study help to contribute to the development o f a general theory that 
explains the outcome of implementation processes. Where a credible commitment is 
given or a power-sharing arrangement agreed, it may be the catalyst that enables 
formations to endorse a peace settlement, but in the absence of sequence and timing 
mechanisms that ensure issue breakdown and parallel sequencing and a degree of 
insulation for implementation mechanisms it will not guarantee a successful outcome as 
it does not prevent spoiler factions from using the process to engender breakdown. 
While the emergence or presence of a regional-conflict complex will present barriers to 
implementation, its absence will not guarantee implementation. Nor will
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implementation be guaranteed by the absence of the conditions in the political economy 
that appear to foster violence. In sum, the key to understanding the determining effect of 
any single issue on the prospects for the successful implementation of a peace 
agreement is to estimate the effect that it will have on the ability o f spoiler factions to 
use spoiler tactics to undermine the ability of pro factions to pursue the full 
implementation of the settlement. This, the struggle between factions that characterises 
all conflict formations is the cornerstone of the intra- formation faction theory on 
implementation, hypothesised in chapter three and proposed by this thesis as the best 
explanation for the outcome of implementation processes.
The depiction of a conflict formation as involving a constant power struggle between 
individuals and groups that are driven by multiple motivations to belong to factions, or 
power hierarchies, helps to answer the question as to why elites might endorse a 
settlement and subsequently stall or refuse to implement it. The empirical study in both 
the case studies and the statistical analysis of 25 post-cold war implementation 
processes supports the hypotheses on the design of implementation process and the 
impact of external factors suggested by the IFF model. This provides a good deal o f  
support for the IFF model focus on the importance of factions and the assumption that 
the individuals that make up factions are driven by multiple motivations that complicate 
the implementation process. When elites negotiate and endorse a settlement, 
implementation or at least a start to the implementation process is perceived to be in 
their immediate interest. But the degree of fluidity in factions and the possibility that for 
very different reasons individuals may together support a strategy that aims to prevent 
implementation offers very plausible explanations as to why implementation encounters 
so many obstacles.
This idea, that all formations are characterised by factions composed o f groups and 
individuals motivated by multiple factors to support a strategy that is in favour of, 
sceptical of, or opposed to implementation, is consistent with the conclusions drawn by 
Donald and Hayes (1998) in their work on obstructionist leaders. They argue that 
regardless of organisational structure, the incentives for factionalism exist and whether 
‘a dictator, a militia commander or a warlord:’
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‘often a faction leader’s control over his followers is at best tentative, 
and followers may challenge that control when ordered to demobilise, 
since they may, as a result lose their own ability to dominate their 
region (Donald and Hayes, 1998: 79).
The intra-formation factionalism theory helps to illustrate the inadequacies of seeking to 
explain elite and sub-elite behaviour during the implementation process with a focus on 
personalities, or on an intransigence that is assumed to characterise the entire conflict 
formation. Analysts have suggested that mediators must work to judge the true 
intentions of conflict actors (Sisk, 1996: 114) and it has been proposed that a concerted 
effort by mediators to understand the personalities o f leaders may facilitate a stable 
settlement (George, 1993: 125-9). It is perhaps as a consequence of this approach that 
analyses of the Angolan process have been obsessed with second-guessing the strategy 
of Jonah Savimbi. Yet those who worked with him on countless occasions, even former 
sponsors such as South Africa’s Pik Botha and members o f the US administration, were 
unable to truly discern his peace-process strategy. On the other hand, the most useful 
assessment o f Savimbi is a general one, which proposes that4 Savimbi’s goal is the only 
easy question to answer: he wants to be president’ (JIR, 08.98: 37). Arguably, at some 
point Savimbi perceived implementation rather than a return to civil war as a better 
route to this goal. But by 1997, at the very least, Savimbi appears to have chosen to 
pursue a spoiler strategy. By 1998 he perceived that his best route to power was not 
through another presidential election, in which he may not have secured the support of 
UNITA pro factions anyway, but a fight to retain whatever quasi-govemmental powers 
he had by effectively partitioning the country.
Instead of a reliance on a need to second-guess the intentions of leaders, the intra­
formation factionalism model focuses on the set of rules, procedures and institutions 
governing implementation design that may serve to facilitate the exposure of true 
strategies. Implementation design should facilitate a pro faction strategy in its quest to 
gain sceptic support and should simultaneously serve to expose spoiler tactics and 
increase their risk perception. This does not necessitate the categorisation of specific 
individuals into pro, sceptic and spoiler factions. It is argued that, where the 
implementation design includes issue breakdown, parallel sequencing and excludes 
issue hierarchy, unilateral deadlines and issue holdover, the process is more likely to
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allow pro factions to move forward and to make it more difficult for spoiler factions to 
disrupt the process. At the very least, if  process design works to highlight the true 
intentions of ‘spoiler factions’ who pose as pro or sceptical factions, those concerned 
with furthering implementation can choose appropriate responses to stalling on the basis 
of accurate information, instead of trying to second guess human nature.
An application of the IFF theory may help to increase understanding of the impact of 
explanatory variables additional to the external variables and the variables on 
implementation design on which this study has concentrated. For example, it has been 
argued that a peace process should seek to identify ways in which the international 
community can contribute constructively to the consolidation of peace through the 
coordination of technical and material resources and effective support for the 
implementation of agreements (Amson, 2000: 49). But without a general theory on 
implementation, it is nearly impossible to begin to understand the various ways in 
which the external factors and resources injected into peace building actually impact 
upon the outcome of the process. Where one factor - the injection of donor financial aid 
and resources into a process -  is concerned, Forman and Patrick (2000: 379) seem to 
recommend that aid should be conditional on an agreed timetable for implementation, or 
on the taking by recipients o f certain actions that secure peace-building objectives. The 
intra-formation factionalism theory developed in this study, suggests that, if  such a 
timetable were to include mechanisms that reduce spoiler capacity to stall and to 
eventually unravel the process, the implementation and peace-building process would 
have a greater probability o f succeeding. If resource injections were coordinated to 
make delivery conditional on an implementation process that excludes any feature o f 
issue hierarchy, any barrier to issue breakdown or to the parallel sequencing of issues, 
this study suggests that spoiler capacity to unravel the process would be dramatically 
decreased.
The intra-formation factionalism theory can also help to explain the obstacles to 
implementation posed by powerful international financial institutions (IFIs) in their 
prioritisation of sound fiscal policy above all else. A concern of the peace-building 
discipline briefly raised in chapter four, Boyce and Pastor (1997; 1998) argue that in 
seeking to avoid high inflation by focusing exclusively on macro-economic stability and 
the reduction of budget deficits, IFIs create obstacles to peace building. Obstacles stem
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from the failure of IFI policy to recognise that high inflation and social unrest are 
equally likely to flow from extremely low public spending in an economy that is 
recovering from civil war and in the process of peace building. UN mediator Alvaro de 
Soto (de Soto and del Castillo, 1994: 71) highlighted this dilemma when he asked: 
Should El Salvador sacrifice economic stabilisation to proceed with 
implementing the accords or...carry out its structural adjustment 
programme, perhaps endangering the peace process?
The IFF model explains that, firstly insistence on structural adjustment programmes for 
trade liberalisation and privatisation can undermine the livelihood of peasant producers 
(Boyce, 2000: 376) and thereby increase their vulnerability to spoiler faction coercion 
and rhetoric. Secondly, IFI insistence on low public spending can provide spoiler 
factions in government conflict formations with pretexts on which to avoid the 
implementation of socio-economic provisions to which they committed, but to which 
they are, in fact, fundamentally opposed. The theory and analysis in this thesis suggest 
that a resource and loan-allocation policy that prioritises both peace-building and 
macro-economic stability would financially support processes in which issue 
breakdown, parallel sequencing of commitments, the exclusion of issue hierarchy and 
the inclusion of insulated dispute-resolution institutions are central to design. This 
design would extend to the rules and procedures for the implementation of the socio­
economic commitments that are frequently vaguely documented in agreement texts.
Mediators to violent civil conflict tend to prioritise above all the reaching of a mutually 
acceptable settlement. The serious impediments that this priority can present to the 
agreement on good institutions for the post-conflict political system have been 
recognised by analysts (Sisk and Horowitz in Sisk, 1996: 94). The analysis in this study 
suggests that, even if  mediators do prioritise good post conflict-management institutions 
during pre-settlement negotiations, even more immediate barriers to conflict resolution 
are presented by the temptation for the mediator to prioritise any settlement over a 
settlement that is implementable. The findings of this thesis suggest that the prospects 
of concluding an ultimately implementable settlement will increase if the rules and 
procedures for implementation are informed by the intra-formation struggle between 
factions and if the process is designed to limit the opportunities for those factions most 
opposed to the consolidation of a settlement.
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Raising the issue that prompted this study, Galtung contends that the assumption that a 
conflict is resolved:
‘once elite members of the parties to the conflict, have accepted the 
solution, as indicated by their signature on some documents, is the 
most naive view of a conflict.’ (Galtung, 1996: 8 8 ).
But the evidence suggests that the barriers to implementation in the wake of these 
settlements are not best explained by the intransigence o f parties to civil wars, and the 
argument that their intransigence ensures that eiltes never intended to implement the 
settlement in the first place. Neither can high levels of insecurity and distrust between 
the conflict formations fully explain the barriers at the implementation stage. Instead, 
barriers can be explained by intra-formation factionalism. Elites and sub-elites that 
make up each party to a conflict are driven by multiple motivations, which are 
ultimately security and power seeking, to support, be sceptical of, or to oppose the 
implementation of a settlement. The outcome of the implementation process depends on 
the ensuing power struggle between factions and on the extent to which those in favour 
of implementation can prevent the emergence o f a blocking coalition between those 
sceptical of and against the implementation of the agreement. The findings of this study 
suggest that the rules, procedures and institutions of the implementation process are 
fundamentally important to outcome, in that they shape the choices and opportunities 
available to the factions during the implementation process. Design informed by 
reciprocal or reversible issue breakdown, parallel sequencing, insulated institutions and 
excluding all forms o f issue hierarchy can overcome the damaging barriers to 
implementation that the intra-formation struggle presents.
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APPENDIX A
DEPENDENT VARIABLE PROXIES
Democ
Process Year Outcome Viol Level Level
Angola 1 1991 F 0 0
Angola 2 1994 F 0 1
Bosnia 1995 P 2 0
Cambodia 1991 P 1 1
Chechnya 1996 F 0 0
CHT (Banglds) 1997 P 1 2
Djbouti 1994 P 1 0
El Salvador 1992 S 2 2
Guatemala 1996 S 2 2
Israel/ Palest 1993 F 0 1
Lebanon 1989 P 2 0
Liberia 1996 P 1 2
Mali 1995 S 2 1
Mozambique 1992 S 2 2
Namibia 1988 S 2 2
Nicaragua 1991 S 2 2
Niger 1995 p 1 1
N.Ireland 1998 S 2 2
Philipp (Mind) 1996 p 1 2
S.Leone 1 1996 F 0 0
S.Leone 2 1999 F 0 0
Sri Lanka 1987 F 0 0
South Africa 1991 S 1 2
Tajikistan 1997 P 1 1
W.Sah (Mor) 1991 F 2 0
Implem Int
Autoc Level Freedom Inx Record Displaced Refugees
0 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 2 2
0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 2
1 0 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2
2 1 2 2 2
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 2
2 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 1
2 1 1 2 2
2 2 2 1 2
2 1 1 1 2
0 1 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
2 2 2 1 2
1 1 2 1 2
0 1 0 1 1
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0 = No Change / Deterioration
1 = Some Improvement
2 = Significant Improvement
(Democracy and Autocracy Levels together have the same weight as the other proxies).
PROXIES 
Violence Levels
SOURCES 
Chapter Tw o Text.
Democracy and Autocracy Policy 1998 and 2000.
Freedom
Implementation Record
Freedom  in the W orld Index, 1999, 2000, 2001.
Secondary Source m aterials (See B ibliography, Sections ED, V and A dditional Sources).
Trend in level of internal International Red Cross, W orld D isasters R eport 1997, 1998
displacement and refugees W orld R efugee Survey, w w w .refugees.org/w orld .
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APPENDIX B.l
Credible Commitment, Regional Conflict Complex And Guarantees/Institutionalisation Proxies
Strength Econ Guar
Accord CCommit CC RegConfCompxGuarantComb PolPwrSh TerritPwrSh PwrSharing MilitPwrShar Comb2
Angola 1 present 2 no 2 1 0 0 1 2
Angola 2 present 3 yes 3 1 1 0 1 2
Bosnia present 3 no 3 1 1 0 1 2
Cambodia present 3 no 2 1 0 0 1 2
Chechnya absent 0 yes 4 1 1 1 1 3
Chitt Hill T absent 0 no 3 1 1 1 0 2
Djbouti absent 0 no 2 1 0 0 1 2
El Salvador present 2 no 3 1 0 1 1 3
Guatemala present 2 no 2 1 1 0 2
Is/Palestine present 1 yes 3 1 1 1 3
Lebanon present 3 yes 2 1 0 0 1 2
Liberia present 3 yes 2 1 0 0 1 3
Mali present 1 no 3 1 1 1 3
Mozambique present 3 no 3 1 1 0 1 2
N.Ireland present 1 no 3 1 1 1 0 2
Namibia present 3 no 2 1 0 0 1 2
Nicaragua present 2 no 4 1 1 1 1 3
Niger present 1 yes 3 1 1 1 3
Philippines present 1 no 4 1 1 1 1 3
S.Leone 1 present 1 yes 1 0 1 0 1
S.Leone 2 present 3 yes 3 1 0 1 1 3
South Africa absent 0 no 4 1 1 1 1 3
Sri Lanka present 3 no 1 0 1 0 0 1
Tajikistan present 2 no 2 1 0 0 1 2
Western Sahara present 2 no 1 0 1 0 1 2
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DATA AND SOURCES
The text in chapter four describes each independent variable in detail.
StrengthCC: Strength of credible commitment
This is on a scale of 0-3, from absent to weak to medium to strong. Data is outlined below in the Credible Commitment Table.
RegConfCompx: Regional Conflict Complex
Data on the presence or absence of a regional conflict complex is sourced from a reading of secondary sources; any major interruptions in regional relations (as 
outlined in the text, chapter four) are coded as a regional conflict complex. It is argued that this might be equilibrium altering.
GuarantComb; Polpwersharing; TerrPwrsharing; EconPwrsharing; MilitPwrsharing; Guar Comb2: Guarantees
The criteria used by Hartzell (1999, 2001) are used to code the extent to which all types of power sharing are part of the settlement, with the sum of power sharing 
giving the combined guarantees or institutionalisation variable. A second combined power sharing is added in which political and territorial power sharing are coded 
together as one aspect of power sharing, along with economic and military to give the overall level out of 3,2 or 1. The final GuarComb combines territorial and 
political power sharing into one proxy and thus adds political/territorial, economic and military power sharing for the combined institutionalisation between 0 -3 .
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APPENDIX B.2
M utually H urting Stalemate Proxies
Accord Magnitude1 Death per 1000 Duration
Angola 1 6 27.5 16
Angola 2 6 50 19
Bosnia 6 50 3
Cambodia 5 25 16
Chechnya 4 42 2
Chitt Hill T 2 18 22
Djbouti 1 1.6 4
El Salvador 6 13.15 12
Guatemala 5 11.3 30
Is/Palestine 2 2 11
Lebanon 5 35 16
Liberia 4 19 7
Mali 1 4.0 5
Mozambique 6 30 11
N. Ireland 2 2.4 29
Namibia 2 14.7 25
Nicaragua 3 17 12
Niger 1 0.6 5
Philippines 3 7.0 24
1 Marshall Monty, M ajor Episodes o f  Political Violence 1946-1999, CIDCM, University of Maryland: Baltimore, http://www.bsos.umd.edu
2 The population of the West Bank, Gaza and Israel (including all of Jerusalem) is approximately 8.2 million in 2000. Klieman: 73. It is here estimated at 8  million 
during the implementation period. Estimates of casualties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are complex and difficult to separate from the general Middle East 
conflict and the Israeli involvement in the Lebanon civil war and its conflict with Syria and Jordan. The intensity o f the Palestinian/ Israeli conflict since 1987 (the year 
in which the first Intifada began) is first considered: Between 1987 and the signing o f Oslo in 1993, 1,500 were killed and 1,000s were wounded. (Le Monde 
Diplomatique: 6.11.2000). This does not include the 1982 approximately 1,700 Palestinians (Independnet, 24.01.02) killed in refugee camps in Lebanon. These 
casualties are considered in addition to the casualties of the first intifada. The numbers of people killed during the low level conflict involving the PLO campaign 
against Israel’s occupation and the Israeli counter insurgency campaign should be added to this figure. With this Marshall would have arrived at his 2 level of 
magnitude.
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S.Leone 1 3 1.7 6
S.Leone 2 3 6 9
South Africa 3 4.9 18
Sri Lanka 2 4 15
Tajikistan 3 4.3 6
Western Sahara 3 33 16
DATA AND SOURCES
Magnitude
This is the most important proxy here. It combines the other proxies and gives the best indication of the extent to which a mutually hurting stalemate (as defined by 
intensity, duration and magnitude) prevails in a civil war. See chapter four, p. 108 for description.
Intensity: Deaths per 1000 (intensity)
The estimated number of casualties inflicted by civil war is difficult to confirm and tends to vary widely from source to source. The line of distinction between battle 
related deaths, commonly referred to as a measure of intensity in the literature, has become increasingly blurred, as civilians are more and more becoming key targets 
of groups involved in violent civil conflict and civilians are more and more involving themselves in both military and civilian lives. Marshall (1999) discusses this 
problem and endeavours to estimate battle-related casualties for each conflict. Where the conflict takes place in an entity or a part of a state and the civil war is 
relatively concentrated there despite some conflict in the entire state, such as Mindanao in the Philippines, Northern Ireland in the UK, the North and Eastern provinces 
of Sri Lanka, Chechnya, the CHT in Bangladesh and Western Sahara under Moroccan jurisdiction/control, the population of the entity is taken in so far as possible. 
Population figures (over time) were taken from a number of sources including World Development Reports, 1991 -  2001, Human Development Reports 1989-2001; 
UNCTAD, Handbook o f  International Statistics and  European Platform for Conflict Transformation and Management, (Reports for all countries), www.euconflict.org
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APPENDIX B.3
Greed And Grievance Hypotheses Proxies (Table Below)
Proxies
Value of primary commodity exports as a % of GDP 
Primary Commodity Exports as a % of GDP
Dominant Export category. This is a second way of measuring lootable 2. A category is dominant if it accounts for over 50% of export products. If 
no one cateory accounts for 50% the export economy is diversified. This variable was then coded as a dummy variable with economies coded as 
either dominated by primary products (including fuel) or diversified, services or manufacturing based.
GDP Per Capita = (US $ 1995)
Income Group = Measure in GDP per capita.
GNP Change = Average % GNP per capita change over five and ten yearly stages. The data for years immediately preceding settlement are used.
Years Ed = Years Education (see below) Inequality =
Gini Co-eff.= Higher the figure the more inequality (higher concentration of wealth).
DATA AND SOURCES
For civil conflict concentrated in entities rather than entire countries, where figures for the entity are available or information from which figures can be deduced is 
available, it is included and the source and method of deduction included in the appendix endnotes. Where separate information is not available the figure for the entire 
country is taken. In order to control for possible inaccuracies in these figures, the tests are run both including and not including these cases.
Lootable Goods
In so far as the available information allows, the proxies for both the availability o f ‘lootable goods’ and opportunity in the political economy are taken from the year in 
which the settlement is agreed and/or in the years that immediately precede settlement. These years best reflect the extent to which the political economy might present 
structural obstacles to implementation, by decreasing incentives for conflict formations to implement agreed conflict management solutions. Data from later years are 
in danger of reflecting more accurately the dependent variable: Whether or not civil war continues, ends or the entity continues in a state of quasi-peace and quasi-war 
will clearly affect the political economy. Unless otherwise stated the data is taken from UNCTAD Commodity Report, 1995. Table 1.22 pp.84-6; Table 1.23 pp. 87-89; 
Table 1.19 pp. 74-9. Social Indicators of Development, 1991-2; 1995 and 1996 are used for lootable 3.
While the deduction of an overall figure for the extent to which the political economy displays ‘conflict- sustaining structures’ might be desirable, the task of deduction 
would reduce the accuracy of each proxy.
Lootable 1 = 
Lootable 2 = 
Lootable 3 =
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APPENDIX B.3
Greed And Grievance Hypotheses Proxies
Opportunity And Strength Of Human Capital
Per capita income is used to proxy the existence of more opportunity in an economy (de Soysa, Collier): A level of per capita income, measured in the same currency 
and where possible in US95S and from the same source, is taken for each entity in the closest year available in comparative form immediately preceding (or year of) 
the peace settlement. Unless stated the data comes from Human Development Report, 2000: Tables 7 and 8 . A closely related proxy, which classifies states by per 
capita income, is also taken: The income group of each entity in 1990/1995/96 (Social Indicators of Development). Given the qualitatively different societies 
represented in the data set, a comparison of GDP per capita across cases may be unreflective of political economy factors individual to particular entities. Thus 
subsequently a measure of the % increase in GNP per capita over at least five years before, and up to and including, the year of settlement is taken. The availability of 
this data is less comprehensive for comparative purposes. World Development Reports, 1990-2001.
Educational opportunity is measured using the average number of years of education received by the male population (as Collier chose) in 1990. 1990 offers the best 
comparative figure for which information is available on all cases. The Human Development Report Education Index from 1995-2001, which is based on the combined 
primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment rate and the adult literacy rate (HDR, 2000:278), is used to ensure that no dramatic changes occurred (although it is 
measured using different proxies it is intended to reflect the same thing). This information is not added as no entity appeared to undergo trends would suggest 
significant changes in education attainment patterns.
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APPENDIX B.3
Greed And Grievance Hypotheses Proxies
Accord Year lootable_1 lootable_ 2 lootable_3
Angola 1 1991 60 95 primary fuel
Angola 2 1994 66.9 76.2 primary fuel
Bosnia 1995 ii
Cambodia 1991 5.9 99iv service/ div
Chechnya 1996 primaryv
Chitt Hill T 1997 1.4 14.1 viiprimary
Djbouti 1994 1.8 45 service/ div
El Salvador 1992 5.4 63 service/ div
Guatemala 1996 8 64.9 service/ div
Is/Palestine 1993 3.0 29.0ix maufacturing
Lebanon 1989 4.8 19 maufacturing
Liberia 1996 60xiii 56 Primary
Mali 1995 10.5 79 Primary
Mozambique 1992 10.3 82 service/ div
N.Ireland 1998 3.2XV 15 manufacturing
Namibia 1988 30 57 Primary
Nicaragua 1990 16.7 88 Primary
Niger 1995 12 99 Primary
Philippines 1996 5.8 CD CD o 00 xixPrimary
S.Leone 1 1996 10.2 45 service/ div
S.Leone 2 1999 10.2 45 service/ div
South Africa 1991 5.2 26.1 service/ div
Sri Lanka 1987 15.9 50.3 service/ div
Tajikistan 1997 gyXXiii Primaryxxiv
Western Sahara 1991 7.0 02*xvii Primary
GDPpc IncGroup GNPchange Yearsed inequality
667 Lower-med -6 . 1 2
428 Low -3.3' 2
Lower-med1"
240 Low 2.3 40.7
vi Lower-med -5.1 5 48.7
348 Low 2.34viii 3.1 33.6
1032 Lower-med 0.5
1378 Lower-med 0 . 2 4.1 52.3
1358 Lower-med 0.3 4.4 59.6
1329x Lower-med 2 0 xi 8.9xii 35.5
1720 Lower-med 5.3
Low 3.2
249 Low 0 . 8 0.5 50.5
144 Low -1.5xiv 2 . 1 39.6
15177xvi High 3.2 1 1 .5™ 36.1
460 Lower-med 0.7 1.7
1991xviii Low-med -3.3 4.1 50.3
235 Low -2 . 1 0 . 2 50.5
1064xx Lower-med’0" 1.5 7.8 46.2
279 Low -3.6 1.4 62.9
150 Low -6.3**' 1.4 62.9
3788 Upper-med -0 . 2 4.1 59.3
536 Low 2.9 7.7 34.4
321 Low -9 .5™ 5»vi 37.5
1310 Lower-med 1.4 4.1 39.5
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APPENDIX B.3
Greed And Grievance Hypotheses Proxies (Endnotes)
* The first figure is the average annual growth rate over the 1985-95 period. GNP per capita experienced a 12% growth rate in the 1996-7 period. In order to account for 
some of this growth in the early years of implementation a figure from 1985-1997 is calculated for the second process: -3.3.
II Figures are not available for Bosnia. In 1990 in the former Yugoslavia primary commodity exports were 3.2% of GDP and from 1989 to 1991 primary commodity 
exports were 23% of total exports. While these figures are reflective of the Federation as a whole, the Bosnian economy was fairly diversified in 1990, with 
manufacturing/industrial activity (metallurgy, chemical, manufacturing, sugar and tobacco) accounting for 65% of GDP. Value of exports in GDP are not given. 
Woodland and forestry were also important sectors. The Economic Situation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, European Forum August 1999. w'ww.europeanforum.bot- 
consult.se.
III World Development Report, 2000/01, Table la
From 1989-91 primary commodity exports make up 99% of total exports but in 1993 make up only 42.1% according to UNCTAD 1995 Commodity Yearbook. As 
the 1993 data is over a year into the implementation process the 1989-91 figure is used as the best indicator of the political economic structure at the onset of 
implementation.
T v From 1989-91 exports from the USSR were 56% primary commodities, with 40% fuel exports and 16% other primary commodities. Chechnya is a mostly 
agricultural based economy with 70% of the population based on the land in 1989, but it remains an important centre of petroleum production and refining and crucial 
oil and gas pipelines are located there providing further income-generating activity in 1992. ASF Chechnya Brief -  Andrei Sakharov Foundation:
www.wdn.com/asf/cgi/ASFdbs [August 2001].
VI Former Soviet Union had a GDP per capita of 3668 in 1990 and 2138 in 1998. Chechnya was one of the poorest parts of the former USSR and is assumed to have
liad a GDP per capita of at least 'A that of the USSR average.
VII The economy of Bangladesh appears to have made the transition to a more diversified economy, with the % of primary commodity exports reducing from nearly
29% of total exports in 1980/81 to 17.8% in 1990 and to 8.2% in 1999/00. UN Conference on Least Developed Countries, 2001: Bangladesh. United Nations 
Conference of Least Developed Countries, 2001: Bangladesh: 3. While no breakdown in economic data on regions is given Bangladesh is a ‘ primarily agricultural’ 
based economy with 75% of the population residing in rural areas and a significant proportion o f the population living below the poverty line (26). CHT is part of a 
large, heavily forested mountain range stretching from western Burma to an area where it merges with the Himalayas in China. The tribals and Bengali settlers who 
live there depend on the forests (from which they have been refused access for many years by military) and agriculture. It is considered by the Bengali government to 
have huge potential for development (Levene: 345), with forest and mineral resources perceived as vital if the government is to turn around Bengali economic fortunes 
(Levene: 348). Given the large dam constructed there in the area displaced large proportions of the population. Sources indicate that the CHT region supplies 
Bangladesh with water (from the dam) and forest resources and it is believed that mineral resources are more widespread than currently exploited. Exports (internal to 
Bangladesh) are almost certainly primary commodity, though figures were not available to confirm this.
Vl" Calculated for the 1985-1997 period. 2.1% from 1985-1995 and 3.7% from 1996-7.
K Palestinian Central Bureau Statistics are used for data on Palestinian territories alongside usual source for Israeli data. Primary products constituting food and live 
animals, beverages and tobacco, crude materials, mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials, animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes, together were worth 
117,140$ in 1998 (PCBS). As a % of GDP (1996 value) this is 3897$million (both at current prices) small: 3%. The total value of exports is $394,846, with
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manufactured good, machinery and transport equipment and miscellaneous manufactured goods together accounting for $276,626, primary 117,140. Thus 
manufacturing goods appear to account for 70% of total exports, with primary commodity exports contributing 29%. The commodity balance does not therefore differ 
much from Israel’s economy in which primary commodity exports were 2%of GDP in 1992. Primary commodity exports are significantly less as a % of all exports in 
Israel, accounting for 9.1% 1993.
x This is the figure for the West Bank and Gaza in 1994. In 1995 and 1996 the figure is 1496 and 1537$ respectively and the WDR 1000/01 estimates it at 1,610 in 
1998/9. Israel’s GDP per capita in 1998 was 15,978 US $. This does not include the occupied territories.
Xl This is the figure for Israel’s economy from 1980-1993. Figures for the Palestinian territories are arguably lower considering that from 1998-9 (during more peaceful 
times) the average GNP per capita growth rate was 1.3%. However the figure is included as a more accurate time (1993) and to proxy Israel’s economic situation too. 
xn This figure is for both male and female and it only refers to Israel, not including the number of years of education in the occupied territories, which is considerably 
lower.
XI" Excluding fuel this becomes 45-6%. It is still a very high figure considering the fact that Djibouti is not coded as having a primarily primary commodity based 
economy. As a % of total exports neither primary commodity non-fuel nor primary commodity fuel account for over 50% of exports.
xin Despite this apparent drop from 20.9% in 1990 to 8.5 and 11.1% in 1991 and 1992, a recent report on Liberia confirms the huge significance of primary commodity 
exports to GDP (well above 11%). The UN Third Conference on Least Developed Countries, May 2001, reports that the contribution of exports in logs and timber to 
GDP was less than 10% in the late 1980s and was almost 20% in 1999 (43). Yet logs and timber are only secondary in economic importance to the export of rubber. A 
statistic for the contribution of rubber exports to GDP is not given, but the % of total exports accounted for by rubber increased from 24% to 77% (1987 and 1997). In 
terms of value in 1999, rubber contributes 61.7 Million US $ to GDP; Forestry 60.7 (of which logs and timber 19.3 MUS$). (73) At a conservative estimate, the value 
of primary commodity exports to GDP must exceed 60% (given the significantly larger monetary contribution o f rubber to GDP yet the fact that export logs and timbre 
constitute 20% of GDP.
x,v GNP per capita grew at -1.5% from 1980 up until the period of the implementation process (1993). From 1985-1994 it grew at 3.8% but this figure is too likely to 
reflect the successful outcome.
xv This is the 1991 figure for the UK as a whole and pending a figure for Northern Ireland in the 1995-8 period is a good estimate. Lootable 2 is calculated using the 
UK 1993 figure (17%) as a base and using NIERC DETI National Statistics, 1998-9: 5 for information on the value of manufacturing exports as a % of GDP (National 
Statistics 1989-1999 values for GDP). Manufacturing exports are worth 20% of GDP and manufacturing exports is the biggest exporting sector. The value for primary 
commodity exports thus cannot exceed this and the UK 1993 figure is used. More up to date NI figures were sought.
XVI NI GDP per capita as a % of the UK as a whole was 72.3% in 1990, 77% in 1993 and to 79% in 1995. It fell again and in 1998 was 75.8% of UK GDP per capita 
(NI Statistics, NI Annual Abstract of Statistics, 2000: 97). In order to keep the value in US$ 1995, this estimate is 75.8% of the UK figure for 1998.
XV1‘ Male and Female.
XV1" Average between the 1985 and 1990 GDP per capita.
XIX Calculated using figures on Mindanao trade and development. W M r w .m in d a n a o .c o m :  Mindanao Economy in Perspective, Table 5. Lootable 3 is thus changed from 
diversified (which reflects the entire economy) to primary, which reflects the Mindanao economy.
** GDP per capita in Mindanao is estimated to be 1/3 of that in the NCR (North) (www.mindanao.com). This figure is the combined figure for all of the Philippines and 
thus that of Mindanao (population of 17.2 out of 6 8  million) would be more than 1/3 of this figure but considerably less. The figure should thus be reduced by at least
'/2.
309
XXI While the Philippines is categorised as lower-medium with 1064 $ GDP per capita, bearing in mind the above statistic it is estimated that Mindinao could be low 
income. It is tested as both.
xx" 1997-8 the average growth was -2.9%  and from 1998-9 it was -9.8%. This figure is the 1997-9 average % growth. 
xxm Calculated from annual statistics for Tajikistan available at m w .sesrtcic.org/
XXIV UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, 2000. Table 4.3:186. Cotton, Aluminium and fruit (all SITC primary commodity goods) dominate exports accounting for 40.6, 
17.4 and 9.4% respectively.
xxv 1985 to 1994 average growth was -11.4%. From 1996-7, the years immediately, preceding the agreement average annual growth was 0.7%. This figure is from 
1985-97.
XXM Human Development Report, HD Index, 1994: 130. This refers to years of education for male and females. Male would be a little higher.
xxvn reflects the Western Sahara economy only, CIA World Book o f  Facts, 2001 . In the Moroccan economy as a whole primary commodity exports make up a far 
smaller % of overall exports. The 7.0% (lootable 1) is the % of primary commodity exports in GDP for all of Morocco as no breakdown figure for the Western Saharan 
GDP is available.
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APPENDIX B.4
Implementation Design: Sequencing and Timing Mechanisms
Accord Year
Angola 1 1991
Angola 2 1994
Bosnia 1995
Cambodia 1991
Chechnya 1996
Chitt Hill T 1997
Djbouti 1994
El Salvador 1992
Guatemala 1996
Is/Palestine 1993
Lebanon 1989
Liberia 1996
Mali 1995
Mozambique 1992
N.Ireland 1998
Namibia 1988
Nicaragua 1990
Niger 1995
Philippines 1996
S.Leone 1 1996
S.Leone 2 1999
South Africa 1991
Sri Lanka 1987
Tajikistan 1997
Western Sahara 1991
Is
Holdover Unilat
1 (election) 0
0 1
1 0
1 (election) 0
1 1
1 1
0 0
0 0
1 0
0 0
1 (election) 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 0
0 0
1 0
Combd IH Pari Seq
1 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
0 1
0 1
1 0
1 0
1 0
0 1 (Ev)
0 1 (Ev)
0 1 (Ev)
0 1 (Ev)
0 1 (Ev)
0 0
1 0
1 0
0 1
1 0
0 1
1 0
0 = Absent; 1 = Present; Ev = Eventually
Pari Seq2 Is BkDown
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 1
1 1
1 1
0 1
0 1
0 0
0 1 Eventually
0 1 Eventually
0 1 Eventually
0 1 Eventually
0 1 Eventually
0 0
0 0
0 1
1 1
0 0
1 1
0 1
Insulation
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
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DATA AND SOURCES
The independent variables are clearly defined in chapters three and four.
There are six basic independent variables and one of them is coded twice, this making for the 7 overall measures that appear in the above table for each of the 25 cases.
1 . Issue holdover,
2 . Unilateral timetable (with date),
3. Issue Hierarchy Combined
4. Parallel sequencing 1
5. Parallel Sequencing 2
6 . Issue breakdown
7. Insulation.
Issue Holdover and Elections; Unilateral Timetable and Issue Hierarchy Combined.
The absence of the first three variables is expected to predict success.
Combined Issue Hierarchy indicates that unilateral demands (with or without date), issue hierarchy or both are present.
Unilateral timetables in this case refer to unilateral demands with fixed deadlines (dates). The relationship of combined issue hierarchy proxy is expected to have the 
strongest relationship with outcome.
Parallel Sequencing 1 and 2
Parallel sequencing is initially coded as either absent (0) or present (1) (present, meaning that it is either explicitly provided for or eventually adopted) and a strong 
relationship is expected between the presence of this condition and successful outcomes. It is then recoded as either specifically provided for in the text of the settlement or 
not (absent). The specific provision for parallel sequencing in the text of the settlement is expected to relate to success, but its relationship will not be as strong as that with its 
simple presence (parallel Seq 1). It is expected that where parallel sequencing is not fully provided for in the terms o f the settlement but where it eventually emerges (2), 
insulation is a feature of the observation in question and combined IH is not.
Issue Breakdown
Presence of issue breakdown is expected to coincide with success.
Insulation
Presence is expected to coincide with success.
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APPENDIX B.5
BRIEF EXPLANATION FOR CODING THE IFF HYPOTHESIS 
ON IMPLEMENTATION DESIGN
B5.1 ANGOLA 1
Chapter Five
B5.2 ANGOLA 2
Chapter Five
B5.3 BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
In the implementation process that followed the Dayton Agreement there are no clear signs of either issue 
breakdown or parallel sequencing. There is evidence of ‘issue holdover’ and of inadequate institutional 
provisions to deal with the ‘issue holdover’ concerning the eventual status of Bosnia, its two entities and three 
ethnic groups. While unilateral timetables (or demands) were not a feature of design, another form of issue 
hierarchy was endorsed by the inclusion of strict timetables to govern two issues only: the holding of national 
elections and the implementation of the military ceasefire in clear, reciprocal steps. There was no timetable 
for any other issue; this ensured that the implementation of other agreements, aspired to, but not part of the 
sequence and timing of implementation, did not commence. In the absence of insulated institutions with the 
power to facilitate the introduction of parallel sequencing, issue hierarchy would remain the dominant rule for 
the sequencing and timing of implementation.
With the exception of a strict ceasefire timetable and a strict deadline by which national elections, (both 
within each entity and to the three-person presidency and 'national institutions') were to take place within six 
to nine months, the Dayton Agreement gives little guidance for the sequencing and timing of all other 
military, civilian, political or human rights issues. Despite an enormous international presence there was no 
insulated institution with a clear mandate to oversee the implementation of all issues, with the exception of its 
military provisions. The large number of poorly co-ordinated international actors that oversaw 
implementation resulted in little or no setting of priorities on these issues (Cousins, 2001: 129). Thus 
demobilization, police reform, elections, constitutional reform, human rights guarantees, refugee returns, 
while dealt with as broad aspirations and commitments, were not subject to an implementation sequence, 
order or breakdown. As neither the agreement, nor a subsequent implementation plan, put any order or 
sequence on implementation, factions in favour of the most minimalist interpretation of all provisions 
(including the unprecedented agreement on the return of displaced people) could simply implement the 
ceasefire requirements, take part in the elections, and, while in line with the agreement, find legitimate 
pretexts with which to justify stalling on the implementation of other critical issues. This sequence, which 
emphasised elections above all else, legitimised hard-line nationalist factions in all three formations. The lack 
of sequence ensures that the task of, for example, the international police force in creating a new and civilian 
police force is made far more difficult with the demobilisation of militia and armed civilian gangs incomplete.
In the words of one analyst, no effort was made to present elections as a means through which a transitional 
regime would be established (Woodward, 1996: 4); a transitional regime that would facilitate the 
implementation of Dayton along with the institutions which Dayton establishes, such as the all Bosnian HR 
Commission and the Commission to work on the compensation or return of land. The transition regime could 
have been presented as a step in the implementation process and those driving implementation could have 
ensured that this transition included commissions involving civil groups, such as a commission for economic 
assistance, a commission for local redevelopment.
Opportunities existed to encourage a sequence and timing that creates incentives to implement more than the 
minimal. But there was no effective mechanism to deal with continued conflict over the clearly unresolved 
issue of national rights. Joint institutions provided for in the new constitution that Dayton presented appear to 
be the only mechanism; in them no inherent mechanism encourages co-operation and the development of a 
consensus, even on how to institutionally manage this issue. Maintenance of the uncertainty on national rights 
played into the hands of spoiler factions who could use it as an excuse to drag their feet on all provisions that 
might gradually facilitate the development of the entity to the Stated goal of Dayton: to draw the entities into 
one truly integrated state’ (JIR, 09.97: 396).
B5.4 CAMBODIA
UNCTAD was responsible for overseeing the implementation of the agreement: it was a relatively insulated 
institution with wide powers to oversee the implementation of the process. However, the agreement provided 
for deadline-bound, winner-takes-all elections and this placed a form of issue hierarchy at the centre of the 
Cambodian implementation process. According to the terms of the agreement, these elections were scheduled
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to take place after 70 per cent of demobilisation (and disarmament) was complete; demobilisation itself was to 
begin once the UN-monitored cease-fire was put in place. But the timetable for demobilisation was effectively 
ignored by UNCTAD once it became clear that it was not achievable before the time of the elections. 
Throughout the implementation process, the provision that made the holding of elections possible by the date 
agreed in the Accord was prioritised for implementation and all other issues were effectively stalled or left 
until after the elections. Therefore, the demobilisation and disarmament processes were highly incomplete 
when the elections took place, and the Khmer Rouge had not even started the disarmament process.
There was some issue breakdown in the sequence and timing of the security issues, for example, in the 
cantonment, demobilisation and disarmament processes: these were to take place in stages and were 
reciprocal in that no faction was asked to disarm and demobilise before the other. But demobilisation was not 
linked with any other issue (bar the election and this was ignored). Important issues that were not properly 
implemented included the political issue of converting conflict formations into stable political parties before 
the elections, and the security issue which ultimately aimed to breakdown the military structure of each 
formation. These and other issues were reduced to sub-texts by the sequencing and timing of implementation. 
Therefore, the non-irregular, coercive powers possessed by the conflict formations, especially by the CPP 
who controlled the bulk of the army, the lower-level bureaucracy (and the patronage associated with it), the 
judiciary and the police (Doyle, 1997: 91), were ignored during the implementation process. This was despite 
UNTAC’s promise in the agreement to ensure that these coercive powers would not be used. Thus the 
agreement’s promise to implement political provisions to make a neutral environment for elections was 
unfulfilled: this contributed to the issue hierarchy (elections above all other provisions) and to unilateral 
demands on the other formations to demobilise and disarm while the CPP was not required to implement 
provisions that would neutralise its political power. This was because the demobilisation process was not 
accompanied by provisions for phased, sequenced implementation of all issues: no administrative reforms 
were required of the CPP and the police force remained fully under its control (despite its agreement to allow 
UNTAC to provide a neutral environment for elections). Furthermore, provisions for the full integration of 
former combatants into a new army were lacking, despite aspirations to do this alongside demobilisation (JIR, 
October 1994: 470).
That these provisions, which were not broken down and were not sequenced in parallel with the preparations 
for elections, were never implemented is supported by the fact that, despite FUNCINPEC's victory in the 
elections, the CPP effectively controlled the coalition regime that followed (JIR, October 1994: 468). A coup 
d’état in 1997 finally threw out the peace agreement: it was launched by the CPP; it was apparently in 
anticipation of an impending coup by its closest rival, FUNCINPEC, which included remaining factions of the 
Khmer Rouge (JIR. April 1998: 38-9).
In sum, the perception of issue holdover created by the emphasis on elections above all else encouraged 
spoiler factions and limited the opportunity for pro factions’ to control the agenda. The lack of issue 
breakdown left the state power possessed by the CPP intact, this creating a perception of unilateral timetables 
for other formations: some formations were required to dismantle military formations before elections while 
others, arguably, retained an almost unchanged monopoly of power.
B5.5 CHECHNYA
The August 1996 Agreement and the subsequent May 1997 Agreement between the Russian Federation and 
the Chechen Republic are considered to be part of the same overall peace process. The August 1996 Peace 
Agreement committed both sides in the Chechnyan war to defend human rights and freedoms of citizens and 
to acknowledge that the use of armed force, or, the threat of armed force to settle disputes is unacceptable.
The Agreements worked out 'the principals for the determination of the basis of relations between Russia and 
Chechnya.’ They were:
Before December 2001 relations between the Russian Federation and Chechnya will be agreed in 
accordance with generally accepted principles and norms of international law;
Before 1st October 1996 a Joint Commission with representatives from Russia and the Chechen 
Republic will be formed to perform the following tasks:
o To prepare and supervise the pull out of Russian troops from Chechnya; 
o To prepare for agreed-upon measures to combat crime, terrorism and manifestations of 
national and religious conflict and control of their implementation; 
o To prepare proposals for monetary and budgetary relations between Chechnya and the 
Russian Federation;
o To prepare and create (by the govt of Russia) a programme of rehabilitation o f the 
economic infrastructure of the Chechen republic; 
o To control the activities of organs of state power and other organisations in the supply of 
food and medicine;
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o To allow for elections in Chechnya in January 1997, which would be monitored by the 
UNPO.
o In October 1996, the Russian PM and the Chechen leader agreed to set up a joint body to 
rebuild Chechnya's economy and organise local elections.
The May 1997 treaty once again shelved and left open the question of secession. It confirmed that Russia 
would abide by the norms of international law and would not use force to settle disputes. The Chechen 
delegation agreed to keep the Russian rouble and the treaty cleared the way for Russia’s use of Chechen oil 
pipelines. This agreement was negotiated to clear the way for economic and social cooperation in the 
reconstruction of Chechnya.
By leaving the question of independence open, and, more specifically, deferring it for five years, both the 
1996 and 1997 Russia -Chechnya treaties allowed hardliners in both camps to continue to concentrate on one 
issue and one issue only: the status of Chechnya. By failing to establish an institution through which the 
status might be debated, worked on or institutionalised, the five-year deadline in which the status would be 
decided constitutes issue holdover. Regardless of the other drawbacks in this agreement, this issue holdover 
ensured, as the hypotheses outlines, that any other provisions of the agreement are unlikely to be implemented 
in any serious way. As reports confirm, the Chechen moderate, who was elected by a strong majority of the 
Chechen people and received Moscow's recognition in January 1997, faced almost insurmountable opposition 
to the implementation of the agreement from hardliners in his own organisation. Before his negotiations with 
Moscow in May 1997, he met Radytev, warlord and former member of his formation. According to 
Reports, Radytev had a few hours earlier held a rally at which he promised to fight until Russia granted full 
independence. In sum, the failure to agree on any clear implementation timetable ensured that no space 
existed for those like the president of Chechnya, who appeared willing to implement a political compromise. 
The strong endorsement for issue hierarchy in the Chechen-Russian Agreements may reflect the strength 
during negotiations of those factions who were dis-interested in implementing any agreement, this especially 
so in the case of the Russian government. However, it confirms the argument that an agreement that places 
any form of issue hierarchy at the heart of the implementation process is unlikely to give any space to pro 
factions to fulfil their goal of full implementation.
B5.6 CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS (CRT)
The peace agreement between the Bengali government and the PCJSS insurgency provided for the 
autonomous administration and government of the Hill Tribe area by a Regional Hill Council and district hill 
local governments; the amnestied return of guerrilla fighters from just over the Indian border; amnesty for 
other guerrilla fighters; the withdrawal of Bengali troops and their cantonment in barracks; the return of over 
50,000 Jumna refugees; social and economic development of the region and provisions on land settlement and 
disputes. The new institutions provide for some non-tribal representation (as non-tribal people who have been 
relocated in the CHT area consistently since the 1960s now make-up a significant percentage of the 
population there); and a ministry of CHTaffairs was to be set up in central government with a tribal member 
as minister.
However, issue hierarchy is evident firstly, in a unilateral timetable and secondly in the prioritising of military 
over other issues. Firstly, within 45 days a full list of the armed members, arms and weaponry of the PCJSS 
(insurgency) was to be submitted to the government, and a day for the PCJSS 's depositing of arms would then 
be jointly agreed. The government could take legal action against those who refused to deposit arms within 
the stipulated time, and, while an amnesty and rehabilitation in the form of a cash payment was 
simultaneously provided for PCJSS members, no parallel commencement of the agreement to reduce the huge 
Bengali security presence in the area was provided for in the implementation process; nor are provisions to 
ensure the sequenced implementation of other issues included. Reinforcing the unilateral nature of the move 
on military issues, a withdrawal or (even) cantonment to barracks of Bengali forces was to take place with 
‘the coming of PCJSS to normal life,’ and no deadline for this withdrawal was fixed.
Other issues were over-shadowed by this unilateral timetable and this served to create issue hierarchy. The 
absence of issue breakdown and of parallel sequencing is evident when the land issue is considered. Disputes 
over landownership, one of the most problematic issues of the conflict which stem from a Bengali 
government policy of re-settling Bengalis on tribal-owned hill tract land, was to be dealt with by a Land 
Commission. It would be chaired by a retired judge, an appointment which both parties would agree on. But 
little guidance was included on how to deal with the complexity of land disputes and no deadline that ties the 
settlement of land disputes to other aspects of the implementation process is included. Providing even more 
issue hierarchy, those measures that were agreed to settle existing disputes were not accompanied by a
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government agreement to stop settlements. This created the potential for issue holdover, giving the 
government the unquestioned right to continue settlements without consultation. Further issue hierarchy can 
be seen in the provision that made the establishment of the Land Commission dependent on the formation of 
an interim regional council appointed by the Bengali government. Disagreement within the Bengali 
government, which was under pressure from the opposition, meant that this provision delayed action on 
almost all issues bar the above-discussed security issues: this sharpened the issue hierarchy demand and made 
the chances of introducing parallel sequencing even more remote.
While the possibility of its adoption is not precluded, issue breakdown is not explicitly evident for all issues. 
On the land issue, the Land Commission (once established) was to institutionally deal with the long-term 
issue of land disputes; the government committed to start a land survey in an attempt to ascertain the legal 
owners of, and provisions to, allocate small amounts of land to returning landless tribals: this provided some 
semblance of issue breakdown, in that the complex issue was broken down into a number of steps. On socio­
economic issues, the government’s commitments were broken down into steps that included the allocation of 
additional finance to projects to develop the CHT, to encourage the development of tourism there, to consider 
the environmental aspect of the region, to continue a quota system in quota system in government jobs and 
educational scholarships for tribals (agreed in the late 1980s), and to take measures, and provide finance, for 
measures to preserve the distinctiveness of the culture and heritage. While broken down in that promises were 
detailed and clearly definable, they were not subject to any timetable for implementation.
Finally, the task of monitoring the implementation process was clearly assigned to an implementation 
committee, the governor of which was to be appointed by the government and the other two members of 
which were the chairman of the implementation task force and the president of a key tribal family. The body 
is a highly political one which is very subject to the pressures of spoiler factions, both within the political 
establishment and the PCJSS movement.
B5. 7 DJIBOUTI
Data on the implementation process is incomplete and the peace agreement text was unavailable to the author 
up to October 2002.
B5.8 EL SALVADOR
Chapter Seven
B5.9 GUATEMALA
The negotiation process in Guatemala took place over a seven or eight year period and concluded with a final 
agreement in December 1996. The URNG and the government agreed in 1990 to acknowledge the 
Esquipulas II (agreement between five Central American Presidents on paving the way toward peace in 
Central America) and to request UN observation of the process. But any real progress on its implementation, 
and on further negotiations, was blocked by the Guatemalan Army's insistence on issue hierarchy in the peace 
process: URNG had to demobilise and disarm before any agreement could be reached (Spenser Denise,
1997:12). Agreement on a schedule for the implementation and verification of agreements in 1991 was still 
blocked by this issue hierarchy demand and the civil war continued.
Negotiations took place on a nothing is agreed until everything is basis from 1993 to 1996 and, in spite of 
continuing violence, agreements were made on a number of political changes that would be necessary if 
URNG was to negotiate for a final agreement with the government. These included some agreement on 
substantive issues such as human rights, the rights of indigenous people, social, economic and agrarian issues; 
on a commission to document war crimes; on a new, civilian role for the army and demobilisation and 
reintegration of URNG. In March 1996, a unilateral 'temporary ceasefire' implemented by URNG (the result 
of a reasonable request by its pro faction) created space for the final agreement, enabling the government to 
respond with an order to the army to stop all counter-insurgency operations. It also provided space for the 
government’s pro faction to call for the firing, arrest or purging of certain groups of individuals in the officer 
corps and city forces (spoiler faction). The size of this step was reduced with the introduction (and passing) in 
December 1996 of a general amnesty law to congress exempting soldiers and guerrillas from prosecution for 
killings and violent acts. Human rights and religious groups have been critical (Spenser, 1997: 13) but the 
amnesty is perceived here as an example of where issue breakdown enabled the government, in particular, to 
implement the political and military aspects of the Accords.
Unilateral deadlines were not a feature of the carefully-negotiated implementation timetable in the Final 
Agreement1. The timetable for URNG demobilisation and sequenced reintegration was quite tight but this
1 Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace, Guatemala, 29 December 1996; Agreements on the
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commenced after the official disbanding of the Voluntary Civil Defence Committees (December 1996), one 
of the most offensive militias of the war and after the beginning of reforms to the armed forces began 
(Amson: 114-5). It also coincided with the government's introduction into congress of specific agreements on 
institutional reforms and the first ninety days prioritised the firm establishment of the implementation 
commissions provided or in the agreement.
Other forms of issue hierarchy were not a feature. Actions required of the URNG were to be implemented 
alongside an institutionalised and sequenced implementation of government commitments, much of which 
had already begun prior to the signing of the final agreement. The final agreement sets out to provide a guide 
for the phased implementation of those commitments set down in the agreements, whose fulfilment could not 
be scheduled reliably in December 1996. The follow up commission, on which the URNG is well represented, 
is to determine the subsequent timetable for the implementation of commitments that are not susceptible to 
immediate monitoring. These commitments are listed specifically. (Agreement on Implementation,
Compliance and Verification Timetable for the Peace agreement. Guatemala City, December 1996)
Issue holdover is not a feature in that all substantive issues were part of a detailed agreement and very specific 
commitments were made on all substantive issues. Mechanisms for implementation were widespread and 
relatively institutionalised. Commissions on which members of civil society such as the church and unions, 
contributed significantly to the final agreements and commissions and these alongside URNG's representation 
in congress, a Civilian Secretariat of Strategic Analysis, a Department of Civilian Intelligence and Analysis 
of Information, and an Academy of National Civilian Police, exist to reduce the risks for the government’s pro 
faction's efforts to continue to implement reforms which many in its conflict formation, especially in the 
Armed Forces, oppose (Schimicr: 8-9). While there have been some obstacles to the implementation of 
important constitutional changes on the status of indigenous people (low turnout and lack of information 
leading to the rejection of the referendums) as the political system normalises space may develop for the 
running of fairer referendums. This depends very much on the full implementation of socio-economic 
development measures.
Nonetheless the hypotheses on successful or stable implementation are satisfied. In terms of institutions for 
implementation, the UN (MINUGA) mission was an insulated mechanism for the process of documenting 
human rights abuses, of demobilising URNG and corresponding security and policing institutions of the state.
B5.10 ISRAEL-PALESTINE
A form of issue hierarchy was central to the Oslo Accords and to the series of agreements that followed on 
from the implementation of the Accord and on final status negotiations. The final status of Jerusalem and of 
the Palestinian Authority's relationship with Israel was held over and this reduced incentives to implement 
other aspects of the peace agreement in any comprehensive way. Clear issue hierarchy also exists the failure 
of the Accords, and the agreements on substantial issues that followed them, to comprehensively address 
several issues, the most significant of which were water rights and of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. Once again this created enormous obstacles to the full implementation of other aspects of the 
accords: there was no parallel sequencing of implementation and parties had to implement full issues before 
agreements on how to implement these other issues were made. Given that there was no full agreement on 
important issues, there was no issue breakdown on how to implement them. Secondly, and perhaps most 
importantly, no insulated institutions existed to ensure that the implementation process could be designed to 
facilitate the introduction of issue break down and parallel sequencing.
While the case bears out the IFF hypotheses, this case is also indicative of the limits of the IFF hypotheses as 
a prescriptive theory for conflict management. The question as to whether or not Israeli and Palestinian 
negotiators could (when the equilibrium in favour of reaching a settlement existed) have prioritised reaching a 
‘package’ settlement (as opposed to one that endorsed issue hierarchy) is important and highlights the 
importance of the other variables considered by this thesis: the regional context and the degree to which a 
third party was willing to give a credible security commitment to the process. In this case, all three factors 
were missing, and this mitigated against the chance of reaching an implementable agreement.
B 5.ll LEBANON
The TAIF Accords (1989) which aimed to bring 13 years of civil war in Lebanon to a close with a phased, 
reciprocal demobilisation of paramilitaries/militias, the formation of a new, unified Lebanese Army, and a 
renegotiation of the congressional political system to reflect new balances of powers between the main
Implementation, Compliance and Verification Timetable for the Peace Agreements, Guatemala, 29 December 
1996.
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communities: the Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims, the Maronites and the Druze1. It was agreed that while the 
military and other security and political issues were being implemented, a transitional unity cabinet (elected 
by a small group of the last-elected Lebanese MPs) would preside until the first elections in twenty years took 
place towards the end of the first phase of implementation in 1992.
However, while the Accords included a timetable and parallel sequencing for other issues, the Taif Accords 
‘provided no timetable for the withdrawal of Syrian troops in Lebanon’ (AP, 13.11.89). According to one 
analyst, the issue of Syrian withdrawal was a unilateral commitment by Syria (which was associated with the 
Muslim conflict formations). It lacked ‘any mechanisms that guaranteed Syria to respect it’ (Malia, 1992: 87). 
Therefore, all other issues were, in effect, to be implemented before negotiations on Syria’s withdrawal were 
to commence; even then there was no mechanism to guarantee that it would happen. This placed issue 
hierarchy at the heart of the implementation process and provided the Christian Lebanese leader, General 
Aoun, with a pretext on which to reject the Accords, which he otherwise deemed acceptable.2 Given the need 
to maintain unity amongst the Maronite elite (and fearful of losing out to the spoiler faction), other Maronite 
leaders refused to become part of the new unity cabinet, despite their support for the principles of TAIF. They 
feared a loss of power from within their own community especially given the possibility of successful action 
by Aoun (FT, 7.12.89). Without the Maronites, the cabinet was doomed to represent only those sections of 
Lebanon under the control of Syria.
Syria eventually responded to the stalling that resulted from this issue hierarchy by intervening with military 
force, prompting renewed civil war and ousting General Aoun. With his threat to the power of the other 
Christian factions gone, they were free to engage with the implementation of the TAIF Accords, or at least the 
part of the TAIF Accords that were not obstructed by the continuing issue hierarchy.
Following the brief civil war of 1990, the implementation of Phase II of the peace agreement was in part 
facilitated. The reciprocal process of militia demobilisation, in which no unilateral deadlines were included, 
alongside the phased formation of a unified and strong Lebanese Army was successful. This demobilisation 
began alongside the election (by former MPs) of the transitional, unified, power-sharing cabinet and its 
subsequent preparations for elections. While this parallel sequencing enabled the first democratic elections in 
twenty years to take place in 1992 and effectively ended the existence of multiple militias and laid the 
foundations for a centralised, unified army at the same time, the remaining provisions in the agreement have 
been stalled by the continuing issue hierarchy created by Syria’s presence. Members of the elite in both 
factions continue to support Syria’s presence (40,000 troops) in the knowledge that they will retain their 
power. These factions are spoiler factions in that they stall on the implementation of commitments to 
decentralisation and démocratisation3 in the agreement and justify this by Syria’s continuing presence: when 
Syria withdraws, the rest of the agreement is to be implemented. Further, Hizbollah’s refusal to cooperate 
with demobilisation caused it to become a powerful political movement with both an armed and a political 
wing. Its refusal to demobilise was based on Israel’s presence in Southern Lebanon, this highlighting the 
ability of regional dynamics to obstruct the sequence and timing that is likely to facilitate full implementation.
In sum, issue hierarchy and the inability to introduce issue breakdown and parallel sequencing to the issues of 
Syria’s withdrawal and further démocratisation and decentralisation4, prevented the sequence that might have 
encouraged full implementation of the political system that TAIF envisaged. The implementation process 
appears to be permanently stalled at this stage (2 0 0 1 ).
B5. 12 LIBERIA
The Abuja Accord II was signed by the rival Liberian factions in 1996 (NPFL, ULIMO-K, LPC, ULIMO-J). 
The agreement committed the warring parties to demobilise, disarm, transform themselves into political 
parties and take part in democratic, zero-sum elections to a Presidency and a national parliament. The 
difficulties of the implementation process are described at length in Aning (1999) and Adibe (1997). The 
implementation process was insulated in that ECOWAS (and its military force -  ECOMOG) and UNIMIL
1 Division of power had been altered to reflect the new realities of demographics, decreasing the power of the 
Maronite president, increasing that of the Sunni Prime minister and the Shia Speaker of the parliament.
2 Hundreds of 1,000s of Syrian forces had been in Lebanon since they entered as an Arab League Peace­
keeping Force in 1976; its power over Lebanon was extensive in 1990 and it had become embroiled in the 
civil war fighting against the Christian militias. Therefore, most of the Christian elite saw a reduction in 
Syria’s power as fundamentally important to any agreement. The rival Muslim factions (that together make up 
a formation) relied to various degrees on Syrian patronage. To back calls for Syrian withdrawal with a view to 
furthering the implementation process (pro faction) would have risked losing this patronage to other rival pro- 
Syrian groups (sceptical or spoiler factions). Only a significant majority of Muslim groups willing and able to 
challenge Syrian hegemony could have overcome this barrier to issue breakdown by together moving (and 
the Arab League and possibly France) to convince Syria to agree to a type of phased withdrawal.
3 According to the agreement the confessional power-sharing is a step on the way to full démocratisation and 
decentralisation of power is central to its implementation.
4 The newly-negotiated, confessionally-based power sharing system was to be transitional.
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The sequence and timing in the agreement almost mirrored that of the Bicesse Accords in Angola except that 
the timeframe for elections was even shorter. A strict, rigid deadline for elections, in which only one party 
could truly gain power, placed one fomi of issue hierarchy at the centre of the implementation process.
While demobilisation and disarmament were to have taken place before the elections, and were, according to 
the agreement, a requirement if a faction was to be transformed into a political party, the time frame for this 
was way too short for such a complex task (Aning, 1999: 345-347). The rigid deadline for elections, and the 
obstacle that this presented to parallel sequencing of security and political issues, meant that few (less than 
1/3 of combatants) parties were truly demobilised or disarmed when the elections took place. The 
inadequacies of making the election issue more important than any other were seen when the newly-elected 
President, Charles Taylor, refused to implement a key commitment in the agreement to allow ECOMOG to 
control the reorganisation of the Liberian Army and security forces. By sequencing this re-organisation to 
take place after the elections, the agreement created little incentive for anyone in Taylor’s party to involve the 
former combatants from other factions, and little incentive for the other factions to join what effectively 
became Taylor’s army. In sum, the implementation process included no procedures for phased, broken- 
down implementation of demobilisation and de-militarisation, alongside a socio-economic programme that 
would have helped to encourage combatants that there was security in another way of life. Neither was the 
issue of political power broken down: a transitional power-sharing government to last until a unified army 
was formed would have helped to sequence issues in a way that created more incentives for compliance.
B. 13 MALI
The National Peace Pact was signed by the Malian transitional government, and MFUA (an umbrella 
organisation co-ordinating four insurgent groups fighting a rebellion against the government in Northern 
Mali). The agreement committed the government and the insurgents to the integration of rebels into the 
Armed Forces, the exchange of prisoners, to promote and support the safe return of refugees, to develop the 
under-developed and neglected Northern region of Mali, to decrease the heavy presence of the Malian 
military there, to allow policing of the peace to be carried out/implemented by local people and to set up a 
Commission for Northern Mali in the Central government’s Office (Lode, 1997: 64-65). While some attempts 
to implement the military provisions of the agreement were made, and a Commission of the North was set up, 
initial attempts to implement the NPP met with failure and the intensity of the rebellion increased with the 
military and rebel movements becoming increasingly hostile to its implementation. The difficulties were 
overcome in 1995 with the negotiation of a new implementation plan. The President of Mali’s ability to 
gradually win control over significantly powerful sections of the military who had been reluctant to 
implement the settlement in the pre-1995 implementation process was seen as critical to the success of the 
second implementation plan (Lode, 1997: 85).
In the second implementation plan, all moves were carefully broken down and breakdown was accompanied 
by parallels sequencing of every issue, from a political process of step-by-step decentralisation, to the 
process of withdrawing the most offensive elements of the Malian military from the North (as a step towards 
demilitarisation of the North), to the reconsideration given to new methods of demobilisation of insurgent 
troops. Once there was agreement through these new mechanisms on a strategy for demobilisation, a parallel 
socio-economic process, which was developed by grass-roots initiatives with the support of the UNDP and a 
number of foreign NGOs, was implemented to reintegrate combatants into society (Lode, 1997: 85). In a very 
important step towards decentralisation, civil society structures, which were strong in Northern Mali, were 
formally converted into a level of local government in 1995. This meant that by the time the phased 
demobilisation had been completed in 1996 a degree of decentralisation was well in place and a process 
whereby the most damaging socio-economic consequences of demobilisation was institutionalised in the 
Commission for demobilisation.
Low level international mediation by the UN, UNDP and NGOs had, according to most accounts of the 
process, played a hugely constructive role in both the socio-economic and civil society movement that 
eventually led to the re-negotiated implementation process (Lode, 1997: 123). The implementation process 
was insulated to the extent that these actors played a large role in designing and overseeing the post-1995 
implementation process, in settling disputes, in the running of the demobilisation commission and the socio­
economic reconstruction of the North (see Lode, 1997 and Poulton, 1996).
B. 14 MOZAMBIQUE
The agreement was signed in 1992 by the Mozambique government and RENAMO. The institutions 
responsible for directing the implementation of the agreement were insulated; implementation was overseen 
by a Monitoring Commission (CSC), which was chaired by the UN, and composed of an equal number of 
government and RENAMO members. Representatives from Italy, France, Portugal, the UK, the US, the
were given control to oversee and run the implementation process.
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Organisation of African Unity and Germany were also observers on the commission. The CSC assumed 
responsibility for interpreting the Accords, for settling disputes, for guiding and coordinating the activities of 
the sub-commissions and appointed the main subsidiary commissions (Ceasefire, Formation of the Armed 
Forces and Reintegration Commissions). Facilitating phased implementation, ONUMOZ’s mandate included 
a political, military, electoral and humanitarian component and its mandate was based strongly on an inter­
relationship between the four (UN, 1996: 323)
Critical to avoiding a form of issue hierarchy common to many implementation processes, the elections, 
which were to be planned by ONUMOZ, would only go ahead when the security situation was judged to be 
under control; no rigid deadline was included which would have elevated the importance of the issue above 
all others. In this way, procedures to enable the holding of elections were incrementally put into place in 
parallel with the implementation of other issues.
Issue breakdown and parallel sequencing were to eventually characterise all issues in the implementation 
process and their introduction was necessary to break the deadlock that initially prevailed. This was facilitated 
by the absence of clear issue hierarchy from implementation design. In fact, issue breakdown and parallel 
sequencing characterised every implementation issue following the negotiation of ‘package deals’ in 
September and October 1993. Concerning political issues, RENAMO and the government through the UN-led 
electoral commission agreed preparations for the elections. Through the package deals, the issue of political 
power was broken down by the negotiation of a type of power sharing which allowed RENAMO to maintain 
control of administration in the areas under its control. At the same time the agreement on policing was 
negotiated into the package: the UN would monitor all police activities in the country, monitor the rights and 
liberties of people and provide support to the joint police commission. These agreements preceded the 
October 1993 breakthrough, which included an agreement on the assembly and demobilisation of RENAMO 
and government troops, the simultaneous disarmament of paramilitary forces, irregular and militia troops, and 
the embellishment of local police commissions and sub-commissions to monitor police behaviour.
Cantonment was broken down and phased with socio-economic reintegration programmes and with the 
formation of the new armed forces. There were no unilateral demands and all forces, including paramilitary 
and militia forces, were part of the demobilisation process. This was accompanied by an agreement on the 
composition of the National Elections Commission and the system and timetable for finalising the electoral 
law. Finally, while the political system did not include a measure of political power sharing, the elections took 
place after both formations had co-operated in the step-by-step implementation of the military, policing, 
political, socio-economic and other issues in the process: without this co-operation the elections would not 
take place (according to the agreement).
B.15 NAMIBIA
The December 1988 Peace Agreement provided for a democratic and independent Namibia incorporating 
both SWAPO -  the independence movement which had fought for over twenty-five years -  and the former 
South African-controlled administration which organised politically to take part in the new political system 
(Tumhalle Alliance). The institutions overseeing the implementation process were insulated. UNTAG, which 
was a militarily-robust United Nations Mission, and a Joint Commission incorporating members of both 
conflict formations, a strong mediator, and former sponsors of the civil war, were to oversee the 
implementation of the Agreement. According to the agreement, the Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary General had to be personally satisfied with every step of the implementation process before it could 
move forward (Hampson, 1996: 72). This gave him an effective veto over the entire implementation process.
It gave him the power and autonomy to design a workable implementation process in consensus with the 
sponsor states and the mediators in the Joint Commission.
The Agreement committed both parties to implement a number of political, military and security issues, 
which would together bring about a transition from a South-African controlled, one party political system to 
an independent, democratic, multi-party system. The transition period would end with elections to newly 
agreed institutions.
Issue hierarchy was not endorsed in any of its forms by the agreement. However, the Accord’s provisions 
were vague and presented many opportunities to spoiler factions from both parties to undermine the 
implementation process with persistent stalling. Concerning security issues, SWAPO was to withdraw its 
forces to camps outside of Namibia and the SADF (South African Defence Forces) to withdraw to barracks. 
But while the agreement clearly required SWAFF, a South-African controlled indigenous armed force, to 
simultaneously disband, the future of Koevoet, the infamous, elite counter-insurgency unit, was unclear from 
its terms. This lack of clarity meant that Koevoet was almost completely incorporated into SWAPOL, the 
South African police force. The parties had agreed that SWAPOL would continue as the police force during 
the transition period, but with the whole scale incorporation of the elite counter-insurgency force (Koevoet), 
this was clearly unacceptable to SWAPO. This sequence effectively made a unilateral demand of SWAPO
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and, as a consequence, stalling ensued until the issue of the Koevoet force was resolved in October 1989. This 
resolution was only possible in the context of a parallel implementation of the political issues.
In fact, while mediators and pro factions endeavoured to bring about this resolution on military and policing 
issues, attempts were made to breakdown the political issues which were also stalled. The difficulty was that 
both parties perceived the upcoming elections as a continuation of war through politics. These perceptions 
provided opportunities for the spoiler factions, in particular the spoiler faction within the government party1, 
to create further insecurities amongst sceptical factions. This fed into the existing insecurity over military and 
policing issues and led to antagonistic behaviour by SWAPOL and Koeveat (Hampson, 1996: 75). An 
agreement to breakdown political issues into smaller steps (which would eventually be implemented in 
sequence with military issues) was critical to the ultimate success of the implementation process. The 
agreement took the following form: the newly-elected constituent assembly was, according to the agreement, 
to draft the new constitution. This clause could, in theory, have undermined the implementation of a 
democratic system as it was anticipated that SWAPO would dominate this constituent assembly. This led to 
stalling by the government party until the mediators facilitated an agreement between the parties on a number 
of democratic principles which would be central to the political system outlined in the constitution. This 
included an agreement that the constitution would have to win the approval of a 2/3 majority in the 
constituent Assembly. This broke down the political issue from a zero sum contest to one in which parties 
were forced to co-operate on the drafting of the constitution. It thereby facilitated co-operation between the 
pro factions.
In sum, the insecurities that the move to accept the new political system created for the pro faction in the 
Tumhalle Alliance were lessoned by two factors: the above-mentioned agreement on the constitution and 
agreement to use a PR electoral system. But these breakthroughs only happened alongside a resolution of the 
military and policing issues as follows: for SWAPO, the disbanding of Koeveat, the SWAFT and other 
militias, along with the confinement of SADF to barracks, and the neutral monitoring of the police force, 
ensured that the elections could take place without the threat of violence. These moves facilitated its pro 
faction’s efforts to ensure that all of SWAPO’s troops remained encamped during the election process (though 
there were some violent incidents).
Finally, the introduction of issue breakdown and parallel sequencing had been facilitated by the approach to 
dispute-resolution taken by UNTAG officials: when large disputes, both local and national emerged, they 
brought representatives of all parties, the church and ethnic and community leaders together in formal 
reconciliation meetings, They also set agendas at bimonthly meetings at the national and regional level 
(Hampson, 1996: 85).
B5. 16 NICARAGUA
Nicaragua is an unusual case in that the process was not strictly speaking a peace process but a series of 
agreements for an agreed transition and an end to violence. The civil war was fought primarily between the 
communist Sandinista government (FSLN) and the US and right-wing supported contra insurgency which 
attempted to over-throw it. An initial agreement was negotiated in 1989 between the Sandinista (FSLN) 
government and the contras with the endorsement of the Central American presidents (Tela Agreement). In 
this the contras promised to demobilise in return for early, free and fair elections. When the FSLN lost the 
elections to a centre-right coalition (UMT) led by Chimera, (which included many supporters of the contras), 
it demanded the full demobilisation and disarmament of the contras, as agreed in the Teal Agreement, before 
it handed over power. It also demanded their demobilisation before it introduced reforms to increase civilian 
control over the Armed Forces over which the FSLN still commanded control. A number of tripartite 
agreements followed which aimed to reform the army, to demobilise the contras and allowed the FSLN to 
occupy the position of Army Commander. Many obstacles, including the failure of the Chimera government 
to fulfil its socio-economic promises and a large spoiler faction amongst the contras, which re-mobilised in 
1992, thwarted the long-term success of these initiatives. A further settlement was not reached until 1994 and 
this agreement is the focus of this analysis.
The agreements on demobilisation and reintegration of the contras were unsuccessful until they were 
implemented alongside the phased implementation of socio-economic programmes that were negotiated 
between the Chamarro government and the contras. Likewise, the complete hand over of power by the FSLN, 
and the implementation of reforms to the army, were not possible without phased demobilisation of the 
contras, an informal power-sharing arrangement which allowed Ortega (brother of former president) to
1 SWAPO was a popular, umbrella independence movement which represented a large proportion of the 
indigenous population of Namibia: it was therefore anticipated that SWAPO would win the elections with a 
significant majority.
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remain as head of the Armed Forces and allowed the Sandinista elite to remain considerable power and 
economic wealth. The breakdown in the implementation of issues facilitated a type of informal Chamorro- 
FSLN coalition in that the president relied on the FSLN to support her implementation process. In fact, 
powerful elements of Chamorro’s centre-right coalition were against her reforms and political reforms were 
introduced slowly with the support of both ‘pro factions’ and in conjunction with demobilisation and 
reintegration programmes, and reform of the Armed Forces. Unilateral deadlines were not a feature of 
implementation design: contra demobilisation was presented as voluntary. No other form of Issue hierarchy 
featured in implementation design which was slow and bargained.
Institutions were insulated for the implementation of the security aspects of the 1991-2 process. However, for 
the 1994 process, while there was a UN presence, it was the informal power sharing that developed which 
appeared to facilitate pro faction unity. Insulation was not a feature of this process.
B5.17 NIGER
Data on the implementation process is incomplete and the peace agreement text was unavailable to the author.
B5.18 NORTHERN IRELAND
Chapter Six.
B5.19 PHILIPPINES
The agreement in the Philippines was signed in 1996 between the government and the MNLF insurgency 
which had been fighting for an independent Muslim state in the Southern Philippines for over twenty years.
An Joint Monitoring Committee with members from the government and the MNLF, and with the help of the 
OIC (Organisation of the Islamic Conference) was to meet continually to review the implementation process, 
to identify the aspects that could be immediately implemented, and to monitor implementation of the 
agreement during Phase I of its implementation. This institution was not, however, insulated and the OIC 
was not given a powerful role in the oversight of the implementation process.
The parties agreed to the demobilisation of the MNLF and the integration of most of its combatants into the 
police force and army of the Southern Philippines. They also agreed to the establishment of a consultative 
assembly involving members of both the Muslim and Christian communities, of a peace and security zone in 
part of Mindanao and a Southern Philippines Council fo r  Peace and Development which would through a 
variety of steps work to establish a peaceful and secure area, with investment and economic recovery.
The idea behind the agreement appears to have been that a semblance of peace and economic recovery in the 
existing Autonomous region (already implemented in 1989) was a necessary confidence-building step. This 
would be followed by the ultimate step which would see the powers of the Autonomous Region expanding 
both territorially and politically (subject to a plebiscite).
There is some evidence of reciprocal, step-by-step implementation on security issues: a phased demobilisation 
of MNLF fighters was to take place alongside a phased, socio-economic programme, and a programme 
(which included a system for dispute resolution) which integrated combatants into the police services and 
army of the Southern Philippines. This included some senior positions for the MNLF. However, while issue 
hierarchy is not a central part of the agreement, neither are clear guidelines for a parallel, broken 
down sequencing of all issues. The absence of an insulated mechanism to encourage this gave spoiler 
factions, especially those in the government and in the MILF (see below), ample opportunity to stall. 
While the military and policing provisions concerning the demobilisation and reintegration of the MNLF are 
quite clearly laid out in the agreement, the steps that the government would take to facilitate and finance the 
economic recovery in the Autonomous region, that was necessary if the next phase of the agreement was to be 
implemented, are very unclear. This gave opportunities to the sizeable spoiler faction in the government to 
stall on their implementation.
The spoiler faction within the government was provided with more pretexts for stalling by an external spoiler 
faction on the insurgency side. While the MILF, (which broke from the MNLF in 1976 and calls for full 
independence), has some stake in appearing to be reasonable and therefore continues to negotiate with the 
government, it does not have to appear to agree with the Peace Agreement in question and it presents a 
legitimate argument in favour of outright independence. While its actions stir up the security situation 
(throughout the endeavours to implement the agreement), it gave the government’s spoiler faction a further 
pretext on which to stall support for economic development, placing in danger the government’s economic 
commitments in the Peace Agreement. In fact, it appears that the fate of the peace agreement depends on 
whether or not the economic deliverance of the zone of peace can be actualised by the MNLF and the 
government. Yet the sequencing and timing of implementation, by failing to include a clear breakdown of 
issues and parallel sequencing, facilitates those who aim to thwart this process.
322
B5.20 SIERRA LEONE
The Abidjan Agreement was signed by the government of Sierra Leone and an alliance between the RUF (the 
civil war between the government and the RUF had been ongoing since 1990). The implementation process 
following the Abidjan Peace Agreement was almost immediately a stalled process. The provisions of the 
agreement provided for little issue breakdown, included no procedures for parallel sequencing and no 
mechanism likely to encourage it. Further, while unilateral timetables or demands were not an explicit feature 
of the implementation process, the lack of an explicit timetable on key political issues, and the inclusion of 
one on the issue of demobilisation, served to create issue hierarchy.
The issue hierarchy was created by a combination of the weakly-stated, but ultimately unilateral deadline for 
the RUF/SL to demobilise. This resulted from the agreement’s failure to sequence the RUF’s demobilisation 
to that of the government’s Kamajor militias and to a more stringent monitoring the SL army. It also resulted 
from the further failure to sequence steps to implement the political and human rights provisions along with 
the military provisions. This sequence and timing would have made it almost impossible for strong pro 
faction to prevail in the RUF. Further, the government committed to restructure and re-orientate the SL armed 
forces and to open up the opportunity to former RUF combatants to join it (article 9). But this was to be 
discussed by a commission, which was to be established by the government. There were no guidelines to 
ensure that this commission was established so that its work would take place in sequence with the RUF’s 
demobilisation.
There were further weaknesses in design. The political provisions committed the government to a number of 
steps but the commitment to begin a process of consultation with other parties with a view to appointing a 
new and independent Electoral Commission was the only one subject to a deadline (within 3 months of the 
agreement). Other commitments made by the government were not phased with the demobilisation process. 
They included provisions to set up an independent National Commission on Human Rights with the power to 
investigate violations in cooperation with local civil society groups; to strengthen the police force by vetting 
the current force and investigating a Police Council nominated by civilian sectors of society; promises on 
socio-economic policy including the establishment of a Socio-Economic forum on which the RUC would sit.
In terms of providing insulated institutions to guide implementation, the agreement is also weak. A national 
body -  the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace - was to be established within two weeks. It was to be 
the verification mechanism responsible for supervising and monitoring implementation of, and compliance 
with, all provisions. It was to be made up of representatives from the RUF and the government and was to 
appoint all other commissions that would oversee the implementation of the Accords. While it was to be 
assisted by a neutral grouping from the international community (article 1 1 ), which was to be responsible for 
monitoring alleged breaches of the agreement, the Neutral Monitoring Group had no powers to drive 
implementation or to set the agenda (i.e. to encourage parties to negotiate on sequencing and timing). 
Therefore, implementation was entirely in the hands of the CCP.
As the implementation process unfolded, stalling characterised every single issue, the only progress being the 
appointment of the CCP and the two formation’s request for UN observers. The degree to which a parallel 
socio-economic programme to assist with the demobilisation of the RUF was needed can be seen by the 
manner in which a disorientated RUF, primarily in search of food, prevailed on towns and civilians. This led 
to violence between the Kamajors (which were still legal) and the RUF (which was supposed to demobilise). 
As the process continued, intra-formation clashes between the kamajor militias and the armed forces of SL 
escalated into violent conflict over resources. It was these clashes, and the stalling implementation process, 
that eventually led to a coup in May 1997 and the end of the peace process.
B5.21 SIERRA LEONE B
While parts of the Lome Agreement have subsequently been successfully implemented, this analysis covers 
only the implementation process during the period from July 1999 until its collapse into violence in May 
2000. The Lome Agreement suffered from many of the same drawbacks as those central to the Abidjan 
process. The Agreement, like Abidjan, provided for the legalisation of the RUF and for the setting up of a 
trust fund to facilitate its transition. It also provided for a type of power sharing which would see the RUF 
with 4 out of 18 cabinet posts, a number of diplomatic and state positions and the chair of an implementation 
commission that concerned resources and development. Sankoh (RUF leader) was also offered the position of 
Vice President. While the Lome Agreement provided was a far superior basis for a settlement to the Abidjan 
Accord, there were a number of series difficulties with the implementation process which was vague and 
which facilitated issue hierarchy.
Like in the Abidjan process, the encampment, disarmament and demobilisation terms were very specific, were 
focused on the RUF and its AFRC and SLA allies (who had split from the government in 1997). Due to the
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lack of parallel sequencing with political issues, military were eventually prioritised above all else.
The timetable stipulated that from day 1 to 31 the obstacles (legal) to the RUF-AFRC’s establishment as a 
political movement were to be removed. However, the timetable it does not mention the setting up of the trust 
fund. During the same period the institutions for implementation were to be set up 1 and the entire process of 
encampment, disarmament and demobilisation, which was to be overseen by UNOMSIL, was to begin and to 
end 90 days into the process. Simultaneously, soldiers from the Army were to be restricted to barracks and 
their arms and ammunition to be under constant surveillance by the neutral peace-keeping force. While the 
latter provision did introduce a measure of reciprocity to the demobilisation process, the moves expected of 
the Army were considerably less than those expected of the RUF which suggested a unilateral deadline. 
Furthermore, the failure to implement political provisions in any meaningful way (see below) meant that 
meeting effectively prioritised the implementation of military issues above all else. This created two possible 
issue hierarchies which would stall the implementation process.
The implementation of political provisions was to take place early in the process: the two parties were to meet 
within 3 weeks to agree on the personnel for the RUF appointments. But while the cabinet appointments were 
made, vague terms and the failure to sequence the further appointments with other parts of the implementation 
process, facilitated spoiler factions in both camps in their quest to undermine further implementation. For 
example, on several occasions between July 1999 and May 2000 Sankoh complained that the government had 
failed to honour its commitment to offer the RUF the political, diplomatic and para-state jobs provided for in 
the settlement. The government pointed to financial constraints as justifying its failure to do so but it 
subsequently set up diplomatic missions for its own members in 2000. This opened up opportunities for the 
RUF’s spoiler factions to refuse further implementation. Furthermore, the government conceded cabinet 
ministries which were considered to be less senior that those suggested in the agreement. This opened up 
further opportunities for the RUF spoiler factions to refuse to co-operate. In addition to this, the power sharing 
in the agreement was not institutionalised and was watered down during the implementation process. For 
example, Sankoh was to chair the Commission for Strategic Mineral Resources, National Reconstruction and 
Development. But this was a new institution, and, while supposedly autonomous and only answerable to the 
president, its powers were confused with the already-established Ministry of the Mines. The work of Sankoh’s 
Commission was not co-ordinated with existing institutions, and, for Sankoh it was easier to continue funding 
the RUF through extra-legal mining activities (especially given the failure to establish a trust fund). If the 
RUF’s spoiler faction needed a pretext for continuing this extra-legal activity it only needed to point to the 
government’s Ministry of the Mines which obstructed the work of the new commission.
In further evidence of issue hierarchy, the Human Rights Commission was not to be set up until after the 
demobilisation process on day 90 of implementation. The Commission, if given power to carry out its 
mandate, would arguably have provided support to the process of deterring action by the many groups that 
were still armed with incentives to seek revenge.
While the principle of insulation is central to the implementation mechanisms envisaged in the Lome Accord 
(with the UN the key institution for oversight), the problems created by dual mandate and by the gradual 
process of changing the ECOMOG mandate, arguably reduced the positive effect that this insulation should 
have added. While issue breakdown did appear to be a feature of the process. The weakly-insulated 
institutions, along with the failure to sequence political and military issues and the unilateral steps called for 
in the military provisions, provided much opportunity for spoiler factions to control the implementation 
process.
B5.22 SRI LANKA
Issue hierarchy featured strongly in the Sri Lanka-India Accord. The Sri Lankan government’s agreement to 
release Tamil prisoners was dependent on the Tamil insurgencies implementing the demobilisation and 
disarmament programme (Hancock, 1999: 95). Formal devolution was also dependent on their 
demobilisation. Demobilisation was itself to take place over a number of days and there were no provisions 
for the parallel reintegration of insurgents into civilian life (or into another, neutral force) (Hancock, 1999:
97). The provisions, in effect, stipulated that the insurgents meet a unilateral deadline after which the rest of 
the Accord would be implemented.
Although an Indian peace-keeping force was to be present to provide security in Tamil areas during the post­
demobilisation implementation process, no details were provided on how this process would work. Issue 
breakdown was starkly absent. While the demobilisation process was taking place the government was to
1 A request for parties to change ECOMOG’s mandate to peace-keeping was also to be formally made and a 
phased withdrawal of ECOMOG in its current form to begin (by introducing soldiers from two new 
countries).
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announce the setting up of an interim administration in the North and East provinces (a combined council) 
until elections could be held in the newly-devolved local councils (Hancock, 1997: 92). But no details 
concerning the Singhalese population in the North and East provinces were included, no issue b reak d o w n  
outlined how the implementation of a consultative institution, of a limited form of power sharing which would 
encourage other groups to support the process, were included. Instead, legislation was to be passed that would 
provide for a referendum in the East province concerning its inclusion in the autonomous area. This amounted 
to a form of ‘issue h o ldover’ and was the cause of much violence during the implementation period, with the 
LTTE insurgency attacking local Singhalese settlers with a view to moving them before the referendum was 
to take place.
Therefore, issue breakdown and parallel sequencing were absent from design and issue hierarchy was present 
and created by a unilateral demand on insurgents to disarm and demobilise and by prioritising this issue above 
all others. A form of issue holdover was also central to the settlement. Institutions that oversaw 
implementation did not include representatives of the insurgents. In fact, implementation appeared to depend 
on the ability of the Indian Peace-keeping Force to coerce the insurgents into implementing the settlement and 
on the Sri Lankan government’s ability to fulfil its promises. The government was itself subject to immense 
pressure from Sinhalese chauvinists who led a rejuvenated JVP and which waged a bloody guerrilla campaign 
in the south of the country (Hancock, 1999: 99-100).
B5.23 SOUTH AFRICA
The ruling National Party of South Africa entered negotiations with the ANC to safeguard its economic 
privileges and to avoid destruction and revolution; the ANC entered negotiations for power, but for limited 
power, with economic power still concentrated (CIIR, 1996: 2). The negotiation process was not unlike the 
Salvadorian and Guatemalan negotiation processes in that it was made up of a series of agreements over a 
number of years which cantered on the 1991 National Peace Accord. The process of implementing some of 
these agreements, such as agreements on human rights issues and on some political issues, began (but was not 
complete) before a final agreement was reached.
The National Peace Accord between the ANC, the National Party and the IFP (an ethnically-based rival 
independence movement) provided a code of conduct for political parties and the security forces, measures 
for the development of communities, the setting up of local and regional peace committees to mediate in areas 
of conflict, a National Peace Commission to monitor implementation and a standing Committee of Inquiry 
into political violence (Goldstone Commission) which was widespread between and within communities 
(Guelke, 1999:97). It also paved the way for the multi-party talks through CODESA, which was established in 
December 1991, and through which negotiations on substantive issues were to take place. A nothing is agreed 
until everything is agreed formula was adopted during these negotiations (UN, 1994) but this was alongside 
the incremental implementation of political and human rights agreements that began the dismantling of 
apartheid, including one that lifted the ban on the liberation movements. The Goldstone Commission on 
political violence was an important mechanism and during the implementation process it exposed a co­
operative relationship between the spoiler factions in the National Party and the IFP who were co-operating to 
ensure that their respective sceptical factions withdrew support from the process (United Nations, 1994: 103). 
This tactical spoiler faction alliance had effectively ended by 1993, and the ANC/National Party alliance was 
strengthened with the Record of Understanding signed in September 1992. The alliance between pro factions 
was to be the driving force behind the rest of the implementation process.
Issue breakdown was accompanied by a clear phased implementation o f commitments, both before and after 
the National Peace Accord (1991) and before and after the multi-party elections that were held in 1994. 
Agreements on military, policing and paramilitary issues were reciprocal and were phased with other issues. 
Agreements on political issues concerned an incremental, legislative breakdown of the apartheid system and 
this was implemented in parallel with human rights issues which included legislative changes and the 
establishment of a Human Rights Monitoring Commission in 1991. Negotiations on further political issues - 
for new power-sharing institutions (including a two person vice presidency) and for a new constitution - also 
took place through CODESA alongside the implementation of all political and military issues. The power 
sharing that was agreed was a transitional arrangement and it led to the establishment of a government of 
national unity until 1999. The constitution was negotiated and approved by this government and it required 
70% approval in the new national assembly, this allowing pro factions in both parties to have enough 
influence over the constitution’s drafting to keep spoiler factions at bay. According to one analysis, the 
ANC’s tactical concessions made it very difficult for the government to continue to stall over the key issue of 
the interim government (CIIR, 1996: 19).
While the South African army and the ANC’s troops had been on a reciprocal cease-fire and reciprocal 
cantonment prior to the elections in 1994, the reciprocal demobilisation of all forces was implemented 
alongside the government of national unity’s inauguration and its negotiation of the constitution. All forces 
were initially incorporated into the National Defence Forces and a phased process of demobilisation
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subsequently took place (Malan, 1996:2). While there has been some criticism of the failure to implement 
adequate socio-economic support for the demobilisation process a phased and broken-down implementation 
of all issues characterised the implementation process and there was little endorsement for any form of issue 
hierarchy.
Finally, the creation of complex institutions which were to oversee the implementation process, such as the 
Goldstone Commission, the National Peace Commission and the local and regional peace commissions lent a 
measure of insulation to the process, despite the absence of a third party country or organisation on the 
ground.
B5. 24 TAJIKISTAN
An insulated institution did not oversee the implementation process in Tajikistan. The Commission for 
National Reconciliation (CNR) was charged with implementing the Agreement which was signed between the 
government of Tajikistan and UTO representatives in 1997. The CNR was the central implementation 
mechanism and was mandated to create an atmosphere of trust and mutual forgiveness and to institute 
dialogue amongst various political forces and to promote national reconciliation. It included an equal number 
of government and UTO representatives and was to be chaired by a UTO representative with a government 
representative as deputy. The Commission was organised into four sub-commissions that would concentrate 
on the following issues: return of refugees, political change, disarmament and economic regeneration. The 
agreement has been criticised, however, for failing to identify clear directions and guidelines for the CNR in 
its work on constitutional reform and for the consequential structural bias in favour of a centralised political 
system which dominated the implementation of constitutional reform. It has also been criticised as ‘ill 
defined’ and ‘lacking procedural safeguards to ensure its independent functioning’ (Accord Series 10, Zoir 
and Newton: 3). UNMOT was to guarantee the implementation of the General Agreement, to monitor 
implementation, provide expert advice, consultations and good offices. However, its did not control the 
implementation process; it did not control the agenda of the CNR which was effectively a bi-lateral, political 
institution.
UNMOT, a small UN peace-keeping force, provided some insulation to the implementation of security issues. 
A joint commission made up of members of the government and UTO was to oversee the implementation of 
the ceasefire and the return of refugee issues and CIS peace-keeping forces were to assist with the ceasefire 
and the implementation of the military protocol.
From a reading of the agreement and of early accounts of its implementation (Accord Series, 10), the 
implementation process appeared to have been characterised by parallel sequencing and some issue 
breakdown. Reciprocal and broken-down steps characterised military and security issues which were to be 
implemented alongside other issues. Further, the terms of the agreement and its implementation do not appear 
to have created the basis for issue hierarchy. This does not mean that spoiler factions have not attempted to 
create issue hierarchy demands and the lack of an effective implementation mechanism, and the above- 
mentioned difficulties over constitutional issues, has facilitated them in this task.
B5. 25 WESTERN SAHARA
The peace settlement in the Western Sahara was agreed in 1991 by the Moroccan government and the 
Polisario, an internationally-recognised insurgency movement which had been fighting for decades for 
independence from Morocco. However, a form of issue h ie ra rch y  was at the heart of this agreement: the 
parties agreed that a referendum on the question of sovereignty would be held in Western Sahara. This would 
follow a transitional period during which each party would implement a number of commitments. However, 
the incentives to comply with any other aspects of the implementation process has been reduced by the issue 
hierarchy created by the zero-sum referendum, and intra formation rivalry, especially within the Moroccan 
government, has resulted in stalemate. The sequence and timing of the agreement, and its vague provisions on 
when and how the referendum should be run in relation to other commitments, has allowed spoiler faction to 
control each conflict formation. In particular, the Moroccan government uses logistical, historical and ethnic 
pretexts (which were not dealt with in the agreement) to justify permanent stalling.
Implementation began in September 1991 when ceasefires were implemented by both the Moroccan forces 
and the Polisario. A transitional phase that was to follow the ceasefires and to precede the referendum was to 
be driven by the UN peace-keeping force - MINURSO. It would begin registering Saharans for the 
referendum while the UN High Commissioner for Refugees was to simultaneously run a programme to 
repatriate eligible voters. However, disagreements over who was eligible to vote, which for many were proof 
of the Moroccan government’s intention to stall until it stacked-up the prospects of winning the referendum 
(Gurr, Minorities at Risk Dataset, Western Sahara), meant that stalling prevailed. Following much diplomatic 
work by MINURSO to break the deadlock, a start to the voter-identification process began. In 1994 and 1995 
some agreement was reached about who was eligible to vote. But further disagreements led to the suspension 
of this process for 18 months (until 1996). A series of face-to-face meetings between the Polisario,
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representatives of the government, the UN Special Representative and his Assistant, culminated in a new 
agreement in 1997. The Houston Agreement, which was hailed as a breakthrough, included agreements to 
reduce troop levels (Moroccan), to release prisoners of war, to allow the voluntary repatriation of Saharans 
eligible to vote. It also included a compromise which was to lead to the resumption of the voter-identification 
process. However, while this did facilitate the end of the voter-identification process, the issue of three 
disputed tribes was left unresolved. A package agreement, which was proposed by the Secretary General in 
1998, was accepted by the Polisario and accepted, in principle, by the government, but stalling has ensued.
In sum, stalling has ensued because the winner-takes-all solution, which is envisaged at the end of the 
transition phase, makes it difficult to create incentives for parties to fulfil any commitments on other issues. In 
other words, this issue hierarchy prevents the pro faction, in either the Polisario or the Moroccan government, 
from moving the process forwards. The commitments to deploy Polisario and Moroccan forces away from 
residential areas, the virtual withdrawal of Moroccan forces from the area, the exchange of prisoners of war, 
the release of political prisoners and an agreement to implement a code of conduct to enable the running of 
the referendum, all remain stalled.
Continual stalling by the Moroccan government prompted the Polisario’s Foreign Minister to say: there is a 
fear that the entire process, and the Moroccan government’s professed co-operation with it, is part of a plan to 
trap the Saharans by using the process to distort or deadlock the referendum process so as to destroy the 
Frente Polisario (BBC WWM, 24.11.97). This is most likely the goal of the spoiler faction which appears to 
control the government’s strategy. But the design of the agreement, which includes no mechanisms to 
breakdown the enormity of the zero-sum referendum, means that spoiler factions will continue to dominate 
both factions. With the current agreement, issue break down and parallel sequencing cannot be effectively 
introduced to expose the Moroccan government’s intransigence, and internal divisions which are emerging in 
the Polisario are likely to become more damaging (Gurr, Minorities at Risk). Its refusal to contemplate some 
breakdown of the political issue, such as extensive autonomy for Western Sahara suggested in May 1997, is 
justified by the text of the 1991 and 1997 agreements. Therefore, while the partial breakdown of some 
conflicting issues and the principle of reciprocity in security issues had helped to mitigate against serious 
outbreaks of violence, the agreement is unlikely to be implemented without a serious re-negotiation of the 
political issues and the procedures through which they are to be implemented.
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APPENDIX C 
PEACE ACCORD OUTLINES
ANGOLA
Bicesse Accords, Peace Accords for Angola, May 15 1991.
I Cease-fire Agreement
II Fundamental Principles for the Establishment of Peace in Angola 
EI Concepts for resolving the issues still pending
TV Protocol of Estoril
Lusaka Protocol, 15th November 1994
Annex 1 Agenda o f the Peace Talks between the Government of Angola and UNITA 
Annex 2 Reaffirmation of the acceptance by the government and UNITA of the 
relevant legal instruments 
Annex 3 Military Issues I 
Annex 4 Military Issues II 
Annex 5 The Police 
Annex 6 National Reconciliation 
Annex 7 Completion of the Electoral Process
Annex 8 The UN Mandate, Role of the Observers o f the Peace Accords and the 
Joint Commission 
Annex 9 Other Pending Issues 
Annex 10 Other Matters
NORTHERN IRELAND
Good Friday Agreement, 10th April 1998.
Annex: Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Government o f Ireland.
GFA, Ch 1, Declaration of Support 
GFA, Ch 2, Constitutional Issues 
GFA, Ch 3, Strand One 
GFA, Ch 4, Strand Two 
GFA, Ch 5, Strand Three
GFA, Ch 6, Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity
GFA, Ch 7, Decommissioning
GFA, Ch 8, Security
GFA, Ch 9, Police and Justice
GFA, Ch 10, Prisoners
GFA, Ch 11, Validation, Implementation and Review.
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EL SALVADOR
AGREEMENTS OF THE CHAPULTEPEC ACCORDS
1990
Geneva Protocol: Agreed on Goals of the Negotiations
Caracas Agenda: UN Secretary General mapped out detailed timetable / Agenda for 
issues to be discussed
San Jose Agreement: Agreement to respect Human Rights. First substantive agreement 
in the process
Parties and UN, at a meeting in Mexico City, agreed to make adjustments in mechanics 
of the negotiations, which included more direct involvement of UNSG Special Rep, de 
Soto and more confidentiality.
Pact signed unifying on paper the parties’ commitment to a settlement.
1991
SG informed SC that he had accepted the recommendations of a preliminary mission 
that the ‘human rights component of ONUSAL be established immediately and in 
advance of a cease-fire.’
Mexico City Agreement: Agreement to speed up agreement on constitutional issues to 
overcome a potential crisis created by constitutional law: The content of a number of 
constitutional reforms necessary to transform the political system was agreed and it was 
agreed that they would be presented as a ‘package’ to the Legislative Assembly before 
its term expired in April 1991'. Proposed constitutional amendments were to underpin:
(1) Security reforms: Included the constitutional subordination of the armed forces to civilian 
government; provision to create a National Civil Police Force, independent of the armed forces 
and a National Public Security Academy to train civilian police.
(2) Reform of the judicial system: A provision that would underpin new procedures for the selection 
of Supreme Court Judges and underpin the creation of a position of National Council for the 
Defence of Human Rights; Legal underpinning for the establishment of and mandate of a 
Commission on the Truth.
(3) Electoral system: An amendment to provide for the creation of a Supreme Electoral Tribunal
The composition and mandate of the Three-Member-Truth Commission was also agreed: Members 
were to be appointed by UN Special Rep in consultation with the parties and the TC was to 
investigate serious acts of violence since 1980. Its final report to the parties and the SG was to be 
include conclusions and recommendations and would be made public by SG who would take 
appropriate action. The parties undertook to implement the T. Commission’s recommendations.
May 1991: SC 693 established ONUSAL as an integrated peace-keeping operation to monitor all
agreements, initially carrying a mandate to verify compliance with San Jose2. Began 
operating in July 1991 and investigating human rights violations in October.
1 This was to overcome a potentially huge obstacle presented by the Salvadorian constitution which 
requires that a constitutional amendment, in order to be passed, requires the backing of two successive 
Legislative Assemblies, with 2/3 backing in the second (BH, 426; Juhn: e tc .).
2 This involved actively monitoring the human rights situation, investigating specific cases of alleged 
violations, promoting human rights in the country, making recommendations for the elimination of 
violations, reporting on these matters to the SG and through him to the UN Gen Assembly and SC. 
BH:427.
April:
May:
July:
Oct:
Dec:
April:
April:
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(1991)
September: New York Agreement.
(1) To establish COPAZ mandated to oversee the implementation of all political agreements;
(2) To ‘purify3’ the armed forces and to reduce their size;
(3) To redefine the doctrine of the armed forces re. its function;
(4) To begin immediately to organise the new National Civilian Police (PNC).
(5) To use lands in excel of 245 hectares (constitutional limit) to meet needs of small farmers. 
Respect current landowning situation until a definite one is reached.
December: Act of New York
Combined with the previous four agreements, this completed all negotiations on substantive issues of 
the peace process. It covered the details on the implementation of agreements on the reform of 
military-civil relations based on the principles of the NY Agreement, of the FMLN cease-fire and 
separation of forces. Before the agreements were formalised SG requested from SC a dramatic 
increase in strength of ONUSAL to enable it to supervise cease-fire, separation of forces and monitor 
the maintenance of public order while PNC was being set up. It set out the detail and parameters of 
the reform of police force, judiciary and electoral system. In January 1992 a general agreement 
including all agreements and the timetable agreement were formally endorsed.
Sources: Acuerdos de Chapultepec, www.cepaz.org: UN, 1995. UN and El Salvador, Chapter III. UN, 
Blue Helmets, 425-28.
3 Ad Hoc Commission: Examining the record of up to 3,000 military officers with a view to making 
recommendations to purge the high command of officers unsuitable for the military’s new role in El 
Salvador: Subordinate to the civilian government and upholders of new human rights standards.
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APPENDIX B: CREDIBLE COMMITMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION BODIES CHART
Civil War 3rd Party Involvement Main Body Responsible fo r 3rd Party Guarantee
(Negotiations) Implementation fo r  implementation
Strength o f
Commitment
Angola UNAVEM; UN SG;
(Bicesse) Portugal mediated, with
US and USSR participating 
Known as the Troika.
CCPM (Joint M ilitary & Political 
Committee): Composed o f members 
o f UNITA & the M PLA government. 
M em bership selected after signing o f PA.
Yes. UNAVEM  II staff & Troika staff involved W eak/M oderate1 
as observers o f  CCPM & CM VP activity.
Helped verify cease-fire and with negotiations.
UNAVEM  II ’s duration was
CMVP was responsible for cease-fire monitoring. M AY 1991 -  FEBRUARY 1995.
Angola 2
(Lusaka)
SG rep in Angola and troika and a A jo in t commission o f government & UNITA Yes, and stronger than during the 1992-4 period. M ODERATE
number o f  African countries including reps presided over by the UN, & troika.
Cote d ’Ivoire; Ethiopia; were involved observers. Size & mandate o f UN increased,
in negotiations.
Eg. SG visit to Angola; increase in military presence. 
Also UN to control UNITA quartering areas & weapons. 
D uration o f  UNAVEM  III: FEB 95 -  30 JUNE 97
Bosnia Yes: Strong third party involvement in Institutions o f the two entities created by
Negotiations -  US, UN, NATO, OSCE & Dayton with the international community. 
EU states. Dayton negotiated and signed International community responsible for
IFOR (& then SFO R)’s primary respon- STRO NG3 
sibility was to ensure that the parties met 
their military and extra-m ilitary obligations.
in the US. NATO air strikes played a 
role in the o f negotiations4.
developing strategies to deal with obstruction. Strong role for other international bodies too.
1 The military presence o f UNAVEM II was 350 military observers, 126 police monitors, some 80 international civilian staff and 155 local staff. (Up to 400 electoral 
observers).www. www. un. org/Depts/DPKO/'Missions/'.
2 UNAVEM  Il l’s two and a half year mission included 4,220 military personnel, comprising 283 military observers, 3,649 troops and 288 civilian police. M ONUA replaced 
UNAVEM III on 30 June 1997, and included a reduction in military presence: 240 personnel including 222 troops, 12 m ilita ry  o b se rv e rs , 6 c iv ilian  p o lice  m o n ito rs  and  
in te rn a tio n a l &  lo ca lly  recru ited  c iv ilian  staff. www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/
3 With Dayton, the international community was involved in implementation on all fronts. IFOR, a 60,000 strong multi-national force, followed in Dec. 96 by 
SFOR (31,000) was responsible for military provisions, with UNMIB (UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina) and IPTF (International Police Task Force) 
responsible for other aspects of implementation, and the OSCE and UNHCR also heavily involved. Cousens and Kumar, 2001:127. Jane’s Sentinel (Balkans), 
2001: 111.
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Civil War 3rd Party Involvement
(Negotiations)
Main Body Responsible for
Implementation
3rd Party Guarantee
for implementation
Strength o f
Commitment
C am bodia Contact group o f 5 included all
5 Security Council members.
UNTAC. PA saw parties agreeing to a UN Yes -  UNTAC in charge o f 
transitional administration in consultation with implementation.
A committee comprising all 4 parties. UNTAC DURATION: March 92-Sept 1993
responsible for governing & implementing terms 
o f  agreement.
ST R O N G
C hechnya No Russian and Chechen governments. There were NO 
moves in 1997 to set up an Inter-govem mental 
Comm ission to work on drafting more agreements 
to implement peace in 1997 but responsibility 
for im plem entation was largely the governments.
NON E
C hittangong  Hill Not in the negotiations. But improved 
T rac ts  relations between Bangladesh & India
facilitated negotiations, encouraging 
Shanti Bahini rebels to take part.
An implem entation Committee comprising No. The only 3rd party involvement is NGO or N ON E
a Prime M inister nominee, Chairman o f  task members o f the donor comm unity willing to
force formed under the purview  o f the PA & support the implem entation process.
President o f National committee o f Hill tribes.
No 3rd party supervision or verification. UNDP has 
had some involvement, but only facilitating6.
4 Cousens and Kumar, 2000: 124-5.
5 All accounts would consider the commitment to be strong, and to have had possibly the strongest international support of any peace keeping mission. Hampson, 
1996 and Wesley, 1999 both stress the strength of the mandate and presence. According to UN public information sources, there were 22,000 military & civilian 
personnel; IISS, 93/4 estimate 19,450 military and civilian police personnel. The preceding mission (UNAMIC) from November 1991 -  March 1992, 
immediately followed the signing of the peace agreement and comprised 1,504 military & civilian personnel.
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Civil War 3rd Party Involvement
(Negotiations)
Main Body Responsible for
Implementation
3rd Party Guarantee
for implementation
Strength o f
Commitment
D jibouti France was periodically involved Government and FRUD
In negotiations -  helping to negotiate
Cease-fire in 92 and prom ised a peace-
Keeping force. Assisted the govt mili-
arily when conflict continued.
There is a perm anent French 3,200 strong N ONE
military presence in Djibouti. It is not 
a peace keeping force but has acted before to . 
contain fighting. France, EU and African D evel­
opm ent Bank provided funding for demobilisation 
& social reintegration o f some soldiers7.
El S alvador Yes -  United Nations SG rep in 
El Salvador = interlocutor in 
Negotiations.
COPAZ (body representing FMLN & Govt) but Yes, by virtue o f the duration 
overseen by ONUSAL. ONUSAL verified cease- o f  its presence, its role in overseeing
M O D E R A T E 8
fire & demobilized forces. M andate expanded to 
verifying & monitoring. UNOSAL effectively 
drove the implementation process.
& m onitoring implem entation o f key 
provisions. Remained in place 
until April 95 & was succeeded by 
M INU SAL,a small mission to m onitor 
outstanding issues.
G uatem ala Human Rights Verification M ission MINUGUA verified & assisted with institution M ilitary observer mission: UN Verification
MINUGUA established in Sept 1994 building o f many agreem ents9. Dec 1996 m ission in Guatemala . Responsible for M O D E R A T E 10
6 See the text of the agreement signed by the National Committee on Chittagong Hill Tracts (Govt) & The Parbattya Chattagram Janasanghati Samity. See also 
Daily Star (Bangladesh), 24.06.98.
7 European Platform for Conflict Management and Transformation, Djbouti, 2000: 4.
8 ONUSAL had 380 military observers; 8 medical officers; and 631 police observers. Provision for 140 civilian international staff & 180 local staff. Notably, it began in July 1991 
-  prior to the final PA, indicating a considerable commitment. WMW.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/
9 MINUGA were present in Guatemala since 1994 with over 250 monitors facilitating the implementation o f agreements leading up to the 1996 General 
Agreement. w w m >. un. org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/
10 In addition to MINUGA’s 250 observers, the peace-keeping force established (within MINUGA) by the 1996 agreement numbered 188 uniformed personnel, 
145 military observers and 43 civilian police. The maximum military strength was 155 military personnel. www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/M issions/.
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(confidence building & commitment), agreement established as part o f M INUGUA verifying formal cease-fire and implementing
a military observer mission. separation & demobilisation. Jan-July 97.
Israel/Palestine US heavily involved & Russia 
Also witnessing Oslo Accord. 
Norway the key mediator in Oslo 
Process. Also other ME states at 
Madrid Process.
Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison 
Committee to deal with issues 
in agreement requiring co-ordination/ 
issues of common interest/ disputes.
Yes. Eg. International 
monitoring of elections 
Palestinian authority); Numerous 
Statements from US & UNSC supporting
W eak
Arbitration Commission established also11. & process & guaranteeing their role as
Neutral parties/mediators in the process.
L iberia
L ebanon
ECOMOG monitoring group -  ECOW AS & Liberian Transitional
ECOWAS has been involved since Government with UN playing a .
1990; militarily and in a mediating role, a supportive role.
UN role since the signing o f the first 
comprehensive agreement -  Sept. 1993.
Yes, negotiations were instigated by 
3rd parties and depended on 
3rd party co-operation.
Lebanese government o f unity 
& de facto Syrian co-operation.
ECOW AS -  Its strong role in implementation ST R O N G  
& provision o f security guarantees was increased 
to enable it to guarantee the disarmament 
components o f Abuja II12. In terms o f mandate 
numerical strength plus UN backup, a considerably 
strong guarantee for implementation.
Tripartite Arab Commission, but it legitimized ST R O N G  
Syria’s presence in Lebanon. Syria guarantees the 
Implementation with 40,000 troops present and it has 
stalled on withdrawal.
11 Established by Articles X and XV of the Oslo Agreement, 1993, respectively. Sees the implementation process in the hands of joint commissions, and 
negotiation within the commissions as the main method of conflict management.
12 ECOMOG’s strength was increased from 3,500 to 7,000 in September 1990. Adibe, 1997: 476 and it acted as a regional peace enforcement force for a series of 
failed agreements between 1991 and 1996. Its strength was increased to 12,000 to enable it to fulfill its mandate to implement the provisions of Abuja II. See 
Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, 1999: 339. UNOMIL was to monitor and verify compliance with Abuja ceasefire and embargo on arms, cantonment and dis-armament of combatants in 
conjunction with ECOMOG was intended as a neutralizing presence. Its maximum strength was 303 military officers, with a medical unit of 20 and 25 civilian stag.
www. un. org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/
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M ali Algerian mediators involved in Tranistional Government & newly created UNDP and NCA playing a significant third W E A K
early (1991) negotiations for the Natl. Commissariat for the N orth shared responsibility party role. UN appointed a resident coordinator 
Pact (92). Meetings to break deadlock with a Steering Committee coordinated by and UN support for dem obilization was 
in 1994 also held in Algeria. QIC NCA and the U N D P13. considerable14.
M ozam bique Yes. Agreement was negotiated CSC (Supervisory & M onitoring Committee) ONUM OZ set up by SC to m onitor & verify c-fire S T R O N G 15
with the help o f a number o f to guarantee implementation. Comprised govt. and demobilisation; provide security; Also
mediators and observers including & RENAM O reps set up with guidance o f Humanitarian mandate for demobilisation;
UN representatives. Interim  UN Sec Gen rep. UN chaired CSC. DURATION:92 - 94
N am ibia UN, Western Contact Group and UNSR (Special Representative), UNTAG, Joint
The US were involved in negotiations Commission for Im plementation and Yes. UNTAC was responsible for monitoring S tro n g 16
Over at least a decade. The A dministrator General (Governor). S. African Defense Force w ithdrawing and
Those rem aining in Namibia; Monitoring restriction 
o f SWAPO forces to bases; D isarming and de 
M obilising forces; M onitoring police force during 
Transition; organizing and monitoring elections;
13 Following the 1994/5 re-negotiation and new agreement on the implementation process, the Commissioner du Nord retained responsibility for implementation 
but choose to negotiate with and give responsibility for part of the process to UNDP and NCA (Norwegian Church Aid).
14 The UN support for demobilization has been described as crucial at a time when no donor organizations or governments were ready to provide it. The UN paid 
almost half of the cost of cantonment (US $ 2 million) through the creation of a trust fund. European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation: Mali: 
3-4.
15 ONUMOZ’s mandate involved a military, humanitarian and political (electoral) role in the implementation of the agreement. UN personnel were there as 
monitors and verifiers and coordinators o f the overall implementation process (chair o f CSC), along with its relatively strong military presence ensured that a 
strong credible commitment to implementation was given. (ONUMOZ constituted 6,625 troops and military support personnel, 354 military observers; 1,144 
civilian police. It also involved some 355 international electoral staff and 506 local, with 900 electoral observers deployed also during polling. UNOMOZ had an 
authorized strength of between 7 and 8,000 military and civilian personnel. www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/
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Driving and coordinating implementation .
N icaragua Arias Peace plan (Esquipulas II) Sapo Agreement (M arch 88) implementation - ONUCA involved from Tela Agreement M O D E R A T E 17
Paved the way for peace negotiations, impetus provided by Central American states (89). Onwards -  To m onitor cease-fire & separation
Driven by Central American heads o f Tela Agreement (89) -  more comprehensive. 
State. ONUCA established to monitor
com pliance with Tela (Nov 89).
o f  forces agreed to by N icaraguan parties. 
DURATION: Dec 89- January 92.
Niger France and Algeria - official mediators. Special Peace Committee: to oversee
In ’92. French withdrew from negot­
iations for a time in 1993. The 1995 
Accord was reached with Algeria, 
Burkino Faso and France as mediators.
implementation. Composed o f  members 
o f the three mediating countries, the govt, 
and Toureg groups18.
M ilitary observers from France, Burkina Faso W E A K  
and Algeria to supervise the collection and 
storage o f the weapons. OIC issued resolutions 
in support o f the process19.
Northern
Ire land
US Executive and individuals facilitated The British and Irish Governments along
negotiations eg. By holding separately 
Exploratory meetings during the years 
Preceding and following the agreement.
with the NI parties to the agreement through 
the governing institutions set up in the PA. 
A num ber o f independent commissions 
Responsible for setting agendas on security 
and justice system reform issues.
To the extent that the British and Irish Govts. W E A K
are still perceived as part o f the conflict, they 
do not offer a ‘security guarantee’. Very strong 
US diplomatic and economic commitment & 
independent commissions offer commitments 
o f  a sort. EU financial comm itment also significant.
16 UNTAC comprised military, civilian police and electoral units. Authorized upper limit was 7 ,5 0 0  personnel. Actual size was 4 ,6 5 0  personnel. Hampson: 70.
17 Moderate as the opposition (UNO -  government by 1990) was aware that if  the FSLN refused to deliver on commitments, the US would continue to support (as it did during 
1989) the contras, thus enabling them to continue the military campaign. The UN was an acceptable guarantor or verifier, but one could argue that a guarantee from the US for the 
non-Sandinista parties, existed. For Sandinistas, compliance w ith agreements m eant that the contras should no longer be perceived as legitimate or supported militarily. In terms o f 
size, ONUCA included 260 military observers, and an infantry battalion o f approx. 800; crews and support personnel for air wing and naval unit and international and locally 
recruited civilian staff. See W alter, 1997: 350 .
18 Camel Express, 22  April 1995.
19 Organisation of Islamic Conference, (OIC), June 2 8 th -  1st July 1999. Report of the Secretary General to the 2 6 th Session of the OIC Conference of Foreign 
Ministers: The Support to Niger’s Efforts to Consolidate its National Unity. Official Web Site of OIC.
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Philippinnes Organisation for the Islamic 
Conference, Indonesia 
and Lybia played important 
roles in the negotiations.
Joint monitoring committee with Philippine Govt A role for OIC was provided for: To lend W E A K
& M NLF reps, with OIC help, m onitor 
implementation. Actual responsibility for 
implementation -  Govt and M NLF (as part 
o f  governing body o f the Zone o f Peace & 
Security.
support during the transition period, 
by overseeing implementation and supporting the 
Zone o f Peace & Security. In July 2000 an OIC 
M onitoring team was asked to report on im plem entation.20
S ie rra  Leone Yes. Numerous African states
1996 involved in negotiations: Most
significantly Ivory Coast, OAU & . 
UN representatives.
Comm ission for Consolidation o f Peace 
Created by the PA & monitored 
by a neutral group from the international 
community. Sub Commission to 
monitor security clauses.
Before signing, US announced commitment to W E A K  
fund OAU to m onitor disarmament and the UK 
announced funding to resettle RUF fighters.
ECOM OG was present -  and 
perceived as guarantor by govt. RUF leader 
Refused to allow UN peacekeepers & monitors; but 
the offer o f a guarantee was there22.
21
S ierre  Leone Yes. Numerous states incl. Tongo
1999 (Lom e) Lybia, OAU, UN rep (Okelo),
ECOWAS, UK &
Commonwealth representatives.
Joint Implementation Commission, chaired 
by ECOWAS in charge o f reviewing
Both sides requested strong role for UNOM SIL STR O N G  23 
granted in October 1999 & ECOM OG phased out. 
implementation. Commission for Consolidation Strong mandate to m onitor compliance with cease-fire, 
in charge o f monitoring all implem entation to assist govt, w ith disarmament, demobilisaton
20 Information from Keesings Record of W orld Events, the M inority Project, Accord publications. Also Philippine Daily Inquirer, 1.07.2000.
21 Despite there being a considerable ECOMOG presence in 1996 ECOMOG was not given a mandate to implement the peace agreement. In fact the agreement 
actually called for the withdrawal of all regional forces within 3 months (although full withdrawal did not take place). Accord: The First Stages on the Road to 
Peace’: 8-10. While ECOMOG continued to play a significant (if partisan) role in keeping order in the country, it was only in October 1997 that ECOWAS 
authorized ECOMOG to ensure the implementation of the peace agreement as well to ensure the re-installing of the President who had been ousted by the 
Junta/RUF’s May 1997 coup. Additional ECOMOG troops were moved in to fulfill this task. JIR, 04.2000: 40. UN Secretary General had recommended that the 
Security Council agree to send a peace keeping force to monitor implementation, but this recommendation was not acted on, partly the result o f RUF objections.
22.See Gberie Lansana, 1999/2000 in the Accord Series (Liberia); www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/M issions/
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& reintegration;. Also support for elections24.
South A frica Involved ANC and South African 
Govt. With strong diplomatic 
& economic pressure from the 
International community,
National Peace Accord established 
a number o f representative bodies to monitor 
implementation: Natl. Peace Committee 
National Peace Secretariat; Dispute Resolution 
C o m m ittees  (n a tio n w id e); P o lic e  B o ard 26 .
CODESA coordinated further negotiations.
W eak guarantees in the form o f diplomatic 
support from the UNSC, the US, Europe and 
Russia/USSR. No security presence.
NONE2
Sri L anka
Tajikistan
Negotiations involved India and the . Sri Lankan Govt.in co-operation with 
Sri Lankan governments. an Indian Peace keeping force.
UNMOT (estbd Dec 94), CNR -  Commission for National Recon-
The Indian Peace-keeping force was to M O D /STRO N G
M aintain a cease-fire between Sri Lankan 
Forces and all Tamil insurgent groups28.
UNMOT, OSCE and the Contact Group have STRONG 29
23 While RUF leader Sankoh has since been involved in fighting with the UN force & disputed its mandate & right to be there, thus repudiating its guarantee, he 
initially accepted it as neutral & the offer of a strong guarantee on implementation did exist.
24 UNAMSIL replace UNOMSIL’s military observer mission, put in place in June 1998 following the Feb reinstatement of the civilian government; It has a 
significant authorized military presence of 13,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers & 60 civilian police; it is at 12,477 on 31 August 2000.
25 While the role of the international community was highly significant in pressurizing the South African government and the white South African community to 
compromise (see Guelke, 1999: 135-158) no credible commitment similar to that outlined by Walter was present during the implementation process.
26 Gastrow Peter, 1995: 43-7.
27 The Convention for a Democratic South Africa involved the govemment/ANC/ IFP and 16 other political groupings. It was set up to drive the implementation 
of the National Peace Accord of 1991, which outlined very broad principles for a settlement. Guelke, 1999: 99. A Record of Understanding between the 
government and the ANC was signed in September 1992 and another body -  the Transitional Executive Authority -  was set up in September 1993
28IPKF (Indian Peace-Keeping Force), originally 3,000 strong in August 1987, had ballooned to over 100,000 by 1990 (withdrawal). Hancock L.E., 1999: 98. 
That the IPKF peace keeping force became a party to the conflict and was involved in an intense war with LTTE between 1987 and 1990is important, but it does 
not take away from the initial offer of a credible commitment. On its arrival IPKF was welcomed as ‘a liberator’ by most Tamil people (Hancock, 97) and 
initially perceived to be a force capable o f providing guarantees.
29 The UNMOT peace-keeping force had an authorized number of 120 military observers with varying numbers o f civilian and local staff and a civilian staff for 
the Secretary General’s permanent representative for Tajikistan. The security guarantee would be considered weak but for the presence of a 25,000 strong CIS 
(largely Russian) peace-keeping force (by 1999 all but Russian troops had left this force) which helped to implement the peace agreement. Transitions On Line, 
1998: Tajikisatan.
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Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan and 
Krygstan formed contact group 
to drive negotiations.
ciliation: Membership split evenly between role in implementation. UNMOT peace-
govemment and UTO. With support from 
international community.
keeping force helped to monitor and implement 
security clauses, along with a large CIS peace­
keeping force.
Morocco/ UN Sponsored Peace Plan.
W est Sahara Significant Algerian co-operation
A necessary component o f  process.
UN Special Rep with help o f  M INURSO has Transitional phases whereby UN exercises MOD.
sole & exclusive responsibility for im plem enting the power to implement referendum remains on hold
key provisions & all matters relating to the 
Referendum M INURSO also verifies ceasefire 
and continued cessation o f hostilities.
because o f non-co-operation by parties (esp. 
the M oroccan govt.) in preparation for this process.
Role has been that o f to m onitoring cease-fire and 
attempting to generate a voting register satisfactory to all parties
30 Because o f its duration and its extensive mandate to implement this peace plan, this commitment could be coded as strong. In terms o f resources and military presence, and the 
appointm ent o f James Baker to the position o f  SG ’s special rep in the mid 1990s certainly indicates com m itm ent and resolve. In terms o f  presence, M INURSO was authorized to 
have up to 2,800 military and civilian personnel (Independent, 8.08.91). The mission has, as o f  31 July 2000, 204 military observers, 27 troops, 34 civilian police, supported by 275 
international civilian personnel and 112 local staff. In terms o f authorized size o f im plem entation force the commitment is moderate-strong.
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